The whistleblower's job at time of the "decision to terminate" was Position Classification Specialist, GS-221-12. Expertise and duties included processing discipline cases, and grievances, while providing employees due process, and setting employee pay. My performance record was excellent.
From hired 26 August 1969, Grade 7 (GS-201), through last pre-firing promotion, 23 June 1974, to GS-12, the whsitleblower's average promotion rate of increase was one rank increase per year: to GS-9 as of 6 September 1970; to GS-11 as of 19 September 1971, to GS-12 as of 23 June 1974. A "Crime Prevention Officer" function was added November 1976. As of the ouster date alleged in January 1982 (as distinct from earlier dates including in 1979, as the agency kept changing stories), whistleblower Pletten was at the 6th step of the Civil Service 10 step pay range for GS-12.
The below pay chart for calculating damages, initally prepared in 1991 pursuant to court hearing discussion on using 8% increase rate), provides no more than four promotions thereafter, for rest of decades of career that would otherwise have occurred.
As of May 1988, the whistleblower's rank was alleged to have become GS-16 but for having committed the whistleblowing. Federal law 5 USC § 5332, as implemented by annual Executive Orders (examples, 21 March 2003 and Jan 2004), sets federal employee pay. Pay follows the pay chart by length of service. There are 10 steps, granted in 1, 2, then 3 year intervals. At step 10, pay is capped. No additional increases except for inflation occur.
Chart Developed In 1991
YearAmountRemarks| Cumulative | | | |
| 1980 | $66,273 | 11 months; $72,298 X 11/12| $66,273 | |
| 1981 | $ 74,708 | | $ 140,981 |
| 1982 | $ 77,118 | | $ 218,099 |
| 1983 | $ 79,528 | | $ 297,627 |
| 1984 | $ 79,528 | | $ 377,155 |
| 1985 | $ 81, 396 | | $ 458,551 |
| 1986 | $ 81,396 | | $ 539,947 |
| 1987 | $ 82,697 | | $ 622,644 |
| 1988 | $ 82,697 | | $ 705,341 |
| 1989 | $ 85,060 | | $ 790,401 |
| 1990 | $ 85,060 | | $ 875,461 |
| 1991 | $ 85,060 | | $ 960,521 |
| 1992 | $ 87,424 | | $ 1,047,945 |
| 1993 | $ 87,424 | | $ 1,135,369 |
| 1994 | $ 87,424 | | $ 1,222,793 |
| 1995 | $ 89,787 | | $ 1,312,580 |
| 1996 | $ 96,969 | $ 89,787 + 8%| $ 1,409,549 | |
| 1997 | $ 104,726 | $ 96,969 + 8%| $ 1,514,275 | |
| 1998 | $ 113,104 | $ 104,726 + 8%| $ 1,627,379 | |
| 1999 | $ 122,152 | $ 113,104 + 8%| $ 1,749,531 | |
| 2000 | $ 131,924 | $ 122,152 + 8%| $ 1,881,455 | |
| 2001 | $ 142,477 | $ 131,924 + 8%| $ 2,023,932 | |
| 2002 | $ 153,875 | $ 142,477 + 8%| $ 2,177,807 | |
| 2003 | $ 166,185 | $ 153,875 + 8%| $ 2,343,992 | |
| 2004 | $ 179,479 | $ 166,185 + 8%| $ 2,523,471 | |
| 2005 | $ 193,837 | $ 179,479 + 8%| $ 2,717,308 | |
| 2006 | $ 209,343 | $ 193,837 + 8%| $ 2,926,651 | |
| 2007 | $ 226,090 | $ 209,343 + 8%| $ 3,152,741 | |
| 2008 | $ 244,177 | $ 226,090 + 8%| $ 3,396,918 | |
| 2009 | $ 263,711 | $ 244,177 + 8%| $ 3,660,629 | |
| 2010 | $ 284,807 | $ 263,711 + 8%| $ 3,945,436 | |
| 2011 | $ 307,591 | $ 284,807 + 8%| $ 4,253,027 | |
| 2012 | $ 332,198 | $ 307,591 + 8%| $ 4,585,225 | |
| 2013 | $ 358,773 | $ 332,198 + 8%| $ 4,943,998 | |
| 2014 | $ 387,474 | $ 358,773 + 8%| $ 5,331,472 | |
| 2015 | $ 418,471 | $ 387,474 + 8%| $ 5,749,943 | |
| 2016 | $ 414,285 | $ 418,471 + 8%, $ 451,918 x 11/12| $ 6,164,228 | |
| Assume | Retirement | at this | Time?
| Retirement Fund | $ 418,471 | 7% of pay| $ 431,495 | |
| Life Insurance | A Multiple | 1 - 5 times final pay| $ 451,948 | |
| Health Insurance | $ 2,000 PA | For 37 Years| $ 74,000 | |
| Total | | | $ 7,121,671 |
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[Ed. Note: Chart Prepared 1991, Estimating 8% Inflation Per Court Advisory.
Chart Would Need Updating Per Changed Circumstances]
Note comparable unjust discharge Michigan precedents,
Jenkins v Southeast Michigan Chapter, American Red Cross, 141 Mich App 785; 369 NW2d 223 (1985) (disparate treatment and animus)
Pilarowski v Brown, 76 Mich App 666; 257 NW2d 211 (1977) (Macomb County employee case of being fired over freedom of speech/press issue, letter-writing) (note: after he won, employer waited a while, then re-fired him; he won jury verdict, then judge and Sixth Circuit overturned the jury verdict)
Ritchie v Mich Cons Gas Co, 163 Mich App 358; 413 NW2d 796 (22 Sep 1987) (unjust discharge, front pay, due to nature of charges making it ahrd to get another job)
James Ospalski v City of Warren (ED Mich, Spring 2003) ($853,750 jury verdict, on issue of: City ordered whistleblower to count ceiling tiles).
Linda Gilbert v DaimlerChrysler Corp, Case 227392; 2002 Mich App LEXIS (Mich App, 30 July 2002) ($21,000,000 for sexual harassment, employee was not fired; harassment situation was of less severity and duration than in Pletten situation) (Subsequent at 468 Mich 883 and 670 NW2d 560 (30 Oct 2003); rev Case 122457, 470 Mich 749; NW2d; 2004 WL 1632857 (22 July 2004))
Note also other comparable cases:
Gary Trepanier v Showcase West Theaters aka National Amusements (Genessee County Circuit Court, Flint, MI) (fired manager received jury verdict Tuesday, 6 April 2004, of $180,000 for past wages, $844,500 for future wages, $1,024,500 for past mental anguish, and $1,024,500 for future mental anguish, said Attorney Glen N. Lenhoff, “$3 million awarded in manager's firing,” Macomb Daily, p 6A, Sat., 10 April 2004)
Heidi Sumner v Merrill Lynch (San Antonio, 19 April 2004) (broker's gender discrimination three-member arbitration award: "Sumner alleged she was not allocated the same amount of brokerage work as male colleagues and that her office manager sexually harassed her." (This reduced work assignments and harassment situation was of less severity and duration than in Pletten situation)
Erin Weber v WYCD-FM (D Mi, 23 May 2005), cited by David Shepardson, "Radio DJ wins $10.6 million in stink over perfume," The Detroit News (24 May 2005) (citing jury award of $7 million in punitive damages, $2 million in mental anguish and emotional distress and $1.6 million for past and future compensation) (This situation was of less severity and duration than in Pletten situation, and involved perfume, not an inherently dangerous combination of multiple toxic chemicals as TTS is. Note that in this pure air rights case, no false agency or court claims of handicap, accommodation, or 'disability retirement' were made against her, unlike the disparate treatment directed against Pletten)
EEOC v Tallgrass Golf Club, et al, #CV 05 4648 (ED NY, 30 Sept. 2005) ($34,000 damages for ridicule in company newsletter)
James McKelvey v Army TACOM (Federal Eastern District of Michigan Jury Decison, 23 October 2009) ($4.3 million for discrimination in TACOM's hostile working environment accusing him of being a "cripple")
Note also the upholding in a case of "abusive and repeated harassment" a ten-fold punitive damages award (10 times compensatory damages), in Kimbrough v Loma Linda Linda Dev., Inc, 183 F.3d 782, 785 (CA 8, 1999), cited in Ogden v Wax Works, 214 F3d 999, 1011 (CA 8, 2000).
In the Pletten v Army case, the extortion, mail fraud, falsification of documents, and other racketeering crimes by the government warrant trebling pursuant to federal law 18 USC § 1964.(c). $7,121,671 X 3 = $21,365,013. This amount ($21,365,013) constitutes, as said in legalese, the "value of the underlying claim," Basic Food Industries, Inc v Grant, 107 Mich App 685, 691; 310 NW2d 26, 29 (1981).
The subsequent malice in depriving appellant of EEOC review like others receive, of the underlying claim invokes the Michigan trebling law, MCL § 600.2907, MSA § 27A.2907. $ 21,365,013 X 3 = $ 64,095,039. This thereupon constitutes the value of the claim. A pertinent trebling case is Pauley v Hall, 124 Mich App 255; 335 NW2d 197 (1983).
The further additional years, nay decades, of obstruction of obtaining the foregoing constitutes additional racketeering and malice, warranting re-trebling. $64,095,039 X 3 = $192,285,117.
Note that punitive damages are appropriate for each of three pertinent factors: oppression, fraud, malice. Hasson v Ford Motor Co., 126 Cal App 3d 52; 178 Cal Rptr 514 (25 Nov 1981).
In the federal civil service, employees receive pay during the pendency of administrative processing, whether representing themselves or others. 29 CFR § 1613.214(b); and Power v United States [Army], 200 Ct Cl 157, 168-169; 597 F2d 258, 264-265 (1979). Disregarding this rule shows malice. Reference 5 USC § 5596 n 85.
Employees who have had some success administratively, as appellant had, are to receive their pay during participation in court processing. Mitchell v Baldridge, 662 F Supp 907 (DDC, 1987) (discovery and pre-trial). Disregarding this concept shows malice.
Note guidance on prejudgment interest, Dancer v Postal Service, 38 MSPR 224 (1988); and on consequences of having diverted the employee from income producing time, Crooker v Dept of Transportation, 634 F2d 48 (CA 2, 1980), here, by the sadistic savagery of refusing me review-on-merits for well over two decades, forcing constant full-time personnel-legal research and writing in self-defense against the multitude of crimes committed.
Federal employers cannot claim to have had a basis for disciplining/removing me based on "approved leave." Punishing an employee for approved leave is an improper reason, Bond v Vance [Army], 117 US App DC 203, 204; 327 F2d 901, 902 (1964); Washington v Dept of Army, 813 F2d 390, 394 (CA Fed, 1987). (I didn't request! and forced LWOP is prohibited by the agency's own regulation 600-5.14-27 and 28; moreover, the agency overruled the agency's own chosen examining doctor specialist Dr. David Schwartz who supported my Dr. Jack Salomon's view I was (am) ready, willing, and able to perform all duties of record. Agency defiance of its own regulations has long been judicially rejected, see, e.g., Watson v Dept of the Army, 162 F Supp 755 (1958); Piccone v U.S., 186 Ct Cl 752; 407 F2d 866, 871 (1969); Service v Dulles, 354 US 363; 77 S Ct 1152; 1 L Ed 2d 1403 (1957), so is no excuse.)
Pursuant to Weiden v Weiden, 246 Mich 347, 352; 224 NW 345 (1929), malice may be inferred from lack of probable cause.
Pursuant to Gladieux Food Services, Inc v Int'l Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 70 Lab Arb 544, 547 (1978), "The act of [chemical-dispersing] becomes a source of peril . . . in effect . . . malice and any fatality resulting . . . may be potential murder" (case cited with approval in USM Corp, Bostik West Division v Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Int'l Union, 78-2 ARB 8545; 71 Lab Arb 954, 958 (1978).
The criminality of the underlying situation produces mental anguish typical of crime victims, as it constitutes "interference with the victim's ability to conduct a normal life, . . . . absence from the workplace," People v Gorney, 99 Mich App 199, 207; 297 NW2d 648, 651 (1980) lv app den 410 Mich 911 (1981).
This "extreme and outrageous . . . conduct [arising] from the abuse of a relationship which puts [them] in a position of actual or apparent authority . . . or gives [them] power to affect [appellant's] interests," McCahill v Commercial Ins Co, 179 Mich App 761, 768; 446 NW2d 579, 582 (1989).
The discrimination, treating appellant differently in retaliation for his having sought administrative review in 1979 of the non-enforcement of pertinent rules, is clear. Nonetheless, "A finding of discrimination . . . is not a necessary condition precedent to recovery under Title VII if there is a showing of retaliation by the [employer] for having filed a discrimination complaint. See Schei and Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law, 426-33 (BNA 1976). The basis for an action challenging the alleged retaliatory activity of an employer is . . . 42 USC § 2000e-2(a) . . . ." Clemente v United States, 568 F Supp 1150, 1159 (CD Cal, 1983).
The anti-discrimination law also provides for compensatory damages, see West, Sec'y of Veterans Affairs v Gibson, 527 US 212; 119 S Ct 1906; 144 L Ed 2d 196 (26 April 1999).
Here, the award should be like that in the McKelvey case, supra, $4.3 million, multipled in view of the protracted nature of the situation and refusal of review, multipled by the number of violations, clause by clause, multipled by the number of days of violations, multiplied by the number of days of refusal of review involved. For example, note the number of violations of just one regulation, TACOM's discipline regulation, TACOM-R 600-5, Chapter 18, clause after clause after clause. Note also the continuing violations with respect to its leave regulation, TACOM-R 600-5, Chapter 14, clause after clause after clause. Multiply this, clause by clause, times $4.3 million times the numbers of days involved.
Consider also the many other regulations and laws TACOM violated, and the number of days involved. Consider also the deliberate refusal to allow Mr. Pletten access to the Commander's "Open Door," much less, to the EEO 29 CFR § 1613 and § 1614 review system. This refusal continued day after day, week after week, month after month, year after year, decade after decade.
This continued refusal demonstrated TACOM's disdain, hatred, loathing, contempt, viciousness, malice, against the rules and against Mr. Pletten for having blown the whistle on the many violations.
"Embarrassment and humiliation denote shame, disgrace, degradation, distress, anguish, etc. See Perkins v Ogilvie, 148 Ky. 309, 146 S.W.2d 735 (1912)," cited in Ky Com on Human Rights and Cooper v Fraser, 625 SW2d 852 (Ky, 1981). [See Concept Details]. It is firm government policy and practice to shame, disgrace, degrade, distress and otherwise abuse whistleblowers, and, as with the abused Mrs. Cooper, supervisor "had fired her for her own benefit"!!
Damages include pain and suffering from the personal injury effects of the rejection, ostracism and social loss, maliciously protracted ultra far beyond the statutory and regulatory time limits for case processing, see, e.g.,
Jaak Panksepp, “NEUROSCIENCE: Feeling the Pain of Social Loss,” 302 Science (#5643) 237-239 (10 Oct 2003); and
Naomi I. Eisenberger, Matthew D. Lieberman, and Kipling D. Williams, “Does Rejection Hurt? An fMRI Study of Social Exclusion,” 302 Science (#5643) 290-292 (10 October 2003).
A bottom line purpose of damages is stated in the case of
Cancellier v Federated Dept Stores, 672 F2d 1312, 1320 (CA 9, 30 March 1982), an amount "sufficient to discourage . . . practicing age discrimination in the future." (A pathetic little $2.3 million award in that case was insufficient to deter other employers from age discrimination. Awards in the tens of billions have been insufficient to deter tobacco companies.)
In view of the employer's decades-long documented hostility and ruthlessness against whistleblowers (deterring whistleblowing including at FBI and NASA) resulting in many deaths among Americans, an amount sufficient to deter all federal agencies must be enormous.
Other Materials in Case File
Your assistance is requested. Please write to the President asking him to order a genuine investigation, and when he verifies that no notice of charges was issued to the whistleblower (unlike what is provided to others accused of genuine wrongdoing), to reinstate the whistlblower pursuant to the rule of law.
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