| DISPOSITION FORM
________________________________________________________________________
REFERENCE OR OFFICE SYMBOL| SUBJECT
| Request for EEO Counseling; and | Notice That I Remain On The Rolls ________________________________________________________________________ TO C, Ofc of Eql Opp FROM Leroy J. Pletten 5/28/93 1. I again request EEO Counseling on "the agency's decision to terminate" me as noted so long ago by EEOC's Henry Perez, Jr. Your predecessor Kenneth Adler refused me EEO counseling since February 1980, when the "decision to terminate" was made. 2. My supervisor never issued me a "statement or citation of the written regulations . . . said to have been violated [and] a detailed statement of the facts," Boilermakers v Hardeman, 401 US 233, 245; 91 S Ct 609, 617; 28 L Ed 2d 10, 21 (1971). 3. To protect the public by protecting federal employees from unjust, discriminatory termination, Congress requires that the supervisor must state why he/she wants to terminate the worker. Congress put this 30 days advance written notice requirement in 5 USC 7513.(d). Pursuant to it, the notice must: (a) comply with 5 CFR 752.404(f) by stating all reasons including ex parte contacts. Sullivan v Navy, 720 F2d 1266, 1273-4 (Fed Cir 1983). (b) say more than a conclusion, Mulligan v Andrews, 93 US App DC 375, 377; 211 F2d 28, 30 (1954); (c) enable more than "general denials," Deak v Pace, 88 US App DC 50, 52; 185 F2d 997, 999 (1950); (d) list witnesses and say "the names . . . places . . . dates" of alleged acts, Money v Anderson, 93 US App DC 130, 134; 208 F2d 34, 38 (1953). Examples include being: (i) "lengthy and detailed," Baughman v Green, 97 US App DC 150; 229 F2d 331 (1956); (ii) with "numerous examples of specific errors," Long v Air Force, 683 F2d 301 (CA 9, 1982); and (iii) "item by item," Mandel v Nouse, 509 F2d 1031, 1032 (CA 6) cert den 422 US 1008; 95 S Ct 2630; 45 L Ed 2d 671 (1975). 4. Although the agency issues thirty days advance written notices pursuant to 5 USC 7513.(d) to others, it never issued one to me. This difference shows discrimination, e.g., retaliation. 5. I remain an employee as a matter of law -- the status of a federal employee against whom termination is effected without thirty days advance written notice. Sullivan, 720 F2d 1274, supra. I look forward to returning to duty. Sincerely yours,
DA FORM 2496
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Slaves had a right to proper notice of charges!
Josephine, a slave v State of Mississippi,
39 Miss (10 Geo) 613, 647 (1860-1):
The right to a properly drafted statement of charges is
"a substantial right . . . and not a
mere question of form or proceeding."
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5 USC § 552.(a)(l)(C) - (D) makes publication of a rule/qualification "jurisdictional," as all adjudicators on-point have ruled, e.g.,:
The tobacco qualification "requirement" does not exist, was purely ad hoc, invented solely for my case by TACOM, with corrupt prior MSPB and DOJ approval, ex parte arranged. Disregard of Morton and Bowen is especially striking as a matter of law, as there can be no tobacco qualification for the "employment" matters herein. Smoking is not in employment, as numerous precedents show, see list in Annot., 20 A.L.R.3d 893 (1968). So Tobacco Smoke cannot be used to measure job performance, handicap or accommodation all of which "relate to employment." 29 U.S.C. 706 (7)(B). Tobacco smoke is not job "essential functions." Once "individualized inquiry" on job description requirements begins pursuant to Hall v Postal Service, 857 F2d 1073, 1078-9 (CA 6, 1988), smoking will not be found in any job description. Both Morton and Bowen show that both existence and publication are conditions precedent to an alleged disqualification. Quod ab initio non valet in tractu temporis non convalescet." That which is bad in its commencement improves not by lapse of time. Quod initio non valet, tractu temporis non valet. A thing void in the beginning does not become valid by lapse of time.—Black's Law Dictionary (St. Paul: West Pub, 5th ed, 1979), pp 1126-1127. U.S. Attorney pattern of contempt for due process rights is clear, see NAACP v Levi, 418 F Supp 1109, 1114-1117 (D DC, 3 Sep 1976) (not investigating before acting). I repeatedly return to duty per Bevan v N Y St T R System, 74 Misc 2d 443; 345 NYS 2d 921 (1973) (employee also falsely accused of not meeting non-existent qualification requirement!) Army had provided me a qualifications waiver—then ousted me re 'qualifications'! |
| Appellant's 19 Nov 1976 Appointment |
| The 7 Jan 1992 Attempt To Get Review to Begin | The 3 Nov 1992 Attempt To Get Review to Begin |
Being Obstructed 1991-1996: Citing Legal Principles With Respect To Some of The Crimes Being Aided and Abetted |
for Attorneys Being Violated And Attempting To Get Review To Begin After Being Obstructed 1991-1996 |
Citing Starr's Apparent Coverup of Falsehood In Another Case and My Attempting to Get Review To Begin After Being Obstructed 1991-1998 |
Review Pursuant to the 1991 Agency Settlement To Do So |
Untimely Agency Response Attempting to Continue to Obstruct Review |
To Agency Refusal to Allow Review on Merits |
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While decision is pending on whether to even allow review on the merits to begin, the petitioner will continue to post additional materials from the case file, including issues on the merits, as able.
Your assistance is requested. Please write to the President asking him to order a genuine investigation, and when he verifies that no notice of charges was issued me (unlike what is provided to others accused of genuine wrongdoing), to reinstate me.
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