The agency forced my case to the corrupt Chicago area. I had chosen EEOC review. The agency refused to process my EEO requests though required to do so by 29 CFR § 1613.403. I was right to not want review in Chicago and Cook County. corruption was rampant, as the "Operation Greylord" prosecutions revealed. Recently, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Circuit Court of Cook County is a criminal enterprise. United States v Murphy, 768 F2d 1518, 1531 (CA 7, 1985) cert den 475 US 1012; 106 S Ct 1188; 89 L Ed 2d 304 (1986).
The United States Supreme Court recently acknowledged the judicial corruption in Cook County, when it stated that Judge "Maloney was one of many dishonest judges exposed and convicted through 'Operation Greylord', a labyrinthine federal investigation of judicial corruption in Chicago," Bracy v Gramley, 520 US 899; 117 S Ct 1793; 138 L Ed 2d 97 (June 9, 1997), pursuant to the conviction of the judge in United States v Maloney, 71 F3d 645 (CA 7, 1995) cert den 519 US 927; 117 S Ct 295; 136 L Ed 2d 214 (1996).
Judges have gone so far as to accept bribes in murder cases, e.g., In re Brennan, 65 NY2d 564; 493 NYS 2d 549; 483 NE 2d 484 (1985), and Ohio v McGettrick, 40 Ohio App 3d 25; 531 NE2d 755 (1988). So for other adjudicators to be taking bribes in other cases, including this, is not at all surprising. Mine would be an especial target as I am a whistleblower reporting non-compliance with laws against cigarette smuggling, manufacture, sales, and use. As most criminals are smokers, this has the potential of reducing crime, hence, reducing the population base from which corrupt officials snd judges draw much of the bribes they receive.
The MSPB adjudicators, U.S. Attorney staff, and the federal judges of whom I sought aid for relief from the corrupt Chicago MSPB action did not report the criminal activities of the others. They, and Starr in turn, became principals in the criminal activity, 18 USC § 1.
According to Citizens for Legal Responsibility®, the criminal activities that the Federal Courts found in the Circuit Court of Cook County still exist, and are today under the care, custody and control of Judge Greylord II (Chief Judge Donald O'Connell), so the Circuit Court of Cook County remains a criminal enterprise.
Some officials including judges may have immunity for their official or judicial functions. But none, including judges, have judicial immunity for criminal acts, aiding, assisting, or conniving with others who perform a criminal act, or for their administrative and ministerial duties. When a judge has a duty to act, he does not have discretion - he is then not performing a judicial act, he is performing a ministerial act.
Judicial immunity does not exist for judges who engage in criminal activity, for judges who connive with, aid and abet the criminal activity of another judge, or to a judge for damages sustained by a person who has been harmed by the judge's connivance with, aiding and abeting, another judge's criminal activity.
The Illinois Supreme Court has held that "if the magistrate has not such jurisdiction, then he and those who advise and act with him, or execute his process, are trespassers." Von Kettler et al. v Johnson, 57 Ill 109 (1870)
Under Federal law which is applicable to all states, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that if a court is "without authority, its judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void; and form no bar to a recovery sought, even prior to a reversal in opposition to them. They constitute no justification; and all persons concerned in executing such judgments or sentences, are considered, in law, as trespassers." Elliot v Piersol, 26 U.S. (1 Pet) 328, 340 (1828).
The Illinois Supreme Court has held that if a court "could not hear the matter upon the jurisdictional paper presented, its finding that it had the power can add nothing to its authority, it had no authority to make that finding." The People v Brewer, 128 Ill 472, 483 (1928). The judges listed below had no legal authority (jurisdiction) to hear or rule on certain matters before them. They acted without jurisdiction.
When judges (e.g., MSPB adjudicators) act when they do not have jurisdiction to act, or they enforce a void order (an order issued by a judge without jurisdiction), they become trespassers of the law,and are engaged in treason (see below). A federal court in Yates v Village of Hoffman Estates, Illinois, 209 F Supp 757 (ND Ill, 1962) held that "not every action by a judge is in exercise of his judicial function. . . . it is not a judicial function for a judge to commit an intentional tort even though the tort occurs in the courthouse."
When a judge acts as a trespasser of the law, when a judge does not follow the law, the judge loses subject-matter jurisdiction and the judge's orders are void, of no legal force or effect. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 US 232; 94 SCt 1683, 1687 (1974) stated that "when a state officer acts under a state law in a manner violative of the Federal Constitution, he "comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States." [Emphasis supplied in original].
By law, a judge is a state officer. The judge then acts not as a judge, but as a private individual (in his person).
In Illinois, 705 ILCS 205/4 states "Every person admitted to practice as an attorney and counselor at law shall, before his name is entered upon the roll to be kept as hereinafter provided, take and subscribe an oath, substantially in the following form: 'I do solemnly swear (or affirm, as the case may be), that I will support the constitution of the United States and the constitution of the state of Illinois, and that I will faithfully discharge the duties of the office of attorney and counselor at law to the best of my ability.'"
In Illinois, a judge must take a second oath of office. Under 705 ILCS 35/2 states, in part, that "The several judges of the circuit courts of this State, before entering upon the duties of their office, shall take and subscribe the following oath or affirmation, which shall be filed in the office of the Secretary of State:
'I do solemnly swear (or affirm, as the case may be) that I will support the constitution of the United States, and the constitution of the State of Illinois, and that I will faithfully discharge the duties of judge of ______ court, according to the best of my ability.'" Further, if the judge had enlisted in the U.S. military, then he has taken a third oath. Under Title 10 USC § 502 the judge had subscribed to a lifetime oath, in pertinent part, as follows: "I, __________, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign or domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; . . . ."
The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that "No state legislator or executive or judicial officer can war against the Constitution without violating his undertaking to support it." Cooper v Aaron, 358 US 1; 78 S Ct 1401 (1958).
Any judge who does not comply with his oath to the Constitution of the United States wars against that Constitution and engages in acts in violation of the Supreme Law of the Land. The judge is engaged in acts of treason.
Having taken at least two, if not three, oaths of office to support
the Constitution of the United States, and the Constitution of the State
of Illinois, any judge who has acted in violation of the Constitution is
engaged in an act or acts of treason (see below).
If a judge does not fully comply with the Constitution, then his
orders are void, In re Sawyer, 124 US 200 (1888), he/she is without jurisdiction, and he/she has engaged in an act or acts of treason.
Whenever a judge acts where he/she does not have jurisdiction to act, the judge is engaged in an act or acts of treason, United States v Will, 449 US 200, 216; 101 S Ct 471; 66 L Ed 2d 392, 406 (1980); Cohen v Virginia, 19 US (6 Wheat) 264, 404; 5 L.Ed 257 (1821).
Copyright © 1999 by Leroy J. Pletten
email: lpletten@tir.com