EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P. O. Box 19848
Washington, D.C. 20036

Leroy J. Pletten, )

Appellant, )

v. ) EEOC Docket No. Unknown

)

Kenneth W. Starr, Solicitor General; ) AFBVF09902J0630

Michael P. W. Stone, and Louis Caldera, )

Secretary of the Army, ) 14 May 1999

Agency/Respondents. )

_______________________________________)

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF APPEAL

14 May 1999 Leroy J. Pletten

Appellant

8401 18 Mile Road #29

Sterling Heights MI 48313-3042

(810) 739-8343

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................................................................................... i

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................................................................... iv

STATEMENT OF FACTS ................................................................................................................................. 1

ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................................................... 6

1. STARR HAS A PATTERN OF MISCONDUCT: EXTORTION, COVER-UP, AND PRO-LYING ............ 6

2. THE UNDERLYING SITUATION AIDED AND ABETTED BY STARR AND

TO WHICH HE IS ACCESSORY, INVOLVES MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE .............................. 7

A. THE UNDERLYING SITUATION INVOLVES "UNIVERSAL MALICE" .......................................... 7

B. STARR AND THE AGENCY HAVE FULL PERCEPTION OF THE HAZARD ................................ 11

C. THE AGENCY AND STARR ARE VIOLATING

LEGAL PRINCIPLES AGAINST POISONING PEOPLE ................................................................... 12

D. EVEN TREATING THE MATTER AS MERELY A JOB SAFETY SITUATION,

STARR AND ACCESSORIES ARE VIOLATING THE SAFETY DUTY .......................................... 16

E. STARR AND THE AGENCY ARE VIOLATING

THE TWIN DUTIES OF PREVENTION AND AID .......................................................................... 17

F. STARR AND THE AGENCY ARE VIOLATING

THE "TAKING VICTIMS AS THEY COME" DOCTRINE ............................................................... 18

G. TOBACCO-CAUSED DEATHS ARE NOT UNEXPECTED ............................................................ 19

H. COMPLIANCE WITH THE LEGAL DUTIES IS NOT AN "OBJECTIVE IMPOSSIBILITY" ........ 20

I. WRONG IS NOT APPORTIONED ...................................................................................................... 21

J. THE SEEKING OF SHELTER, AND DENIAL THEREOF, FURTHER SHOWS GUILT .................. 21

3. THE AGENCY FEARS REVIEW AS IT WILL SHOW I AM QUALIFIED .............................................. 23

4. EEOC HAS ALREADY VERIFIED THE AGENCY PATTERN OF REFUSING ME REVIEW .............. 26

5. AFTER RETROACTIVELY BASING THE DECISION TO TERMINATE ME ON INABILITY

TO BAN SMOKING, THE AGENCY BANNED IT, SHOWING THAT ITS INABILITY

CLAIM WAS FRAUDULENT, MISREPRESENTATION, AND CONCEALMENT

OF ACTUAL ABILITY--HENCE I NEED NOTIFICATION OF HOW TO OBTAIN

REVIEW OF THAT SUBSEQUENTLY DISCOVERED DATA .............................................................. 28

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6. THE AGENCY COMMITTED ADDITIONAL MISREPRESENTATION, CONCEALMENT, AND

FRAUD, BY COMMITTING FRAUD ON THE COURT (JUDGE COOKE) VIA BRIBERY/

CORRUPTION OF/WITH MY THEN ATTORNEY TO ABANDON MY ASE, HENCE, IT WAS

NEVER PRESENTED, I.E., NO FULL AND FAIR OPPORTUNITY OF PRESENTATION IN COURT. . 29

7. THE AGENCY ALSO COMMITTED MISREPRESENTATION, CONCEALMENT,

AND FRAUD, VIA BRIBING SIXTH CIRCUIT JUDGES TO CLAIM I

APPLIED TO RETIRE MYSELF(1), AND COMPOUNDED IT BY OBSTRUCTING

THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION I SOUGHT AND WHICH HAD BEGUN......................................... 16

8. THE AGENCY ALSO COMMITTED MISREPRESENTATION, CONCEALMENT, AND

FRAUD, VIA RACKETEER KENNETH STARR, SOLICITOR GENERAL, HAVING HIM

COMMIT FRAUD, CONCEALMENT, AND MISREPRESENTATION AT THE SUPREME

COURT--RESUSCITATING THE OLD BRIBED MSPB LIE THAT EEOC HAD ALREADY

CAUGHT--ALL TO PREVENT THE SUPREME COURT DOING WHAT IT NORMALLY

DOES--REMAND WHEN THERE IS REVERSIBLE ERROR OF THE EXTREME HEREIN ............. 19

9. THE AGENCY RETURNS OTHERS TO DUTY WHO MEET THE "WITHIN ONE YEAR"

REQUIREMENT OF 5 USC 8151(b)(1), THUS CONSTITUTING DISPARATE TREATMENT .......... 22

10. THE AGENCY KEEPS OTHERS ON THE ROLLS PENDING DECISION BY

THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR FOR

COMPENSATION; NOT DOING SO FOR ME IS DISPARATE TREATMENT ...................................... 23

10. FOR OTHERS, THE AGENCY GOES BY JOB QUALIFICATIONS.

11. REMEMBER THE ORIGINAL ISSUE--NOW SO DISTORTED BY AGENCY LYING, FRAUD,

MISREPRESENTATION, BRIBERY, OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE AS TO BE LOST SIGHT OF ..... 25

13. IT IS AGENCY POLICY TO HIRE SEX HARASSERS ............................................................................ 28

14. IT IS A PUBLISHED FACT THAT IT IS DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND PENTAGON

POLICY TO PROMOTE DRUG ABUSE AND UNDERMINE THE WAR ON DRUGS ......................... 30

15. THE PRO-TOBACCO SIDE HAS A PATTERN OF LAWBREAKING SINCE THE SLAVERY ERA .... 31

16. SLAVERS, TOBACCO FARMERS, AND THEIR LEGISLATORS, ENJOYED TORTURE. AND

DEMONSTRATING THEIR DEPRAVITY, THEY EXTENDED SLAVERY TO WHITE WOMEN .. 38

17. NOTICE HOW THE VILE COURT DECISIONS OF NOW, USE THE SAME VILE

TECHNIQUE AS DID THE VILE PERVERT JUDGES OF THE OLD--PERVERT--SOUTH ........ 40

18. THE AGENCY'S ONLY HOPE IS BY TRICKING EEOC ....................................................................... 38

19. THE AGENCY DECISION SHOULD BE REVERSED AS IT WAS ISSUED PURSUANT

TO THE AGENCY THREAT TO DEFY AN EEOC ORDER IN MY FAVOR ................................. 41

20. THE AGENCY FAILS TO IMPLEMENT THE AGENCY'S OWN PROCESSING ORDER.................. 43

21. THE AGENCY OBSTRUCTED MY GETTING COMPLIANCE WITH THE RULES AGAINST

FRAUD ON THE COURT--RULES PROVIDING FOR REOPENING IN EVENT OF SUCH ........ 43

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22. THE AGENCY DISREGARDS THE FACT THAT THE CONDITION

PRECEDENT (NOTICE) FOR DISMISSAL DOES NOT EXIST ...................................................... 44

23. THE AGENCY IS DISREGARDING SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE LEGAL ATMOSPHERE ........ 42

A. MASS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL LITIGATION .................................................................... 47

B. A PRESIDENTIAL EXECUTIVE ORDER (13508) AGAINST SMOKING .............................. 47

C. THE ARMY'S MAJOR SEX HARASSMENT SCANDAL SHOWING NO EEO HELP ........... 48

D. NEW (1996) EVIDENCE OF AGENCY FRAUD/CONCEALMENT/MISREPRESENTATION 50

E. NEW (1996) EVIDENCE (CONFESSION) AGENCY BRIBERY OF FEDERAL JUDGE ......... 50

F. THE MICHIGAN GOVERNOR FOUND A CIGARETTE SMUGGLING EMERGENCY ......... 51

G. THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION

HAS TAKEN ANTI-CIGARETTE ACTION ................................................................................ 52

24. EEOC SHOULD TAKE AN ANTI-KKK, ANTI-CRIME STAND AND RULE IN MY FAVOR ............. 53

25. STARR'S CONDUCT HAS CROSSED THE LINE INTO CRIME .......................................................... 55

26. STARR'S CONDUCT VIOLATES THE CODE OF ETHICS

(EO 12674) AND RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT ................................................................... 57

27. THERE WERE MANY OTHER INCIDENTS CITED IN THE

RECORD ON AGENCY MISCONDUCT, ALSO NOT YET REVIEWED ................................. 59

CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 79

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Albemarle Paper Co v Moody, 422 US 405; 95 S Ct 2362; 45 L Ed 2d 280 (1975) ........................................... 10

Am Fed of Labor, Etc. v Marshall, 617 F2d 636 (1979) aff'd 452 US 490 (1981) ............................................. 10

American Textile Mfrs Inst v Donovan, 452 US 490; 101 S Ct 2478; 69 L Ed 2d 185 (1981) ............................ 10

Anderson v Dept of Transp, FAA, 46 MSPR 341 (1990) .................................................................................. 15

Austin v State, 101 Tenn 563; 48 SW 305; 70 Am St Rep 703 (1898) aff'd 179 US 343 (1900) .. 11, 20, 30, 38, 57

Bertram v TACOM, Case A9-190131 (1977) .................................................................................................... 23

Barylski v Paul, 38 Mich App 614; 196 NW2d 868 (1972) .............................................................................. 19

Biafore v Baker, 119 Mich App 667; 326 NW2d 598 (1982) ........................................................................... 32

Bolling v Dept of Navy, 43 MSPR 668 (1990) .................................................................................................. 21

Bowen v Illinois C R Co, 136 F 306 (CA 8, 1905) ........................................................................................... 13

Bradley v Stevens, 329 Mich 556; 46 NW2d 382 (1951) .................................................................................. 13

Brown v Gaston Co Dye Mach Co, 457 F2d 1377 (1972) ..................................................................................11

Brown v Postal Service, 47 MSPR 50 (1991) ................................................................................................... 21

Bullock v Pizza Hut, Inc, 429 F Supp 424 (MD La, 1977) ................................................................................. 10

Carreno v Dept of Army, 22 MSPB 515 (1984) ................................................................................................ 14-15

Case Lists

Negligent Hiring ........................................................................................................................................... 13

No Notice = Invalidity/Jurisdictional ......................................................................................................... 5, 24 Slavery Illegal ........................................................................................................................................... 32-34

Torture ............................................................................................................................................... 15, 20, 38-40

Use Validated Qualifications Criteria ........................................................................................................... 8-11

Celotex Corp v Catrett, 477 US 317; 106 S Ct 2548; 91 L Ed 2d 265 (1986) .................................................. 44

Clark Oil & Refining Co v Golden, 114 Ill App 3d 300; 70 Ill Dec 80; 448 NE2d 958 (1983) ........................... 11

Cleveland Board of Educ v Loudermill, 470 US 532; 105 S Ct 1487; 84 L Ed 2d 494 (1985) ................ 5, 44-45

Coleman v Darden, 595 F2d 533 (1979) ............................................................................................................ 9

Commonwealth v Aves, 35 Mass (18 Pickering) 193 (1836) ........................................................................ 33-34

Commonwealth v Holloway, 2 Serg & Rawle 305 (1816) ................................................................................. 34

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Commonwealth v Souther, 48 Va 673 (1851) ........................................................................................ 20, 39-40

Commonwealth v Turner, 26 Va 678 (1827) ......................................................................................... 20, 39-40

Cosby Transfer & Storage Co v Dept of Army, 480 F2d 498 (CA 4, 1973) ........................................................ 24

Davidson v Chinese Republic Restaurant Co, 201 Mich 389; 167 NW 967 (1928) .......................................... 13

Deak v Pace, 88 US App DC 50; 185 F2d 997 (1950) ....................................................................................... 5

Diaz v Pan American Airways, Inc, 442 F2d 385 cert den 404 US 950 (1971) ................................................. 10

Diefenthal v CAB, 681 F2d 1039 (1982) ............................................................................................................ 9

Doughty v Board, 731 F Supp 423 (D Col, 1989) ............................................................................................ 28

Duckworth v Apostalis, 208 F2d 936 (D C Tenn, 1913) ................................................................................... 13

EEOC v Bailey Co, Inc, 563 F2d 439 (CA 6, 1977) ........................................................................................ 55

Fortunoff F J & S, Inc v N Y St Div of H R, 227 App Div 2d 557; 642 NYS2d 710 (1996) .............................. 13

Hazel-Atlas Glass Co v Hartford-Empire Co,

322 US 238; 64 S Ct 997; 88 L Ed 1250 (1944) .............................................. 14, 16, 23, 25, 43, 46, 50-52, 54

Hersh v Kentfield Builders, 385 Mich 410; 189 NW2d 286 (1971) .................................................................. 13

Hill v Nettleton, 455 F Supp 514 (1978) ............................................................................................................. 9

The T. J. Hooper, 60 F2d 737 (CA 2, 1932) ..................................................................................................... 32

Houston v Nimmo, 670 F2d 1375 (CA 9, 1982) ............................................................................................... 17

Hotch v U.S., 212 F2d 280 (CA 9, 1954) .......................................................................................................... 24

Jacobs v Mental Health Dept, 88 Mich App 503; 276 NW2d 627 (1979) .............................................. 9, 35, 44

James v Lechmere (Mass Sup Ct, 1770) ........................................................................................................... 32

Kelley, Attorney General v Phillip Morris, et al., Michigan Circuit Court Case 96-84281-CZ .......................... 47

Keyser Canning Co v Klots Throwing Co, 94 W Va 346; 118 SE 521 (1923) .................................................... 9

Kinler v G.S.A., 43 MSPR (1990) ..................................................................................................................... 23

Knotts v U.S., 128 Ct Cl 489; 121 F Supp 630 (1954) ........................................................................................10

Kurtz v City of Miami, 653 So 2d 1025 (Fla, 1995) .......................................................................................... 13

Laborde v Postal Service, EEOC Request 05.91.0521 (25 July 1991) .............................................................. 14

Littleton v Tuttle, 4 Mass 128 (1796) ................................................................................................................ 33

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Maloney Tank Mfg Co v Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp, 49 F2d 146 (CA 10, 1931) ...................................... 9

Margules v Block, 38 FEP (BNA) 1244 (D Or, 1981) ...................................................................................... 17

Matter of Cartwright, 11 Elizabeth; 2 Rushworth's Cell 468 (1569) ........................................................... 32, 40

McDonald v Santa Fe Trail Transp Co, 427 US 273; 96 S Ct 2574; 49 L Ed 2d 493 (1976) ............................. 11

McDonnell Douglas Corp v Green, 411 US 792; 93 S Ct 1817; 36 L Ed 2d 668 (1973) .................................... 9

McKinney v Anderson, 924 F2d 1500 (CA 9, 1991) .................................................................................. 28-29

Mercer v DHHS, 772 F2d 856 (CA Fed, 1985) ................................................................................................. 5

Money v Anderson, 93 US App DC 130; 208 F2d 34 (1953) ............................................................................ 5

Moore v Devine, 780 F2d 1559 (CA 11, 1986) ................................................................................................ 17

Morton v Ruiz, 415 US 199; 94 S Ct 1055; 39 L Ed 2d 270 (1974) .................................................................. 24

Mulligan v Andrews, 93 US App DC 375; 211 F2d 28 (1954) ........................................................................... 5

Natl Realty & Const Co Inc v O.S.H.R.C., 160 US App DC 133; 489 F2d 1257 (1973) .................................... 10

Neal v Farmer, 9 Ga 555 (1851)............................................................................................................. 20, 39-40

The Nurnberg Trial, 6 FRD 69 (1946) ..............................................................................................................15

Onweiler v U.S., 432 F Supp 1226 (D Idaho, 1977)........................................................................................... 24

People v Atcher, 65 Mich App 734; 238 NW2d 389 (1975) ............................................................................ 27

People v Carmichael, 5 Mich 10; 71 Am Dec 769 (1858) ...................................................................... 26, 55, 57

People v Kevorkian, 447 Mich 336; 527 NW2d 714 (1994) ............................................................................ 27

People v Stevenson, 416 Mich 383; 331 NW2d 143 (1982) ............................................................................. 27

Piccone v U.S., 186 Ct Cl 752; 407 F2d 866 (1969) .......................................................................................45, 47

Pittman v Dept of Army, 832 F2d 598 (CA Fed, 1987) ....................................................................................... 5

Pletten v Dept of Army, EEOC Docket 01.80.0273 et al. (23 Feb 1982) .......................... 5, 12, 25, 41-43, 46, 53

Pletten v Dept of Army, EEOC Docket 05.82.0275 (4 March 1983) ................................................................. 12

Pletten v Dept of Army, EEOC Docket 03.81.0087 (April 1983) ..................................................... 15, 19-21, 46

Pletten v Dept of Army, EEOC Docket 01.91.0498 (14 March 1991)................................................................ 12

Pletten v Dept of Army, EEOC Docket 01.92.3611 (4 Dec 1992) ................................................................. 12. 53

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Pletten v Dept of Army, EEOC Docket 01.93.4758 (8 April 1994) ................................................................... 12

Pletten v Dept of Army, EEOC Docket 01.93.4855 (8 April 1994) .................................................................. 12

Rum River Lumber Co v State, 282 NW2d 882 (Minn, 1979) ..................................................................... 35, 42

Ryder v U.S., 515 US 177; 115 S Ct 2031; 132 L Ed 2d 136 (1995) .......................................................... 13, 44

Samson v Saginaw, 393 Mich 393; 224 NW2d 843 (1975) .............................................................................. 13

Scharf v Dept of Air Force, 710 F2d 1572 (CA Fed, 1983) .............................................................................. 15

Service v Dulles, 354 US 363; 77 S Ct 1152; 1 L Ed 2d 1403 (1957) ............................................................ 45, 47

Shelton v EEOC, 357 F Supp 3 (D Wash 1973) aff'd 416 US 976 (1974) .................................................. 45, 54

Shimp v N J Bell Telephone Co, 145 NJ Super 516; 368 A2d 408 (1976) .......................................................... 9

Sabol v Snyder, 524 F2d 1009 (1975) ................................................................................................................. 9

Somerset v Stewart, Lofft 1; 20 Howell's State Trials 1 (King's Bench, 1772) ..................................... 32, 34, 40

Spann v McKenna (Dept of Army), 615 F2d 137 (CA 3, 1980) .................................................................. 19, 44

Stalkfleet v U.S. Postal Service, 6 MSPB 536 (1981) .......................................................................................... 9

State v Mann, 13 NC 263 (1829) ......................................................................................................................-40

Stevens v Inland Waters, Inc, 220 Mich App 212; 559 NW2d 61 (1996) ......................................................... 11

Sullivan v Dept of Navy, 720 F2d 1266 (CA Fed, 1983) ............................................................................... 5, 44

Teamsters v U.S., 431 US 324; 97 S Ct 1843; 52 L Ed 2d 396 (1977) ............................... 6, 22, 30, 32, 36, 40, 42

Texaco Inc v U.S., 217 Ct Cl 416; 579 F2d 614 (1978) .................................................................................... 45

Texas & Pac Ry v Behymer, 189 US 468; 23 S Ct 622; 47 L Ed 903 (1903) ....................................................32

Trafficante v Metropolitan Life Ins Co, 409 US 205; 93 S Ct 364; 34 L Ed 415 (1972) ................................... 55

United States v Bethlehem Steel Corp, 446 F2d 652 (CA 2, 1971) ..................................................................... 11

United States v Bettis, 39 F Supp 160 (D SD Cal, 1941) .................................................................................. 22

United States v City of Los Angeles, 595 F2d 1386 (CA 9, 1979) ..................................................................... 32

United States v Crisp, 435 F2d 354 (CA 7, 1970) ........................................................................................ 37, 57

United States v Crystal, 39 F Supp 220 (D ND Ohio, 1941) ............................................................................. 23

United States v Jacksonville Terminal Co, 451 F2d 418 (CA 5, 1971) ............................................................... 11

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United States v City of Chicago, 549 F2d 417 (CA 7, 1977) .......................................................................... 8, 10

United States v Fisher, 6 US (2 Cranch) 358; 2 L Ed 304 (1804) ..................................................................... 34

United States v Kibler, 667 F2d 452 (1982) ...................................................................................................... 27

United States v Wilford, 710 F2d 439 (1983) .................................................................................................... 27

United States v Utah Construction & Mining Co., 384 US 394; 86 S Ct 1545; 16 L Ed 2d 642 (1966) ........... 16

Wangerin v State, 73 Wis 2d 427; 243 NW2d 448 (1976) ............................................................................. 37, 57

Watson v Dept of Army, 142 Ct Cl 749; 162 F Supp 755 (1958) ................................................................... 45, 47

Welsh Mfg v Pinkerton's, Inc, 474 A2d 436 (1984) ......................................................................................... 13

White v DHHS, 30 FEP (BNA) 880 (D DC, 1981) ........................................................................................... 16

Williamson v U.S., 310 F2d 192 (CA 9, 1962) ............................................................................................ 29, 52

Wilson v Turnage, 791 F2d 157 (CA Fed, 1986) ........................................................................... 45-47, 49-50, 52

Winchendon v Hatfield, 4 Mass 123 (1808) ...................................................................................................... 33

FEDERAL LAWS

U.S. Constitution, Anti-Slavery Clauses ....................................................................................................... 33-34

5 USC 552.(a)(1) (publication of qualifications) ........................................................................................... 8, 24

5 USC 7513.(b) (notice requirement)............................................................. 5, 14, 19, 21, 23-24, 41, 44-46, 51

5 USC 7902.(d) (safety law) ......................................................................................................... 19, 25, 27, 47

5 USC 8101.(12) (compensation) ................................................................................................................... 22-23

5 USC 8151.(b)(1) (restoration to duty) ................................................................................................. 8, 19, 21-22

18 USC 545-6 (smuggling) ....................................................................................................................... 29, 52

18 USC 1001 (falsification) ................................................................................................................... 11, 19-20

18 USC 1961 (racketeering) ....................................................................................................................... 19-20

29 USC 651 et seq. (safety)...................................................................................................................... 10, 25

29 USC 706(7)(B) (hiring practices) ..................................................................................................... 11, 13, 30

Fugitive Slave Act .................................................................................................................................. 15, 38-39

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MICHIGAN LAWS

Michigan Compiled Law 330.1401, MSA 14.800(401) ..................................................................... 5, 10, 42

MCL 421.28(1)(c), MSA 17.530.28(1)(c) (unemployment criteria) ............................................................ 8

MCL 750.27, MSA 28.216 (cigarettes) ............................................... 11, 19-20, 25-26, 28, 46-48, 52-53, 55

MCL 750.174, MSA 28.371 (embezzlement) .............................................................................................. 27

MCL 750.213, MSA 28.410 (extortion) ...................................................................................................... 27

MCL 750.316, MSA 28.548 (first degree murder) .......................................................................................... 27

MCL 750.317, MSA 28.549 (second degree murder) ...................................................................................... 27

MCL 750.321, MSA 28.553 (manslaughter) ................................................................................................... 27

MC L 767.39, MSA 28.979 (accessory-principal distinction abolished) ............................................ 22, 50, 57

MCL 14.28, MSA 3.131, (anti-trust; AG Criteria); MCL 445.771 et seq., MSA 28.70(1) et seq. ......... 45

MCL 330.1400a et seq., MSA 14.800(400a) et seq. (persons needing treatment) ....................................... 47

MCL 445.901 et seq., MSA 19.418(1) et seq. (consumer protection) .......................................................... 47

Michigan Court Rule 8.122 (attorney duty) ........................................................................................................... 43

FEDERAL REGULATIONS

5 CFR 339 ........................................................................................................................................................ 8

5 CFR 339.104, 202, and 204 .......................................................................................................................... 7

5 CFR 752.404 ......................................................................................................................................... 45, 54

5 CFR 831.1206 .............................................................................................................................................. 23

21 CFR 897 .................................................................................................................................................... 53

29 CFR 800.125 .............................................................................................................................................. 10

29 CFR 1607 .................................................................................................................................................... 8

29 CFR 1607.5(b)(3) ......................................................................................-3, 19, 41, 44, 46, 57

29 CFR 1613.705 ............................................................................................................................................. 8

29 CFR 1614 ................................................................................................................................. 3, 23-24, 41-42

29 CFR 1910.1000 ................................................................................................. 10-11, 19, 25, 27, 46-47, 56

-ix-

40 CFR 85.2203-81........................................................................................................................................ 26

Executive Order 12674 (Code of Ethics) .......................................................................................................... 57

Executive Order 13508, 62 Federal Register 43451-2 (13 Aug 1997) ............................................................ 47

Federal Personnel Manual Supplement 296-33, Subchapter 35 ..................................................................... 5, 44

Federal Personnel Manual Chapter 335 ............................................................................................................... 7

Federal Personnel Manual Supplement 335-1 ..................................................................................................... 8

Federal Personnel Manual 752, Subchapter 2-6 ........................................................................................... 42, 51

Food and Drug Administration Anti-Cigarette Rules ................................................................................... 18, 50

AGENCY REGULATIONS

32 CFR 203 ................................................................................................................................. 9, 19, 27, 46-47

Army CPR 700, Chapter 771 ...................................................................................................................... 19, 44

Army Pamphlet 600-63-7 .............................................................................................................................. 9, 58

Army Pamphlet 611-2 ........................................................................................................................................ 8

Army Regulation 1-8 ................................................................................................................ 9, 19, 26, 35, 46-47

Army Regulation 385-10 ............................................................................................................................. 12, 44

TACOM Regulation 190-4 ................................................................................................................................ 19

TACOM Regulation 600-5.14.27-28 ................................................................................................................ 19

MISCELLANEOUS

Agency BRIBERY of Federal Judges To Say I Applied To Retire Myself ............................................ 3-4, 17, 58

American Psychiatric Assoc, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, eds 3-4 (1980, 1987) ... 13

29 Am Jur 267 .................................................................................................................................................. 13

15 Am Jur 2d Civil Rights 112 ......................................................................................................................... 8

61 Am Jur 2d Affirmative Defense 152 ......................................................................................................... 21

Annot, 40 ALR 1215 (1926) ............................................................................................................................. 13

Annot, 114 ALR 1041 (1938) ........................................................................................................................... 13

Annot, 34 ALR2d 372, 390 9 (1954) ............................................................................................................. 13

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Annot, 44 ALR 4th 603 (1984) ......................................................................................................................... 13

Army Order by LTC Wigner Refusing to Respond to Pletten ........................................................................ 5, 45

Beard, Charles A. and Mary R., The Rise of American Civilization, II (NY: The Macmillan Co, 1927) ............ 37

Black's Law Dictionary, 6th ed (St. Paul: West Pub Co, 1990) ........................................................... 6, 29, 52, 55

Bordewich, Fergus M., "City Lost in the Jungle," 152 Reader's Digest 112 (May 1998) ................................. 13

Cigarette Smuggling Emergency in Michigan, Governor's Order..................................................................... 51-52

CIA, DOJ, Pentagon, and Drug Smuggling to Blacks .................................................................................. 30, 37

Comment, "Legislation for Clean Air: An Indoor Front," 82 Yale Law J 1040-1054 (April 1973) ..........

Confederate, Slaver, Tobacco Farmer Mindset .................................................................................................. 48

Congressional Globe (predecessor of Congressional Record) ......................................................... 34, 38-39, 48

Constitution, Analyses of, At the Time of Ratification ...................................................................................... 34

Davis, William C., ed. The Civil War: Brother Against Brother:

The War Begins (Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1983) .......................................................................... 36

Dept of Health, Educ and Welfare, NIDA Research on Smoking Behavior (Dec 1977) ..................................... 29

Dept of Health, Educ and Welfare, Smoking and Health (1964) ................................................................... 10, 56

Dept of Health and Human Services, International Classification of Disease, 9th ed (1980) ............................ 13

Dept of Health and Human Services, Reducing the Health Consequences of Smoking (1989) ....................... 25, 56

Dept of Health and Human Services,

Preventing Tobacco Use Among Young People: A Report of the Surgeon General (1994) ........................... 29

Devine and Aplin, "Whistleblower Protection--

The Gap Between the Law and Reality," 31 Howard Law J 223 (1988) ...................................................... 53

Dyer, Frederick N, Smoking and Soldier Performance, Report No. 86-13,

U.S. Army Aeromedical Research Laboratory (Fort Rucker, AL) (June 1986) .............................................. 29

Eaton, Clement, The Freedom-of-Thought Struggle in the Old South

(Duke Univ Press, 1940, and New York: Harper & Row, 1964) .............................................................. 35, 39

Enslaving White Women ............................................................................................................................ 38-39

Comment, "Legislation for Clean Air: An Indoor Front," 82 Yale Law J 1040, 1045 (April 1973)....

Finkelman, Paul, "The Crime of Color," 67 Tulane Law Rev 2063 (1993) ....................................................... 48

-xi-

Fleming, R., Levanthal, H., Glynn, K., and Ershler, J. "The Role of Cigarettes In

The Initiation and Progression of Early Substance Use." 14 Addictive Behaviors 261 (1989) ........................ 29

Goldsmith, Barbara, Other Powers (NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998) .................................................................... 36

Goodell, William, Slavery and Anti-Slavery (William Harned, 1852) ......................................... 32-35, 37-38, 40

Griffiths, Martha Browne, Autobiography of a Female Slave (J. S. Redfield, 1857) ......................................... 48

Higginbotham, A. Leon, et al., "The Law Only As an Enemy," 70 North Carolina Law Rev 969 (1992) ......... 47

Hilts, Philip J., Smoke Screen:

The Truth Behind The Tobacco Industry Cover-up (Addison-Wesley Pub Co, 1996) .................................... 20

"How to Navigate the River of Legal Liability When Hiring," 63 Personnel Journal 32 (March 1986) ............ 13

Inspector General Review Is Sought ........................................................................................................... 2, 41, 46

KKK ..................................................................................................................................................... 20, 39, 53

Levine, Michael, The Big White Lie (Thunder's Mouth Press, 1993) ........................................................... 30-31

70 LRA 915 (1905) ........................................................................................................................................... 13

Pletten's Published Paper, 26 Smoke Signals 4 (Oct 1980) ............................................................................... 47

Porter, Glenn, ed., Encyclopedia of American Economic History, Vol II

(NY: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1980) ............................................................................................................ 35-36

Rat Poison in Tobacco .................................................................................................................... 1, 20, 35, 56=57

Recommendation by Supervisor For a Position ................................................................................................... 7

Qualifications Waiver ....................................................................................................................................7, 23

Seward, William H., Senator and Secretary of State .......................................................................................... 37

Sojourner Truth, Narrative of Sojourner Truth (1850) ...................................................................................... 48

Stampp, Kenneth M., The Era of Reconstruction (NY: Random House, 1965) ................................................. 37

Standard Form 78 ................................................................................................................. 5, 11, 13-14, 24, 30

Stowe, Harriet Beecher, Uncle Tom's Cabin (1852), and The Key to Uncle Tom's Cabin (1854) .................... 48

Sumner, Senator Charles, The Barbarism of Slavery, Cong Globe, 36 Cong, I Sess, 2590-2604 (4 June 1860) 48

USACARA Report ......................................................................... 2, 4, 13, 17, 19, 25, 27-28, 44, 46, 53-54, 58

Washburn, Emory, Sketches of the Judicial History of Massachusetts

from 1630 to the Revolution in 1775 (Boston: Charles C. Little & James Brown, 1840) ...............................32

-xii-

Whelan, Elizabeth M., Sc.D., "Cigarette Makers Get Away With Murder,"

The Detroit News, p 4B (14 March 1993) ................................................................................20, 22, 26-27, 52

Willson, Marcius, American History (New York: Ivison, Phinney, Blakeman & Co, 1846) ........................ 32, 35

xiii-

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P. O. Box 19848
Washington, D.C. 20036

Leroy J. Pletten, )

Appellant, )

v. ) EEOC Docket No. 01 99

)

Kenneth W. Starr, Solicitor General; ) AFBVF09902J0630

Michael P. W. Stone, and Louis Caldera, )

Secretary of the Army, ) 14 May 1999

Agency/Respondents. )

____________________________________)

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF APPEAL

STATEMENT OF FACTS

This case involves discrimination by Kenneth W. Starr and accomplices in the agency. The facts herein are undisputed. Drug-users with Confederate ideas were being hired by falsifying their hiring papers. These people were engaged in widespread smuggling, bringing on post, large numbers of containers of poisonous substances, toxic chemicals, with deleterious ingredients including but not limited to the following:

acetaldehyde (1.4+ mg) arsenic (500+ ng) benzo(a)pyrene (.1+ ng)

cadmium (1,300+ ng) crotonaldehyde (.2+ g) chromium (1,000+ ng)

ethylcarbamate 310+ ng) formaldehyde (1.6+ g) hydrazine (14+ ng)

lead (8+ g) nickel (2,000+ ng) radioactive polonium (.2+ Pci).

Then these druggies Confederate-types were setting the chemicals' containers on fire!! Fires were rampant on post. They even burned down one of the government buildings, the fires were so prevalent. In addition, the toxic chemical containers created toxic chemical emissions far above the federally-prescribed 29 CFR 1910.1000 limits. Examples include but not limited to:

Toxic Chemical Emission Level "Speed Limit"

acetaldehyde 3,200 ppm 200.0 ppm

acrolein 150 ppm 0.5 ppm

ammonia 300 ppm 150.0 ppm

carbon monoxide 42,000 ppm 100.0 ppm

formaldehyde 30 ppm 5.0 ppm

hydrogen cyanide 1,600 ppm 10.0 ppm

hydrogen sulfide 40 ppm 20.0 ppm

methyl chloride 1,200 ppm 100.0 ppm

nitrogen dioxide 250 ppm 5.0 ppm

Workers were being injured and killed as a result. The outrageous chemical spewing and fire-setting behavior was being cited in the local installation newspaper. The problem was that like before the Civil War, a number of Confederates in attitude had infiltrated the Army installation (TACOM) in key positions. Those infiltrators were both aiding and abetting, and committing the acts of smuggling and fire-setting behavior.

-1-

My duties included personnel work and crime prevention. In addition, an Army Regulation, AR 385-10, tells all workers to take action against such gross misconduct and hazardous behavior. However, the Confederate managers were taking no action to enforce the federal law that bans workplace hazards and drug abuse. They disregarded the federal hiring requirements that forbid hiring applicants dangerous to themselves and others. They flouted Michigan law that bans the toxic chemical containers and emitters from being manufactured, given away, or sold in Michigan. Michigan's Governor has found that such smuggling is a state emergency situation and that the chemicals' containers (being illegally sold and smuggled) are killings tens of thousands of Michigan residents. Confederate managers on-post also disregarded and defied Department of Defense and Amy regulations forbidding these chemical containers from causing a hazard, indeed, forbid their use when others are impacted even minimally, on their verbal indication.

There are good reasons for the various above-cited rules against these chemical containers and setting them on fire. The toxic chemical containers (called "cigarettes" for short) are a Confederate product. Shortly after the Civil War, Confederates altered their formula to make them a war weapon, they added coumarin, for rat poison, to take revenge on Yankees for winning the war. To Confederates, cigarettes are an anti-personnel weapon with great killing potential. Their goal of mass killing Yankees is being achieved, on the order of 400,000 killings per year. Cigarettes are also the gateway drug delivery agent to other drugs, so the Confederates joined with the Mafia (and its involvement in cigarette smuggling and drugs) to increase the intensity of their continued war on America.

Loyal members of the Army have issued memoranda and pamphlets on the subject, including identifying cigarettes' nicotine as an addictive drug and the severe hazard smokers pose to soldiers, Army civilians, and their families. They are concerned as cigarettes are linked to drug abuse, alcoholism, impaired driving, Alzheimer's disease, Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS), suicide, etc., all adversely affecting Army staff performance and morale. At the Warren Army base, the Tank-Automotive Command (TACOM), workers were complaining in the TACOM newspaper about the problem on post.

The Army specifies in AR 385-10 that its personnel (including myself) who become aware of hazards and misconduct, are to report it. Of course, criminal law provides severe penalties against the culprits. In addition, one of my assigned duties due to my meeting and exceeding the qualifications requirements was as a Crime Prevention Officer. Starting in 1978, I began reporting the violations to the Headquarters Inspector General. It referred the reports to local officials, who -- due to their Confederate-Mafia inclinations -- refused to bring the installation into compliance. The mass violations including illegal sales on-post continued. Nonsmokers continued complaining. Workers were being hurt on post.

My immediate supervisor, J. H. Kator, told me to prepare a memorandum banning the use of the chemical containers in the office. I did so, but his supervisor Archie Grimmett, a drug abuser, and others in management wanted the violations to continue, so forbad issuance of the memo. There is a lot of money to be made in cigarette and drug smuggling (with sales being mostly to smokers) and in dealing with cigarette effects. Coming into compliance on-post, setting a precedent, would cut off a lot of money for a lot of people. Also, it would halt the Confederates' (unreconstructed southerners) killings of Yankees.

In June 1979, my supervisor was told not to assist in getting pertinent rules enforced. I began the process of reporting the misconduct to the U.S. Army Civilian Appellate Review Agency (USACARA). Management obstructed its review, even sending documents to the wrong address. This caused some months of delays. But my whistle blower activity led to success when USACARA in January 1980 told TACOM to begin the compliance process.

-2-

My supervisor gave me awards for my good performance meeting and exceeding performance standards during this time, due to my excellent qualifications, and directed a pay raise for me for my good work performance. Also a good conduct award was set in process by him for me. Simultaneously, on behalf of the workers being hurt on post from the chemical emissions being spewed into the air, I filed safety cases and EEO class action materials on their behalf. And much more, but this suffices for now.

My supervisor's support, and my whistleblowing success with USACARA, enraged people including Edward Hoover, Col. John Benacquista, Emily S. Bacon, Francis J. Holt, etc., drug users and/or profiteers, an organized crime gang of unreconstructed southerners with Confederate anti-Yankee notion, desirous of mass killing as many Yankees as they could. I stood in the way. Col. Benacquista demanded that I cease and desist, i.e., alter my anticipated testimony, cease stating the violations. Or else. This is extortion, in violation of Michigan criminal law, MCL 750.213, MSA 28.410, and I refused.

These Confederates were enraged that I would not stop blowing the whistle on their drug smuggling operation and Confederate-inspired killing spree directed against the employees there, and the residents of Michigan. Emily Bacon, a Mafia consiglière, advised her fellow criminals that, as extortion, they should embezzle my pay in violation of MCL 750.174, MSA 28.371, to pressure me to change my testimony. So despite my supervisor's efforts on my behalf, the said Confederate-type organized crime gang ordered me instantly fired without charges.

As others are issued advance notice of charges, this was an obvious case of discriminatory treatment and reprisal for my class action and USACARA activities. I sought EEO review pursuant to 29 CFR 1613. The crime gang refused to allow review. They had pre-arranged bribery of Merit System Protection Board (MSPB) officials, Martin Baumgaertner, et al., so wanted to force me out of my chosen forum, into the bribe-ridden MSPB forum that they knew I didn't want.

Fortunately, EEOC soon began issuing repeated orders directing review on the merits of many of the incidents (starting with Decision 01.80.0273, 23 Feb 1982; then 05.82.0275 (4 March 1983), etc.. Confederates on post, Emily Bacon, Edward Hoover, the Commanding General, etc. opposed compliance. So they commit massive insubordination, refusing to obey EEOC's orders to allow merits review to begin.

To get EEOC's orders enforced, I eventually began suing. However, the gang, in conjunction with tobacco lobbyists, Confederates, and Mafia-types such as Kenneth W. Starr infiltrated into the government for the purpose of using public office for private gain, and to obstruct pertinent law enforcement lest it halt their genocidal Confederate-motivated killing spree of hundreds of thousands of Americans each year (according to the government's own count), bribed area federal and appellate judges. This BRIBERY culminated in the ultra-outrage of getting the appeals court (via bribed judges Jones, Ryan, and Celebrezze) to claim that I had applied (somewhere between October 1984 and September 1985, since they made it up, they couldn't say exactly when!!) to retire myself on total disability!! Notwithstanding the fact that no such application as they alleged exists, and my doctor and I deny any basis for my filing such an absurd thing!!

Naturally, I reported this outrageous criminal activity to the military police. Officer Scott Szekely was assigned; he verified that no such alleged application existed, and was apparently about to arrest the perps including the judges. So the crime gang came down hard, and obstructed, indeed ended, the investigation. As others' investigations that are so productive in verifying crime are not so abruptly halted, I filed for EEO review -- another obstructed case, which I hope you order review to proceed on as well.

-3-

Simultaneously, I sought review at the Supreme Court, including of the outrageous, criminal activity of the judges. Kenneth Starr, Solicitor General, a Yankee-hating Confederate and unreconstructed southerner tobacco lobbyist, instead of doing his job and honestly reporting the misconduct in his brief as he should have and as Rules of Professional Responsibility and Code of Ethics require, chose to obstruct the review process, aid and abet the crimes including bribery, extortion and falsification. This means, under Michigan law MCL 767.39, MSA 28.979, which does not distinguish accessory and principal, that he became a principal to the crimes. Other Solicitor Generals have not become either accessories or principals in crime. So due to this different behavior, I filed for more EEO review. This has been obstructed now all these years since my initial 1991 filing. Starr's criminal accessories D. Diane Weaver, Gonzellas Williams, Kathleen Buttrey, Emily Bacon, Stanley Kelley, Jr., etc., are themselves criminals, so ordered that no normal processing occur.

As criminals, they naturally fear that genuine review in the 29 CFR 1613-1614 process will lead to findings of misconduct by Starr, et al. The anticipated USACARA-type Report will show a mass of violations January 1980 to present. The anticipated testimony will, they fear, foreseeably show that Starr used public office for private gain; sought roles conflicting with government assignments; procured, aided and abetted defiance of EEOC directives in the situation; and obstructed justice and compliance with federal and Michigan law.

Examples: laws against drug abuse and unsafe practices on government property, alcoholism, and resultant foreseeable incidents of sex harassment and rape; falsifying/ forging government records; disregarding pertinent case law and laws against retaliation for raising such issues; obstructing federal hiring guidelines against hiring persons dangerous to self, others and property.

So Starr and accomplices have been since 1991 obstructing the making of such findings, via obstructing/preventing review such as others get, including investigation and hearing. Here, the so-called counselor refused to even talk to the alleged discriminators.

As the time limits have been exceeded, I hereby invoke the "flight from review" doctrine, and refer to normal review as though having occurred, via default. (It has been over six months since the requests for review were filed!! "Default" is the right word! EEOC rules do not authorize agency refusal to allow review, nor to exceed time limits, as one EEO official told me! To penalize the agency for spitting on the rules, nothing short of default will suffice.) If I file late, I lose; the constitutional equal protection of the law concept, if it is to mean anything, cannot do other.

So here goes. The default Counselor Report, the default Investigator Report, the default transcript of the witness testimony at the default hearing held by an Administrative Judge (AJ) of the Detroit, EEOC office, show that the perps including the above-named and the Detroit U.S. Attorney staff Roy C. Hayes, Jr., Gary Maveal, Stephen Markman, Kathleen M. Nesi, all confessed to involvement in bribing Judges Jones, Ryan, and Celebrezze. The said judges confessed to taking bribes. Kenneth Starr confessed to aiding and abetting the bribery and underlying extortion and falsification. They were all thereupon imprisoned and disbarred. All was done retroactively to when it would have occurred, but for the refusal to allow review, i.e., 1991. Please treat this default concept as constituting the great weight of the evidence, thus rule in my favor. Sorry if this imposes some burden on EEOC, but that is the result of failure to bring the agency under control, as I have been pleading for since 1979.

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I keep thinking I can have what others get--genuine counselor, counselor report, genuine investigator, investigation report, hearing, witness testimony, and administrative judge findings. My mistake! I am the one federal employee in America who for 19+ years is refused such, as LTC Larry Wigner's 24 July 1980 threat that "the Command will no longer respond to" me has been carried out, I am sure you will agree.

As the agency with tobacco lobby support now evident, bribed judges etc., to support the post-decision claim that I was removed for lack of "qualifications," they fear genuine review as it would show my actual qualifications and performance record, and TACOM's pattern of violation of Standard Form 78 criteria against hiring persons (smokers) with "medical findings which . . . would make him a hazard to himself or others." Stating that federal principle in state law MCL 330.1401, MSA 14.800(401) terms, TACOM has a pattern of hiring "person[s] requiring treatment."

Here is one sad example: Its EEO Officer Kenneth Adler (due to the tobacco induced brain disease acalculia) could not even count right, to 30, could not calculate the 30 days for filing a request for EEO review. He accused me!! Luckily, EEOC saw his miscounting and reversed him. Dockets 01.80.0273, et al., 23 Feb 1982, one of the decisions Kenneth Starr so hates. Worse, Adler, due to his tobacco-induced abulia, delusions of grandeur, etc., hallucinating that he was above the law, refused to obey the EEOC orders that starting being issued then. The criminal Kenneth Starr aided and abetted this sad mentally ill person in refusing to let me have review. What a sicko!

I am a current employee of the agency, having received no 5 USC 7513.(b) notice to the contrary.1 So please specifically take note of the agency lying, saying otherwise since February 1980. Later it said I was removed because it supposedly could not ban tobacco smoking conduct by others. But it issued no prior confirming 5 USC 7513.(b) notice. Due to my repeated seeking review of the agency claim, among other incidents, EEOC issued remand orders directing review.

________________

1 "Removal" is defined as "A disciplinary separation action, other than for inefficiency or unacceptable performance . . . where the employee is at fault." FPM Supp 296-33, Subchapter 35, Glossary, page 35-11. The condition precedent for a removal is that the agency have first written and issued a 30 days advance written notice of charges. But treating me differently than others, the agency ignored this condition precedent, issued no 30 days advance written notice--no accusation of violating conduct rules or performance standards, no incidents, dates, witness names, etc. I asked for specifics. Refusing me same carried out Lt. Col. Larry Wigner's 24 July 1980 threat that "the Command will no longer respond to" me. Refusing me specifics denied (and continues to deny) me the right to reply.

Due process case law shows that if an employee is supposedly removed without the condition precedent advance notice having been issued, the employee remains on the rolls entitled to pay and immediate reinstatement. Others receive the benefit of that condition precedent requirement: Money v Anderson, 93 US App DC 130, 134; 208 F2d 34, 38 (1953); Deak v Pace, 88 US App DC 50, 52; 185 F2d 997, 999 (1950), Mulligan v Andrews, 93 US App DC 375, 377; 211 F2d 28, 30 (1954); Smith v Dept of Interior, 9 MSPR 342 (1981); Sullivan v Dept of Navy, 720 F2d 1266, 1274 (CA Fed, 1983); Mercer v DHHS, 772 F2d 856, 858 (CA Fed, 1985); Pittman v Dept of Army, 832 F2d 598 (CA Fed, 1987), etc. Indeed, notice is more than a condition precedent, it is a constitutional due process requirement, required by the Constitution as necessary to enable a person to reply, Cleveland Board of Educ v Loudermill, 470 US 532; 105 S Ct 1487; 84 L Ed 2d 494 (1985). But for Starr's lying to the Supreme Court, that case law would have been held applicable to me, and I would have long ago been reinstated.

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ARGUMENT

1. STARR HAS A PATTERN OF MISCONDUCT: EXTORTION, COVER-UP, AND PRO-LYING.

"The proof of the pattern or practice [of Starr's willingness to file false data and extort] supports an inference that any particular decision [to file a false document in court], during the period in which the policy was in force, was made in pursuit of that policy." Teamsters v U.S., 431 US 324, 362; 97 S Ct 1843, 1868; 52 L Ed 2d 396, 431 (1977).

Note the expose by reporters Bradley A. Stertz and Kenneth Cole, "Claims that he hid perjury could undercut Starr's moral tone," Detroit News, 5 Mar 98, p 7B. Starr had seen that he could get away with hiding crimes in my situation, and have EEO review obstructed. So he went unpunished. So there was no deterrent effect. The obstruction of justice which he knew can be done with the aid of the corrupt agency and accomplices herein cited, emboldened him to commit new misconduct. (Of course, the obstruction of my case since 1991 constitutes an additional pattern of continuing discrimination. Others are not subjected to such obstruction.)

MCL 767.39, MSA 28.979, abolished the distinction between "principals" and "accessories." Starr is an "accessory during the fact." See definition, Black's Law Dictionary, "One who stands by without interfering or giving such help as may be in his power to prevent the commission of a criminal offense." The crimes and obstruction of justice re which review is sought, were in process during the time of his known role, and continuing.

Stephen Gillers, Prof., Legal Ethics, NYU School of Law, says "The rule is clear and uniform. A lawyer who learns that a witness he's handing has lied has an obligation to ask the witness to correct the lie, failing which he has an obligation to correct it himself." Starr violated both provisos. Here are key words from the Detroit News Article:

"CLAIMS THAT HE HID PERJURY COULD UNDERCUT STARR'S MORAL TONE

The Detroit News, Thursday, 5 March 1998, page 1

By Bradley A. Stertz and Kenneth Cole - Detroit News Washington Bureau

"Washington -- Whitewater independent counsel Kenneth Starr has defended General Motors Corp. in a handful of product liability cases since 1993, when he joined the prestigious law firm Kirkland & Ellis. But it's his involvement in a lawsuit the giant automaker settled four years ago that threatens to undercut Starr's moral authority to query President Clinton on allegations that he had an illicit affair with a White House intern, then obstructed justice by urging her to lie about it.

"South Carolina attorney J. Kendall Few earlier this seek said Starr -- while representing GM in cases brought by families of people killed or injured in truck fires -- knew an employee of the automaker lied on the witness stand. But Few claims Starr helped "cover up the perjury," thus obstructing justice.

"It strikes me as the irony of the decade that the man who is investigating the president for obstruction of justice now stands accused of obstructing justice and possibly faces a grand jury inquiry," said Ralph Hoar, a Virginia auto safety advocate.

Numerous Clinton supporters have been attacking Starr. On Wednesday, several prominent Democrat lawmakers, including Reps. John Conyers of Detroit and John Dingell of Dearborn, formally asked Atty. Gen. Janet Reno to investigate Starr's conduct."

-6-

Of course, it is common knowledge in the public domain, that of the voluminous charges Starr made against President William J. Clinton, the House of Representatives only agreed on four. The Senate in turn accepted none. Also, witnesses keep coming forward, as in the recent McDougal case, saying that Starr wanted lying to occur. That is the same type of criminal extortion as Col. Benacquista did to me. Criminal Starr is simply following standard extortion tactics. He had supported them against me, saw that he could get away with it, 1991-present, so does it again and again.

Juries don't believe Starr. An article about the McDougal case in The Macomb Daily, p 8A, 31 March 1999, says another witness, Julie Hiatt Steele, came forward against him. A Virginia woman, she was called to testify that Starr prosecuted her for being truthful. Her testimony was another in a series alleging that Starr favors falsity vs truth, as an attorney, Mark Geragos, observes. This further shows Starr's pattern and propensity to disregard the truth, and to support, cover-up, aid and abet perjury and obstruction of justice.

2. THE UNDERLYING SITUATION AIDED AND ABETTED BY STARR AND

TO WHICH HE IS ACCESSORY, INVOLVES MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE.

A. THE UNDERLYING SITUATION INVOLVES "UNIVERSAL MALICE."

The President of the American Council on Science and Health, Elizabeth M. Whelan, Sc.D., says, "Cigarette Makers Get Away With Murder," The Detroit News, p 4B (14 March 1993). This includes their accessories and aiders and abettors such as Starr. Please help bring him under control. Stop him killing children.

"Over 37 million people (one of every six Americans alive today) will die from cigarette smoking years before they otherwise would." See the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), book, Research on Smoking Behavior, Research Monograph 17, Publication ADM 78-581, p v (December 1977).

A few years earlier, the Royal College of Physicians of London, in its book Smoking and Health Now (London: Pitman Medical and Scientific Publishing Co, 1971), p 9, had already declared the smoking-caused death toll a "holocaust" due to the then "annual death toll of some 27,500." If 27,500 deaths is a "holocaust" -- and it is -- 37 million is (in contrast to the Nazi 6 million holocaust), a six fold+ holocaust. That is above the World War II "crimes against humanity" level for which prosecutions occurred in The Nurnberg Trial, 6 FRD 69 (1946).

Such deaths are "natural and probable consequences," a term defined in Black's Law Dictionary, 6th ed (St. Paul: West Pub Co, 1990), p 1026, as events happening "so frequently as to be expected [intended] to happen again." Cigarette deaths are clearly foreseeable and so are not "accidents" ("unexpected" "unusual," "fortuitous" events), p 15. They constitute murder in the first degree, pursuant to the doctrine of "universal malice."

Toxic substances have a potential for wide devastation. Their characteristic structure, size, invisibility, portability, method of operation, and capacity for causing harm are such that as to pose a foreseeable widespread (or "universal) danger. Toxic substances act adversely upon anyone coming within their ambit of life-endangering ability. Tobacco smoke contains toxic substances. The legal doctrine of "universal malice" encompasses tobacco, i.e., toxicity "without knowing or caring who may be the victim." Mitchell v State, 60 Ala 26, 30 (1877), cited in Black's Law Dictionary, 4th ed., (St. Paul, West Pub Co, 1968), p 1110.

-7-

In situations of "universal malice," deaths are foreseeable among many more than merely one individual. Of course, in law, even one wrongful incident is one too many. "If no one else" but one person is harmed, "that is so much of loss fortunately saved to respondent," DeMarco v United States, 204 F Supp 290, 292 (ED NY, 1962). The court was rejecting the claim that guilt should be deemed less, as only one person was killed! No, it's not less guilt, just fewer victims re which to penalize the accused!! DeMarco was cited as relevant to smoking in a second-hand smoke case, Smith v Western Electric Co, 643 SW2d 10, 13 (Mo App, 1982).

The "universal malice" doctrine especially applies as cigarettes are inherently dangerous. Banzhaf v Federal Communications Commission, 132 US App DC 14, 29; 405 F2d 1082, 1097 (1968) cert den 396 US 842 (1969). The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), Reducing the Health Consequences of Smoking: 25 Years of Progress: a Report of the Surgeon General, Publication CDC 89-8411, Table 7, pp 86-87 (1989), lists examples of deleterious ingredients including but not limited to:

acetaldehyde (1.4+ mg) arsenic (500+ ng) benzo(a)pyrene (.1+ ng)

cadmium (1,300+ ng) crotonaldehyde (.2+ g) chromium (1,000+ ng)

`ethylcarbamate 310+ ng) formaldehyde (1.6+ g) hydrazine (14+ ng)

lead (8+ g) nickel (2,000+ ng) radioactive polonium (.2+ Pci).

Judicial notice of cigarettes' "inherent" deleteriousness was taken long ago, pursuant to an 1897 Tennessee law banning cigarettes, in Austin v State, 101 Tenn 563; 566-7; 48 SW 305, 306; 70 Am St Rep 703 (1898) affirmed 179 US 343 (1900). Tennessee was scared of cigarettes as they are a dangerous Confederate product. The Michigan law banning cigarettes with deleterious ingredients, MCL 750.27, MSA 28.216, was passed soon thereafter, in 1909.

A second aspect in cigarettes' "universal malice" is that due to their inherently deleterious nature and ingredients, they, when lit, emit deleterious emissions. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare (DHEW), Smoking and Health: Report of the Advisory Committee to the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service, PHS Pub 1103, Table 4, p 60 (1964), lists examples of deleterious emissions compared to the chemicals' "speed limits" (in 29 CFR 1910.1000, available at your local library), including but not limited to:

Cigarette Chemical Emission Level "Speed Limit"

acetaldehyde 3,200 ppm 200.0 ppm

acrolein 150 ppm 0.5 ppm

ammonia 300 ppm 150.0 ppm

carbon monoxide 42,000 ppm 100.0 ppm

formaldehyde 30 ppm 5.0 ppm

hydrogen cyanide 1,600 ppm 10.0 ppm

hydrogen sulfide 40 ppm 20.0 ppm

methyl chloride 1,200 ppm 100.0 ppm

nitrogen dioxide 250 ppm 5.0 ppm

It is because cigarettes' emissions vastly exceed the "speed limits" that they are dangerous and so fatal as to kill tens of millions of people. If cigarettes' toxic chemicals were under the "speed limits," they'd be safe! Example: The "speed limit" for carbon monoxide is about 100, whereas it's doing 42,000.

The Michigan law banning cigarettes with deleterious ingredients, MCL 750.27, MSA 28.216, is intended to prevent "universal malice," i.e., cigarettes with dangerous ingredients!! Only safe cigarettes, if any, can legally be manufactured, given away, and sold in Michigan. Governor Engler and his staff have tried to halt cigarette smuggling.

-8-

Tobacco is filled with poisons including radioactive polonium, as stated above, and is

"absorbed through the pulmonary circulation and [is[] carried by the systemic circulation to every tissue and cell, causing mutations of cellular genetic structures, deviation of cellular characteristics from their optimal normal state, accelerated aging, and early death from a body-wide spectrum of diseases," see Ravenholt, R. T., 307 N Engl J Med 312 (29 July 1982)

"Smoking is the greatest cause of premature death and disability in the United States," see Martin, M. J., et al., 315 N Engl J Med 647 (4 Sep 1986). It is because of toxic quantities in excess of standards ("speed limits") that tobacco smoke is the No. 1 hazard and killer.

"The smoker of cigarettes is constantly exposed to levels of carbon monoxide in the range of 500 to 1,500 parts per million when he inhales." Miller, G. H., 72 J Indiana St Med Ass'n 904 (Dec 1979), in the context of violation of 29 CFR 1910.1000.

Carbon monoxide has "no 'safe' level, no level below which adverse effects do not occur." Comment, "Legislation for Clean Air: An Indoor Front," 82 Yale Law J 1040, 1045 (April 1973). Thus,

"The act of smoking becomes a source of peril . . . in effect . . . malice and any fatality resulting . . . may be potential murder." Gladieux Food Services, Inc v International Ass'n of Machines and Aerospace Workers, 70 Lab Arb 544, 547 (1978), cited with approval in USM Corp, Bostik West Division v Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, 78-2 ARB 8545; 71 Lab Arb 954, 958 (1978). "Cigarette Makers Get Away With Murder," says Elizabeth M. Whelan, Sc.D., The Detroit News, p 4B (14 March 1993).

Explanation of the deleteriousness of specific cigarette ingredients is stated in, e.g., the following reference materials:

Gosselin, Smith, Hodge, and Braddock, Clinical Toxicology of Commercial Products, 5th ed (Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins, 1984). Page II-4 lists toxicity levels of 1-6 (1, "practically non-toxic"; 4, "very toxic"; 6, "super-toxic"). Nicotine, item 772, pp II-237 and III-311-4 is rated a 6; coumarin, p II-257, item 861, is a 4.

Dreisbach and Robertson, Handbook of Poisoning: Prevention, Diagnosis and Treatment, 12th ed (Norwalk, CT: Appleton & Lange, 1983 and 1987). Pages 35 and 259-263 cover carbon monoxide poisoning; pp 130-132, tobacco and nicotine; pp 385-7, anticoagulants, e.g., coumarin and warfarin.

Sondra Goodman, Director, Household Hazardous Waste Project, HHWP's Guide to Hazardous Products Around the Home, 2d ed (Springfield, MO: Southwest Mo St Univ Press, 1989). Page 99 covers poisoning by carbon monoxide, of which cigarettes emit 42,000 ppm , exceeding the 29 CFR 1910.1000 average safe limit of 50 ppm).

Arena and Drew, Poisoning, 5th ed (Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas Pub, 1986). Pages 216-217 cover nicotine; pp 308-312, carbon monoxide; p 999, which lists coumarin, says, ominously, "see Warfarin," p 1007.

The U.S. Supreme Court states that it is not

"unfair to require that one who deliberately goes perilously close to an area of proscribed conduct shall take the risk that he may cross the line." Boyce Motor Lines, Inc v United States, 342 US 337, 340; 72 S Ct 329, 331; 96 L Ed 367 (1952).

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In a cigarette death case (two firemen killed due a smokers' smoking), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that a "toxic substance "is the prototype of forces" or substances "which the ordinary man knows must be used with special caution because of the potential for wide devastation [universal malice]," Commonwealth v Hughes, 468 Pa 502; 364 A2d 306, 311 (1976).

It is well established that a single act can violate more than one legal principle or restriction. The initial violation may be no more than a minor one, as in Hughes, a work rule violation (the no smoking rule). The violation of that safety rule caused a fire which, in turn, produced "the death of two firemen," p 308, leading to "two counts of involuntary manslaughter." Both counts were upheld by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Tobacco involves two, not just one, prototypic hazards, i.e., toxic chemicals and fire.

In situations of widespread potential harm ("universal malice"), harm is foreseeable, hence, malice is presumed. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals described a situation of universal malice thus:

"Precisely what happened is what might have been expected as the result . . . and is the natural and probable consequence . . . Malice is presumed under such conditions." Nestlerode v United States, 74 US App DC 276, 279; 122 F2d 56, 59 (1941). The court added, "The wonder of the case is that . . . there were not more . . . victims," in finding guilt and upholding conviction. Tobacco has so many victims -- in the tens of millions -- that it is clearly a situation of "universal malice" run rampant, i.e., above the holocaust level.

A "universal malice" (by act of commission or omission) has certain characteristics: It commonly "is not directed to any particular individual, but is general and indiscriminate . . . putting the lives of many in jeopardy." This is definitely the case with tobacco. Harm and death from a "universal malice," e.g., tobacco, does not arise from "provocation" at all, much less "sufficient provocation" to constitute a defense in law. Smokers do not provoke non-tobacco executives into becoming such!

In a classic "universal malice" case, the Alabama Appeals Court cited examples when universal malice concepts "have an apt and intelligible meaning, when used in regard to such cases" as shooting or driving into a crowd of people, while "not having the intent to kill any particular person, although . . . likely to [kill] some one or more persons." A universal malice is "'regardless of human life, although without any preconceived purpose to deprive any particular person of life." State v Massey, 20 Ala App 56, 58; 100 So 625, 627 (1924).

The doctrine of "universal malice" clearly does "have an apt and intelligible meaning, when used in regard to such cases" as tobacco, as it contains multiple hazardous substances/toxic chemicals, and the fire aspect. The tobacco chemical/fire hazard combination "is not directed to any particular individual, but is general and indiscriminate."

And even if tobacco had just been invented, it would be foreseeable that (due to its multiple toxic ingredients and emissions far above the legal level), some people are "likely to" be killed by same. But as it is, we already have a body count in the tens of millions, already described nearly thirty years as a holocaust. We are not writing speculation for the future and the mere possibility/probability that deaths may perhaps occur in the distant future -- still a fact sufficient for conviction -- but for the here and now -- the current already existing record. Tobacco is "universal malice" run rampant.

Another "universal malice" case provides an insightful distinction between degrees of murder involved: "If an act be committed with a premeditated design to effect death, it is murder in the first degree; but if it is merely imminently dangerous to others, evincing a depraved mind, regardless of human life and without premeditated design, it is murder in the second degree." Montgomery v State, 178 Wis 461; 190 NW 105, 107 (1922).

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Considering the known toxic ingredients and emissions, the many years that the hazard has been known and is "beyond controversy," Larus & Bro Co v F.C.C., 447 F2d 876, 880 (CA 4, 1971), the voluntary production thereof, and the non-implementation of corrective measures over an extended period of time, the situation is clearly one of "premeditated" "universal malice" run rampant.

B. STARR AND THE AGENCY HAVE FULL PERCEPTION OF THE HAZARD

It is well-established that tobacco has a natural, probable, and foreseeable consequence of death. Toxic substances such as tobacco smoke contains are poisonous. The hazard is well-established such that, as a matter of law, there can be no "failure to perceive it." "Buyer beware" is not the law; manufacturers and retailers and their accessories (principals) such as Bacon, Starr, et al., must make truthful disclosure, Bishop v Strout Realty, 182 F2d 503 (CA 4, 1950).

As manufacturers and retailers are required to know what they are doing(!), and their agents -- the TACOM smugglers -- which knowledge constitutes "the standard of care," an ignorance claim, is itself a violation! Any alleged "failure to perceive" a hazard (an ignorance defense) itself "constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care . . . " Dillon v State, 574 SW2d 92, 94 (Tex Cr App, 1978). Starr and the agency make no ignorance claim; they well know the hazard. Pursuant to their Confederate/Mafia intent to continue the hazard as long as possible, for mass slaughter of the hated Yankees, they opposed eliminating it. They want the foreseeable "natural and probable consequences" -- genocidal levels of deaths to occur. So they opposed my whistleblowing in support of getting the laws enforced to stop the tobacco holocaust.

They know so doing is illegal. Subjecting people to foreseeable hazard, e.g.,mass-death causing chemicals, is unlawful. This is well-established under several laws, e.g., the general protective law for the population, e.g., 18 USC 1111 (the federal murder ban); MCL 750.316, MSA 28.548 (first degree murder); MCL 750.317, MSA 28.549 (second degree murder); MCL 750.321, MSA 28.553 (manslaughter); 5 USC 7902.(d) (the federal workers safety act), and 29 USC 651 - 678 (the Occupational Safety and Health Act). It is well-established that, pursuant to these laws, employers must assure that everyone in the workplace not commit crimes such as murder, indeed, must behave and function in a safe manner. Workplaces are to be "free of a hazard." The safety duty "adjective is unqualified and absolute," and a hazard "is known taking into account the standard of knowledge in the industry" (not one's personal knowledge or lack thereof). These laws preclude reaching "accommodation" issues, a much lesser, mere civil law duty, subordinate to criminal law, not the reverse as genocidal killers Bacon, Kelley, Starr, etc., fraudulently convey.

The safety duty "adjective" ("'free' of a hazard'") "is unqualified and absolute: A workplace cannot be just "reasonably free' of a hazard." National Realty & Construction Co, Inc v Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC), 160 US App DC 133, 141; 489 F2d 1257, 1265 (1973). Tobacco smoking on the job involves an appreciable amount of time, which in turn promotes at-home smoking--thus substantially increasing exposure to cigarettes' hazardous toxic chemicals. Such matters are known taking into account the standard of knowledge.

Many years ago, already, "the detrimental effects of cigarette smoking on health were beyond controversy." Larus & Bro Co, 447 F2d 880, supra. The D. C. Circuit Court had found that cigarettes

"pose . . . a danger to life itself , . . . a danger inherent in the normal use of the product, not one merely associated with its abuse or dependent on intervening fortuitous events." Banzhaf v Federal Communications Commission, 132 US App DC 14, 29; 405 F2d 1082, 1097 (1968) cert den 396 US 842; 90 S Ct 50; 24 L Ed 2d 93 (1969).

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The Tennessee Supreme Court had previously found that cigarettes are

"wholly noxious and deleterious to health. . . always harmful; never beneficial . . . inherently bad, and bad only . . . . There is no proof in the record as to the character of cigarettes, yet their character is so well and so generally known to be that stated above, that the courts are authorized to take judicial cognizance of the fact. No particular proof is required in regard to those facts which, by human observation and experience, have become well and generally known to be true." Austin v State, 101 Tenn 563, 566; 48 SW 305, 306; 70 Am St Rep 703 (1898) affirmed sub nom Austin v Tennessee, 179 US 343; 21 S Ct 132; 45 L Ed 224 (1900).

Other judicial recognitions of the hazard to smokers include, e.g., Pritchard v Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co, 295 F2d 292, 300 (CA 3, 1961); Green v American Tobacco Co, 154 So 2d 169 (Fla, 1963); and R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co v Hudson, 314 F2d 776 (CA 5, 1963).

Pro-tobaccoists recognize that there are consequences from dissemination of information on the tobacco danger--informed people choose not to be poisoned!! So they have tried to stop that information flow, by suing to ban it from even being broadcast! Fortunately, they lost, Robinson v American Broadcasting Cos., 328 F Supp 421 (ED Ky, 1970), aff'd 441 F2d 1396 (CA 6, 1971). So these genocidal types sought to suppress my acting against the hazard. That pro-tobacco effort to stop the information flow on smoking as a hazard was fortunately rejected on two grounds: the "unclean hands" of the requesters, and the freedom of expression rights that Americans have. Pro-tobaccoists such as Bacon, Kelley, Starr, Ryan, Celebrezze, etc., clearly perceive the hazard, and want their intended targets, not to know!! So they, despite their unclean, blood-stained hands, committed extortion and embezzlement to suppress my freedom of speech in support of the rules and laws. Their intent to mass murder Americans is obvious, prima facie.

C. THE AGENCY AND STARR ARE VIOLATING

LEGAL PRINCIPLES AGAINST POISONING PEOPLE

A leading case on poison was issued by the Michigan Supreme Court in 1858. This was shortly after tobacco's role in suicide, insanity, and crime had been noted. The law at issue provided for up to life in prison for a first offense of poisoning a person. The case at issue involved a poison that served (as tobacco does), as a mind-altering drug. It alters a person's future behavior so that impaired reasoning occurs, with a result including but not limited to self-destructive behavior. Carmichael pleaded ignorance of the substance's actual effects. The court decision includes the following words:

"It is obvious that the law does not encourage tampering with such matters [poisons. Thus], [the judges] are not disposed to resort to . . . subtilities to defeat a law [against poisoning people] which, if severe, is to the public benignant and humane in its severity."

"Where an unlawful act is done, the law presumes it was done with an unlawful intent, and here the act . . . was unquestionably unlawful . . . . It is unnecessary to decide how far even positive proof that a man was misinformed as to the degree of injury likely to arise from the use of any substance would avail him in defense . . . intention is, in law, deducible from the act itself."

Despite the person's ignorance defense, there is therefore

"the legal inference that he did it with intention of producing such effect as would naturally result from its reception," Carmichael, 5 Mich 10, 17-20; 71 Am Dec 769, 762-776. "The greater susceptibility of some persons over others, to be affected by it, renders it [poison] still more dangerous," 19/775. The poison, a mind-altering drug, acts to "take away the power of resistance," p 20/775, thus causing "the most deplorable effect . . . the dethronement of reason from its governing power."

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People v Carmichael, gives a sound overview of the addiction concept. Characteristics of addiction include that it does:

"[1] take away the power of resistance [by producing an unsound mental condition] . . . [2] make [the user] an easy prey to [the pusher and other harm] [3] work upon [the] physical system [so] as to excite . . . passions beyond the control of reason, and, [4] in effect . . . produce, if not insanity, the most deplorable effect of insanity, which is the dethronement of reason from its governing power," Carmichael, 5 Mich 20-21, supra.

Tobacco pushers' "universal malice" leads nonsmoker children, non-addicts, into the starter drug, then down the road, to subsequent addictions, by hooking them on tobacco, a known mind-altering drug. In effect, such drug is a mind poison, causing abulia. It is illegal to do that to a person -- provide a mind-altering drug, Carmichael, 5 Mich 10; 71 Am Dec 769. As a result of ingesting such a drug, the person may come to harm, even if NOT from the initial drug or incident, but something in the future. So providing it is a crime.

"Consent" is based on the person having attained the legal age of contracts, typically age 18. Consent has a condition precedent, a prerequisite. It

"supposes a physical power to act, a moral power of acting, and a serious, determined, and free use of these powers . . . unclouded by fraud, duress, or sometimes even mistake." See Black's Law Dictionary, 6th ed (St. Paul: West Pub Co, 1990), p 305.

In dealing with crime, "consent of victim" "is generally no defense to a crime." See, e.g., State v Fransua, 85 NM 173; 510 P2d 106 (1973). "Informed consent" means

"A person's agreement to allow something to happen (such as surgery) that is based on a full disclosure of facts needed to make the decision intelligently; i.e., knowledge of risks involved, alternatives, etc. Informed consent is the name for a general principle of law that a physician has a duty to disclose . . . whatever grave risks of injury might be incurred." See Black's Law Dictionary, 6th ed, p 779.

It is deemed fraud, action to defraud, page 423, if one provides an inconsistent message, for example, misrepresents fact, denies foreseeable harm. So doing is the opposite of "full disclosure." Doctors, unlike tobacco pushers, do not vaguely tell patients, 'go look it up at the medical library. I'll tell you nothing specific.' Indeed, tobacco pushers do not even say that much. Rather, there are repeated denials of medical journal data, contradicting the hazard. Such misrepresentations are so far outside "informed consent" as to constitute "fraud," p 660. To effect genuine "informed consent," doctors do individualized counseling, one on one. Tobacco pushers do not do this, often do not even know their buyers, e.g., children sold cigarettes without so much as a glance at their identification. Of course, babies and fetuses being poisoned and killed by second-hand smoke, e.g., Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS), do not "consent" and certainly not "informed consent." Here, the perps, Starr, et al., seek to conceal the hazard as long as possible, to maximize the genocidal level of killing, the "natural and probable consequence."

The terms "accident," "accidental," "accidental death," and "accidental killing" all include the concept that the consequence was not a "natural and probable" one, but rather due to a

"sudden, unexpected, external force," with "a reasonable belief that no harm is possible," and occurring "upon the instant, rather than something which continues, progresses or develops." Pages 15-16. The term "natural and probable consequence" relates to events that "happen so frequently . . . that . . . they may be expected [intended] to happen again." Page 1026. "A person is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his voluntary acts." P 1185.

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This is especially true when there is voluntary formula changing (e.g., altering nicotine levels) or adding of additives (e.g., coumarin), as tobacco pushers do.

The term "malice" applies to such acts, especially the "universal malice" type. "Universal malice" relates to action "to take life . . . without knowing or caring who may be the victim." Pp 956-957. The "universal malice" concept is well-established in law, dating from at least as long ago as Mitchell v State, 60 Ala 26, 29 (1877) and State v Massey, 20 Ala App 56, 58; 100 So 625, 627 (1924). This concept links to the "Doctrine of Transferred Intent," p 1498. Once a perpetrator does an initial wrongful act, even if somehow that victim is not harmed, but "another" is harmed, intent in law "is said to be transferred from one to the other and the [perpetrator] is liable to the other even though he did not intend it in the first instance." One example is the poisoning and killing of fetuses and babies via second-hand smoke. Here, the intent was to kill people at TACOM and in Michigan, so perps such as Bacon, Hoover, Starr, et al., obstructed my whistleblowing fulfillment of my AR 385-10 duty concerning securing rule compliance.

Let's not confuse "motive" and "intent." Laymen may think that tobacco sellers' motive is to make money. Yes. But that motive helps confirm "intent." Black's Law Dictionary, p 810, explains as follows:

"Intent and motive should not be confused. Motive is what prompts a person to act, or fail to act. Intent refers only to the state of mind with which the act is done or omitted."

Think, e.g., of a person who kills for money, e.g., during a robbery, or as an organized crime hitman being paid a fee to kill someone perhaps otherwise unknown to the individual. Do we ever for a moment think that the money motive REFUTES the unlawful intent? Of course not. The money motive is involved in causing the intentional behavior. Think of motive as subjective. Intent is objective; the consequences objectively occur as "natural and probable consequences." This objective methodology is how intent is proven in court. "Intent" refers to the objective natural and probable consequences. "A person is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his voluntary acts." P 1185.

"Murder" is defined as

"the unlawful killing of a human being . . . with malice aforethought . . . All murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, or by lying in wait, or by any other kind of wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing . . . [is] murder of the first degree." P 1019.

See also MCL 750.316, MSA 28.548; MCL 750.317, MSA 28.549; MCL 750.321, MSA 28.553; and 18 USC 1111. As the genocidal perps including Bacon, Hoover, Kelley, Starr, et al., are well aware, cigarettes involve poisons, e.g., acetaldehyde, arsenic, benzo(a)pyrene, cadmium, coumarin, crotonaldehyde, chromium, ethylcarbamate, formaldehyde, hydrazine, lead, nickel and radioactive polonium. The toxic chemicals produce emissions above legal limits, acetaldehyde (3,200 ppm vs 200 ppm); acrolein (150 vs 0.5 ppm), ammonia (300 vs 150 ppm, carbon monoxide (42,000 vs 100 ppm), formaldehyde (30 vs 5 ppm), hydrogen cyanide (1,600 vs 10 ppm), hydrogen sulfide (40 vs 20 ppm), methyl chloride (1,200 vs 100 ppm), and nitrogen dioxide (250 vs 5 ppm). (Data from Surgeon General Reports, 1964, p 60. and 1989, pp 86-87.

Engineering and medical analyses of the chemicals led to a regulation, 29 CFR 1910.1000, setting "speed limits" (so to speak) above which exceeding them is foreseeably dangerous. The synergistic effect of the chemical combination leads to 37,000,000 U.S. deaths, i.e., to more than a "holocaust." See DHEW NIDA Research on Smoking Behavior, Research Monograph 17, p v, and the Royal College of Physicians, Smoking and Health Now, p 9, state. Such a high body count is not "accidental" but "premeditated," "thought of beforehand for any length of time, however short," Black's Law Dict, supra, p 1180. As requested in the conclusion, please initiate immediate arrest of the perps as the pose a "clear and present danger" to us all.

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Tobacco products have no label identifying effects. This brings the issue squarely within classic poisoning case law, such as People v Carmichael, 5 Mich 10; 71 Am Dec 769 (1858), which provides life in prison for providing a person a mind-altering substance that influences judgment. Even if there were consent, which there is not, the law bans deaths via such means as herein described.

This is especially so as cigarettes' toxic chemicals cause brain injury such as hemorrhaging leading to abulia, a "state of dethronement of reason from its governing power," Carmichael, 5 Mich 21, e.g., an "abnormal lack of ability to act or to make decisions," Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary (Springfield: G. & C. Merriam Co, Publishers, 1972), p 4.

Tobacco's effect is comparable to that of the "rape drug," causing a specific impairment/effect. (The lay term for tobacco's brain-injuring effect is "addiction," but this term seriously understates the actual extent and nature of the brain injury. One way to comprehend the real extent of it, is by thinking of "cerebral palsy," a condition the symptoms of which in some victims go to the extreme of inability to control motor impulses. Tobacco-induced abulia likewise impairs ethical controls to the extent of motor impulses being affected, e.g., willingness to ingest poison, and the commission of drunk driving and other crimes. Sane people don't typically voluntarily ingest fatal levels of poison, indeed, it is a typical reaction is to seek criminal prosecution for mere attempts to poison!). Actually, the rape drug, rohypnol, does not result in a holocaust level of killings! So tobacco is far worse a mind-altering substance than that!

The laws against murder, and MCL 750.27, MSA 28.216, and the above definitions, protect smokers from being discriminated against by tobacco companies. Smokers are otherwise the only group of people regularly sold a deleterious and adulterated product that kills when used as intended. The laws thus function as both smokers' and nonsmokers' rights laws. The latter's objections to smoking arise from its deleterious emissions, which if smokers' right to a safe product were being respected, would not occur.

These laws including MCL 750.27, MSA 28.216, and the above definitions, refute those who allege that the best way to prevent kids smoking is, while themselves smoking, telling kids --"do as I say, not as I do." The reality is, as Michigan knew in 1985, that kids (while susceptible to being deceived otherwise) are smart enough to be able to tell a hypocrite when they see one! So Michigan followed standard law terms and protects all of us from deleterious and adulterated cigarettes.

There have been many illegal tobacco sales to minors. Professional analysts recognize that adult smokers would typically not be smoking if they had not been illegally solicited or obtained while they were children. Children have in essence been treated by the perps as slaves were treated before the Civil War, treated as though "they had no rights which the white man [often tobacco farmers] was bound to respect," Dred Scott v Sandford, 60 US 393, 407; 15 L Ed 591, 701 (1857). The Michigan cigarette ban tells cigarette manufacturers and sellers,

'once you began the illegal process, enslaving children, selling to children, you can't reap the fruit of your lawbreaking. Otherwise you will continue enslaving/selling to children, as your lawbreaking pays off once they become 18.'

Enforcement of the laws banning this result would, as some allege, perhaps have the effect that cigarettes would go underground. But enforcement would get cigarettes out of legitimate stores, malls, grocery stores, convenience stores, etc. Re any underground cigarettes, the federal cigarette smuggling ban, 18 USC 2341 - 2346), applies. Smuggling in the context of the above standard legal terms, makes it clear that sellers are not doing mere "accidental" harm (a civil matter for which no future immunity is ever granted anyone else), but harm meeting the criteria of standard definitions of unlawfulness and crime. Once you get the U.S. Attorneys and judges arrested in this case, hopefully their more honest successors will commence enforcement.

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As shown herein, tobacco pushers are foreseeably poisoners and murderers. So their aiders and abettors, accessories, principals therefore, the Starrs, the Bacons, the Hoovers, etc., are guilty of the same. Tobacco pushers mass poison nonsmoker children, turning them into smokers, dethroning their reason from its governing power, taking away their power of resistance, making them an easy prey for subsequent addictions. This involves mass violation of the legal principles herein.

In sum, tobacco executives and pushers aided and abetted by accessories (principals) such as Kenneth Starr, produce, manufacture, give away and sell tobacco "with the intention of producing such effect as would naturally result from its reception."

D. EVEN TREATING THE MATTER AS MERELY A JOB SAFETY SITUATION,

STARR AND ACCESSORIES ARE VIOLATING THE SAFETY DUTY.

By law, Congress places "the 'benefit' of worker health above all other considerations." American Textile Mfrs Institute v Secretary of Labor Donovan, 452 US 490, 509; 101 S Ct 2478, 2490; 69 L Ed 2d 185, 202 (1981). Disregard of safety and

"violation of the regulations [here, the principles herein] is evidence of negligence to be considered with the other facts and circumstances," Dunn v Brimer, 537 SW2d 164, 165 (Ark, 1976). "In Michigan, violation of a statute is negligence per se." Thaut v Finley, 50 Mich App 611; 213 NW2d 820, 821 (1973).

The "unqualified and absolute" safety adjective requires foresight and vigilance for compliance: What foresight and vigilance consist of and require of executives and tobacco sellers are described by the Supreme Court as follows:

"The requirements of foresight and vigilance imposed on responsible corporate agents are beyond question demanding, and perhaps onerous, but they are no more stringent than the public has a right to expect of those who voluntarily assume positions of authority in . . . enterprises whose services and products affect . . . health and well-being . . . " United States v Park, 421 US 658, 672; 95 S Ct 1903; 44 L Ed 2d 489 (1975).

This was in answer to a convicted business official (Park) who like Emily Bacon and Kenneth Starr, argued all the way to the Supreme Court that the legal duty set, is too high! Re tobacco, there is no question but that it does adversely "affect . . . health and well-being . . ." up to and including causing death.

"The accused [executive or tobacco seller], if he does not will the violation, usually is in a position to prevent it . . ." Park, 421 US 658; 95 S Ct 1903; 44 L Ed 2d 489, supra.

That is certainly the case here with tobacco, as each

"defendant had, by reason of his position . . . responsibility and authority either to prevent in the first instance, or promptly to correct, the violation complained of, and . . . failed to do so. [Conviction upheld]." Park, 421 US 658; 95 S Ct 1903; 44 L Ed 2d 489, supra.

In that case, the company president personally was arrested and convicted. (Here, please initiate arrest and jailing as a "clear and present danger," criminals cited in the record, e.g. Kenneth Starr, Emily Bacon, Edward Hoover, Commanding General, etc., aiding and abetting and causing the killing of TACOMERS and Michigan residents by his participating in cigarette smuggling, for the "natural and probable consequence" and purpose of killing as many of us as possible.

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Park had argued that he had delegated to his subordinates. In rebuttal, the Supreme Court said that he (the convicted executive) in law "could not rely on his system of delegation to subordinates to prevent or correct" the violation. The business executive has personal responsibility to act when there is a safety hazard. This is certainly true of these officials. Safety involves a stringent duty of this nature, said the Supreme Court, as safety does

"touch phases of the lives and health of the people which, in the circumstances of modern industrialism, are largely beyond self-protection." Park, 421 US 658, 671- 678 and n 35; 95 S Ct 1903; 44 L Ed 2d 489, supra.

"A conscious, intentional, deliberate, voluntary decision [to ignore others' safety] properly is described as willful." F. X. Messina Construction Corp v OSHRC, 505 F2d 701, 702 (CA 1, 1974).

This principle covers "conscious, intentional, deliberate, voluntary decisions" to engage in tobacco production, selling and use on-base, and resultant adverse consequences including the above-holocaust level of deaths. "[T]he distinction between 'misfeasance' and 'nonfeasance' (the distinction between active misconduct and passive inaction) is deeply rooted in the law of negligence." People v Kevorkian, 447 Mich 436, 471; 527 NW2d 714 (1994). The named perps are actively causing the problem and consequences.

"All murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, or lying in wait, torture, or by another kind of wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing . . . shall be deemed murder of the first degree." People v Wiley, 18 Cal 3d 162, 165; 133 Cal Rptr 135, 138; 554 P 2d 881 (1976) (the same criteria as 18 USC 1111).

Tobacco meets these criteria; meeting any one criterion is enough for a conviction, as a matter of law. Please initiate immediate arrest of these perps. (I realize that standard EEO cases involve, let's say, discrimination in promotion; but EEOC should understand that if the discrimination involves say, a Hitler setting up an Auschwitz here in the U.S. on some government installation, killing some minority, EEOC should do more than offer the victims retroactive back pay!! It should call the cop!!) This is such a case.

Actually it is worse, Hitler killed a mere 6-10 million; tobacco is killing 37 million, due to being aided and abetted by criminals such as Ed Hoover, Kenneth Starr, Emily Bacon, the various judges and U.S. Attorneys named herein etc., who due to their Confederate hatred of America and the American people, are terrorizing crime prevention officials such as myself into not daring to even commit freedom of speech, much less, enforcement of the laws against poisoning and murdering people. These criminals want mass genocide in America, as they hate America for having obstructed their Confederate forebears. (Similarly, others in other lands (Serbia, Bosnia, etc.) still have hatreds going back centuries.)

E. STARR AND THE AGENCY ARE VIOLATING

THE TWIN DUTIES OF PREVENTION AND AID.

Poison/toxic chemicals and fire involve a potential for wide devastation. The known susceptibility of smokers, nonsmokers including babies and fetuses subjected to toxic chemicals, and cocaine addicts to sudden death requires law tobacco executives and retailers, to not just NOT do as here is being done (mass death above the holocaust level), but also requires them to obey the pertinent laws and aid the victims of their past and current violations, while ceasing and desisting to commit more. The duty of prevention and of aid, is ancient, e.g., as shown in a 1913 conviction based on failure to meet the duty:

"The defendant was charged with the duty to see to it that . . . life was not endangered; and it is apparent he could have performed that duty . . . " [And] "To constitute murder, there must be means to relieve and wilfulness in withholding relief." Stehr v State, 92 Neb 755; 138 NW 676, 678 (1913).

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All company, corporate, retail officials, and employers have this duty. Tobacco deaths can easily be prevented by the simple act of not producing it! Self-control is not onerous! Producers must produce safe products, i.e., must "see to it that . . . life [is] not endangered." That is duty one, which is obviously being violated.

Duty two relates to aid. Tobacco producers and executives, and their accessories/principals (Bacon, Ryan, Kelley, Markman, Hayes, Starr, etc.) have made no provision to aid the victims that already exist. Indeed, they are in process of creating new and additional victims. This is rampant "willfulness in withholding relief," a holocaust of "universal malice" run rampant.

This is especially evident in view of the Michigan law, the cigarette control law, MCL 750.27, MSA 28.216, to prevent people even manufacturing, much less, selling, deleterious cigarettes, much less, having customers in mass numbers, ending up dead. It is illegal to sell them cigarette one, much less, so many of the toxic murderous things as to kill. Tobacco manufacturers and sellers could easily have obeyed the law. They never did, 1909 to present. This is a clear-cut case of mass murder, above the holocaust level. Even after the numerous lawsuits alleging harm, they continued the en masse violations. They had the means to relive the harm. They did not. Even in non-murder, non-life-threatening situations, i.e., simply as a routine duty,

"A tortfeasor has a duty to assist his victim. The initial injury creates a duty of aid and the breach of the duty is an independent tort. See Restatement (Second) of Torts, 322, Comment c (1965)." Taylor v Meirick, 712 F2d 1112, 1117 (CA 7, 1983).

Tobacco pushers' universal malice leads nonsmoker children, non-addicts, into the starter drug, then down the road, to subsequent addictions, by hooking them on tobacco, a known mind-altering drug. In effect, such drug is a mind poison, causing abulia. Since before 1858, the criminal prosecution for doing that to a person--providing a person a mind-altering drug, Carmichael, 5 Mich 10; 71 Am Dec 769, this has been illegal. As a result of ingesting such a drug, the person may come to harm, even if NOT from the drug, so providing it is a crime.

F. STARR AND THE AGENCY ARE VIOLATING THE

"TAKING VICTIMS AS THEY COME" DOCTRINE."

Whoever sets a process in motion takes the circumstances as he finds them. This includes "taking the victims as they come." It is not lawful to blame a victim for dying!! Courts refuse to let defendants blame the victim. That has been the law for a century. When a defendant tries to blame the victim, the courts say "No.":

"An instruction asked by defendant was to the effect that if, on the account of the diseased condition of Solberg, a blow of less force caused his death than would have been required to take the life of a healthy man, the defendant cannot be held guilty unless he knew of the true condition of the health [advanced tuberculosis] of the deceased. The instruction was properly refused, and the jury were informed, in substance, that the condition of Solberg's health would not excuse defendant. Surely it cannot be claimed that a homicide may be excused on the ground that the man-slayer was ignorant of the fact that his victim's feeble condition was not such as to enable him to resist the violence." State v Castello, 62 Iowa 408; 17 NW 605, 606-607 (1883).

In short, an accused such as Starr cannot do as he did, cite a victim's condition (mine) as a defense against my request for the agency to come into compliance with the laws and regulations. (His doing so, corroborates his intent to murder Michiganites and others, by intimidating other civil service officials from enforcing the laws I cite).

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For example, an accused tobacco executive cannot cite a smoker's addiction as a defense. The smoker can however cite the tobacco executives and retailers as causing the addiction, as doing that to a human constitutes illegal poisoning, Carmichael, 5 Mich 10; 71 Am Dec 769, supra.

As a matter of law, "If the exposure [to cigarettes' toxic chemicals] accelerated the death, it 'caused' the death." State v Smith, 73 Iowa 35; 34 NW 597, 601 (1887). If tobacco production or use "accelerated the death [of a smoker or nonsmoker], it 'caused the death.'" The legal principle of "taking the victim as he comes" is elaborated thus:

"If it appear from the evidence that the death of deceased was accelerated by . . . the defendant, his guilt is not extenuated, because death might have come from natural causes as a result of disease with which the deceased was afflicted at the time . . . ." Barron v State, 29 Ala App 137; 193 So 190, 191 (1939).

Characteristics of the principle that when the victim is "taken as he comes," harm to such a person is culpable, include the following:

"Death in this case was not casually caused by misadventure and thus, in the sense that the defendant's conduct was capable of causing death in and of itself, that conduct was inherently dangerous to life. . . . The requirement that the danger posed be apparent does not require that death be certain or even probable, in the sense that it is more likely than not. . . ." Why? Because an accused is guilty even when the "probability . . . is greater than in the general sense." Turner v State, 76 Wis 2d 1; 250 NW2d 706, 712-713 (1977). This is the same concept cited by Carmichael, 5 Mich 10, 17-20; 71 Am Dec 769, 762-776, "The greater susceptibility of some persons over others, to be affected by it, renders it [poison] still more dangerous," at 19/775.

Tobacco production and use meets these criteria. Resultant deaths do not occur by "misadventure," instead, tobacco is well established as "capable of producing death in and of itself." Even if addiction makes death of a smoker or some health condition in a nonsmoker, a "probability . . . greater than in the general case," that is no defense, that is part of the offense! The doctrine of "taking the victim as he comes" (or is made to become) makes clear that it is not acceptable to blame the victim. The law does not allow placing the blame there. Contrary to the Bacon, Starr, et al., felony claim, "accommodation" - a Johnny-come-lately doctrine, has no role whatever. The criminal law precedes and overrides it.

At The Nurnberg Trial, 6 FRD 69 (1946), nobody said, allergic Jews had less rights in the gas chambers, mere "accommodation" -- do only what is reasonable, whereas all the others had the full benefit of criminal law on their behalf!! The mere claim that Bacon, Starr, et al., make, that for me, the duty is lesser, is conclusive that they are genocidal maniacs, desirous of mass killing Americans, by their seeking to reduce to protection of law for even one person! The precedential effect is horrendous, genocidal, prima facie.

G. TOBACCO-CAUSED DEATHS ARE NOT UNEXPECTED.

In sustaining a conviction for the death of a victim "taken as he comes" (a person more likely to die from an effect that might not harm another person), the Wisconsin Supreme Court said

"The danger of death . . . is not completely outside the realm of common knowledge . . . Although the death may have been an occurrence unexpected by the [specific] defendant, that [ignorance defense] fact alone cannot diminish the danger in which the defendant by his conduct chose to place . . . life. On the basis of all the evidence it was reasonable for the jury to be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's conduct was imminently dangerous to another."

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"An important consideration here is . . . This court has found the relative physical characteristics of the victim and assailant to be factors which may be considered in determining whether conduct is imminently dangerous. Wangerin v State . . . 73 Wis 2d [427] at 435; 243 NW2d [448] at 452; Kasieta v State, 62 Wis 2d 564, 570-571; 215 NW2d 412, 415-416 (1974). It is not unreasonable to infer that the physical trauma . . . will be greater . . . more frightening . . . the probability . . . greater than in the general case." Turner v State, 76 Wis 2d 1; 250 NW2d 713, supra.

In other words, if the killer is more powerful than the victim, imminent danger is more evident. This principle definitely applies in my favor. "Big Tobacco" aided and abetted by its accessories/principals such as Hoover, Bacon, Starr, Ryan, Markman, Hayes, etc., is the biggest killer! The tobacco hazard is well established. The knowledge of harm is clearly more widespread than a mere "not completely outside the realm of common knowledge." Much evidence on tobacco hazards exists, including Surgeon General reports, medical literature, product liability litigation, etc. Knowledge of the hazard is within "the realm of common knowledge" -- not to mention the manufacturer and retailer duty, and their accessories/principals, to know what they are doing! That there is a "greater probability" of harm to smoker addicts and some nonsmokers is foreseeable. The word "unexpected" is not suitable to describe tobacco effects, since

"Precisely what happened is what might have been expected . . . and is the natural and probable consequence . . . Malice is presumed." Nestlerode v U.S., 74 US App DC 276, 279; 122 F2d 56, 59, supra.

H. COMPLIANCE WITH THE LEGAL DUTIES IS NOT AN "OBJECTIVE IMPOSSIBILITY."

The criminals here in essence argued that compliance with the legal principles cited by me was an objective impossibility." But they were relying on their own criminal propensities--refusal to enforce the law--as the factor preventing compliance!! Thus they wished to reduce the legal duty to mere "accommodation," mere "reasonable." (By that standard, at Auschwitz, many deaths were "reasonable," as the items were designed like cigarettes, to kill pursuant to intended design using the same key toxic chemicals as cigarettes emit -- carbon monoxide and hydrogen cyanide -- and many Jews were "allergic," thus "handicapped," so by the Bacon-Kelley-Ryan-Markman-Hayes-Starr murder notion, entitled to less protection!

It is not an "objective impossibility" in terms of legal duty which "requires the defendant to foresee and prepare for [foreseeable harm], whether it be deemed 'natural' or 'artificial.'" Pertinent concepts on the legal doctrine of "objective impossibility" are discussed and applied in United States v Y. Hata & Co, Ltd., 535 F2d 508 (CA 9, 1976) cert den 429 US 828; 97 S Ct 87; 50 L Ed 2d 92 (1976), and United States v Starr, 535 F 2d 512, especially 515 (CA 9, 1976). There is no requirement to produce tobacco products; production of tobacco products is voluntary. There is no requirement to add coumarin, for rat poison. Harm up to and including deaths of smokers and nonsmokers is foreseeable.

One can describe multiple tobacco deaths (e.g., lung cancer and SIDS) in terms of effects on tobacco victims, including those "taken as they come," or have been made to become, straight out of court decisions upholding murder convictions, e.g., "heart attack . . . failure of circulation . . . asphyxiation, the condition where the body tissues have an insufficient amount of oxygen and excess carbon dioxide." Turner, 76 Wis 2d 1; 250 NW 2d, 172, supra. Such words aptly describe the foreseeable consequences of the twin tobacco hazards--toxic chemicals and fire. There can be no "objective impossibility" defense to the charge of failure to prevent such clearly foreseeable hazards.

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It is clearly not impossible to obey, for example, the legal principle on "taking victims as they come." A 1910 ruling covers the situation of "manslaughter where death was caused by fright, fear, or nervous shock, and where the prisoner made no assault or demonstration against the deceased, and neither offered nor threatened any physical force or violence toward the person of the deceased." Ex parte Heigho, 18 Idaho 566; 110 P 1029, 1031-1032 (1910). The court added concerning the offender:

"If his [activity] violence so excited the terror of the deceased that she died from the fright, and she would not have died except for the assault, then the prisoner's act was in law the cause of her death." Ex parte Heigho, 18 Idaho 566; 110 P 1029, 1031-1032, supra. The court added,

"The law clearly covers and includes any and all means and mediums by or through which a death is caused by one engaged in an unlawful act." Heigho, supra.

Criminal culpability exists even if a person "died from the fright" of the hazard to OTHERS, without reference to the hazard to himself, and without limiting application of the legal doctrine of "taking victims as they come" to his own personal "condition"/addiction. The legal doctrine of "taking victims as they come" serves as an absolute bar to reaching the "handicap accommodation" doctrine.

I. WRONG IS NOT APPORTIONED.

Offenders take the victims as they find them, "the law does not apportion the wrong." A

"defendant cannot escape responsibility . . . under the doctrine of apportionment of wrongs, which the law does not do; the law does not apportion the wrong." Barron, 20 Ala App 137; 193 So 190, 191, supra.

Whether the wrong "was caused . . . or hastened . . . or accelerated . . . is of no moment in this inquiry." Wrong, even "superinduced" wrong, is not excused; "the law does not apportion the wrong." Barron, supra. This legal doctrine further serves as a second absolute bar to reaching the "handicap accommodation" issue.

All the words, e.g., "caused," "hastened," and "accelerated," occur in the process of tobacco harm. New and additional harm foreseeably develops in persons previously subjected to tobacco toxic substances. Cause and effect occurs in the "victims taken as they come" process, when they are changed to become. How they came to be that way (addicted, handicapped, etc.) must be noted. A prior criminal assault or murder attempt by the same perpetrators caused it, and does not reduce the crime target's rights!! (Allowing criminals to do a second assault, as the victim's rights were reduced by the prior crime, would be too horrific to contemplate, except by the murderous criminals - perps herein named). Reaching "accommodation" issues is clearly barred.

J. THE SEEKING OF SHELTER, AND DENIAL THEREOF, FURTHER SHOWS GUILT.

In a victim taken as he comes case, "the decedent what not been in good health for several months' when he was "grossly maltreated by defendant." The court added,

"It is certain that [the victim] was greatly excited by the encounter. Immediately after it occurred he applied at a house in the vicinity for shelter, stating that he was afraid . . . on account of defendant . . . . A witness says of his appearance at that time: 'He acted just scared to death' . . . His health failed rapidly from that time." State v O'Brien, 81 Iowa 88;46 NW 752, 753 (1890).

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Over the years, many smokers have sought "shelter" -- medical help for tobacco-caused conditions. Yet tobacco pushers and accessories such as K. Starr, continue the process of producing yet more victims. It may be fairly said that smoker requests for "shelter" were denied by refusal to stop harming others, and by actions that result in others becoming "addicted." A pattern of disregarding prior incidents of people applying for "shelter" constitutes "circumstances which indicate a wilful disregard of the rights or the safety of others." Nestlerode, 74 US App DC 276, 279; 122 F2d 56, 59, supra.

I too applied for shelter, and legal relief, admits the agency, perhaps 2,000 times. The 20 year refusal confirms criminality on a massive scale. Please initiate immediate arrests of all the perps named in the record. Tobacco is a "universal malice" that disables and kills people, healthy people as well as victims taken as they come or were changed to become. Like Michigan's Supreme Court, be "not disposed to resort to metaphysical subtilities to defeat a law which, if severe, is to the public benignant and humane in its severity." Carmichael, 5 Mich 10, 20; 71 Am Dec 769, 776, supra.

"Whenever . . . there is a positive physical effect produced, and the poison administered operates to derange the healthy organization of the system temporarily or permanently, we think there is an injury which, whenever it is reasonably appreciable, may be regarded as within the statute." Carmichael, 5 Mich 10, 20; 71 Am Dec 769, 776, supra.

A conviction is valid even if "death would occur . . . in less than one percent of the cases." Turner, 76 Wis 2d 1; 250 NW2d, 712, supra. (Tobacco kills at a far higher rate. "Cigarette Makers Get Away With Murder," says Elizabeth M. Whelan, Sc.D., The Detroit News, p 4B [14 March 1993].)

"That one may be guilty of homicide by a blow of not itself mortal, but which accelerates death, is proposition supported by the old case of State v Morea, 2 Ala 275, and many other authorities. Tidwell v State, 70 Ala 33, 45; Bowles v State, 58 Ala 335, 339, and cases there cited; and, if there be cases of death accelerated by a blow, in which the party delivering the blow is not responsible for the result, this is not one of them." Winter v State, 123 Ala 1; 26 So 949, 952 (1899).

Please initiate immediate arrests. Let a jury decide on prison for Starr, Bacon, Hoover, Markman, Ryan, Hayes, etc. Let's take those vicious criminals at their word: the murderous attack on me was so severe as to put me off work for approaching 20 years. An assault that violent will foreseeably result in them being jailed for the rest of their lives. Not to mention all the people at TACOM and Michigan that they have slaughtered by their obstructing the rule of law to stop the mass killings at a holocaust level.

"It was the province of the jury to determine whether the wrong of defendant caused or contributed to his [the victim's] death. The fact that he was afflicted with a disease which might have proved fatal would not justify the wrongful acts of defendant, nor constitute a defense in law. State v Smith, 73 Iowa, 35; 34 NW 597. Nor would ignorance o the part of defendant of the diseased physical condition of Stocum excuse his acts. State v Castello, 62 Iowa, 408; 17 NW 605." State v O'Brien, 81 Iowa 88; 46 NW 752, 753, supra.

As was said by Justice Denman in the Towers Case, it would be 'laying down a dangerous precedent for the future' for us [judges] to hold as a conclusion of law that manslaughter could not be committed by [mere] fright, terror,. Or nervous shock [much less, toxic chemicals!!]." Ex parte Heigho, 18 Idaho 566; 110 P 1031-1032, supra.

It would be laying down an dangerous precedent for the future to hold as a conclusion of law that murder cannot be committed by person involved in the No. 1 cause of premature death, i.e, by cigarettes' toxic chemicals.

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3. THE AGENCY FEARS EEOC REVIEW AS IT WILL SHOW I AM QUALIFIED.

The corrupt respondents' goal is to prevent review, and my supervisor Jeremiah Kator's support (his saying I am "very capable and very conscientious" and he "would recommend me for a position" [Dep, 49-51]). Morever, I could not be disqualified as the agency had issued me a qualifications waiver on the very job they now say they fired me from for not meeting qualifications! Now they are disregarding the waiver rules 5 CFR 339.104, 202 and 204 even though personnel work is neither arduous nor hazardous.

Cross-examination will review the extent of criminality and mental disorder among persons such as Edward Hoover, Emily Bacon, Stanley Kelly, etc. They hallucinate apart from normal BFOQ requirements and qualifications, that tobacco smoke is a job requirement. TACOM realizes that any/all EEOC AJ will see that claim as deranged, invented solely for the purpose of firing me, aided by bribing judges to go along with. All EEOC AJ's know that the presence of tobacco smoke in the air is NOT a BFOQ requirement, and that not meeting it, is not disqualifying. (Removal for not meeting a non-existent requirement is the most severe separation from service, and was done--to maximize the humiliation--in retaliation against me as I had (1) applied for shelter and won a Jan 1980 Report finding TACOM in violation of rules, and (2) filed class actions to protect others, provide them the same win I'd won.

BFOQ's must be based on objective job analysis. Criteria for creating BFOQ's are set in Army Pamphlet 611-2 (June 1962); Federal Personnel Manual (FPM) Chapter 335 (Sep 1968); FPM Supp 335-1 (June 1969); 5 CFR 339; 29 CFR 1607, 29 CFR 1613.705, etc., none of which TACOM obeyed. More legal principles for qualifications are in 15 Am Jur 2d Civil Rights 112, Job Requirements (1976).

Unbribed courts say that BFOQ's must be applied across the board, not just to one person (me, as TACOM had done, i.e., disparate treatment). BFOQ's must be stated in advance, not fabricated retroactively, i.e., must be pre-listed in hiring and medical forms, tests, be actually required for the job, checked for in background investigations, etc. The process is described in unbribed case law, e.g., U.S. v City of Chicago, 549 F2d 415, 429-434 (CA 7, 1977). Hoover, Bacon, Kelley, etc., insane as they are, know that there are minimal medical requirements for personnel work, due to the nature of the job, and those few are on the "Health Qualification Placement Form." Mine were use of fingers, rapid mental and muscular coordination, near and far and color vision, hearing, clear speech, and mental and emotional stability. I meet them all. TACOM's own Dr. Francis Holt certified I met them, and never certified otherwise. EEOC review would reveal such facts in minutes.

They also foresee that an EEOC AJ will find that the State of Michigan Unemployment (MESC) Office had agreed with me that I do meet the BFOQ's. So, pursuant to MCL 421.28(1)(c), MSA 17.530.28(1)(c), MESC granted me unemployment compensation.

Corroborating MESC, the U.S. Dept of Labor's Office of Workers Compensation programs (OWCP) said I met the qualifications requirements. It repeatedly said I was able to work March 1980 to present, thereby overruling Crazy Eddy. Pursuant to 5 USC 8151(b)(1), that OWCP finding entitles me to priority consideration. The Office of Personnel Management also agreed that there is no job qualification requirement such as mentally disordered TACOMERS hallucinated. Corroborating further, the Michigan Rehabilitation Service agreed. It even sent supportive letters to EEOC on my behalf, rejecting the hallucinations of a tobacco smoke BFOQ. Contrary to those insane delusions, tobacco smoke is not "in the requirements for any position," 5 USC 2302(b)(6). No such requirement is published pursuant to law, 5 USC 552.(a)(1). These rules are obeyed for others, not for me. Starr is well aware that review must be prevented; once the TACOM criminals go do--accessory/principal--goes down too.

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Courts, when unbribed, reject an alleged requirement "not reasonably related to the duties of the position McDonnell Douglas Corp v Green, 411 US 792; 93 S Ct 1817; 36 L Ed 2d 668 (1973)," cited in Hill v Nettleton, 455 F Supp 514, 519 (1978). In that case, a Ph.D. was not a job requirement, notwithstanding the employer's false claim otherwise. In my case, there is nothing in any job description or BFOQ even mentioning the presence of tobacco smoke in the air, much less as a job requirement, much less, as so essential that failure to meet it, overrides everything, including qualification waivers, performance awards, doctors' letters, supervisory recognition, pay increases, etc.. The claim that Starr supported so maliciously at the Supreme Court -- that there is such a requirement -- is simply wrong. Worse, the claim is the result of TACOMERS' undisputed drug addiction (type cited in Army Pamphlet 600-63-7 p 14) and resultant severe mental derangement, including acalculia (above cited, inability to even count right) and abulia (damaged impulse controls) hallucinating such a BFOQ! Starr fears review, as it would show his role as accessory/principal to the crimes of clearly mentally unbalanced individuals. No wonder he has obstructed it for eight years!

To sane, unbribed people, "Workmen are not employed to smoke," Maloney Tank Mfg Co v Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp, 49 F2d 146 (CA 10, 1931). There is "no necessity to fill the air with tobacco smoke in order to carry on defendant's business," Shimp v N J Bell Telephone Co, 145 NJ Super 516, 523; 368 A2d 408, 411 (1976). (The Shimp case wherein Shimp had been fired like me, is one that gave rise to the Department of Defense's 32 CFR 203 (1977) no-smoking regulation, and in turn to the Army's AR 1-8 (1977), so as to prevent such firings.

Starr and accessories know that in Michigan especially, smoking is not a BFOQ. Cigarettes are illegal in Michigan, illegal since 1909, pursuant to MCL 750. 27, MSA 28.216. Far from cigarette smoke being a BFOQ, it is illegal. An EEOC AJ would see that suppressing smoker conduct, even if done "'brusquely,'" is legally valid, Diefenthal v C.A.B., 681 F2d 1039, 1042 (1982); Jacobs v Mich Mental Health Dept, 88 Mich App 503; 276 NW2d 627 (1979); Keyser Canning Co v Klots Throwing Co, 94 W Va 346; 118 SE 521 (1923).

Even if the hallucination that cigarette smoke is a BFOQ were true (it is not), "the job requirements and qualifications had never been formally changed," Sabol v Snyder, 524 F2d 1009, 1011 (1975) . Starr fears letting an honest investigator or EEOC AJ "examine the position descriptions," look for "legitimate job requirements," Coleman v Darden, 595 F2d 533 (1979), Stalkfleet v U.S. Postal Service, 6 MSPB 536, 541 (1981). Starr knows that it is way too late to forge a retroactive-to-1980 job description with a BFOQ for tobacco smoke. Airborne tobacco smoke only arises from preferences in any case; preferences have no legal standing, Knotts v U.S., 128 Ct Cl 489; 121 F Supp 630 (1954), and Diaz v Pan Am Airways, Inc., 442 F2d 385 (1971) cert den 404 US 950 (1971).

Starr knows he lied to the Supreme Court, that the Hoover-Bacon hallucination that cigarette smoke is a BFOQ is not true. So Starr knows that, contrary to what he told the Supreme Court, neither my possession nor non-possession of such a "skill" is relevant to the job. It cannot be used as the basis for the "decision to terminate" me. In law, "'(p)obsession of a skill not needed to meet the requirements of the job cannot be considered in making a determination regarding equality of skill.' 29 C.F.R. 800.125." Bullock v Pizza Hut, Inc, 429 F Supp 424, 430 (MD La, 1977). The mere fact that Hoover-Bacon relied on a non-job-requirement as the basis for the "decision to terminate" me for purported inability to meet same, is conclusive as to their insanity, hazardousness, and status as "persons requiring treatment" pursuant to Michigan law MCL 330.1401, MSA 14.800(401).

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With respect to smoking (behavior spewing high levels of toxic chemicals into the air), 29 CFR 1910.1000 (alluded to in the 1964 Surgeon General Report, p 60, listing cigarette chemicals vs the legal limits) bans doing it. Starr, due to his private practice wherein he is responsible as an employer to obey the law, knows very well that the safety duty

"is unqualified and absolute," not merely "reasonable," or what "the average workplace" may be doing, Natl R & C Co Inc v O.S.H.R.C., 489 F2d 1265, supra. "[T]he benefit of worker health [is] above all other considerations." Am Textile Mfrs Inst v Donovan, 452 US 509; 101 S Ct 2490; 69 L Ed 2d 202, supra. 29 USC 651 et seq.,bans hazardous conduct, i.e., even if, at any specific employer, compliance "had never before been attained," Am Fed of Labor, Etc. v Marshall, 617 F2d 636, 658 (1979) aff'd 452 US 490, supra. "Otherwise the Act's commitment to protect workers might be forever frustrated."

Starr knows he lied to the Supreme Court, pretending that the applicable duty in my case is much lower!

Starr further knows that the Hoover-Bacon hallucination that cigarette smoke is a BFOQ "suffers from a further inadequacy in that it failed to comply with 29 C.F.R. 1607.5(b)(3), which requires that criteria used to predict job performance 'must represent major or critical work behaviors as revealed by careful job analysis.'" Albemarle Paper Co v Moody, 422 US 405, 432 n 30; 95 S Ct 2362; 45 L Ed 280 (1975); U.S. v Chicago, 549 F2d 415, 431 (CA 7, 1970). At 432, "Job-relatedness can only be determined where the criteria for selection are clearly identified." As the Hoover-Bacon claim was hallucination-driven, there was no "job analysis" at all, much less, a "careful" one. As job analysis is done for others, "Comparison with a single employee" for whom done "is sufficient" for me to prevail, McDonald v Santa Fe Trail Transp Co, 427 US 273 (1976); Clark Oil & Refining Co v Golden, 448 NE2d 958, 964 (Il, 1983).

Starr knows that the Hoover-Bacon hallucination that cigarette smoke is a BFOQ is not "objective." Unbribed courts require objectivity. "In U.S. v Bethlehem Steel Corp, 446 F2d 652, 655 (2nd Cir. 1971), the court identified the lack of "fixed or reasonably objective standards and procedures . . ." as a discriminatory practice. Smokers' deranged, abulic desire to spew toxic chemicals into the air creates no change in my job description. "Assuming arguendo that the hopes of some [smoker] employees will not be met, their hopes arise from an illegal system." 29 CFR 1910.1000 and MCL 750.27, MSA 28.216 ban their activity; 29 USC 706.(7)(B) and Standard Form 78 ban even hiring them, example at Austin v State, 101 Tenn 563, 48 SW 305, 306 (1898), citing Army refusal to hire smokers due to the danger they pose to themselves!!!!!!!!

"The proof discloses no objective standards based on education, experience, ability, length of service, reliability, or aptitude to account for the [unequal] treatment." U.S. v Jacksonville Terminal Co, 451 F2d 418, 449 (CA 5, 1971). "Elusive, purely subjective standards must give way to objectivity." Brown v Gaston Co Dye Mach Co, 457 F2d 1377, 1382 (1972).

So Starr fears that, if he does not obstruct review of my qualifications, issues of the Hoover-Bacon insanity, their hallucinating an elusive, bizarre BFOQ for which no objective documentation exists--would arise; and a counselor, investigator, or EEOC AJ would make findings showing Starr to be an accessory/principal. He can't trust them; their mind is erratic, in one personnel job situation, they say tobacco smoke-in-the-air is a BFOQ; in the next, they say no!! Review by an investigator or EEOC AJ would notice their inconsistency, their insanity; and Starr and accomplices are terrified of this happening. Thus the near decade obstruction of review.

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In addition, Starr knows (due to his prosecutorial experience) that review would find the long pattern of agency fraud, concealment, and misrepresentation. In context with Col. Benacquista's self-confessed extortion, violation of the anti-racketeering law, 18 USC 1001, would be obvious. The crimes continued, each time they cite a non-existent BFOQ and/or criminally obstruct my getting review of same, and/or bribe someone to go along.

4. EEOC HAS ALREADY VERIFIED THE AGENCY PATTERN OF REFUSING ME REVIEW.

Starr knows that EEOC has already verified that the agency refused me access to the EEO review system beginning in February 1980, and continuing to present. Verification:

EEOC decision 01.80.0273 - 01.81.2239 (23 Feb 1982). This decision arise due to EEO Officer Kenneth Adler's insanity, abulia (impaired ethical and impulse controls), acalculia (inability to count cited p 5 above), delusions of grandeur that he was above rules and need not do case processing on merits. His insanity was so severe that, even after being reversed and told to do processing on merits, he refused. It was to protect him (among other purposes) from being removed on an insanity/medical disqualification charge, that Attorney Emily Bacon arranged with U.S. Attorney personnel including Roy C. Hayes, Jr., Gary Maveal, Stephen Markman, Kathleen Moro Nesi, etc., to bribe judges, so as to prevent review on merits from ever occurring--a bribery pattern at which she was highly successful, as review on merits has still not occurred nearly 20 years later.

Ed. Note: “The U.S. government, through the CIA, disburses tens of millions of dollars each year in cash bribes. Bribery is a standard operating technique of the U.S. government, via the CIA, but it is a criminal offense for U.S. businesses,” says long-time CIA Agent John Stockwell, In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story (New York: W.W. Norton & Co, Inc., 1978), p 246.
The CIA is not the only agency by which the U.S. government bribes.
“The proof of the pattern or practice supports an inference that any particular decision, during the period in which the policy was in force, was made in pursuit of that policy.” Teamsters v U.S., 431 US 324, 362; 97 S Ct 1843, 1868; 52 L Ed 2d 396, 431 (1977).

EEOC decision 05.82.0275, 4 Mar 1983 (different incidents are different cases). This seems such a basic point as would hardly need a three page decision. But inv view of the agency pattern of hiring insane EEO Officers, it was needed--to state that simple fact to K. Adler. Again, the same refusal to act as in the above decision: no compliance, and bribery to prevent compliance.

EEOC decision 01.91.0498 (14 March 1991). This decision directed counseling by the agency regional office. By then, EEOC had given up on TACOM. Its pattern of hiring insane EEO Officers and of bribing federal judges to go along, was insurmountable. So EEOC deemed it wise to elevate review to a higher level. EEOC underestimated the massive corruption in the Department of Army. The regional EEO office is, like TACOM's, opposed to review beginning.

EEOC decision 01.92.3611 (4 Dec 92). The agency must show by proof that my current issues are the same as those the court had a decade ago+. This point seems too basic to need elaborating. A sane EEO Officer would have understood the point without needing a formal decision telling him!

EEOC decision 01.93.4758 (8 April 1994). This decision noted my complaint of being refused the EEO review process with respect to the removal).

EEOC decision 01.93.4855 (8 April 1994) (showing agency refusal to deal with issues, including my qualifications, and telling the counselor "not to deal with the pattern").

The EEOC decision 01.80.0273 (1982) says the underlying start of the situation best:

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"The record indicates that as early as February, 1980, appellant was denied EEO

counseling and prevented from filing further complaints." (page 2, top).

Starr knows that the refusal went so far as to deny me review of the "decision to terminate" me cited by EEOC Hearing Officer Henry Perez, Jr., 9 April 1980, and as admitted by the agency in a 27 Jan 1982 memo by supervisor Carma Averhart. Once review begins, the record will show (already shows) that I am educated and committed freedom of speech in favor of laws, case law, and rules against smoking. (Army Reg 385-10 requires Army employees to be whistle blowers on violations of the type I reported). My education and willingness to read and support rules, and blow the whistle on violations, led to my winning the 25 Jan 1980 USACARA Report that the 2/23/82 EEOC decision references at p 2. The educated Grievance Examiner, Norma Kennedy, respected my education and knowledge and ruled in my favor.

Education and knowledge are good. But some people (e.g., Hoover, Bacon, Kelley, etc.) hate or resent educated, knowledgeable people. They were unlawfully hired in violation of federal hiring form Standard Form 78.2 This is a situation "when knowledge was treated as a crime." (Quote from Fergus M. Bordewich, "City Lost in the Jungle," 152 Reader's Digest 112-120, at p 118 (May 1998) (discussing the hatred, under smoker Pol Pot, that Cambodian Khmer Rouge Communists had for educated people, leading to the Khmer genocide against same.) (Such killings by smokers thus add to the number of killings cited by the government--37,000,000--in its 1978 DHEW Report.

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2 Starr, as a hiring official himself, well knows that pursuant to the law of "negligent hiring," an applicant (Bacon, Hoover, Kelley, Benacquista, Grimmett, etc.) must show more than merely absence of bad data but also affirmative positive statements of non-dangerousness to self/others. See [William J. Connelly,] "How To Navigate The River Of Legal Liability When Hiring," 63 Personnel Journal 32-46, especially p 38 (March 1986).

29 USC 706.(7)(B) and SF 78, Certificate of Medical Examination, preclude hiring persons with "medical findings which . . . would make him a hazard to himself or others," e.g., smokers. Pursuant to Ryder v U. S., 515 US 177; 115 S Ct 2031; 132 L Ed 2d 136 (1995), an appellant can challenge the validity of an adjudicator's appointment. Citing the mental disorder of smokers Hoover, Benacquista, Averhart, etc., is a Ryder matter. They were not lawfully hired, and thus not proper deciding officials.. Showing invalidity of their appointment involves citing medical data on smoker mental disorder in, e.g., the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 3rd - 4th eds; the Int'l Classification of Disease, 9th ed; Mich Law Rev, Nov 1982; their medical files; case law on smoker mental disorder; and anticipated testimony. Hoover, Benacquista, Averhart, etc,. have mental disorder and behavior dangerous to themselves, others, and property. Hired in violation of hiring rules, they were unfit adjudicators, Ryder, supra.

Ryder, supra, follows case law on the duty to do proper hiring. Bowen v Illinois C R Co, 136 F 306 (CA 8, 1905); 70 LRA 915 (1905); Duckworth v Apostalis, 208 F 936 (D C Tenn, 1913); Davidson v Chinese Republic Restaurant Co, 201 Mich 389; 167 NW 967 (1928); Annot., 40 ALR 1215 (1926); 114 ALR 1041 (1938); Bradley v Stevens, 329 Mich 556; 46 NW2d 382 (1951); Annot., 34 ALR2d 372, 390 9 (1954); 29 Am Jur 267; Hersh v Kentfield Builders, 385 Mich 410; 189 NW2d 286 (1971); Samson v Saginaw, 393 Mich 393; 224 NW2d 843 (1975); Ponticas v KMS Investments, 331 NW2d 907 (Minn, 1983); Welsh Mfg v Pinkerton's, Inc, 474 A2d 436 (1984); 44 ALR4th 603 (1984); Kurtz v City of North Miami, 653 So 2d 1025 (Fla, 1995); Fortunoff F J & S, Inc v N Y St Div of H R, 227 App Div 2d 557; 642 NYS2d 710 (1996); Stevens v Inland Waters, Inc, 220 Mich App 212; 559 NW2d 61 (1996). Employers have a duty to ascertain applicants' criminal and dangerous propensities prior to a hiring decision, especially when there is a pattern of such conduct or propensity, as with TACOM's smokers, dangerous people like Hoover, Bacon, Benacquista, Averhart, etc.

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In retaliation, as I am educated and knowledgeable on medical, science, chemistry, psychology, etc. facts that they resent, they made the angry February 1980 "decision to terminate" me that EEOC AJ Henry Perez, Jr. promptly noted in April 1980. Personnel Officer Edward Hoover, in an insane/abulic fit of rage in retaliation against me, made the decision, with fellow racketeers Col. John Benacquista, MG Oscar Decker, Jr., etc. Ed Hoover was hired in violation of Standard Form 78. To protect him (among other purposes) from being removed on an insanity/medical disqualification charge, Attorney Bacon arranged with U.S. Attorney personnel including R. Hayes, G. Maveal, S. Markman, K. Nesi, etc., to bribe judges, so as to prevent review on merits from ever occurring--a bribery pattern at which she was highly successful, as review on merits has still not occurred nearly 20 years later. Starr fears review, and it has been obstructed since 1991, as he knows review will identify him as an accessory/principal

5. AFTER RETROACTIVELY BASING THE DECISION TO TERMINATE ME

ON INABILITY TO BAN SMOKING, THE AGENCY BANNED IT,

SHOWING THAT ITS INABILITY CLAIM WAS FRAUDULENT,

MISREPRESENTATION, AND CONCEALMENT OF ACTUAL ABILITY--

HENCE I NEED NOTIFICATION OF HOW TO OBTAIN

REVIEW OF THAT SUBSEQUENTLY DISCOVERED DATA.

Starr knows that he defended and covered-up for Hoover, etc.'s lying, their knowingly false after they removed me, that they could not eliminate their own and others' tobacco smoking conduct. (Starr knows the claim is a crock; that's not a basis for a removal--only gross misconduct/performance deficiency by me re which there would have had to have been a long term effort to have helped me improve, before the last resort (removal) would be effected!!

Assuming arguendo the agency claim that I am a mere former employee (despite its never showing any adjudicator a 5 USC 7513.(b) notice of charges), former employees have standing to challenge agency actions which presently affect them and for which remedial action would be available if they prevailed. Clay Laborde v Postal Service, EEOC Request No 05910521 (7/25/1991). This applies here. The false data provided to the Supreme Court can be replaced with true data; Starr can be disbarred; the lying judges can be jailed; the review process I sought in 1980 and on can be begun. I had chosen the EEO forum. A complainant's first forum choice -- here, of EEOC, is binding. Carreno v Dept of Army, 22 MSPB 515, 518 (1984).

After the decision to terminate me based on its claim of inability to ban smoking, which Starr defended b lying about the impossibility of banning smoking, the agency then did just that--banned it! The ban shows that both Starr and the agency had misrepresented, concealed, committed fraud concerning, its ability. So even if review had occurred as alleged, the civil service rule on reversals, and case law, provide for reopening. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co v Hartford Empire Co, 322 US 238; 64 S Ct 997; 88 L Ed 1250 (1944).

MSPB refused to accept jurisdiction of my case as EEOC Decision 03810087, April 1983, notes. As EEOC's decision is undisputed, it is clear that I had chosen the EEO forum. A complainant's first forum choice is binding. Carreno v Dept of Army, 22 MSPB 515, 518 (1984). Even if this were a reopening due to the new evidence of agency fraud, the agency must notify me of how to go about seeking "reopening." That is especially essential here, as evidently MSPB allows reopening issues. Anderson v Dept of Transp, FAA, 46 MSPR 341, 349-350 (1990). Relief sought: order the agency to notify me of the "reopening" process, and how it is to be invoked.

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Notifying me of my rights will help fulfill the agency duty of notification of rights, pursuant to case law that agencies must tell potential appellants their rights so they can make an informed choice. Scharf v Department of Air Force, 710 F2d 1572, 1575 (CA Fed, 1983). Here, I have been trying since the new data was discovered, to obtain such notice from the agency. But it refuses to notify me. So please order it to notify me--so I can obtain review of the agency fraud, concealment, misrepresentation on its ability to ban tobacco smoking conduct by others. We now see a further motive for the agency refusal, Starr's tobacco lobbyist role. Review will show him as an accessory/principal in local personnel's crimes. Starr wants to be on the Supreme Court. He knows that his involvement in this scandal will foreseeably wreck his chances. So obstructing my right to review goes on and on.

6. THE AGENCY COMMITTED ADDITIONAL MISREPRESENTATION

CONCEALMENT, AND FRAUD, BY COMMITTING FRAUD ON THE

COURT (JUDGE COOKE) VIA BRIBERY / CORRUPTION OF/WITH MY

THEN ATTORNEY TO ABANDON MY CASE, HENCE, IT WAS NEVER

PRESENTED, I.E., NO FULL AND FAIR OPPORTUNITY OF

PRESENTATION IN COURT HAS EVER OCCURRED.

Starr knows that Hoover, Bacon, et al., want fraudulent court decisions honored, no matter how illegally, immorally, and fraudulently obtained. It is not necessary, indeed, is unlawful, to follow immoral orders. The Nurnberg Trial, 6 FRD 69 (1946). 3 This is especially so when bribery of the federal court is undisputed.

Starr knows that honoring even legitimately obtained court decisions only applies if I had already had both (a) "a full and fair opportunity" for me to have presented my case, and (b) prior "adverse findings," U.S. v Utah Construction & Mining Co, 384 US 394, 422; 86 S Ct 1545, 1560; 16 L Ed 2d 642 (1966). As the agency had refused me the EEO forum I had chosen, p 12, n 4, and EEO review on merits never began, it is clear that the agency cannot show compliance with either criterion!! No "full and fair opportunity" for me to present my case has even started. Starr knows he helped obstruct such review from even beginning.

But the agency had done much worse. It committed fraud on the court. Via bribery / corruption of / with my then attorney, it lied to the court, pretending case settlement had occurred! Thus dismissing my case. Such fraud on the court is clearly of the type warranting reopening pursuant to Hazel-Atlas Glass Co, 322 US 238; 64 S Ct 997, supra, criteria (fraud on the court preventing it adjudicating the case on the

________________

3 The Nurnberg Trial, 6 FRD 69, applied a legal concept held by, e.g., pre-Civil War Abolitionists. The murderers, torturers, thieves, and rapists known as slave-holders, often tobacco farmers, enjoyed raping and torturing slaves, especially women. This tobacco scum controlled Congress in the 1850's (as they may seem to do now as farseeing abolitionists warned if they were not properly disposed of for their murderous, treasonous acts in the Civil War.) That slaver scum got a Fugitive Slave Act (1850) passed, to forbid Northerners from rescuing torture and kidnap victims a.k.a. slaves. That ultra-immoral law, passed by a vile pro-slaver/tobacco farmer Congress, and supported by court orders, was disrespected and defied by moral Yankees. Their revulsion at the brazenness of such perverts, demanding that Northerners aid them in their kidnaping, raping, murderous ways, was a key factor in the election of Abraham Lincoln (1860). Moral people understood that an immoral court order or law, was not valid, and was to be defied. The Nurnberg Trial, 6 FRD 69 (1946) codified that wise concept, after Hitler, a smoker (expelled from school at age 8 for smoking) and adherent to tobacco farmer kidnaping, torture, robbery and murder concepts, followed their example (they'd reduced 17,000,000 black slaves to 3,000,000) and got rid of 6 million or so victims.

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merits). That fraud on the court prima facie denied me "a full and fair opportunity" to have presented my case, and (b) prior "adverse findings," U.S. v Utah Construction & Mining Co, 384 US 422; 86 S Ct 1560; 16 L Ed 2d 642, supra.

The very act of arranging the fraud on the court was itself a separate and distinct discriminatory act, something the agency does not do to other litigants. But whether treating the matter as a separate act, or as fraud warranting reopening, please order that the agency notify me of the right to secure review, whether called initial or reopening type--so I can obtain the review that the agency fraud, concealment, misrepresentation so egregiously prevented and forestalled.

7. THE AGENCY ALSO COMMITTED MISREPRESENTATION, CONCEALMENT,

AND FRAUD, VIA BRIBING SIXTH CIRCUIT JUDGES TO CLAIM I

APPLIED TO RETIRE MYSELF(!), AND COMPOUNDED IT BY OBSTRUCTING

THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION I SOUGHT AND WHICH HAD BEGUN.

It is undisputed that the agency (via the unlawfully hired, mentally disordered individuals Carma Averhart and Edward Hoover, and bribed [with promotion promise] coworker Thomas Alef), applied in April 1981 to retire me. I then sought EEO review. (MSPB lacks jurisdiction of such matters, so could did not review it; absent EEO review, there has been none). But EEO Officer K. Adler, was himself mentally disordered as above stated so refused to let me have review. Adler's mental disorder was so severe as to aid and abet even such an outrageous agency application, disparate treatment, as it does not file disability applications on others similarly situated. Starr aided and abetted that in turn.

EEOC had ordered case processing (examples, p 26). Courts are to enforce EEOC processing orders. White v DHHS, 30 FEP (BNA) 880, 882 (D DC, 1981); Margules v Block, 38 FEP (BNA) 1244 (D Or, 1981); Houston v Nimmo, 670 F2d 1375, 1378 (CA 9, 1982); Moore v Devine, 780 F2d 1559, 1563 (CA 11, 1986). I had already gone through the process of getting an order to do case review. I wanted case processing; I'd won EEOC orders directing it; I was/am full-time gathering evidence to present to USACARA Investigators--elaborating the evidence I had previously gathered to win the 25 Jan 1980 USACARA Report. Doing otherwise than seeking and preparing for administrative review, would defeat the purpose of having an administrative forum. Moore, 780 F2d 1563, supra. I know how to win with a USACARA Investigator, and had/have no intention of presenting my case to a judge prior to/without the normal situation (full administrative investigation) with which I am familiar and experienced.

Starr knew that based on my grievance processing and crime prevention background, win record, and the pattern of corruption among judges, I want/ed to avoid premature action (i.e., prior to normal review--counseling, investigation, hearing). The record of corruption among judges and rampant bribery thereof is not one to inspire confidence in judges, and certainly not to go to one without full administrative review first. See data such as

The Finest Judges Money Can Buy, by Charles R. Ashman (Los Angeles: Nash Pub, 1973);

Dillow, Gordon L., "Thank You For Not Smoking," 32 American Heritage 94-107 (February-March 1981) (p 103 admits bribery of officials, and disinformation, by the tobacco lobby);

Higgins, Jack M., Luciano's Luck (New York: Stein and Day, 1981) (relates governmental cooperation with the Mafia dating back to World War II); Kwitny, Jonathan, The Crimes of Patriots: A True Tale of Dope, Dirty Money, and the CIA (New York: W. W. Norton, 1987) (this Wall Street Journal investigative reporter -- and biographer of Pople John Paul II -- gives examples of government officials including the Army smuggling drugs into the U.S.); Levine, Michael, The Big White Lie (New York: Thunder's Mouth Press, 1993) (from a Drug Enforcement Agency [1965-1989] perspective, he labels the war on drugs an "illusion" due to officials undermining it so much); Lieberman, Jethro K., How The Government Breaks the Law (New York: Stein and Day, 1972) (has many examples of legislator, police, and judicial lawlessness); Lockwood, Brocton and Harlan H. Mendenhall, Operation Greylord: Brocton Lockwood's Story (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1989) (analysis of bribery of judges); McCoy, Prof. Alfred W., The Politics of Heroin (New York: Harper and Row, 1972) (cites some of the government role in promoting drug abuse); New York City Commission to Investigate Alleged Police Corruption, Knapp Commission Report on Police Corruption (1972) (analyzes how police have been pressured or corrupted to not enforce laws, just as pre-Civil War, they were not allowed to enforce Northern states' anti-kidnaping laws; while not all police are corrupt, those who are not, typically look the other way with respect to corrupt colleagues, so prosecutions are rare); The Surgeon General Report (1998) "sends an urgent alarm" that "shows tobacco's increasing grip on racial and ethnic minorities." (Purpose: Cigarettes are a confederate product dating from the slavery era. Michigan was an abolitionist state, and abolitionists included anti-tobacco activities among their efforts. Targeting of minority youth to begin the drug lifestyle by initiating them into the starter drug delivery agent, cigarettes, is part of the long-established pattern of unreconstructed southerners to re-enslave blacks via the prison system, and to injure the North's people via crime, and the North's economy via the post-Civil War en masse establishment of a vast prison gulag and criminal justice system of enormous cost, due to the massively increased amount of crime which the joint confederate/organized crime/tobacco cartel have set in process, aided and abetted by Confederates-in-attitude government officials and legislators.); Tate, Cassandra, "In the 1800's, antismoking was a burning issue," 20 Smithsonian 107-117 (July 1989) (p 115 admits bribery of officials, and disinformation, by the tobacco lobby; Tuohy, James and Rob Warden, Greylord: Justice, Chicago Style (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1989) (cites judges' willingness to make money from crime, and willingness to take bribes from defendants, 90% of whom are typically smokers; as with the Knapp Commission situation, those judges who don't do bribes, typically do not turn in colleagues who do).

United States v Sheriff Goins, 593 F2d 88 (CA 8, 1979) (has the official court-written narrative of the criminal prosecution and conviction of a sheriff for taking bribes to not enforce cigarette-related law).

No ignorance plea allowed: as long ago as 1914, Thomas Edison cited one of the many factors/chemicals causing cigarettes' deleteriousness -- acrolein.

Pre-1930's judges used to denounce the cigarette role in crime. Then they went silent 1940's on, then the massive judge bribery scandals of 1970's-on came about. For information on the gateway drug delivery agent, cigarettes, which are the typical means of initiating children into the drug life style, the starter drug, click here. That site has data on Michigan's gateway drug -- cigarette -- prevention act.

The above materials concern judges and officials who were caught taking bribes and/or doing other corrupt activities! When one person is caught speeding, hundreds of others are not caught. Might this be true of judges and other officials as well?!

Obviously, due to Michigan's role as an abolitionist state opposing the Confederate product tobacco, drug prevention meant in 1909, eliminating the starter drug the unrepentant, unreconstructed Confederates were producing en masse. (And adulterating with coumarin, for rat posion, as a revenge measure). But as you suspect, that 1909 law is never enforced.

The role of cigarettes in initiating vulnerable people into the drug lifestyle has been known since at least the 1850's. That's how the Confederate Army -- often tobacco producers -- after the war knew to use tobacco as a revenge measure against the North. Naturally, our Michigan abolitionist ancestors who knew the Confederate's vile mindset, tried to ban the starter drug delivery agent, cigarettes, that the unreconstructed South was producing en masse.

The widespread refusal of government officials to enforce the anti-cigarette law has the obvious effect. What the law intended to prevent, is not being prevented, so we have an epidemic of cigarette effects as a " natural and probable consequence" and deaths at a level above the holocaust and genocide level of World War II. Hitler killed 6-10 million people worldwide. Tobacco is killing 37 million people in the U.S. alone. The Royal College of Physicians, in its book Smoking and Health Now (London: Pitman Medical and Scientific Pub Co, 1971), p 9, called cigarettes' then body count ("annual death toll of some 27,500"), the new "holocaust." Murder case precedents corroborate that analysis.

Tobacco is a Confederate product; tobacco farmers were lawless before the Civil War slavery was illegal and unconstitutional). Their lawlessness then went unpunished. There was no deterrent, and their descendants continue producing tobacco, and for revenge, began shortly after the Civil War, adding the adulterant coumarin (otherwise used, for example, for rat poison). The government should be protecting us, and the media should be warning us, but we see from the above writings, and from our own experience, that neither is doing so.
Bribery of officials is not a new phenomenon. The case of Fletcher v Peck, 10 US 87; 3 L Ed 162 (1810), case involved wholesale bribery of the entire Georgia legislature. The bribers wanted "special interest legislation" to get legislators to pass a law granting vast acreage of valuable state land to the bribers. They used bribery. (That era was before the modern refined term of "campaign contribution!) The Legislature passed the land grant bill as the bribers wanted.