This concerns Emily Bacon's fraudulent cancellation of the in-process investigation in May 1981. She and her principals, Edward Hoover, et al., fear the integrity of EEO investigators and EEOC administrative judges. One, Norma Kennedy, had already cited subject matter aspects in my favor in terms of the 25 January 1980 Grievance Report. Another, Henry Perez, Jr., noted that the without-charges termination decision was already evident, contrary to agency denials of same. Others get their Grievance Reports implemented, as doing so is mandatory upon acceptance.
Pursuant to Wyle v R. J. Reynolds Industries, Inc, 709 F2d 585 (CA 9, 30 June 1983), when a company law firm engages in deliberate ignorance of facts, that is deemed equivalent of knowledge; as failure to investigate binds them to the underlying misconduct.
Bacon, Hoover, et al., rightly feared that the Investigator would rule in my favor. Cigarettes' mere existence on post violates state law MCL 750.27. As a drug container, they violate local regulation 190-4. Their emissions violate 29 CFR 1910.1000 and the common law, e.g., that cited in the Shimp precedent on which the Grievance Examiner had relied, granting the right to breath the air in its pure and natural state. Any hazard violates federal law 5 USC 7902.(d). Hiring such persons violates hiring criteria against hiring people whose behavior poses a hazard to themselves, etc.
The unlawful decision was made to terminate me, not later than Febraury 1980. TACOM wanted to make sure that I would not be allowed to get further trained Grievance/EEO Investigator review (they are the same people at USACARA). Such review would foreseeably immediately specifiy ending the unlawful termination (the forcing me off-post without 30 days advance notice of charges).
Cigarette smuggling is lucrative. My getting a precedent of enforcing the law was believed to pose an immediate threat to the smuggling and profits to all, not just at TACOM, but tobacco companies, and bribed U.S. Attorney personnel, law enforcers, and judiciary. So with unlimited funds (tobacco lobby and agency) available for bribes, Edward Hoover, Col. John Benacquista, and Emily Bacon ex parte bribed Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) officials including but not limited to Martin Baumgaertner (bribe one = bribe all; once bribed, always bribed). There was already rampant corruption in Chicago (noted by "Operation Greylord"), including widespread bribery of officials, of which the MSPB policy and practice of bribery was one aspect.
Bribed MSPB officials advised how to obstruct review. Refuse me access to the EEOC system, but pretend to allow it, thus preventing my knowing how to respond except to file more cases which would be stalled. The bribe-induced MSPB assurances included that MSPB would deny jurisdiction, ignore all laws and regulations, ignore the Grievance Report supporting my position on TACOM authority and rights of co-workers, accept any and all of TACOM's perjured and fraudulent claims, refuse me a hearing, etc., whatever needed to prevent my getting review on merits. The bribed-induced plan was to get the subject off any "absolute" duties, re safety, the common law, etc., instead to pretend the sole issue was "accommodation." This would disregard all condition precedent rules, a reduction to one, the meaningless term "reasonable," meaning to do nothing.
Bacon, et al., were assured that pursuant to MSPB policy and practice (bribe one = bribe all; once bribed, always bribed), all MSPB officials would continue the criminal enterprise. With that MSPB support firmly cemented, TACOM thereupon felt confident in my being forced off post without advance notice of charges, and with me never getting review on merits.
However, I was ultra persistent in seeking review. Nobody had filed so many cases, on the many incidents that occurred, as me. So an Investigation was allowed to proceed, with Jonelle Calloway.
The timing of the cancellation involved ex parte contacts with bribed MSPBers, e.g., Ronald Wertheim, et al, who would fabricate claims of actions taken, while simultaneously denying actions were possible. This bribery process and cover story that would lead to the fraudulent MSPB decision Wertheim et al issued, once arranged, was calculated to obstruct my ability to respond to so many events at once, the sudden cancellation of USACARA investigation and the fraudulent MSPB decision, necessitating doubling up on reacting and appealing. (This was combined with other actions then in process, securing favorable MESC decision, fighting off the application to OPM, trying to survive without pay, dealing with the falsified LWOP SF-50, etc., etc.)
I have of course tried to get the Investigation resumed, however, no review, not even Counseling, is allowed by TACOM on-point. Counselors refuse to even record my issues. TACOM-tobacco lobby combined bribery actions have managed now for many years at all levels to prevent review on the merits. Please intervene, order the Investigation resumed, or, better yet, direct an immediate acknowledgement that condition precedents for termination do not exist (no specifics provided thus denying me right to reply) nor for review (no forum notice having yet been provided, with genuine ability to use the EEO system which as eEOC noted, has been closed to me since February 1980) thus I remain an employee entitled to pay, and restore me immediately to duty.
Please adhere to evidence & rule of law, contrasting with employer-favored adjudicators, MSPB, et al., who rule corruptly, advise on how to obstruct EEOC review; fabricate outside evidence of record, and disregard Constitutional due process rights & precedents, and rule of law.
process is a request for action pursuant e investigator
Hoover and Starr should have been removed pursuant to the precedent of Foster v State of Kansas ex rel. Johnston, 112 US 205; 5 S Ct 97; 28 L Ed 696, 697 (10 Nov 1884) (the prosecutor removed for non-enforcement of liquor control law). Here, they are obviously refusing to enforce the rules cited in my case which led to the 25 Jan 1980 USACARA Report despite compliance being mandatory. They are refusing to enforce the safety law 29 USC 651-678, the implementing regulation 29 CFR 1910.1000, personnel hiring forms, the state law MCL 750.27, MSA 28.216, etc.
They are not just refusing to enforce them, they are actively and repetitively violating them! (Pursuant to the Table of Penalties, three offenses is sufficient for removal!) For example, note Hoover's claim of negotiability. This was perjury. Unions cannot negotiate state and federal laws, the common law, medical books citing smoking as a mental disorder, the hiring form precluding hiring dangerous-to-self people, job descriptions much less personnel employee's job descriptions, etc.
Here, pursuant to Gen. Stallings' January 1982 letter agreeing to let me have EEO review, "considerations point to an accommodation favoring the application of [pertinent] law. It must be remembered that we are dealing here with a contract, and therefore with obligations, by hypothesis, voluntarily undertaken, and not, as in the case of tort liability or public regulations, obligations imposed simply by virtue of the authority of the State or Federal Government. This fact in itself creates some presumption in favor of applying that law tending toward the validation of the alleged contract. Pritchard v Norton, 106 US 124; Ehrenzweig, "Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, Part One: Validity," 59 Col. L. Rev. 973, cited in Kossick v United Fruit Co, 365 US 731, 741 (NY, 17 April 1961).
The gross procedural abuses (no compliance with rules, no compliance with USACARA Report, no notice for firing, no opportunity to reply pre-decision, etc.) are themselves discriminatory acts, Cohen v Austin, GSA, 833 F Supp 512 (ED Pa, 13 Sep 1993) (case deemed not "mixed," but on procedural errors constituting discrimination).
A smoking ban is not unconstitutional; there is no right to smoke; the case is baseless and asserts nothing but the infringement of a nonexistent legal interest; smoking is not one of "life's necessities," the same concept as in State v Ohmer, 34 Mo App 115 !), Grass v Sargent, 903 F2d 1206 (CA 8, 29 May 1990)
Doughty v Board of County Com'rs for County of Weld, State of Colorado, 731 F Supp 423, 424 (D Col, 5 June 1989) (smoking ban is not unconstitutional, and not a due process matter; instead it protects the rights and health of employees and inmates, eliminates potential fire hazards; promotes a clean living environment; segregation, i.e., designated areas, are not applicable as a total ban is valid; and segregation interferes with jail operations, and would be unhealthful as the ventilation system was unable to remove smoke; a total ban reduces costs)