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Office of Federal Operations P. O. Box 19848 Washington, D.C. 20036
Maloney Tank Mfg Co v Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp, 49 F2d 146 (CA 10, 1931) ... 9 Margules v Block, 38 FEP (BNA) 1244 (D Or, 1981) ...... 17 Matter of Cartwright, 11 Elizabeth; 2 Rushworth's Coll 468 (1569) .... 32, 40 McDonald v Santa Fe Trail Transp Co,, 427 US 273; 96 S Ct 2574; 49 L Ed 2d 493 (1976) .... 11 McDonnell Douglas Corp v Green, 411 US 792; 93 S Ct 1817; 36 L Ed 2d 668 (1973) ...... 9 McKinney v Anderson, 924 F2d 1500 (CA 9, 1991) .. 28-29 Mercer v DHHS, 772 F2d 856 (CA Fed, 1985) .. 5 Money v Anderson, 93 US App DC 130; 208 F2d 34 (1953) ...... 5 Moore v Devine, 780 F2d 1559 (CA 11, 1986) ...... 17 Morton v Ruiz, 415 US 199; 94 S Ct 1055; 39 L Ed 2d 270 (1974) ...... 24 Mulligan v Andrews, 93 US App DC 375; 211 F2d 28 (1954) ..... 5 Natl Realty & Const Co Inc v O.S.H.R.C., 160 US App DC 133; 489 F2d 1257 (1973) ...... 10 Neal v Farmer, 9 Ga 555 (1851).... 20, 39-40 The Nurnberg Trial, 6 FRD 69 (1946) .....15 Onweiler v U.S., 432 F Supp 1226 (D Idaho, 1977)...... 24 People v Atcher, 65 Mich App 734; 238 NW2d 389 (1975) ...... 27 People v Carmichael, 5 Mich 10; 71 Am Dec 769 (1858) ..... 26, 55, 57 People v Kevorkian, 447 Mich 336; 527 NW2d 714 (1994) ...... 27 People v Stevenson, 416 Mich 383; 331 NW2d 143 (1982) .. 27 Piccone v U.S., 186 Ct Cl 752; 407 F2d 866 (1969) ..45, 47 Pittman v Dept of Army, 832 F2d 598 (CA Fed, 1987) .. 5 Pletten v Dept of Army, EEOC Docket 01.80.0273 et al. (23 Feb 1982) ...... 5, 12, 25, 41-43, 46, 53 Pletten v Dept of Army, EEOC Docket 05.82.0275 (4 March 1983) ..... 12 Pletten v Dept of Army, EEOC Docket 03.81.0087 (April 1983) ... 15, 19-21, 46 Pletten v Dept of Army, EEOC Docket 01.91.0498 (14 March 1991).... 12 Pletten v Dept of Army, EEOC Docket 01.92.3611 (4 Dec 1992) ..... 12. 53 Pletten v Dept of Army, EEOC Docket 01.93.4758 (8 April 1994) .. 12 Pletten v Dept of Army, EEOC Docket 01.93.4855 (8 April 1994) ...... 12 Rum River Lumber Co v State, 282 NW2d 882 (Minn, 1979) .... 35, 42 Ryder v U.S., 515 US 177; 115 S Ct 2031; 132 L Ed 2d 136 (1995) ... 13, 44 Samson v Saginaw, 393 Mich 393; 224 NW2d 843 (1975) ... 13 Scharf v Dept of Air Force, 710 F2d 1572 (CA Fed, 1983) ... 15 Service v Dulles, 354 US 363; 77 S Ct 1152; 1 L Ed 2d 1403 (1957) ..... 45, 47 Shelton v EEOC, 357 F Supp 3 (D Wash 1973) aff'd 416 US 976 (1974) ..... 45, 54 Shimp v N J Bell Telephone Co, 145 NJ Super 516; 368 A2d 408 (1976) ... 9 Sabol v Snyder, 524 F2d 1009 (1975) ... 9 Somerset v Stewart, Lofft 1; 20 Howell's State Trials 1 (King's Bench, 1772) .. 32, 34, 40 Spann v McKenna (Dept of Army), 615 F2d 137 (CA 3, 1980) ...... 19, 44 Stalkfleet v U.S. Postal Service, 6 MSPB 536 (1981) ..... 9 State v Mann, 13 NC 263 (1829) ...... .20, 39-40 Stevens v Inland Waters, Inc, 220 Mich App 212; 559 NW2d 61 (1996) .. 11 Sullivan v Dept of Navy, 720 F2d 1266 (CA Fed, 1983) .... 5, 44 Teamsters v U.S., 431 US 324; 97 S Ct 1843; 52 L Ed 2d 396 (1977) ...... 6, 22, 30, 32, 36, 40, 42 Texaco Inc v U.S., 217 Ct Cl 416; 579 F2d 614 (1978) .... 45 Texas & Pac Ry v Behymer, 189 US 468; 23 S Ct 622; 47 L Ed 903 (1903) ..32 Trafficante v Metropolitan Life Ins Co, 409 US 205; 93 S Ct 364; 34 L Ed 415 (1972) ..... 55 United States v Bethlehem Steel Corp, 446 F2d 652 (CA 2, 1971) .... 11 United States v Bettis, 39 F Supp 160 (D SD Cal, 1941) .. 22 United States v City of Los Angeles, 595 F2d 1386 (CA 9, 1979) .... 32 United States v Crisp, 435 F2d 354 (CA 7, 1970) ... 37, 57 United States v Crystal, 39 F Supp 220 (D ND Ohio, 1941) .. 23 United States v Jacksonville Terminal Co, 451 F2d 418 (CA 5, 1971) ... 11 United States v City of Chicago, 549 F2d 417 (CA 7, 1977) .... 8, 10 United States v Fisher, 6 US (2 Cranch) 358; 2 L Ed 304 (1804) .... 34 United States v Kibler, 667 F2d 452 (1982) .. 27 United States v Wilford, 710 F2d 439 (1983) ..... 27 United States v Utah Construction & Mining Co., 384 US 394; 86 S Ct 1545; 16 L Ed 2d 642 (1966) ...... 16 Wangerin v State, 73 Wis 2d 427; 243 NW2d 448 (1976) .. 37, 57 Watson v Dept of Army, 142 Ct Cl 749; 162 F Supp 755 (1958) .. 45, 47 Welsh Mfg v Pinkerton's, Inc, 474 A2d 436 (1984) .... 13 White v DHHS, 30 FEP (BNA) 880 (D DC, 1981) ...... 16 Williamson v U.S., 310 F2d 192 (CA 9, 1962) .. 29, 52 Wilson v Turnage, 791 F2d 157 (CA Fed, 1986) ..... 45-47, 49-50, 52 Winchendon v Hatfield, 4 Mass 123 (1808) .. 33
U.S. Constitution, Anti-Slavery Clauses ... 33-34 5 USC § 552.(a)(1) ...... 8, 24 5 USC § 7513.(b) .... 5, 14, 19, 21, 23-24, 41, 44-46, 51 5 USC § 7902.(d) ..... 19, 25, 27, 47 5 USC § 8101.(12) .... 22-23 5 USC § 8151.(b)(1) .. 8, 19, 21-22 18 USC § 545-6 ... 29, 52 18 USC § 1001 .... 11, 19-20 18 USC § 1961 .... 19-20 29 USC § 651 et seq. ... 10, 25 29 USC § 706(7)(B) ... 11, 13, 30 Fugitive Slave Act ..... 15, 38-39 Michigan Compiled Law § 330.1401, MSA § 14.800(401) .... 5, 10, 42 Michigan Compiled Law § 421.28(1)(c), MSA § 17.530.28(1)(c) .. 8 Michigan Compiled Law § 750.27, MSA § 28.216 ... 11, 19-20, 25-26, 28, 46-48, 52-53, 55 Michigan Complied Law § 750.213, MSA § 28.410 .... 27 Michigan Complied Law § 767.39, MSA § 28.979 ...... 22, 50, 57 Michigan Antitrust Reform Act MCL § 14.28, MSA § 3.131, MCL § 445.771et seq., MSA § 28.70(1) et seq .. 45 Michigan Consumer Protection Act MCL § 445.901 et seq., MSA § 19.418(1) et seq .. 47 Michigan Court Rule 8.122 ...... 43 5 CFR § 339 .. 8 5 CFR § 339.104, 202, and 204 .. 7 5 CFR § 752.404 .. 45, 54 5 CFR § 831.1206 .. 23 21 CFR § 897 ... 53 29 CFR § 800.125 .. 10 29 CFR § 1607 ... 8 29 CFR § 1607.5(b)(3) ..... 10 29 CFR § 1613 ..... 2-3, 19, 41, 44, 46, 57 29 CFR § 1613.705 ...... 8 29 CFR § 1614 .... 3, 23-24, 41-42 29 CFR § 1910.1000 .. 10-11, 19, 25, 27, 46-47, 56 40 CFR § 85.2203-81...... 26 Executive Order 12674 (Code of Ethics) ...... 57 Executive Order 13508, 62 Federal Register 43451-2 (13 Aug 1997) ..... 47 Federal Personnel Manual Supplement 296-33, Subchapter 35 .... 5, 44 Federal Personnel Manual Chapter 335 ...... 7 Federal Personnel Manual Supplement 335-1 ...... 8 Federal Personnel Manual 752, Subchapter 2-6 ...... 42, 51 Food and Drug Administration Anti-Cigarette Rules ... 18, 50
32 CFR § 203 .... 9, 19, 27, 46-47 Army CPR 700, Chapter 771 ... 19, 44 Army Pamphlet 600-63-7 ...... 9, 58 Army Pamphlet 611-2 ...... 8 Army Regulation 1-8 .. 9, 19, 26, 35, 46-47 Army Regulation 385-10 ..... 12, 44 TACOM Regulation 190-4 ... 19 TACOM Regulation 600-5.14.27-28 .. 19
Agency BRIBERY of Federal Judges To Say I Applied To Retire Myself .... 3-4, 17, 58 American Psychiatric Assoc, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, eds 3-4 (1980, 1987) ... 13 29 Am Jur 267 ...... 13 15 Am Jur 2d Civil Rights § 112 ...... 8 61 Am Jur 2d Affirmative Defense § 152 ..... 21 Annot, 40 ALR 1215 (1926) ..... 13 Annot, 114 ALR 1041 (1938) ... 13 Annot, 34 ALR2d 372, 390 9 (1954) .... 13 Annot, 44 ALR 4th 603 (1984) ...... 13 Army Order by LTC Wigner Refusing to Respond to Pletten .. 5, 45 Beard, Charles A. and Mary R., The Rise of American Civilization, II (NY: The Macmillan Co, 1927) .. 37 Black's Law Dictionary, 6th ed (St. Paul: West Pub Co, 1990) .... 6, 29, 52, 55 Bordewich, Fergus M., "City Lost in the Jungle," 152 Reader's Digest 112 (May 1998) ... 13 Cigarette Smuggling Emergency in Michigan, Governor's Order .... 51-52 CIA, DOJ, Pentagon, and Drug Smuggling to Blacks .. 30, 37 Confederate, Slaver, Tobacco Farmer Mindset ... 48 Congressional Globe (predecessor of Congressional Record) .. 34, 38-39, 48 Constitution, Analyses of, At the Time of Ratification ...... 34 Davis, William C., ed. The Civil War: Brother Against Brother:
Dept of Health, Educ and Welfare, NIDA Research on Smoking Behavior (Dec 1977) .. 29 Dept of Health, Educ and Welfare, Smoking and Health (1964) .. 10, 56 Dept of Health and Human Services, International Classification of Disease, 9th ed (1980) ... 13 Dept of Health and Human Services, Reducing the Health Consequences of Smoking (1989) ... 25, 56 Dept of Health and Human Services,
Devine and Aplin, "Whistleblower Protection--
Dyer, Frederick N, Smoking and Soldier Performance, Report No. 86-13,
Eaton, Clement, The Freedom-of-Thought Struggle in the Old South
Enslaving White Women ..... 38-39 Finkelman, Paul, "The Crime of Color," 67 Tulane Law Rev 2063 (1993) ..... 48 Fleming, R., Levanthal, H., Glynn, K., and Ershler, J. "The Role of Cigarettes In
Goldsmith, Barbara, Other Powers (NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998) ... 36 Goodell, William, Slavery and Anti-Slavery (William Harned, 1852) ...... 32-35, 37-38, 40 Griffiths, Martha Browne, Autobiography of a Female Slave (J. S. Redfield, 1857) ...... 48 Higginbotham, A. Leon, et al., "The Law Only As an Enemy," 70 North Carolina Law Rev 969 (1992) .... 47 Hilts, Philip J., Smoke Screen:
"How to Navigate the River of Legal Liability When Hiring," 63 Personnel Journal 32 (March 1986) .. 13 Inspector General Review Is Sought .. 2, 41, 46 KKK .... 20, 39, 53 Levine, Michael, The Big White Lie (Thunder's Mouth Press, 1993) .... 30-31 70 LRA 915 (1905) .... 13 Pletten's Published Paper, 26 Smoke Signals 4 (Oct 1980) .... 47 Porter, Glenn, ed., Encyclopedia of American Economic History, Vol II
Rat Poison in Tobacco ...... 1, 20, 35, 56=57 Recommendation by Supervisor For a Position .... 7 Qualifications Waiver ..7, 23 Seward, William H., Senator and Secretary of State ..... 37 Sojourner Truth, Narrative of Sojourner Truth (1850) ...... 48 Stampp, Kenneth M., The Era of Reconstruction (NY: Random House, 1965) .... 37 Standard Form 78 ... 5, 11, 13-14, 24, 30 Stowe, Harriet Beecher, Uncle Tom's Cabin (1852), and The Key to Uncle Tom's Cabin (1854) ..... 48 Sumner, Senator Charles, The Barbarism of Slavery, Cong Globe, 36 Cong, I Sess, 2590-2604 (4 June 1860) 48 USACARA Report ... 2, 4, 13, 17, 19, 25, 27-28, 44, 46, 53-54, 58 Washburn, Emory, Sketches of the Judicial History of Massachusetts
Whelan, Elizabeth M., Sc.D., "Cigarette Makers Get Away With Murder,"
Willson, Marcius, American History (New York: Ivison, Phinney, Blakeman & Co, 1846) .... 32, 35
Office of Federal Operations P. O. Box 19848 Washington, D.C. 20036
Leroy J. Pletten, )
This case involves discrimination by Kenneth W. Starr and accomplices in the agency. The facts herein are undisputed. Federal law bans workplace hazards and drug abuse. Federal hiring requirements forbid hiring applicants dangerous to themselves and others. Michigan law bans deleterious cigarettes from being manufactured, given away, or sold in Michigan. Michigan's Governor says that cigarettes (being illegally sold) are killings tens of thousands of Michigan residents. Department of Defense and Amy regulations forbid smoking causing a hazard, indeed, forbid smoking when nonsmokers are impacted even minimally, on their verbal indication. There are good reasons for the various above-cited rules. Cigarettes are a Confederate product. Shortly after the Civil War, Confederates altered the cigarette formula to add coumarin, for rat poison, so as to take revenge on Yankees for winning the war. Their goal of mass killing Yankees is being achieved, on the order of 400,000 killings per year. The Army has issued memoranda and pamphlets on the subject, including identifying cigarettes' nicotine as an addictive drug and the severe hazard smokers pose to soldiers, Army civilians, and their families. The Army is concerned as cigarettes are linked to drug abuse, alcoholism, impaired driving, Alzheimer's disease, Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS), suicide, etc., all adversely affecting Army staff performance and morale. At the Warren Army base, the Tank-Automotive Command (TACOM), workers were complaining in the TACOM newspaper about the cigarette problem on post. The Army specifies that its personnel (including myself) who become aware of hazards and misconduct, are to report it. In addition, one of my assigned duties due to meeting and exceeding the qualifications requirements was as a Crime Prevention Officer. Starting in 1978, I began reporting the violations to the Headquarters Inspector General. It referred the matter to local officials, who took minimal corrective action. The mass violations including illegal sales on-post continued. Nonsmokers continued complaining. Workers were being hurt on post. My supervisor, J. H. Kator, told me to prepare a memorandum banning smoking in the office. I did so, but his supervisor and others in management wanted the law violations to continue, so forbad issuance. There is a lot of money to be made in cigarette and drug smuggling (with sales being mostly to smokers) and in dealing with cigarette effects. Coming into compliance on-post, setting a precedent, would cut off a lot of money for a lot of people. Also, it would halt the unreconstructed southerner killings of Yankees, and quite a number of unreconstructed southerners had infiltrated into management positions, via falsification of hiring documents. In June 1979, after my supervisor was told not to assist in my effort to have pertinent rules enforced, I began the process of reporting the misconduct to the U.S. Army Civilian Appellate Review Agency (USACARA). Management attempted to obstruct its review, even sending documents to the wrong address. This caused some months of delays. But my whistle blower activity led to success when USACARA Management in January 1980 told TACOM to begin the compliance process. My supervisor gave me awards for my good performance meeting and exceeding performance standards during this time, due to my excellent qualifications, and directed a pay raise for me for my good work performance. Also a good conduct award was set process by him for me. Simultaneously, on behalf of the workers being hurt on post from cigarette smoking, I filed safety cases and EEO class action materials on their behalf. And much more, but this suffices for now. My supervisor's support, and my success with USACARA in whistle blowing, enraged local officials including Edward Hoover, Col. John Benacquista, Emily S. Bacon, Francis J. Holt, etc., drug users and/or profiteers, an organized crime gang of unreconstructed southerners with Confederate anti-Yankee notion, desirous of mass killing as many Yankees as they could. I stood in the way. Col. Benacquista demanded that I cease and desist, i.e., alter my anticipated testimony, cease stating the violations. Or else. Of course, this is extortion, and I refused. So despite my supervisor's efforts on my behalf, the said Confederate-type organized crime gang ordered me instantly fired without charges. Naturally, as others are issued charges, this was an obvious case of discriminatory treatment and reprisal for my class action and USACARA activities. I sought EEO review pursuant to 29 CFR § 1613. The agency refused to allow review. The crime gang had pre-arranged BRIBERY of Merit System Protection Board (MSPB) officials, and the gang wanted to force me out of my chosen forum, into the bribe-ridden MSPB forum that they knew I didn't want.
Fortunately, EEOC soon began issuing repeated orders telling the agency to let me have review. To get those orders enforced, I eventually began suing. However, the gang, in conjunction with tobacco lobbyists such as Kenneth W. Starr infiltrated into the government for the purpose of using public office for private gain, and to obstruct pertinent law enforcement lest it halt their genocidal confederate-motivated killing spree of hundreds of thousands thus millions according to HEW count, of the hated Yankees, bribed area federal and appellate judges. This BRIBERY culminated in the ultra-outrage of getting the appeals court (via bribed judges Jones, Ryan, and Celebrezze) to claim that I had applied (somewhere between October 1984 and September 1985) to retire myself on total disability!! Notwithstanding the fact that no such application as they alleged exists, and my doctor and I deny any basis for my filing such an absurd thing!! I reported the illegal activity to the military police agency.
An officer, Scott Szekely, was assigned; he verified that no such alleged application existed, and was apparently about to arrest the perps including the judges. So the crime gang came down hard, and obstructed, indeed ended, the investigation. As others' investigations that are so productive in verifying crime are not so abruptly halted, I filed for EEO review -- another obstructed case, which I hope you order review to proceed on as well. Simultaneously, I sought review at the Supreme Court of the outrageous, criminal activity of the judges. Here, Kenneth Starr, Solicitor General, a Yankee-hating confederate and unreconstructed southerner tobacco lobbyist, instead of doing his job and honestly reporting the misconduct in his brief as he should have and as Rules of Professional Responsibility and Code of Ethics require, chose to obstruct the review process, aid and abet the crimes including BRIBERY, extortion and falsification. This means, under Michigan law [MCL § 767.39, MSA § 28.979] which does not distinguish accessory and principal, that he became a principal to the crimes. Other Solicitor Generals have not become either accessories or principals in crime. So due to this different behavior, I filed for more EEO review. This has been obstructed now all these years since my initial 1991 filing. Starr's criminal accessories Kathleen Buttrey, Dorothy Southerland, Emily Bacon, Stanley Kelley, Jr., etc., are themselves criminals, so ordered that no normal processing occur. As criminals, they naturally fear that fear that genuine review in the 29 CFR §§ 1613-1614 process will lead to findings of misconduct by Starr, et al. The anticipated USACARA-type Report will show a mass of violations January 1980 to present. The anticipated testimony will, they fear, foreseeably show that Starr used public office for private gain; sought roles conflicting with government assignments; procured, aided and abetted defiance of EEOC directives in the situation; and obstructed justice and compliance with federal and Michigan law. Examples: laws against drug abuse and unsafe practices on government property, alcoholism, and resultant foreseeable incidents of sex harassment and rape; falsifying/forging government records; and disregarding pertinent case law and laws against retaliation for raising such issues. Genuine review will foreseeably find that the pattern includes obstructing federal hiring guidelines against hiring persons dangerous to self, others and property. So Starr and accomplices have been since 1991 obstructing the making of such findings, via obstructing/preventing review such as others get, including investigation and hearing. Here, the so-called counselor refused to even talk to the alleged discriminators. As the time limits have been exceeded, I hereby invoke the "flight from review" doctrine, and refer to normal review as though having occurred, via default.
(It has been over six months since the requests for review were filed!! "Default" is the right word! EEOC rules do not authorize agency refusal to allow review, nor to exceed time limits, as one EEO official told me! To penalize the agency for spitting on the rules, nothing short of default will suffice.) If I file late, I lose; the equal protection of the law concept, if it is to mean anything, cannot do other. So here goes. The default Counselor Report, the default Investigator Report, the default transcript of the witness testimony at the default hearing held by an Administrative Judge (AJ) of the Detroit, EEOC office, and the Detroit U.S. Attorney staff Roy C. Hayes, Jr., Gary Maveal, Stephen Markman, Kathleen M. Nesi, all confessed to involvement in bribing Judges Jones, Ryan, and Celebrezze. The judges confessed to taking bribes. Kenneth Starr confessed to aiding and abetting the bribery and underlying extortion and falsification. They were all thereupon imprisoned and disbarred. All was done retroactively to when it would have occurred, but for the refusal to allow review, i.e., 1991. Please treat this default concept as constituting the great weight of the evidence, thus rule in my favor. Sorry if this imposes some burden on EEOC, but that is the result of failure to bring the agency under control, as I have been pleading for since 1979. I keep thinking I can have what others get--genuine counselor, counselor report, genuine investigator, investigation report, hearing, witness testimony, and administrative judge findings. My mistake! I am the one federal employee in America who for 19+ years is refused such, as LTC Larry Wigner's 24 July 1980 threat that "the Command will no longer respond to" me has been carried out, I am sure you will agree. As the agency with tobacco lobby support now evident, bribed judges etc., to support the post-decision claim that I was removed for lack of "qualifications," they fear genuine review as it would show my actual qualifications and performance record, and TACOM's pattern of violation of Standard Form 78 criteria against hiring persons (smokers) with "medical findings which . . . would make him a hazard to himself or others." Stating that federal principle in state law MCL § 330.1401, MSA § 14.800(401) terms, TACOM has a pattern of hiring "person[s] requir-ing treatment." Here's one sad example: Its EEO Officer Kenneth Adler (due to the tobacco induced brain disease acalculia) could not even count right, to 30, could not calculate the 30 days for filing a request for EEO review. He accused me!! Luckily, EEOC saw his miscounting and reversed him. Dockets 01.80.0273, et al., 23 Feb 1982, one of the decisions Kenneth Starr so hates. Worse, Adler, due to his tobacco-induced abulia, delusions of grandeur, etc., hallucinating that he was above the law, refused to obey the EEOC orders. The criminal Kenneth Starr aided and abetted this sad mentally ill person in refusing to let me have review. What a sicko! I am a current employee of the agency, having received no 5 USC § 7513.(b) notice to the contrary.1 So notice the agency lying, saying otherwise since February 1980. Later it said I was removed because it supposedly could not ban tobacco smoking conduct by others. But no confirming 5 USC § 7513.(b) notice. Due to my repeated seeking review of the agency claim, among other incidents, EEOC issued remand orders directing review. ________________ 1 "Removal" is defined as "A disciplinary separation action, other than for inefficiency or unacceptable performance . . . where the employee is at fault." FPM Supp 296-33, Subchapter 35, Glossary, page 35-11. The condition precedent for a removal is that the agency have first written and issued a 30 days advance written notice of charges. But treating me differently than others, the agency ignored this condition precedent, issued no 30 days advance written notice--no accusation of violating conduct rules or performance standards, no incidents, dates, witness names, etc. I asked for specifics. Refusing me same carried out Lt. Col. Larry Wigner's 24 July 1980 threat that "the Command will no longer respond to" me. Refusing me specifics denied me the right to reply. Due process case law shows that if an employee is removed without the condition precedent advance notice having been issued, the employee remains on the rolls entitled to pay and immediate reinstatement. Others receive the benefit of that condition precedent requirement: Money v Anderson, 93 US App DC 130, 134; 208 F2d 34, 38 (1953); Deak v Pace, 88 US App DC 50, 52; 185 F2d 997, 999 (1950), Mulligan v Andrews, 93 US App DC 375, 377; 211 F2d 28, 30 (1954); Smith v Dept of Interior, 9 MSPR 342 (1981); Sullivan v Dept of Navy, 720 F2d 1266, 1274 (CA Fed, 1983); Mercer v DHHS, 772 F2d 856, 858 (CA Fed, 1985); Pittman v Dept of Army, 832 F2d 598 (CA Fed, 1987), etc. Indeed, notice is more than a condition precedent, it is a constitutional due process requirement, required by the Constitution as necessary to enable a person to reply, Cleveland Board of Educ v Loudermill, 470 US 532; 105 S Ct 1487; 84 L Ed 2d 494 (1985). 1. STARR HAS A PATTERN OF MISCONDUCT: EXTORTION, COVER-UP, AND PRO-LYING. “The proof of the pattern or practice [of Starr's willingness to file false data and extort] supports an inference that any particular decision [to file a false document in court], during the period in which the policy was in force, was made in pursuit of that policy.” Teamsters v U.S., 431 US 324, 362; 97 S Ct 1843, 1868; 52 L Ed 2d 396, 431 (1977). Note the expose by reporters Bradley A. Stertz and Kenneth Cole, "Claims that he hid perjury could undercut Starr's moral tone," Detroit News, 5 Mar 98, p 7B. Starr had seen that he could get away with hiding crimes in my situation, and have EEO review obstructed. So he went unpunished. So there was no deterrent effect. The obstruction of justice which he knew can be done with the aid of the corrupt agency and accomplices herein cited, emboldened him to commit new misconduct. (Of course, the obstruction of my case since 1991 constitutes an additional pattern of continuing discrimination. Others are not subjected to such obstruction.) Michigan law abolished the distinction between "principals" and "accessories." Starr is an "accessory during the fact." See definition, Black's Law Dictionary, "One who stands by without interfering or giving such help as may be in his power to prevent the commission of a criminal offense." The crimes and obstruction of justice re which review is sought, were in process during the time of his known role, and continuing. Stephen Gillers, Prof., Legal Ethics, NYU School of Law, says "The rule is clear and uniform. A lawyer who learns that a witness he's handing has lied has an obligation to ask the witness to correct the lie, failing which he has an obligation to correct it himself." Starr violated both provisos. Here are key words from the News Article: "CLAIMS THAT HE HID PERJURY COULD UNDERCUT STARR'S MORAL TONE The Detroit News, Thursday, 5 March 1998, page 1 By Bradley A. Stertz and Kenneth Cole Detroit News Washington Bureau "Washington -- Whitewater independent counsel Kenneth Starr has defended General Motors Corp. in a handful of product liability cases since 1993, when he joined the prestigious law firm Kirkland & Ellis. But it's his involvement in a lawsuit the giant automaker settled four years ago that threatens to undercut Starr's moral authority to query President Clinton on allegations that he had an illicit affair with a White House intern, then obstructed justice by urging her to lie about it. "South Carolina attorney J. Kendall Few earlier this seek said Starr -- while representing GM in cases brought by families of people killed or injured in truck fires -- knew an employee of the automaker lied on the witness stand. But Few claims Starr helped "cover up the perjury," thus obstructing justice. "It strikes me as the irony of the decade that the man who is investigating the president for obstruction of justice now stands accused of obstructing justice and possibly faces a grand jury inquiry," said Ralph Hoar, a Virginia auto safety advocate. "Numerous Clinton supporters have been attacking Starr. On Wednesday, several prominent Democrat lawmakers, including Reps. John Conyers of Detroit and John Dingell of Dearborn, formally asked Atty. Gen. Janet Reno to investigate Starr's conduct."
Of course, it is common knowledge in the public domain, that of the voluminous charges Starr made against President William J. Clinton, the House of Representatives only agreed on four. The Senate in turn accepted none. Also, witnesses keep coming forward, as in the recent McDougal case, saying that Starr wanted lying to occur. That is the same type of criminal extortion as Col. Benacquista did to me. Criminal Starr is simply following standard extortion tactics. He had supported them against me, saw that he could get away with it, so does it again and again. Juries don't believe Starr. An article about the McDougal case in The Macomb Daily, p 8A, 31 March 1999, says another witness, Julie Hiatt Steele, came forward against him. A Virginia woman, she was called to testify that Starr prosecuted her for being truthful. Her testimony was another in a series alleging that Starr favors falsity vs truth, as an attorney, Mark Geragos, observes. This further shows Starr's pattern and propensity to disregard the truth, and to support, cover-up, aid and abet perjury and obstruction of justice. 2. THE AGENCY FEARS EEOC REVIEW AS IT WILL SHOW I AM QUALIFIED. The corrupt respondents' goal is to prevent review, and my supervisor Jeremiah Kator's support (his saying I am "very capable and very conscientious" and he "would recommend me for a position" [Dep, 49-51]). Morever, I could not be disqualified as the agency had issued me a qualifications waiver on the very job they now say they fired me from for not meeting qualifications! Disregarding the waiver rules 5 CFR § 339.104, 202 and 204 as personnel work is neither arduous nor hazardous. Cross-examination will review the extent of mental disorder among persons such as Edward Hoover, Emily Bacon, Stanley Kelly, etc. They hallucinate apart from normal BFOQ requirements and qualifications, that tobacco smoke is a job requirement. TACOM realizes that any/all EEOC AJ will see that claim as deranged, invented solely for the purpose of firing me, aided by bribing judges to go along with). All EEOC AJ's know that the presence of tobacco smoke in the air is NOT a BFOQ requirement, and that not meeting it, is not disqualifying. (Removal for not meeting a non-existent requirement is the most severe separation from service, and was done--to maximize the humiliation--in retaliation against me as I had (1) won a Jan 1980 Report finding TACOM in violation of anti-smoking rules, and (2) filed class actions to protect others, provide them the same win I'd won. Bona fide occupation qualifications (BFOQ's) must be based on objective job analysis. Criteria for creating BFOQ's are set in Army Pamphlet 611-2 (June 1962); Federal Personnel Manual (FPM) Chapter 335 (Sep 1968); FPM Supp 335-1 (June 1969); 5 CFR § 339; 29 CFR § 1607, 29 CFR § 1613.705, etc., none of which TACOM obeyed. More legal principles for qualifications are in 15 Am Jur 2d Civil Rights 112, Job Requirements (1976). Unbribed courts say that BFOQ's must be applied across the board, not just to one person (me, as TACOM had done, i.e., disparate treatment). BFOQ's must be stated in advance, not fabricated retroactively, i.e., must be pre-listed in hiring and medical forms, tests, be actually required for the job, checked for in background investigations, etc. The process is described in unbribed case law, e.g., U.S. v City of Chicago, 549 F2d 415, 429-434 (CA 7, 1977). Hoover, Bacon, Kelley, etc., insane as they are, know that there are minimal medical requirements for personnel work, due to the nature of the job, and those few are on the "Health Qualification Placement Form." Mine were use of fingers, rapid mental and muscular coordination, near and far and color vision, hearing, clear speech, and mental and emotional stability. I meet them all. TACOM's own Dr. Francis Holt certified I met them, and never certified otherwise. EEOC review would reveal such facts in minutes. They also foresee that an EEOC AJ will find that the State of Michigan Unemployment (MESC) Office had agreed with me that I do meet the BFOQ's. So, pursuant to MCL § 421.28(1)(c), MSA § 17.530.28(1)(c), MESC granted me unemployment compensation. Corroborating MESC, the U.S. Dept of Labor's Office of Workers Compensation programs (OWCP) said I met the qualifications requirements. It repeatedly said I was able to work March 1980 to present, thereby overruling Crazy Eddy. Pursuant to 5 USC § 8151(b)(1), that OWCP finding entitles me to priority consideration. The Office of Personnel Management also agreed that there is no job qualification requirement such as mentally disordered TACOMers hallucinated. Corroborating further, the Michigan Rehabilitation Service agreed. It even sent supportive letters to EEOC on my behalf, rejecting the hallucinations of a tobacco smoke BFOQ. Contrary to those insane delusions, tobacco smoke is not "in the requirements for any position," 5 USC 2302(b)(6). No such requirement is published pursuant to law, 5 USC § 552.(a)(1). These rules are obeyed for others, not for me. Starr is well aware that review must be prevented; once the TACOM criminals go down, he--accessory/principal--goes down too. Courts, when unbribed, reject an alleged requirement "not reasonably related to the duties of the position McDonnell Douglas Corp v Green, 411 US 792; 93 S Ct 1817; 36 L Ed 2d 668 (1973)," cited in Hill v Nettleton, 455 F Supp 514, 519 (1978). In that case, a Ph.D. was not a job requirement, notwithstanding the employer's false claim otherwise. In my case, there is nothing in any job description or BFOQ even mentioning the presence of tobacco smoke in the air, much less as a job requirement, much less, as so essential that failure to meet it, overrides everything, including qualification waivers, performance awards, doctors' letters, supervisory recognition, pay increases, etc.. The claim that Starr supported so maliciously at the Supreme Court -- that there is such a requirement -- is simply wrong. Worse, the claim is the result of TACOMers' undisputed drug addiction (type cited in Army Pamphlet 600-63-7 p 14) and resultant severe mental derangement, including acalculia (above cited, inability to even count right) and abulia (damaged impulse controls) hallucinating such a BFOQ! Starr fears review, as it would show his role as accessory/principal to the crimes of clearly mentally unbalanced individuals. No wonder he has obstructed it for eight years! To sane people, "Workmen are not employed to smoke," Maloney Tank Mfg Co v Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp, 49 F2d 146 (CA 10, 1931). There is "no necessity to fill the air with tobacco smoke in order to carry on defendant's business," Shimp v N J Bell Telephone Co, 145 NJ Super 516, 523; 368 A2d 408, 411 (1976). (The Shimp case wherein Shimp had been fired like me, is one that gave rise to the Department of Defense's 32 CFR § 203 (1977) no-smoking regulation, and in turn to the Army's AR 1-8 (1977), so as to prevent such firings. Starr and accessories know that in Michigan especially, smoking is not a BFOQ. Cigarettes are illegal in Michigan, illegal since 1909, pursuant to MCL 750.27, MSA 28.216. Far from cigarette smoke being a BFOQ, it is illegal. An EEOC AJ would see that suppressing smoker conduct, even if done "'brusquely,'" is legally valid, Diefenthal v C.A.B., 681 F2d 1039, 1042 (1982); Jacobs v Mich Mental Health Dept, 88 Mich App 503; 276 NW2d 627 (1979); Keyser Canning Co v Klots Throwing Co, 94 W Va 346; 118 SE 521 (1923) . Even if the hallucination that cigarette smoke is a BFOQ were true (it is not), "the job requirements and qualifications had never been formally changed," Sabol v Snyder, 524 F2d 1009, 1011 (1975) . Starr fears letting an honest investigator or EEOC AJ "examine the position descriptions," look for "legitimate job requirements," Coleman v Darden, 595 F2d 533 (1979), Stalkfleet v U.S. Postal Service, 6 MSPB 536, 541 (1981). Starr knows that it is way too late to forge a retroactive-to-1980 job description with a BFOQ for tobacco smoke. Airborne tobacco smoke only arises from preferences in any case; preferences have no legal standing, Knotts v U.S., 128 Ct Cl 489; 121 F Supp 630 (1954), and Diaz v Pan Am Airways, Inc., 442 F2d 385 (1971) cert den 404 US 950 (1971). Starr knows he lied to the Supreme Court, that the Hoover-Bacon hallucination that cigarette smoke is a BFOQ is not true. So Starr knows that, contrary to what he told the Supreme Court, neither my possession nor non-possession of such a "skill" is relevant to the job. It cannot be used as the basis for the "decision to terminate" me. In law, "'(p)obsession of a skill not needed to meet the requirements of the job cannot be considered in making a determination regarding equality of skill.' 29 C.F.R. § 800.125." Bullock v Pizza Hut, Inc, 429 F Supp 424, 430 (MD La, 1977). The mere fact that Hoover-Bacon relied on a non-job-requirement as the basis for the "decision to terminate" me for purported inability to meet same, is conclusive as to their insanity, hazardousness, and status as "persons requiring treatment" pursuant to Michigan law MCL § 330.1401, MSA § 14.800(401). Starr further knows that the Hoover-Bacon hallucination that cigarette smoke is a BFOQ "suffers from a further inadequacy in that it failed to comply with 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(b)(3), which requires that criteria used to predict job performance 'must represent major or critical work behaviors as revealed by careful job analysis.'" Albemarle Paper Co v Moody, 422 US 405, 432 n 30; 95 S Ct 2362; 45 L Ed 280 (1975); U.S. v Chicago, 549 F2d 415, 431 (CA 7, 1970). At 432, "Job-relatedness can only be determined where the criteria for selection are clearly identified." As the Hoover-Bacon claim was hallucination-driven, there was no "job analysis" at all, much less, a "careful" one. As job analysis is done for others, "Comparison with a single employee" for whom done "is sufficient" for me to prevail, McDonald v Santa Fe Trail Transp Co, 427 US 273 (1976); Clark Oil & Refining Co v Golden, 448 NE2d 958, 964 (Il, 1983). Starr knows that the Hoover-Bacon hallucination that cigarette smoke is a BFOQ is not "objective." Unbribed courts find that objectivity is essential. "In U.S. v Bethlehem Steel Corp, 446 F2d 652, 655 (2nd Cir. 1971), the court identified the lack of "fixed or reasonably objective standards and procedures . . ." as a discriminatory practice. Smokers' deranged, abulic desire to spew toxic chemicals into the air creates no change in my job description. "Assuming arguendo that the hopes of some [smoker] employees will not be met, their hopes arise from an illegal system." 29 CFR § 1910.1000 and MCL § 750.27, MSA § 28.216 ban their activity; 29 USC § 706.(7)(B) and Standard Form 78 ban even hiring them, example at Austin v State, 101 Tenn 563, 48 SW 305, 306 (1898), citing Army refusal to hire smokers due to the danger they pose to themselves!!!!!!!! "The proof discloses no objective standards based on education, experience, ability, length of service, reliability, or aptitude to account for the [unequal] treatment ." U.S. v Jacksonville Terminal Co, 451 F2d 418, 449 (CA 5, 1971). "Elusive, purely subjective standards must give way to objectivity." Brown v Gaston Co Dye Mach Co, 457 F2d 1377, 1382 (1972). So Starr fears that, if he does not obstruct review of my qualifications, issues of the Hoover-Bacon insanity, their hallucinating an elusive, bizarre BFOQ for which no objective documentation exists--would arise; and a counselor, investigator, or EEOC AJ would make findings showing Starr to be an accessory/principal. He can't trust them; their mind is erratic, in one personnel job situation, they say tobacco smoke-in-the-air is a BFOQ; in the next, they say no!! Review by an investigator or EEOC AJ would notice their inconsistency, their insanity; and Starr and accomplices are terrified of this happening. Thus the near decade obstruction of review. In addition, Starr knows (due to his prosecutorial experience) that review would find the long pattern of agency fraud, concealment, and misrepresentation. In context with Col. Benacquista's self-confessed extortion, violation of the anti-racketeering law, 18 USC § 1001, would be obvious. The crimes continued, each time they cite a non-existent BFOQ and/or criminally obstruct my getting review of same, and/or bribe someone to go along. 3. EEOC HAS ALREADY VERIFIED THE AGENCY PATTERN OF REFUSING ME REVIEW. Starr knows that EEOC has already verified that the agency refused me access to the EEO review system beginning in February 1980, and continuing to present. Verification: EEOC decision 01.80.0273 - 01.81.2239 (23 Feb 1982). This decision arise due to EEO Officer Kenneth Adler's insanity, abulia (impaired ethical and impulse controls), acalculia (inability to count discussed above), delusions of grandeur that he was above rules and need not do case processing on merits. His insanity was so severe that, even after being reversed and told to do processing on merits, he refused. It was to protect him (among other purposes) from being removed on an insanity/medical disqualification charge, that Attorney Emily Bacon arranged with U.S. Attorney personnel including Roy C. Hayes, Jr., Gary Maveal, Stephen Markman, Kathleen Moro Nesi, etc., to bribe judges, so as to prevent review on merits from ever occurring--a bribery pattern at which she was highly successful, as review on merits has still not occurred nearly 20 years later. EEOC decision 05.82.0275, 4 Mar 1983 (different incidents are different cases). This seems such a basic point as would hardly need a three page decision. But inv view of the agency pattern of hiring insane EEO Officers, it was needed--to state that simple fact to K. Adler. Again, the same refusal to act as in the above decision: no compliance, and bribery to prevent compliance. EEOC decision 01.91.0498 (14 March 1991). This decision directed counseling by the agency regional office. By then, EEOC had given up on TACOM. Its pattern of hiring insane EEO Officers and of bribing federal judges to go along, was insurmountable. So EEOC deemed it wise to elevate review to a higher level. EEOC underestimated the massive corruption in the Department of Army. The regional EEO office is, like TACOM's, opposed to review beginning. EEOC decision 01.92.3611 (4 Dec 92). The agency must show by proof that my current issues are the same as those the court had a decade ago+. This point seems too basic to need elaborating. A sane EEO Officer would have understood the point without needing a formal decision telling him! EEOC decision 01.93.4758 (8 April 1994). This decision noted my complaint of being refused the EEO review process with respect to the removal). EEOC decision 01.93.4855 (8 April 1994) (showing agency refusal to deal with issues, including my qualifications, and telling the counselor "not to deal with the pattern"). The EEOC decision 01.80.0273 (1982) says the underlying start of the situation best: "The record indicates that as early as February, 1980, appellant was denied EEO counseling and prevented from filing further complaints." (page 2, top). Starr knows that the refusal went so far as to deny me review of the "decision to terminate" me cited by EEOC Hearing Officer Henry Perez, Jr., 9 April 1980, and as admitted by the agency in a 27 Jan 1982 memo by supervisor Carma Averhart. Once review begins, the record will show (already shows) that I am educated and committed freedom of speech in favor of laws, case law, and rules against smoking. (Army Reg 385-10 requires Army employees to be whistle blowers on violations of the type I reported). My education and willingness to read and support rules, and blow the whistle on violations, led to my winning the 25 Jan 1980 USACARA Report the 2/23/82 EEOC decision references at p 2. The educated Grievance Examiner, Norma Kennedy, respected my education and knowledge and ruled in my favor. In retaliation, as I am educated and knowledgeable on medical, science, chemistry, psychology, etc. facts
that they resent, they made the angry February 1980 "decision to terminate" me that EEOC AJ Henry Perez, Jr.,
29 USC § 706.(7)(B) and Standard Form 78, Certificate of Medical Examination, preclude hiring persons with "medical findings which . . . would make him a hazard to himself or others," e.g., smokers. Pursuant to Ryderv U. S., 515 US 177; 115 S Ct 2031; 132 L Ed 2d 136 (1995), an appellant can challenge the validity of an adjudicator's appointment. Citing the mental disorder of smokers E. Hoover, Col. J. Benacquista, C. Averhart, etc., is a Ryder matter. They were not lawfully hired, and thus not proper deciding officials in my case. Showing invalidity of their appointment involves citing medical data on smoker mental disorder in, e.g., the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 3rd - 4th eds; the International Classification of Disease, 9th ed; Mich Law Rev, Nov 1982; their medical files; case law on smoker mental disorder; and anticipated testimony of witnesses. Hoover, Benacquista, Averhart, etc,. have mental disorder and behavior dangerous to themselves, others, and property. See hazard data, p 23 below. Hired in violation of hiring rules, they were unfit adjudicators, Ryder, supra. Ryder, supra, follows case law on the duty to do proper hiring. Bowen v Illinois C R Co, 136 F 306 (CA 8, 1905); 70 LRA 915 (1905); Duckworth v Apostalis, 208 F 936 (D C Tenn, 1913); Davidson v Chinese Republic Restaurant Co, 201 Mich 389; 167 NW 967 (1928); Annot., 40 ALR 1215 (1926); 114 ALR 1041 (1938); Bradley v Stevens, 329 Mich 556; 46 NW2d 382 (1951); Annot., 34 ALR2d 372, 390 9 (1954); 29 Am Jur 267; Hersh v Kentfield Builders, 385 Mich 410; 189 NW2d 286 (1971); Samson v Saginaw, 393 Mich 393; 224 NW2d 843 (1975); Ponticas v KMS Investments, 331 NW2d 907 (Minn, 1983); Welsh Mfg v Pinkerton's, Inc, 474 A2d 436 (1984); 44 ALR4th 603 (1984); Kurtz v City of North Miami, 653 So 2d 1025 (Fla, 1995); Fortunoff F J & S, Inc v N Y St Div of H R, 227 App Div 2d 557; 642 NYS2d 710 (1996); Stevens v Inland Waters, Inc, 220 Mich App 212; 559 NW2d 61 (1996). Employers have a duty to ascertain applicants' criminal and dangerous propensities prior to a hiring decision, especially when there is a pattern of such conduct or propensity, as with TACOM's smokers, dangerous people like E. Hoover, E. Bacon, J. Benacquista, C. Averhart, etc. promptly noted in April 1980. Personnel Officer Edward Hoover, in an insane/abulic fit of rage in retaliation against me, made the decision, with fellow racketeers Col. John Benacquista, MG Oscar Decker, Jr., etc. Ed Hoover was hired in violation of Standard Form 78. To protect him (among other purposes) from being removed on an insanity/medical disqualification charge, Attorney Bacon arranged with U.S. Attorney personnel including R. Hayes, G. Maveal, S. Markman, K. Nesi, etc., to bribe judges, so as to prevent review on merits from ever occurring--a bribery pattern at which she was highly successful, as review on merits has still not occurred nearly 20 years later. Starr fears review, and it has been obstructed since 1991, as he knows review will identify him as an accessory/principal 4. AFTER BASING THE DECISION TO TERMINATE ME ON INABILITY TO BAN SMOKING,
Starr knows that he defended and covered-up for Hoover, etc.'s lying, their knowingly false after they removed me, that they could not eliminate their own and others' tobacco smoking conduct. (Starr knows the claim is a crock; that's not a basis for a removal--only gross misconduct/performance deficiency by me re which there would have had to have been a long term effort to have helped me improve, before the last resort (removal) would be effected!!. Assuming arguendo the agency claim that I am a mere former employee (despite its never showing any adjudicator a 5 USC § 7513.(b) notice of charges), former employees have standing to challenge agency actions which presently affect them and for which remedial action would be available if they prevailed. Clay Laborde v Postal Service, EEOC Request No 05910521 (7/25/1991). This applies here. The false data provided to the Supreme Court can be replaced with true data; Starr can be disbarred; the lying judges can be jailed; the review process I sought in 1980 and on can be begun. I had chosen the EEO forum. A complainant's first forum choice -- here, of EEOC, is binding. Carreno v Dept of Army, 22 MSPB 515, 518 (1984). After the decision to terminate me based on its claim of inability to ban smoking, which Starr defended b lying about the impossibility of banning smoking, the agency then did just that--banned it! The ban shows that both Starr and the agency had misrepresented, concealed, committed fraud concerning, its ability. So even if review had occurred as alleged, the civil service rule on reversals, and case law, provide for reopening. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co v Hartford Empire Co, 322 US 238; 64 S Ct 997; 88 L Ed 1250 (1944). MSPB refused to accept jurisdiction of my case as EEOC Decision 03810087, April 1983, notes. As EEOC's decision is undisputed, it is clear that I had chosen the EEO forum. A complainant's first forum choice is binding. Carreno v Dept of Army, 22 MSPB 515, 518 (1984). Even if this were a reopening due to the new evidence of agency fraud, the agency must notify me of how to go about seeking "reopening." That is especially essential here, as evidently MSPB allows reopening issues. Anderson v Dept of Transp, FAA, 46 MSPR 341, 349-350 (1990). Relief sought: order the agency to notify me of the "reopening" process, and how it is to be invoked.. Notifying me of my rights will help fulfill the agency duty of notification of rights, pursuant to case law that agencies must tell potential appellants their rights so they can make an informed choice. Scharf v Department of Air Force, 710 F2d 1572, 1575 (CA Fed, 1983). Here, I have been trying since the new data was discovered, to obtain such notice from the agency. But it refuses to notify me. So please order it to notify me--so I can obtain review of the agency fraud, concealment, misrepresentation on its ability to ban tobacco smoking conduct by others. We now see a further motive for the agency refusal, Starr's tobacco lobbyist role. Review will show him as an accessory/principal in local personnel's crimes. Starr wants to be on the Supreme Court. He knows that his involvement in this scandal will foreseeably wreck his chances. So obstructing my right to review goes on and on. 5. AGENCY COMMITTED ADDITIONAL MISREPRESENTATION, CONCEALMENT, AND
Starr knows that Hoover, Bacon, et al., want fraudulent court decisions honored, no matter how illegally,
immorally, and fraudulently obtained. It is not necessary, indeed, is unlawful, to follow immoral orders. The
Nurnberg Trial, 6 FRD 69 (1946). 3 This is especially so when bribery of the federal court is undisputed.
Starr knows that honoring even legitimately obtained court decisions only applies if I had already had both (a) "a full and fair opportunity" for me to have presented my case, and (b) prior "adverse findings," U.S. v Utah Construction & Mining Co, 384 US 394, 422; 86 S Ct 1545, 1560; 16 L Ed 2d 642 (1966). As the agency had refused me the EEO forum I had chosen, p 12, n 4, and EEO review on merits never began (Exhs 22-26), it is clear that the agency cannot show compliance with either criterion!! No "full and fair opportunity" for me to present my case has even started. Starr knows he helped obstruct such review from even beginning. But the agency had done much worse. It committed fraud on the court.. Via bribery / corruption of / with my then attorney, it lied to the court, pretending case settlement had occurred! Thus dismissing my case. Such fraud on the court is clearly of the type warranting reopening pursuant to Hazel-Atlas Glass Co, 322 US 238; 64 S Ct 997, supra, criteria (fraud on the court preventing the court adjudicating the case on the merits). That fraud on the court prima facie denied me "a full and fair opportunity" to have presented my case, and (b) prior "adverse findings," U.S. v Utah Construction & Mining Co, 384 US 394, 422; 86 S Ct 1545, 1560; 16 L Ed 2d 642 (1966). The very act of arranging the fraud on the court was itself a separate and distinct discriminatory act, something the agency does not do to other litigants. But whether treating the matter as a separate act, or as fraud warranting reopening, please order that the agency notify me of the right to secure reopening--so I can obtain the initial review that the agency fraud, concealment, misrepresentation so egregiously prevented and forestalled. 6. THE AGENCY ALSO COMMITTED MISREPRESENTATION, CONCEALMENT,
It is undisputed that the agency (via the unlawfully hired, mentally disordered individuals Carma Averhart and Edward Hoover, and bribed [with promotion promise] coworker Thomas Alef), applied in April 1981 to retire me. I then sought EEO review. (MSPB lacks jurisdiction of such matters, so could did not review it; absent EEO review, there has been none). But EEO Officer K. Adler, was himself mentally disordered as above stated so refused to let me have review. Adler's mental disorder was so severe as to aid and abet even such an outrageous agency application, disparate treatment, as it does not file disability applications on others similarly situated. Starr aided and abetted that in turn. EEOC had ordered case processing. Courts are to enforce EEOC processing orders. White v DHHS, 30 FEP (BNA) 880, 882 (D DC, 1981); Margules v Block, 38 FEP (BNA) 1244 (D Or, 1981); Houston v Nimmo, 670 F2d 1375, 1378 (CA 9, 1982); Moore v Devine, 780 F2d 1559, 1563 (CA 11, 1986). I had already gone through the process of getting an order to do case review. I wanted case processing; I'd won EEOC orders directing it; I was/am full-time gathering evidence to present to USACARA Investigators--elaborating the evidence I had previously gathered to win the 25 Jan 1980 USACARA Report. Doing otherwise would defeat the purpose of having an administrative forum. Moore, 780 F2d 1563, supra. I know how to win with a USACARA Investigator, and had/have no intention of presenting my case to a judge prior to/without the normal situation (full administrative investigation) with which I am familiar and experienced. Starr knew that based on my grievance processing and crime prevention background, and the record of corruption among judges, I want/ed to avoid premature action (i.e., prior to normal review--counseling, investigation, hearing). The record of corruption among judges and rampant bribery thereof is not one to inspire confidence in judges, and certainly not to go to one without full administrative review first. See books such as The Finest Judges Money Can Buy, by Charles R. Ashman (Los Angeles: Nash Pub, 1973). Indeed, having already won at USACARA in January 1980, I expected to win again. The agency expected to lose, that's why it was so vehemently opposing letting me present my case to a USACARA Investigator. So if I could only get USACARA Investigation, and perhaps, if need-be, an EEOC hearing, I'd win. So, though forced to go to court, I wanted to keep the judges' role minimal: enforce the law, the EEOC decisions ordering review, get administrative review to start like others get. The agency feared review, bribed the local judge, Anna Diggs Taylor, then circuit judges (Nathaniel R. Jones, James L. Ryan, Anthony J. Celebrezze, 891 F2d 292), and U.S. attorney staff (Stephen Markman and Kathleen Nesi). The bribery went to such an ultra extreme as to pay the judges to pretend that in the period 24 Oct 1984 - Sep 1985, I "then filed an application for disability retirement." Imagine my shock when I read that brazen lie!! The bribed, depraved, immoral, judges knew I'd refute their vile claim that I had applied to retire myself (and expose their being bribed), if they let me have administrative review, for which I had made voluminous written requests, alleged to the court as about 2,000 such requests.) Starr knew that, confirming bribery, when I called the falsification to their attention, and filed medical data in support (my doctor denied I applied! A civil servant can't apply without doctor's endorsement, and certainly not, years after the agency said I was off the rolls), they stuck with the lie, rather than retract. Other judges, honest, unbribed judges, correct erroneous court orders. These sleazy paid-off judges refused. Their behavior is in marked contrast to what honest, unbribed people do: Honest, unbribed people admit their errors and correct them. So I reported this criminal activity by the agency, judges, and U.S. attorneys, to the Army Criminal Investigation Command (CID). CID assigned Agent Scott Szekely to investigate. He checked the court files, found no application by me, confirmed the judges had lied! cited a non-extant document no part of the record! The bribe- taking sleaze! Agent Szekely was about to blow the lid off the entire bribery process by the agency criminals. But sadly, to obstruct criminal prosecution of herself and her organized crime gang, consiglière Emily Bacon advised/procured obstruction of justice, obstruction of Szekely's criminal investigation. She prevented him from interviewing the corrupt, bribed judges and U.S. attorney staff. They were terrified that Agent Szekely would have the whole crime gang in prison. His honesty, his finding (and saying he found), no application by me such as the bribed judges had alleged, really shook her, and her mobster gang. This is the kind of behavior Starr defended at the Supreme Court. No wonder he and his accomplices have been obstructing review all these years!!! Criminal investigations for others are not obstructed. Obstructing mine is clearly disparate treatment, not done to others. So I sought EEO review from the Army EEO Office. You know what happened; need I say more--no counseling, no investigation, no hearing. Further confirming bribery, there has been a multi-year pattern of refusing me EEO counseling on the incidents. TACOM EEO Officer Kenneth Adler and successors through Kathleen Buttrey are hardened criminals. No EEO counselor under them has the integrity to counsel me on the issue, for me to even get review to begin. Racketeers Kenneth Adler, Kathleen Buttrey, Emily Bacon, Dorothy Symons, Stanley Kelley, Jr., and certainly Kenneth W. Starr, etc., vehemently oppose letting me have EEO review (counseling, investigation, hearing) on this, as it will blow the lid off the entire corrupt goings on. Wherefore, as these incidents (the ex parte contact with judges, false claim that I filed a disability application, canceling of CID investigation, refusal of administrative review of the application claim, refusal of administrative review of the obstruction of CID investigation) are disparate treatment (others similarly situated are not subjected to same), please order administrative review to begin, as I have been seeking for so many years now. 7. THE AGENCY ALSO COMMITTED MISREPRESENTATION, CONCEALMENT, AND
This incorporates by reference my briefs to the Supreme Court, and Solicitor General Kenneth Starr's false, fraudulent, misleading responses. It is undisputed that in 1981, Emily Bacon bribed MSPB officials including Ronald Wertheim to invent false claims of actions. EEOC caught the lying, found that nothing (0%) had been done, not even implementation of the USACARA Report in my favor. Pages 4-5 of EEOC Decision 03810087 (8 April 1983). Such implementation is mandatory, says the agency's own rules, Spann v McKenna, 615 F2d 137 (1980).4 But giving her credit, Emily Bacon is good at bribing people. She kept on getting people to invent stories of actions taken! Even a decade later, she was still bribing. That year, she bribed Solicitor General Kenneth Starr. Bacon bribed him to have him support Wertheim's false § 1981 claims; indeed, all the violations of laws and rules, e.g., 5 USC § 7513.(b) (bans no-notice firings); 18 USC § 1001 (bans falsifying); TACOM-R 600-5.14.27-28 (bans forced leave); 18 USC § 1961 (bans racketeering); 5 USC § 7902.(d) (bans hazards); 29 CFR § 1910.1000 (bans toxic emissions); 32 CFR § 203 and Army Reg 1-8 (ban cigarette hazards, discomfort, annoyance, and inadequate ventilation); TACOM-R 190-4 (bans drugs on-post); Army CPR 700.771 (bans defying USACARA Reports); MCL § 750.27, MSA § 28.216 (bans cigarettes in Michigan); 29 CFR § 1613 (bans refusal of EEO review); 5 USC § 8151(b)(1) (bans disregarding OWCP decisions in an employee's favor); and of course, all the other misconduct (e.g., the claim I applied to retire myself sometime 24 Oct 84-Sep 85; the insane notion that obeying laws/rules is "accommodation" and unreasonable; the rule violations; the no-notice "decision to terminate"; the reprisals; and the refusal to let me have administrative review of same in my chosen forum. But for Starr's corrupt lying, and his refusal to tell the truth to the Supreme Court, it would have remanded the case to be done properly. The very length of the list of agency violations, shows prima facie that the agency has a motive to prevent review, and thus corroborates bribery as likely, and lying as likely so as to obstruct review. EEOC Decision
03810087 (8 April 1983) caught false claims Emily Bacon had suborned MSPB to allege. But Ms. Bacon was not
deterred by being caught. As long as she could prevent me getting review, and had bribed judges and U.S. Attorneys
in her pocket, and the Solicitor General himself,5 she knew she would not go to prison where she belongs. So she
knew that she could keep on bribing people to keep on alleging events that never happened. Others go to prison for
violating 18 USC § 1001. Not Ms. Bacon. So she kept bribing people to keep on alleging as many claims of .
In fact, putting rat poison in cigarettes is not a "trade secret." It had been published. In 1884, Laurence Johnson, M.D., said "that it [coumarin] is largely used as an adulterant of smoking tobacco . . . Hence, it happens that cigarette-smoking in this country . . . is assuming the proportions of a great national evil," in A Manual of the Medical Botany of North America (New York: William Wood & Co, 1884), pp 170-171. Putting coumarin in tobacco is a Confederate tobacco company practice; "other countries" use "different materials." Michigan responded with MCL § 750.27, MSA § 28.216, banning adulterated cigarettes. We oppose coumarin, rat poison (trade name: Warfarin), killing people. Tennessee had seen the danger in 1897 from its neighbor ex-Confederate states, so banned cigarettes, Austin v State, 101 Tenn 563; 48 SW 305; 70 Am St Rep 703 (1898) aff'd 179 US 343 (1900). In the 1897-1909, era, many people still alive remembered that Confederates--the source of tobacco--had fought for the right to torture and kill. That right, which underlay slavery, had been repeatedly upheld in Southern courts, e.g., Com v Turner, 26 Va 678 (1827); State v Mann, 13 NC 263 (1829); Neal v Farmer, 9 Ga 555 (1851); and Com v Souther, 48 Va 673 (1851). So there was suspicion that they wanted revenge, and would manipulate and flavor tobacco so as to torture and poison Northerners. There was evidence of such poisoning. "It] has been used commercially for many years--mainly in cigarettes . . . harvest of [it] is expanding . . . The composition of one flavoring extract that includes [it] was patented in 1961. . . . About two million pounds of cured plants are harvested annually. . . . Because [it] is a perennial and the roots are not harvested, maintaining populations is not a problem. A decrease in plant populations has not been noted." See Krochmal, Trilisa odoratissima, 23 Econ Botany 185-6 (1969). "Leaves of [the plant] . . . are used in the tobacco industry, particularly in cigarette mixtures. . . . It appears that the . . . constituent most desired by the tobacco industry is coumarin." See Haskins, et al., Coumarin in Trilisa odoratissima, 26 Econ Botany 44-8 (1972). "Leaves used to flavor pipe and cigar tobacco and cigarettes . . . and as a moth repellant . . . may cause hemorrhage and liver damage." See James A. Duke, Handbook of Medicinal Herbs (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 1985), p 491. Starr's morals can be seen by his representing a rat poisoning company, Brown & Williamson, and by his reprehensible, disbarment-warranting conduct--so vile as to lie to the Supreme Court , oppose my pro-law freedom of speech against rat poisoning people. Pres. William J. Clinton committed the same freedom of speech as me, in his proposed and final anti-smoking rules in 60 Fed Reg (# 155) 41313-41787 (11 Aug 1995) and 61 Fed Reg (# 168) 44396-45318 (28 Aug 1996), respectively, incorporated herein by reference as freedom of speech, hence, K. Starr attacks Pres. Clinton also, but without credibility, as the rejection of all charges shows. wonderful things that her wild drug-influenced imagination could hallucinate that TACOM had done for me! Of course, it helps to have a prominent million-dollar tobacco lobbyist to grease the skids and keep the money flowing. As EEOC saw (Decision 03810087 [8 April 1983]), she lies. So adding Kenneth Starr to her stable of liars was her next step. Her criminal pattern of lying to the district and circuit courts could be exposed if Starr did his duty, revealed the truth, told the Supreme Court the truth. So she had Kenneth Starr lie to the Supreme Court. The way that I got EEOC to see that E. Bacon had suborned MSPB lying--was to "accept" the actions they said happened!! (I don't need "accommodation," but the fact that a person doesn't need it, does not preclude "accepting" allegations of being granted same, just as a police officer "accepts" stolen property for the sake of exposing the robber. "Accommodation" issues are an affirmative defense to a 5 USC § 7513.(b) advance notice, 61 Am Jur 2d 152, p 580; Bolling v Navy, 43 MSPR 668, 671 (1990), and Brown v Postal Service, 47 MSPR 50, 59 (1991). There was no such notice. So accommodation issues were both criminally false and premature, as I could not cite/speculate on affirmative defenses to a notice the agency never issued). I successfully got EEOC headquarters staff to see the MSPB lies, even though EEOC staff (off-site) lacked first-hand knowledge; my evidence (my "acceptance" ) was so persuasive that they realized that TACOM and MSPB were liars. Starr continued the malicious lying at the Supreme Court, arguing an affirmative defense to charges against me that had not even been filed!! What a sicko!! Or, what money under the table can buy!!! So here's the pattern. Emily Bacon would suborn MSPB and other officials to lie. Each time these gangsters take a bribe to lie, and say "accommodations" were done, I'd accept! Sudden silence!! That shows their lies for what they are: mail fraud, obstruction of justice, etc. So pursuant to my pattern, when Kenneth Starr lied to the Supreme Court, alleged accommodation, I "accepted" his claim. I planned to present his lie and my "acceptance" in EEO review--tell the counselor, investigator, AJ that Starr lied, i.e., a conflict of interest, misusing his government job to lie, cover up for his client Brown & Williamson. Lying and conflict of interest isn't done in other people's cases. I sought review. You know what happened; need I say more--no counseling, no investigation, no hearing. It's eight years later; investigation of and hearing on Starr's lies has not begun. Please take official notice of President Clinton's statements in the "Whitewater Investigation" about Kenneth Starr, that Starr seeks to have people state perjured or otherwise false evidence against Clinton. Your taking such official notice will obviate the necessity for calling Pres. Clinton in this case as a witness, to show Starr's bad character and willingness to file false documentation in court--thus showing a pattern of Starr's followed in my case. "The proof of the pattern or practice [of Starr's willingness to provide false data in court] supports an inference that any particular decision [to file a document in court], during the period in which the policy was in force, was made in pursuit of that policy." Teamsters v U.S., 431 US 362; 97 S Ct 1868; 52 L Ed 2d 431, supra. As the agency does not commit such a pattern of disparate treatment against others, please remand; order investigation and hearing; put these criminals on the stand. Pres. Clinton may thus see Kenneth Starr in prison for his accessory/principal role in extortion, bribery, falsification, obstruction of justice. He may want to testify ! Wherefore, please remand; order investigation and hearing; let's put these criminals on the stand and soon thereafter, in prison where they belong. They are a menace to decent folks. 8. THE AGENCY RETURNS OTHERS TO DUTY WHO MEET THE "WITHIN ONE YEAR"
5 USC § 8151.(b)(1) says that in cases when OWCP has ruled in an employee's favor, as in my case, the "agency . . . shall immediately and unconditionally accord the employee <> . . . the right to resume his former or an equivalent position."The agency obeys this law for others, but not for me. Once you force the EEO review process open 6 i.e., cause counseling, investigation, and hearing begin, one of the issues I will then raise is that OWCP issued me a qualifying ruling of this type. The investigator and EEOC AJ will foreseeably cite evidence including the fact that OWCP issued me workers' compensation 31 Jan 1980. An OWCP compensation check is clearly "compensation." "Anything that might be paid . . . should be classed as compensation." U.S. v. Bettis, 39 F Supp 160, 164 (D SD Cal, 1941). An OWCP check is included in the word "anything," i.e., is compensation as defined by 5 USC § 8101.(12): "'compensation' includes the money allowance payable to an employee or his dependents and any other benefits paid for from the Employees' Compensation fund."_____________ 6 My access to EEO review like others get, will only occur upon your directing firing of TACOM's hardened criminals, e.g., E. Bacon, EEO Officer K. Adler, and successors including K. Buttrey, and their imprisonment or execution on charges of murdering TACOM workers and others killed by the cited illegal toxic emissions. (Michigan law, MCL § 767.39, MSA § 28.979, does not distinguish accessories and principals.) "Cigarette Makers Get Away With Murder," says Elizabeth M. Whelan, Sc.D., The Detroit News, p 4B (14 Mar 1993). This is due to accessory criminals such as them terrorizing and obstructing Crime Prevention Officers such as me from doing our job of enforcing laws against poisoning and murdering people. That is discrimination. The billboard targeting process to addict children as targets of cigarette poisoning, aims at minorities, e.g., black children, in inner cities such as this Detroit area. "Compensation . . . was intended to cover everything that the government had paid out, not only what the employee received." U.S. v Crystal, 39 F Supp 220, 221-2 (D ND Ohio, 1941). "5 U.S.C. § 8101.(12) defines 'compensation' to include all OWCP benefits." Kinler v G.S.A., 43 MSPR 197, 202 (1990). Even if there were ambiguity, "ambiguity should be resolved to effect legislative purpose" (prompt restoration), Kinler, 43 MSPR 203, supra. Within the under one year period set by 5 USC § 8151.(b)(1), i.e., (January - March 1980), the approval period ended. 5 USC § 8151.(b)(1) says that in such circumstances, the "agency . . . shall immediately and unconditionally accord the employee . . . the right to resume his former or an equivalent position." The investigator, and EEOC AJ will likely note that the agency obeys this law for others, e.g., in Ms. Evelyn Bertram v TACOM, Case A9-190131 (1977). For me, it does not. This is disparate treatment (others similarly situated are treated differently) and retaliation against my having filed EEO cases. Please remand, order compliance, investigation, hearing. 9. THE AGENCY KEEPS OTHERS ON THE ROLLS PENDING DECISION BY
5 CFR § 831.1206 (1980) requires agencies to keep employees on the rolls until the Office of Personnel Management Associate Director for Compensation decides on the retirement application (here, as filed by T. Alef, C. Averhart, and E. Hoover, p 14 above). Once review (counseling, investigation, hearing) begins, the investigator and EEOC AJ will foreseeably cite evidence that OPM's Stanley M. Conley sent me a 16 Jan 1991 letter denying that the OPM ADC ever sent a decision. That was long after the court litigation the agency will likely cite. Starr knew that the agency had committed fraud, concealment, and misrepresentation by having claimed (outside the record, not in a 5 USC § 7513.(b) notice)) that it had such an OPM ADC decision. So review should be granted pursuant to Hazel-Atlas Glass Co, 322 US 238; 64 S Ct 997, supra. (Due to that lie, is why the agency years later, bribed the judges to say that I applied!! Not the agency) Please order the agency to obey 5 CFR § 831.1206 (1980), and/or allow 29 CFR § 1614 review; and/or notify me how to obtain review, under the circumstances of its extreme criminal refusal to let me have review, 1980 to present and bribing judges to prevent me getting review. 10. FOR OTHERS, THE AGENCY GOES BY JOB QUALIFICATIONS. Once review (counseling, investigation, hearing) begins, the investigator and EEOC AJ will see the agency qualifications waiver for me, for the same job from which it says it removed me. There are no qualifications requiring others' tobacco smoking conduct. I meet all the qualifications of record (including those of Standard Form 78). No doctor has ever agreed that I need/ed "accommodation." TACOM cited no Table of Penalties or job requirement violation by me in a 5 USC § 7513.(b) 30 days advance written notice. Smoking is personal/mental disorder, not a job requirement. See John Benacquista's Deposition. Federal law 5 USC § 552(a)(1) says to void actions done without published qualification standards. Starr pursuant to his prosecutorial duty of integrity had a responsibility to act on the fact that others have had actions taken against them canceled when there was no notice of a qualification requirement or other rule violation by them. Morton v Ruiz, 415 US 199, 231; 94 S Ct 1055, 1072; 39 L Ed 2d 270 (1974); Hotch v U.S., 212 F2d 280, 281 (CA 9, 1954); W. G. Cosby Transfer & Storage Corp v Dept of Army, 480 F2d 498, 503 (CA 4, 1973) (Army has a pattern of law violations); and Onweiler v U.S., 432 F Supp 1226, 1229 (D Idaho, 1977). Starr's not obeying the law for me, is part of the agency retaliation and disparate treatment against me. Others similarly situated are not so treated. Wherefore please remand with instructions to have 29 CFR § 1614 review like others get. 11. PLEASE DO NOT OVERLOOK THE AGENCY'S OWN CONFESSION OF BRIBERY
Please note that I have filed undisputed testimony in the present of agency official Robert Singleton, shown in an agency-provided transcript, making it undisputed that the agency bribed adjudicators including "the judge . . . to make up the story about how I serviced the whole place." Re the bribed-induced claim that I serviced the entire Army base (what of my co-workers? - don't they do anything?!!!): "That is impossible. In a 30-year career, I would not get to all the places. They made this up as a deliberate conscious lie and they bribed, they bribed the United States attorney to present this lie to the judge, knowing that it is physically impossible for one person to Service the whole area."As EEOC knows from its prior decisions, the agency beginning February 1980, has for almost two decades, refused me access to the EEO review system, refused to let me meet with an EEO counselor, denied I even tried to obtain review!! The agency's worst fear was that some counselor might blurt out the truth, might blurt out some confession of agency fraud, concealment of fact, misrepresentation of truth. But hard as the agency, the gangsters named in the record, tried to prevent the truth coming out 1980-1996, some suddenly did. Mr. Singleton was an independent counselor, no longer a federal employee. He was the agency's handpicked choice to meet with me over two years ago, for only a short time, no time to really go over the case as discussed herein. Mr Singleton became the agency's (Emily Bacon's) worst night mare--he blurted out that I am right! He blurted out a confession against interest of the agency concealment, misrepresentation, fraud. The startling transcript shows him admitting that "I can tell you from a staffing standpoint, it is an impossibility for you to have serviced this entire installation, it is an absolute impossibility, because if you were, you have gave been a 16 back then."This confession by the agency's handpicked individual against interest, makes the situation very clearly one to be dealt with pursuant to Hazel-Atlas Glass Co, 322 US 238; 64 S Ct 997, supra, criteria. This March 1996 incident was not adjudicated in a past court case. Amazingly, this confession against interest occurred almost under the very nose of Emily Bacon, and just feet from her office. Even one confession of agency crime of this magnitude lends credibility to EEOC's decisions dating from February 1982 and my position that I have been denied review since February 1980. Wherefore please remand with instructions directing EEO review for me like others get. 12. REMEMBER THE ORIGINAL ISSUE--NOW SO DISTORTED BY AGENCY LYING, FRAUD,
Remember that this case began after I won the USACARA Report in Jan 1980 telling the agency to stop disobeying, and begin obeying anti-smoking guidance, as first noted by EEOC in its Decision 01800273 et al. (23 Feb 1982). Recall that Michigan law MCL § 750.27, MSA § 28.216, bans cigarettes from Michigan. The ban arises due to cigarettes' deleterious ingredients:
The list is from the Department of Health and Human Services book, Reducing the Health Consequences of Smoking, Pub No. (CDC) 89-8411, pp 86-87, Table 7 (1989). They are banned by 5 USC § 7902.(d). Due to their deleterious ingredients, cigarettes emit deleterious, toxic emissions far exceeding the worker safety (29 USC § 651 et seq., implemented by 29 CFR § 1910.1000) "speed limits," e.g.,
This list is from the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare book, Smoking and Health. Public Health Service Publication No. 1103, p 60, Table 4 (1964). Here is a word picture of what this means: Example: | 42,000 ppm - carbon monoxide To put those quantities in perspective, during auto emissions tests (AET), automobiles' limit on emissions is not more than 10-12,000 ppm of carbon monoxide. 40 CFR § 85.2203-81. (Cigarettes' emit 42,000 ppm). "Over 37 million people (one of every six Americans alive today) will die from cigarette smoking years before they otherwise would." William Pollin, M.D., Dir, Natl Institute on Drug Abuse. Source: his page v, Foreword, in Dept of Health, Educ, and Welfare, Research on Smoking Behavior, Monograph 17, DHEW Publication ADM 78-581 (Dec 1977). Their massive quantity of toxic chemicals explains why/how cigarettes kill so many people. So, due to cigarettes' deleterious ingredients, Michigan banned "Any person within the state [from action that] manufactures, sells or gives to any one, any cigarette containing any ingredient deleterious to health or foreign to tobacco . . . ." (MCL § 750.27, MSA § 28.216) (1939 ed.) The cigarette ban follows the precedent of common law and statutory law which has long made it unlawful to provide people the means, e.g., a deleterious substance, to injure or kill themselves. People v Carmichael, 5 Mich 10; 71 Am Dec 769 (1858) (cantharides, a behavior-deteriorating, mind-altering drug like tobacco, but causing far fewer casualties); People v Kevorkian, 447 Mich 436, 494-496; 527 NW2d 714, 738-739 (1994) (carbon monoxide). It is unlawful even if death is substantially delayed even for years. People v Stevenson, 416 Mich 383; 331 NW2d 143, 145-146 (1982) (advances in modern medicine preclude reliance on the medieval concept that wrongful death must occur within "one year and a day" of the initial wrongful act). As it is children (about age 12) who are first hooked on cigarettes, and as "Cigarette Makers [Commit] Murder," says Elizabeth M. Whelan, Sc.D., in The Detroit News, p 4B (14 March 1993), smoker deaths are child-murders. The fact that deaths do not occur until 40 or so years later does not absolve the killers and their initial illegal activity. Stevenson, 416 Mich 383, supra. As Michigan anti-murder and anti-cigarette law, bans cigarettes; federal law 5 USC § 7902.(d) bans hazards; and safety rule 29 CFR § 1910.1000 bans their massive emissions, TACOM was triply in violation, without even reaching the agency's own rules. TACOM was also violating 32 CFR § 203 (Department of Defense, August 1977) and Army Reg 1-8 (implementing 32 CFR § 203), the Army's own Nov 1977 rule against cigarette smoking. AR 1-8 banned it via multiple ways: when there is a hazard, nonsmokers are unreasonably annoyed or discomforted, or the ventilation was inadequate to remove smoke and make the post smoke-free. Due to TACOM's malfunctioning ventilation system, TACOM was in violation on all criteria. (That is why it issued a 1993 smoking ban, what insane Ed Hoover and consiglière Emily Bacon, had said couldn't be done, and the lie that Starr defended, a lie the agency -- despising their own bought man -- shortly thereafter refuted, bu banning smoking!!!. Keep in mind the pushers, whose activity the eminent Elizabeth Whelan, Sc.D., labels as "murder,"and TACOM's many violations of law and regulations. Remember that criminal Col. John Benacquista disagreed with the laws and rules, and demanded that (as a condition for letting me work, which he knew I could) I alter my anticipated testimony, promise to falsely say that TACOM "is reasonably free of contaminants" despite the hazard. (Benacquista Deposition, pp 25 and 62). If I wouldn't change it, his consiglière Emily would see to it that I'd never be allowed back. Said demand by Col. Benacquista to alter anticipated testimony is extortion, in violation of law, MCL § 750.213, MSA § 28.410, and case law, People v Atcher, 65 Mich App 734; 238 NW2d 389 (1975); U.S. v Kibler, 667 F2d 452 (1982); and U.S. v Wilford, 710 F2d 439 (1983). Recall that Personnel Officer Edward Hoover, in reprisal against my winning the Jan 1980 USACARA Report, had me terminated on the spot. He had me summarily ordered off post, never to return, with no legal notice whatever. He and his crime gang have been preventing me getting EEO review ever since, despite my 18 years of requests (they say 2,000?) for it to begin. Please keep in mind the original issue: Once I won the USACARA Report, the only issue was--get TACOM to obey it. That was the sole issue. But criminals E. Hoover and Col. Benacquista (advised by consiglière Bacon, and aided and abetted by Kenneth Starr) did a diversion, distraction: remove me without notice. She advised, I wouldn't know how to defend myself, and I'd be just another fired, disgruntled employee. And with her awesome skill at bribing U.S. Attorneys, federal and state judges, even up to the Solicitor General, Kenneth Starr, that's what the record says for the last 19 years--fired, with no chance of ever getting EEO review (counseling, investigation, hearing) like others routinely get. Wherefore, to halt this massive criminal, murderous activity, please remand, with instructions that will deal with the magnitude of their murdering goal. 13. IT IS AGENCY POLICY TO HIRE SEX HARASSERS. MCL § 750.27, MSA § 28.216 (the law against sale, manufacture, and giveaway of deleterious and adulterated cigarettes), dates from 1909, based on the already then known data on the deleteriousness and adulteration of cigarettes, their role in injury and death, and as gateway drug leading to other drug use, thus to crime. One of the most serious aspects of cigarettes' deleteriousness is their role in leading to crime--a fact oft noted since before the Civil War, and published repeatedly prior to 1909. As cigarettes are the gateway drug leading to other drug abuse, they in turn lead to crime. So as reported by multiple analysts since before the Civil War, prisons are filled with smokers--90% smokers, 10% non-smokers. Police, prosecutors, and judges have long known this 90% - 10% ratio. (Jackson, 1854; Hodgkin, 1857; Buckley, 1860; Lindsay, 1914; Torrance, 1916; Brum, 1924; Danis, 1925; Crane, Dawson, Pollock, and Shaw, 1931, etc.). Unbribed federal judges still publish this long and well-established fact: "Nationwide, the [ratio] of smokers [to nonsmokers] in prisons is 90 percent." McKinney v Anderson, 924 F2d 1500, 1507 n 21 (CA 9, 1991). It is smokers who commit the serious crimes. So as a matter of law enforcement priorities, tobacco control is the No. 1 paramount step in crime prevention, including prevention of hiring sex harassers. As all cigarettes contain deleterious ingredients, all cigarettes are illegal in Michigan. They are "contraband." "Contraband" is "any property which is unlawful to produce." Source: Black's Law Dictionary, 6th ed. (St. Paul: West Pub Co, 1990), page 322. Thus, as Starr knows, and as the tobacco lobby hired him to obstruct, and rewarded him highly for having done so in my case, all cigarettes in Michigan were brought in illegally (the word is "smuggling"): "Smuggling has well-understood meaning . . . signifying bringing . . . goods . . . the importation . . . whereof is prohibited." Williamson v U.S., 310 F2d 192, 195 [CA 9, 1962]; 18 USC §§ 545-6. Black's Law Dictionary, 6th ed (St. Paul: West Publishing Co, 1990), page 1389. Since smoking starts with cigarette smuggling, it leads to other drug abuse and crimes as well. For example, William Pollin, M.D., the 1977 NIDA Director said that NIDA gave "increased priority to" combating smoking for "several reasons: the increasing identification of smoking as a prototypic addiction, the status of smoking as a gateway drug to use of stronger or illicit drugs, and [NIDA's] focus on substance abuse as a generic phenomenon that includes tobacco." See NIDA Research Monograph 17, p vi, supra. The U.S. government repeated that cigarette deleteriousness fact (that smoking is the gateway drug to other misconduct, including sex-related) in the 1994 Surgeon General Report. "Among addictive behaviors, cigarette smoking is the one most likely to become established during adolescence . . . Tobacco use is associated with alcohol and illicit drug use and is generally the first drug used by young people who enter a sequence of drug use that can include tobacco, alcohol, marijuana, and harder drugs. . . . Tobacco use in adolescence is associated with a range of health-compromising behaviors, including being involved in fights, carrying weapons, engaging in higher-risk sexual behavior, and using alcohol and other drugs. . . . The initiation and development of tobacco use among children and adolescents progresses in five stages: from forming attitudes and beliefs about tobacco, to trying, experimenting with, and regularly using tobacco, to being addicted. . . . Illegal sales of tobacco products are common." U.S. Dept of Health and Human Services, Preventing Tobacco Use Among Young People: A Report of the Surgeon General (1994). Note three smoker behavior patterns related to sex harassment: "being involved in fights, carrying weapons, engaging in higher-risk sexual behavior." The Surgeon General is simply rewording published findings: "The mean ages of reported first use . . . ranged from age 12.0 for cigarettes and 12.6 for alcohol, to age 14 for marijuana . . . cigarettes were the drug with the youngest . . . age of onset . . . Use of cigarettes was shown to significantly increase the likelihood [of] using other drugs (e.g., beer, marijuana) two years later . . . [When youths] start with one substance, that substance will most likely be cigarettes, not marijuana or alcohol." Fleming, R., Levanthal, H., Glynn, K., and Ershler, J. "The Role of Cigarettes In The Initiation And Progression Of Early Substance Use." 14 Addictive Behavior 261 (1989). As smoking leads to crime, including sex crimes, "Nationwide, the [ratio] of smokers [to nonsmokers] in prisons is 90 percent." McKinney v Anderson, 924 F2d 1507, supra. The Army knows it is not to be hiring smokers. See p 11 above. Its own U.S. Army Aeromedical Research Laboratory (USAARL) Report No. 86-13, Smoking and Soldier Performance, by Frederick N. Dyer (Fort Rucker, AL) (June 1986) p 149 says: "Undoubtedly, if the military [would obey hiring rules that] restrict enlistments to nonsmokers, there would be far fewer discipline, alcoholism, and drug-abuse problems in the Army." Both law, 29 USC § 706.(7)(B), and Standard Form 78, bans hiring them. The Army knows better than to hire smokers, due to their propensity to commit crimes including sex harassment. Starr knew better than to defend such misconduct. Due to the already known medical data on smoking and misconduct, the Army used to not enlist smokers. Judicial notice was taken of that fact in 1898! Austin v State, 101 Tenn 563, 566-567; 48 SW 305, 306, aff'd 179 US 343, supra. To hire smokers now, despite knowing their dangerous propensities for a century+, is evidence of a policy at the highest levels in the agency, of not just condoning, but deliberately, willfully, maliciously causing repeated crimes including sex harassment. "The proof of the pattern or practice [of Army's hiring smokers with criminal tendencies] supports an inference that any particular decision [to hire them at TACOM], during the period in which the policy was in force, was made in pursuit of that policy." Teamsters, 431 US 324, 362, supra. Wherefore, to help prevent sex harassment, EEOC should order the Army to cease and desist its disregard of hiring guidance, e.g., 29 USC § 706.(7)(B), and Standard Form 78, and take note of the fact that it was this violation of proper hiring practices that gave rise to, and underlies, the entire situation herein described. 14. IT IS A PUBLISHED FACT THAT IT IS DEPARTMENT The nature of the Department of Justice (DOJ) pattern herein, wherein it is undisputed that U.S. Attorneys took bribes to support drug abuse and oppose my anti-drug freedom of speech, follows its pro-drug pattern: "I personally am convinced that the Justice Department is against the best interests of the United States in terms of stopping drugs"--Rep. Larry Smith, Chairman, House Task Force on International Narcotics Control. See Michael Levine, The Big White Lie (Thunder's Mouth Press, 1993), p 385. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) Agent Michael Levine (1965-1989) exposed a "pattern" (word from Teamsters, 431 US 362, supra) of DOJ pro-drug corruption. His book (The Big White Lie) says that: "The CIA . . . often courts criminals . . . The highly-connected tuxedo-clad criminal is left in place to provide intelligence to the [CIA]--and drugs to . . . citizens." Ibid., p 125, citing James Mills, The Underground Empire. "For decades, the CIA, the Pentagon . . . have been supporting and protecting the world's biggest drug dealers." Ibid, p 463. Organized crime needs tobacco as the gateway drug to other drug use. My freedom of speech posed a threat to these criminals. So crime infiltrators in the Army (E. Bacon, E. Hoover, Col. J. Benacquista, etc.) and DOJ (Roy C. Hayes, Jr., Gary Maveal, Stephen Markman, Kathleen M. Nesi, Kenneth Starr, etc.) supported drugs rather than my opposition to drugs. Agent Levine found likewise, i.e., that "The war on drugs was only an illusion. . . . drug dealers . . . had bigger and better connections in the American government than [anti-drug staff like me] did." Ibid, p 124. "[T]he CIA perverts the American justice system by protecting drug dealers . . . from prosecution; . . . even federal judges and prosecutors alleged to have violated narcotics laws were protected from investigation." Ibid, p 4. Local federal judge Anna Diggs Taylor is Starr's type, a drug smuggler, violating the Michigan law at issue. Instead of being in prison, she is loose, endangering the public, opposing my freedom of speech, and being cited as though she is a moral authority as to how to process my requests for review! She's a druggie. One drug criminal "was quietly released from jail [as] the U.S. Attorney's office, Southern Judicial District of Miami, dropped all charges against him. [He] immediately returned to Bolivia, where he ran a full- page ad in Bolivia's largest newspapers with a photo of his unconditional release signed by the U.S. attorney. Overnight our war on drugs became a joke among South American drug traffickers." Ibid, p 36. Agent Levine was assigned to DEA Headquarters under Pres. Ronald Reagan, a long time drug (cigarette) pusher/huckster. Reagan imposed his pro-drug views (while loudly mouthing the contrary to his gullible voters): "[H]alf of the job is makin' up fact sheets and briefing papers--you know, statistical bullshit, how we're winnin' the war [on drugs--so one of these clowns [high Reagan officials] can go on TV or testify before Congress." "Where do you get the statistics?" "Outta yer head, where else? And the rest of the job is pretty much . . . what you make of it . . . anything you want; or don't do a fucking thing--no one cares. You ever heard of anyone being fired in DEA for doing nothing?" "Nope, I can't say's I have." Quoting a conversation with Tony Buono [name changed to protect him], an official at DEA Headquarters, 1405 E St, Washington, D.C., Ibid, p 129. Excuse the language, but quoting gives you a sample of what to expect from an Army reply brief. Please note the illegal DOJ policy, which in turn leads it to aid/abet Army's illegal acts, including illegal hiring policy. That illegal hiring policy underlies this situation. Then cancel agency recruiting authority as it is abusing it, knowingly, maliciously hiring people with a propensity to commit crime including but not limited to sex crimes--while firing persons like me for freedom-of-speech whistle blowing in support of the rules, and deny me review for 18+ years. 15. THE PRO-TOBACCO SIDE HAS A PATTERN OF LAWBREAKING SINCE THE SLAVERY ERA. Slavery was illegal, but the perverts, rapists, known as tobacco farmers did it anyway. Cigarettes are illegal in Michigan, but tobacco pushers bring them anyway. The pro-tobacco side has a pattern of law- breaking going back centuries, and didn't intend to stop its criminal, killer ways just because I cited laws. In law, "what ought to be done us fixed by a standard . . . whether it usually is complied with or not." Texas & Pac Ry v Behymer, 189 US 468, 470; 23 S Ct 622, 623; 47 L Ed 903 (1903). Law exists, is "designed to disrupt," nonconforming practice, U.S. v City of Los Angeles, 595 F2d 1386, 1391 (CA 9, 1979). A "practice" "not based upon any rule of law" must be reversed, Biafore v Baker, 119 Mich App 667; 326 NW2d 598 (1982); The T. J. Hooper, 60 F2d 737, 740 (CA 2, 1932). That principle of law was the same during slavery. But sadly, like now, "[g]ross outrages, in open defiance of Magna Charta and common law, have been continued through entire generations." Nonetheless, law is "designed to disrupt" practice, so "customs and usages do not define or create law, but should be controlled by it." See William Goodell, Slavery and Anti-Slavery (William Harned, 1852), page 576. U.S. colonies were to obey English law including common law. Slavery was always illegal in America, as (1) "there were no English statute laws . . . authorizing the holding of slaves, either in England or in the American colonies," and (2) "the common law of England was incompatible with slavery, and neither recognized nor permitted its existence." Goodell, supra, pages 18 and 49-51. This was shown as early as Matter of Cartwright, 11 Elizabeth; 2 Rushworth's Coll 468 (1569) ("England was too pure an air for slaves to breathe in"). Goodell, supra, page 50. Applying common law on a writ of habeas corpus by an alien (James Somerset) challenging his enslavement, Somerset v Stewart, Lofft 1; 20 Howell's State Trials 1, 79-82 (King's Bench, 1772) showed that "there neither then was, nor ever had been, any legal slavery in England." Goodell, supra, pages 18 and 49-51. Two years before, a U.S. court had found likewise, James v Lechmere (Mass Superior Ct, 1770). Goodell, supra, p 112; Emory Washburn, Sketches of the Judicial Hist of Mass from 1630 to the Revolution in 1775 (Boston: Charles C. Little & James Brown, 1840), p 202. "[T]he colonial charters, authorizing the colonial Legislatures to enact laws, gave no license to slavery, and contained the general proviso, that the laws of the colonies should 'not be repugnant or contrary, but as nearly as circumstances would allow, conformable to the laws, statutes, and rights of our kingdom of England.'" "The charters of Virginia, Maryland, the Carolinas, and Georgia, as well as of Pennsylvania and the New England colonies, were essentially alike in this regard." Wherefore, "there were no colonial enactments that authorized the holding of slaves, or defined the relation and condition of slavery." Goodell, supra, page 18. Pursuant to English common law, slavery was illegal in the U.S. In 1776, the Revolution came, and the Declaration of Independence (citing equality of all in fundamental rights), which "has never been repealed." "It was, for years, the only Constitutional law of the United States, and it is no less Constitutional law now, than formerly," citing a then authority, John C. Spencer, saying that "'The first act of our nation (the Declaration of Independence) . . . was the corner-stone . . . above all Constitutions and all laws.'" Goodell, supra, page 574. The issue of applying it to slavery arose. Court rulings found "that the Declaration had abolished slavery." Goodell, pages 111, 573-574, citing cases such as Com v Aves, 35 Mass 193, 209 (1836), a habeas corpus case, which in turn cited earlier cases, e.g., Littleton v Tuttle, 4 Mass 128 (1796) and Winchendon v Hatfield, 4 Mass 123 (1808). The ex-colonies, now states, wrote new Constitutions, with bills of rights, using Declaration of Independence style wording, all thus (redundantly) banning slavery. Goodell, page 78. Later came the current Constitution. As slavery was seen as on the way out, its authors used words crafted to not "recognize . . . the legality of slavery" as it had never been legal, merely illegal practice. So "neither the terms 'slave' nor 'slavery' are to be found there." Goodell, page 84. It, in Art I § 9, recognized habeas corpus--the right used by alleged slaves to obtain anti-slavery court orders--and banned interference with it. It guaranteed (Art 4 § 4) "to every State . . . a republican form of government" (the fundamental rights/legal equality of all men to self-determination and participation in the government process). Art I § 10 banned states' obstructing people's right to make contracts such to work for pay, and to marry (Dred Scott cited the marriage clause in his famous case). Art 1 § 8 granted Congress power to create a military. Pres. Abraham Lincoln used that authority to help stop slavery. Art. I § 9-10 banned "nobility" (a master concept) and "bills of attainder" (penalty without prior due process of law). An equality clause, Art IV § 2, said, "The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states." Art. VI § 2 made the Constitution "the supreme law of the land . . . anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." Goodell, pages 575-576. The effect of such words was to abolish slavery, if not sooner done by, e.g., litigation pursuant to the common law and Declaration of Independence. Goodell, pages 84-85, and 574-577, citing, e.g., 3 Madison Papers 1429 and 1569; 2 Elliott's Debates 452 and 484; 3 Elliott's Debates 598; and Debates of the Virginia Convention, p 463. Indeed, while the Constitutional Convention was in session in 1787, "the Old Congress passed an ordinance abolishing slavery in the North-Western Territories, and precluding its future introduction there. The first Congress under the new Constitution ratified this The proposed Constitution did not take effect automatically. It needed voter approval. Due to voter fears that it lacked a "bill of rights," its defenders in The Federalist Papers, "assured them that the Constitution was more than the equivalent of such bills of rights" under which slavery had already been recognized as banned, and assured them that the clauses stating its purpose, e.g., to "secure the blessings of liberty" to "the people of the United States" constituted "'a better recognition of popular rights' than could otherwise have been framed." Thus assured "that the Constitution was in favor of freedom," the voters ratified it. Goodell, page 88. Even that was not enough to reassure some people. Soon the original Constitution was amended to add the "Bill of Rights." One amendment (V) specifically said that "No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." "'Due process of law' includes an indictment, trial by jury, and judgement rendered in open court." Goodell, pp 575-576. Thus, even if some words of the pre-Bill of Rights Constitution could somehow be construed as somehow pro-slavery (though no colonial charter, state constitution or law did), that amendment repealed and overruled any such prior words. So slavery, already illegal, remained illegal, as, "Where rights are infringed . . .the legislative intention must be expressed with irresistible clearness to induce a court of justice to suppose a design to effect such objects." U.S. v Fisher, 6 US (2 Cranch) 358, 390; 2 L Ed 304, 314 (1804). Goodell, page 574. See Com v Holloway, 2 Serg & Rawle 305, 306 (1816), a habeas corpus case, applying the "irresistible clearness" principle to slavery, and freeing an alleged slave. Soon slavery's illegality was so well-established in law, that in Com v Aves, 35 Mass 193, 209, supra, the issue was deemed "rather a matter of curiosity than of utility, it being agreed on all hands that, if not abolished before [by Somerset, 20 How St Tr 1, supra], it was so by the declaration of [independence]," Goodell, page 111. Indeed, three-fourths of a century later, in 1850, a prominent pro-slavery senator, Senator James M. Mason, admitted against interest that no southern state had any constitution or law saying "that slavery is [legal] established in [any slave] State . . . it is impossible to [find such a citation] . . . for no such proof [law] can be produced . . . in any of the slave States." Cong Globe, 31 Cong, I Sess, App, 1583-4 (19 Aug 1850). Goodell, 570-571. Why slavery? Southern legislators ignored the common law, Declaration of Independence, Constitutions, Bills of Rights--people's right to not be enslaved--as they were "a set of drunkards, gamblers, and whore-mongers," words by abolitionist Daniel Worth cited by Prof. Clement Eaton, The Freedom-of-Thought Struggle in the Old South (Duke Univ Press, 1940, and New York: Harper & Row, 1964), page 140. And "some of the members of [one southern legislature] needed only long ears and a tail to classify them openly as asses." Eaton, supra, page 84. Worth would undoubtedly deem his words still a good description of Southern legislators as they still disrespect rights, indeed, now support rat poisoning cigarettes with coumarin so as to kill Yankees and blacks in retaliation for the North having won the Civil War and freed the slaves. "It is difficult to-day to comprehend the psychosis of the southern mind. . . ." 7 Eaton, supra, page 384. The South imposed censorship to ban abolitionist whistle blowing on their crimes, banned using the mail to deliver whistle blowing documents such as abolitionist writings, i.e., imposed a "dike of silence." Eaton, supra, page 214. Southern voters were often lazy, uneducated illiterates who opposed education, and voted for whomever paid them the highest bribes. It was a handicap in seeking office to be an educated person. Eaton, supra, pages 79-82. "Certain characteristics of Southern oratory arose from the need of appealing to the large class of illiterate voters."And "many of these illiterates or semi-literates were stupid and comically ignorant." Eaton, pages 81-83. Why slavery? Slavers, tobacco farmers, had been the scum of society when they came to America. Decent immigrants had skills. But immigrants who became slavers, tobacco farmers, were different. They were often "persons of no occupation,--mostly of idle and dissolute habits . . . who [came] through curiosity or the hope of gain . . . 'profligate and disorderly persons, who had been sent off to escape a worse destiny at home.'" Goodell, page 19, citing Willson, American History, supra, pages 162 and 166. Too lazy and stupid to work, they'd buy kidnap victims (aka slaves) from pirates. Ignoring common and
constitutional law, slavers, tobacco farmers, remained as they'd often been--habitual criminals, three-time+ losers.
Slavery was illegal, yet perverts--tobacco farmers--did it anyway. They began the major use of slaves here. See Glenn Porter, ed., Encyclopedia of American Economic History, Vol II (NY: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1980), Article,
Article, "Slavery," pp 552-561. It says "of the American slave population . . . most worked in tobacco," p 552. Tobacco farmers were rapists and robbers, stealing workers' pay then, refusing to pay their accrued back pay and damages now (a.k.a. "reparations"), and murdering workers who, like me, blew the whistle on their crimes and committed freedom of speech to get the "no slavery" law enforced. The same pattern as then, is occurring with me, refusing me review like others get, as the agency knows that, once review begins, I will prevail. "The proof of the pattern or practice [of tobacco farmers/accessories' disobeying laws for centuries, and preventing review] supports an inference that any particular decision, during the period in which the policy was in force, was made in pursuit of that policy." Teamsters, 431 US 324, 362, supra. Slave prices were "from $600 each in 1810 to $1,000 in 1840 to $1,200 and $1,800 for a prime field hand on the eve of secession." Source: William C. Davis, ed. The Civil War: Brother Against Brother: The War Begins (Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1983), page 32. "The price of a slave typically represented ten times the yearly earnings of a free worker." Source: Porter, Encyclopedia of Am Econ History, Vol II, supra, p 556. "A planter would consider it a good year if each field slave produce a profit of $250." Source: Davis, The Civil War: Brother Against Brother: The War Begins, supra, p 11. $250 for a year, would still be twice what the slaver would otherwise likely earn on his own, when average annual pay was $125 for white workers. Slavers, tobacco farmers, enjoyed mass rape; the 1860 census showed 588,000 mulatto women. Source: Barbara Goldsmith, Other Powers (NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), page 154. Quadroons are offspring of a mulatto and a white; octoroons are offspring of a quadroon and a white. And slavers, tobacco farmers could make 20 times annual pay, if they raped the black or mulatto woman. Pretty quadroons and octoroons sold for about $2,500, 20 times normal pay for a white worker. Rape = wealth for the tobacco farmer rapist. "A few traders had special rooms for displaying 'choice stock'-- pretty quadroons and octoroons who fetched up to $2,500 or more from New Orleans brothel owners." Source: Davis, The Civil War: Brother Against Brother: The War Begins, supra, p 51. Slavers, tobacco farmers, invented modern public live pornography, strip-shows. "The slaves . . . were paraded in front of the white shoppers . . . women were often stripped. . . 'The customers would feel our bodies,' recalled a former slave." Source: Davis, The Civil War: Brother Against Brother: The War Begins, supra, p 50. The lazy, stupid, ignorant scum known as tobacco farmers thus could become wealthy. If they had the morals to work for a living, they'd have earned about $125.00 a year. But they'd rather use a whip, buy a black woman, work her for $250.00 profit. Rape her, and the mulatto and/or quadroon daughters, and sell them for $2,500. Sell one octoroon to a brothel, and forced prostitution, the tobacco pervert just made himself $2,500, 20 years pay! Invest that $2,500 at 5%, get $125 a year, he'd be making as much as real work!! No wonder slavers, tobacco farmers, enjoyed mass rape--produced 588,000 mulatto women. It was fun and lucrative. Again, and again, and again. The slavers, tobacco perverts, were not content with raping and robbing enslaved blacks. They committed slander and libel against free blacks as well. Slaver perverts referred to free blacks in terms such as these. "Free blacks are a greater nuisance than even slaves themselves."--Af. Rep., II, 189. "This class of persons is a curse and a contagion wherever they reside."--Af. Rep. III, 203. "A class the most corrupt, depraved, and abandoned."--Senator Henry Clay, quoted in Af. Rep. III., 12. "An anomalous race of beings, the most depraved upon earth."--Af. Rep. VII, 230. And, "free Negroes are, as a class, indolent, vicious, and dishonest." Source. Goodell, supra, p 347. The bigots' purpose in disseminating such libelous views was for "fostering prejudice against" blacks, to justify brutalizing them. Goodell, p 347. Once EEO review (counseling, investigation, and hearing) begins for me as for others, such type perverted beliefs of E. Bacon, S. Kelley, Jr., K. Buttrey, K. Starr, etc., will be elicited from them under cross-examination. Their intense fear of letting me having normal review, confirms that they hold such depraved notions, otherwise, they would not so intensely fear and oppose review for me these 19+ years. Flight from review "has probative value to guilt." U.S. v Crisp, 435 F2d 354 (CA 7, 1970); Wangerin v State, 73 Wis 2d 427; 243 NW2d 448, 453 (1976). We need to get such scum out of the government, and banned from holding governmental position, as such vicious bigots with their undisputed vile, racist, views, pose a clear and present danger to decent people. This too follows a "pattern." Abolitionist Senator and Secretary of State William H. Seward "analyzed the civil service of the national government and could descry not a single person . . . who was 'false to the slave holding interest' [i.e., respected the rights herein cited]." Source: Charles A. and Mary R. Beard, The Rise of American Civilization, II (NY: The Macmillan Co, 1927) , page 8. "Our Civil Service was becoming a system of political prostitution. Roguery and plunder . . . had steadily crept into the management of public affairs." Prof. Kenneth M. Stampp, The Era of Reconstruction (NY: Random House, 1965), page 191. The civil service was prostituted to the tobacco (gateway drug) lobby, then and now, thus to violating people's rights, sabotaging the war on drugs, shipping drugs via CIA/Pentagon channels to blacks, and mass rat poisoning Yankees and blacks. Slavery had never been legal here; the legislative "drunkards, whoremongers, gamblers, and asses" knew it. So in 1850, they (Congress) passed a law (the Fugitive Slave Act) against the Constitutional right to trial by jury for persons accused of being a slave. They saw juries (as now) "an immediate threat," a term from druggie lawyer Emily Bacon, who declared me that in 1980. The 1850's slaver/tobacco scum knew that jurors would foreseeably blow the whistle, rule slavery illegal, and vote accused slaves "not guilty," just as the 1980 druggie-types knew I would blow the whistle on cigarettes and cigarette emissions as illegal, pursuant to the data herein cited, in the record and in my anticipated testimony; and that, if I were allowed review like others get, I'd be declared "not guilty" and reinstated. The southern pro-tobacco "drunkards, gamblers, asses, whoremongers" in the 1850 Congress that passed the "Fugitive Slave Act" banned jury review as they knew slavery was illegal and unconstitutional. Senator James M. Mason (Virginia) admitted against interest why slavers, tobacco farmers, were fearful (like E. Bacon, S. Kelley, K. Buttrey, and K. Starr now) of allowing review. Sounding like them, Senator Mason whined that "A trial by jury necessarily carries with it a trial of the whole right, and a trial of the right to service will be gone into . . . in determining upon any other fact." Sen. Mason admitted that the tobacco farmer/slaver fear of a jury trial was that they would be required to show evidence "that slavery is [legal] established in the State from which the fugitive has absconded. Now, this very thing, in a recent case in the city of New York, was required by one of the judges of that State." "In that case, the judge of the State court . . . went so far as to say that the only mode of proving it was by reference to the statute book. . . . it is impossible to comply . . . for no such proof [law] can be produced . . . in any of the slave States." Cong Globe, 31 Cong, I Sess, App, 1583-4 (19 Aug 1850). If Bacon, Kelley, Buttrey, and Starr believed that my removal were legal, would they fear letting me have EEOC review? Please treat their fear of letting me have EEOC review, as conclusive they know I will prevail. Wherefore, please direct such review to occur for me as done for others. 16. SLAVERS, TOBACCO FARMERS, AND THEIR LEGISLATORS, ENJOYED TORTURE. AND
Slavers, tobacco farmers, ex-Confederates, are ultra-dangerous to society, a clear and present danger. Tennessee had seen the danger in 1897 from them, and their rat poisoning cigarettes, so banned cigarettes, Austin v State, 101 Tenn 563; 48 SW 305; 70 Am St Rep 703 (1898) aff'd 179 US 343 (1900). In the 1897-1909 era, when Michigan wisely banned cigarette advertising and cigarettes, many people still alive knew that Confederates--the source of tobacco--had fought for the right to torture and kill. That illegal practice (deemed a "right" in the Old--Pervert--South) which underlay slavery, had been repeatedly upheld in southern courts, e.g., Com v Turner, 26 Va 678; State v Mann, 13 NC 263; Neal v Farmer, 9 Ga 555; and Com v Souther, 48 Va 673. supra, page 18. Slavery was illegal, so, to southerners, slavers, KKK-members, tobacco farmers, what's one more crime? Torture. The ex-Confederates in Congress and southern legislators still favor it, that's why tobacco is rat poisoned. Southern legislators were "a set of drunkards, gamblers, and whore-mongers," and some "needed only long ears and a tail to classify them openly as asses," apt words cited by Prof. Clement Eaton, The Freedom-of-Thought Struggle in the Old South, supra, pages 84 and 140. Once they had an entire class, blacks, outside the protection of the laws, via their insistence on practice as having priority over law, they went another step. Once there is an unprotected class, everyone is in danger; just say that someone is in the unprotected class: presto, they have no rights. To the perverts known as Southern Senators in Congress, this meant that they could enslave white women. Abolitionists of the era objected to their moral depravity. Southerners' actions to enslave white women became an issue during the debate on the Fugitive Slave Act, when southern senators were expressing their fear of jury trials for accused slaves, by honest Northern state courts. They wanted to be able to enslave white women with impunity. Southern senators deemed southern and federal courts amenable to enslaving white women, but feared northern juries. Examples were cited in the debates on the Act. Cong Globe, 31 Cong, I Sess, App, 1586 (19 Aug 1850), but of course, only examples where white women succeeded in getting review. Re one white girl, she was only rescued after being paraded on a New Orleans auction stand. In another case, an Irish girl was kidnaped by a Maryland slaver in Pennsylvania. The slaver alleged that she was black, and a slave, so not entitled to review or jury trial. Fortunately for her, Pennsylvania state courts had more integrity than southern and federal courts (or Emily Bacon, Judge Taylor, K. Starr, et al.) and ordered review anyway. The result was, she was released, but not until after the horror of having been falsely imprisoned during the proceedings, and the terror that she might be deprived of review, and forced to go with the pervert slaver. Significantly, southern senators treated the issue of enslaving white women with "mirth," changed the debate to jailing people who objected, and banned review. "The proof of the pattern or practice [of tobacco farmers/accessories' disobeying laws for centuries and preventing review] supports an inference that any particular decision, during the period in which the policy was in force, was made in pursuit of that policy." Teamsters, 431 US 324, 362, supra. Denying me review, is just another part of the ongoing centuries of the tobacco farmer pattern of denying review to a anyone who dares to question or blow the whistle on their pervert, murderous, ways. The perverts get some unreconstructed southerner-views judge, and southern-origin U.S. attorney or Solicitor General, like Stephen Markman and Kenneth Starr, and proceed to carry out their perverted, centuries-long pattern of denying me review. 17. NOTICE HOW THE VILE COURT DECISIONS OF NOW, USE THE SAME VILE
Remember that slavery was illegal, pages 29-31, 35-36, supra, as (1) "there were no English statute laws . . . authorizing the holding of slaves, either in England or in the American colonies," and (2) "the common law . . . was incompatible with slavery, and neither recognized nor permitted its existence." Matter of Cartwright, 11 Elizabeth; 2 Rushworth's 468 (1569); Somerset, Lofft 1; 20 Howell's St Tr 1, 79-82 (KB, 1772); Goodell, supra, pp 18, 49-51. So how did cases allow torture and killing kidnap victims known as "slaves"? How did illegal practice get upheld in southern courts, e.g., Com v Turner, 26 Va 678; State v Mann, 13 NC 263; Neal v Farmer, 9 Ga 555; and Com v Souther, 48 Va 673? Answer: The same way the perverts herein got decisions alleging "accommodation," etc.--without first showing conditions precedent, e.g., job description duty, job requirement, tobacco as a qualification requirement, advance notice, investigation, hearing, etc. Pervert southern judges simply upheld torture and killing, without first dealing with the condition precedent--the illegality of slavery. The perverts here upheld the "accommodation" issue likewise, in the same perverted way, without first dealing with conditions precedent. Pervert southern-mentality lawyers then, like the K. Starr's, S. Markman's, etc., had no respect for the rule of law then, and none now, and simply got favorable decisions without conditions precedent being shown. They took advantage of the slaves' poverty, and their inability to articulate their rights, as, like me at the time, not notified of same, they likely did not even known their rights. "The proof of the pattern or practice supports an inference that any particular [Agency] decision, during the period in which the [disregard conditions precedent] policy was in force, was made in pursuit of that policy." Teamsters, 431 US 324, 362; 97 S Ct 1843, 1868; 52 L Ed 2d 396, supra. 18. THE AGENCY'S ONLY HOPE OF PREVAILING IS BY TRICKING EEOC. This is and always was a freedom of speech case. The agency's only hope is that offense will be caused by my committing freedom of speech. For example, I say that I am a current employee of the agency. The condition precedent for a removal is the existence of a 5 USC § 7513.(b) advance notice, but the Agency issued me none. While the Agency tells EEOC that there has been court adjudication, its own handpicked people thank me for pointing out that the Agency bribed the judge (Singleton's remarks). As the Agency says I am removed, I filed for review in the 29 CFR § 1613/1614 forum, filed job applications, sought Inspector General (IG) review like others receive, etc., as shown in the record. The Agency's Dolores Symons even promised to review one point, but has done nothing, i.e., she, a known liar, committed fraud, misrepresentation, and concealment of fact on EEOC itself, pursuant to the agency's pattern of habitual lying. Each time the Agency changes position, I ask for review. Employees are entitled to review at the first accusation and also at each changed accusation thereafter. Review of later changed accusations is not "reopening" the prior case (it is first review of the changed accusation), but even if it were "reopening," as E. Bacon and S. Kelley, Jr., tirade, reopening is expressly allowed pursuant to case law. However, due to the drug smuggling cited herein and in the record, to which they are accessories (principals under Michigan law cited herein) and which is very lucrative, they vehemently oppose my efforts to have review begin. EEOC has issued decisions in my favor ordering review, repeatedly, but is occasionally tricked into denying me review. That is the only way, pursuant to sentence 2 of the initial paragraph, that the agency can hope to prevail. So please be alert to that. 19. THE AGENCY DECISION SHOULD BE REVERSED AS IT WAS ISSUED PURSUANT
The agency decision to refuse me review, refuse me investigation and hearing others routinely get, was done pursuant to Stanley L. Kelley, Jr.'s, threat in his 21 Feb 1997 letter to you, bluntly challenging EEOC, brazenly saying that he and the agency would defy an Order by you in my favor. "The Department of the Army does not intend to process any more formal or informal complaints from Mr. Pletten to they extent that they are grounded upon his prior dismissal . . . ." (p 3) Criminal Kelley thus dared you to rule in my favor. He was in essence bragging that even if you, EEOC, order the Agency to at last process anything (as it would confirm the agency pattern/practice of refusing me review for nearly two decades as your 23 Feb 1982 decision 01.80.0273, et al. confirms), the Agency would refuse to obey. Duh! Surprise! He was simply saying the venomous attitude in writing what they, with Starr as accessory, have done for two decades! Once review begins, an investigator or other reviewer will foreseeably find that Kelley is, pursuant to Michigan's MCL § 330.1401, MSA § 14.800(401), a "person requiring treatment," insane--saying "process any more . . ." when there has been none (no counseling, investigation or hearing like others get)--thus bring the matter within Ryder, 515 US 177, supra, p 11, and result in him getting needed treatment, like the insane smokers in Jacobs v Mental Health Dept, 88 Mich App 503; 276 NW2d 627, and Rum River Lumber Co, 282 NW2d 882, supra. The Agency has been refusing to obey EEOC processing rules (then 29 CFR § 1613, now § 1614) ever since February 1980 when it cut me off from review. It even defied your 23 Feb 1982 processing order 01.80.0273, et al. Kelley's arrogant defiance, bragging, confession against interest, about Agency intent to defy EEOC orders confirms that anti-EEOC hostility was the Agency attitude all along, February 1980 to present. I sought EEO counseling: Intended Allegation--disparate treatment, and retaliation: The Agency does not threaten to defy EEOC in others' cases. Kelley's words, in the context of the Agency's mass sex harassment scandal detailed below, and 18 year refusal to allow EEOC review on merits (with investigation and hearing like others get), shows and corroborates the widespread Agency pattern of refusing EEO processing on merits. "The proof of the pattern or practice supports an inference that any particular [Agency] decision, during the period in which the [non-processing] policy was in force, was made in pursuit of that policy." Teamsters, 431 US 324, 362; 97 S Ct 1843, 1868; 52 L Ed 2d 396, 431, supra. (In civil service and slavery, unlike the private sector, one must beg Massa, Agency permission, counseling, before filing a discrimination complaint!!--a conflict of interest, as it refuses to allow it, i.e., refuses to let the case go to the next step). In reaction to Kelley's 21 Feb 1997 letter, I begged, sought an EEO counselor--to (a) get review of Kelley's arrogant threat to continue refusing to let review begin, and (b) show a pattern, that he had put in writing what his predecessors had been saying verbally since 1980--no EEO review on merits is ever to be allowed me. After EEO counseling, there is to be investigation and hearing. Witnesses such as Kelly, Adler, Buttrey, etc. would foreseeably be called, cross-examined, and confess that refusing me review, lying, bribing, etc., has been Agency policy all along, 1980 to present. This would be new evidence for me to rush to EEOC. It would also help show Agency fraud, concealment, and misrepresentation. When an agency defies EEOC, that has strong precedential implications--shows there is no deterrent to Agency defiance of EEOC, even when there is an 19 year pattern of it. I sought review on the basis that the Agency does not threaten to defy EEOC in other cases. But Kelley flew into a rage. He ordered his local accomplices, EEO staff Gonzellas Williams and James Credle, to refuse me review, counseling, a 21 day letter, etc., i.e., refuse to let me have the first-step review necessary for going to the next step, filing a formal discrimination complaint. They made clear their racist goal is to continue to refuse to let me have review such as others get. This refusal corroborates my 18 year position (first verified by EEOC 23 Feb 1982, docket 01.80.0273, et al.) that the Agency refuses me EEO review. Such defiance is intolerable, and letting it pass has significant precedential implications, all bad, foreseeably putting others in my same predicament of a 19 year refusal of review. 20. THE AGENCY FAILS TO IMPLEMENT THE AGENCY'S OWN PROCESSING ORDER. The Agency decision disregards the fact that the Agency itself, by letter 2 August 1993, ordered processing with respect to my "return to duty" request of 31 December 1992. It has significant precedential implications when a subsequent agency decision fails to carry out what the Agency has already promised to do. 21. THE AGENCY OBSTRUCTED MY GETTING COMPLIANCE WITH THE RULES AGAINST
The agency committed fraud on the court, claiming my case was settled before Judge Cooke. Via bribery / corruption of / with my then attorney, the agency lied to the court, pretending case settlement had occurred! Thus dismissing my case. The agency concealed this for many years. Finally, when I did discover this fraud on the court, I sought to invoke Michigan Court Rule 8.122 which requires attorneys to do the performance of an act . . . which law and justice may require"--undoing fraud on the court, for example. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co, 322 US 238; 64 S Ct 997, supra. The agency opposed my seeking such enforcement, went to the extreme of aiding and abetting resistance to compliance, bribing adjudicators (e.g., Deborah Tyner, Robert L. Evans, E. Thomas Fitzgerald, Donald E. Holbrook, Michael J. Kelly, Gary R. McDonald, John H. Shepherd) to fabricate events once again, defy the rule of law, refuse to enforce MCR 8.122, refuse to issue an order directing presentation of my so-long abandoned case. This is an issue that clearly no federal court has adjudicated; the agency refuses to even acknowledge the events in its decision, though they occurred long after the agency caused abandonment of my case in January 1986. So please remand, and order review, investigation, and hearing like others get. 22. THE DECISION DISREGARDS THE FACT THAT THE CONDITION
The Agency decision disregards the fact that the Agency did not meet the condition precedent for claiming I am removed, a 5 USC § 7513.(b) 30 days advance written notice of charges. There has been no finding that such a notice exists, even though that is the key controlling fact that "necessarily renders all of the other facts immaterial." Celotex Corp v Catrett, 477 US 317, 323; 106 S Ct 2548; 91 L Ed 2d 265 (1986). Ever since the assassination of President James Garfield in 1881 by a disgruntled smoker applicant, there is a law, Civil Service Act, to protect the public by protecting its employees, federal civil servants. To protect them from abuse by politicians or top brass, 5 USC § 7513.(b), requires that the agency must, 30 days before removing an employee, state reasons. That is basic due process. The purpose is to let the accused employee have time to provide a defense, if any. Notice is a constitutional due process requirement, required to enable the recipient to reply, Cleveland Board of Ed v Loudermill, 470 US 532; 105 S Ct 1487, 84 L Ed 2d 494, supra. Buttrey is a liar, and likes to downplay the constitutional due process right as merely "procedural." There is a constitutional/due process flaw in how the Agency did the removal decision. It refused to issue me a 5 USC § 7513.(b) notice of reasons. As a matter of law, a federal employee who has not received a notice of reasons for removal, remains on the rolls. Sullivan v Dept of Navy, 720 F2d 1266, 1274 (CA Fed, 1983). Sullivan was fired without legal notice. Once he got honest unbribed review, the "removal" was voided. This is a reprisal case. My whistle-blowing freedom of speech won the USACARA Report, p 2. Others get their USACARA Reports respected. Indeed, the Army's own Civilian Personnel Reg. (CPR) 700, Chapter 771, makes compliance mandatory. The Army lost a case on that same point, Spann v Army and McKenna, 615 F2d 137 (1980). So the Army knew better than to defy the USACARA Report, but did so anyway. The personnel term "removal" is defined as "A disciplinary separation action, other than for inefficiency or unacceptable performance . . . where the employee is at fault"-- the official definition of "removal" from the government's own Federal Personnel Manual (FPM) Supplement 296-33, Subchapter 35, Glossary, page 35-11. So "removal" is definitely the wrong word for the Army to claim against me. Other employee misconduct, smoking in violation of federal and state laws and regulations, is not my "fault." In fact, pursuant to Army Reg. 385-10, on reporting such misconduct, I did so--freedom of speech (whistle blowing) as it (AR 385-10) says to do. "Removal" (the word Army alleges) requires 30 days advance written notice of charges. 5 USC § 7513.(b). But the Agency treats me differently than others. It issues others a notice, not me--no accusation of violating rules or performance standards, no names, incidents, dates, witnesses, etc. Omitting this denied me the right to reply, thus carried out Lieut Col Larry Wigner's 24 July 1980 threat that "the Command will no longer respond to" me. 5 USC § 7513.(b) as elaborated in case law, makes clear that when an employee is purportedly removed without advance notice including specific examples, the employee remains on the rolls entitled to his pay and immediate reinstatement. Other workers receive the benefit of that law, at the Army and elsewhere, as numerous precedents show. That is because notice is a constitutional due process requirement, required by the Constitution as necessary to enable the recipient to reply, Loudermill, 470 US 532, supra. When an agency bungles a case, the agency must start over. This principle of law has been upheld all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court, so the Agency knows better. See Shelton v EEOC, 357 F Supp 3, 8 (D Wash, 1973) affirmed 416 US 976 (1974). The principle is so obvious (if you mess up, start over!!) that it is in the government's own regulations, e.g., Federal Personnel Manual 752, Subchapter 2-6, and 5 CFR § 752.404(f). I will prevail once the review process begins. The investigator will cite the above precedents saying that removals, suspensions, etc., against an employee, must by law, be reversed when the agency has committed law or rule violation. This legal principle is followed for others, e.g., Watson v U.S. Army, 142 Ct Cl 749; 162 F Supp 755 (1958) (Army has a problem obeying rules); Piccone v U.S., 186 Ct Cl 752, 762; 407 F2d 866, 871 (1969); Service v Dulles, 354 US 363; 77 S Ct 1152; 1 L Ed 2d 1403 (1957). 23. THE AGENCY IS DISREGARDING SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE LEGAL ATMOSPHERE. The decision ignores the fact of such "intervening change in the legal atmosphere that it renders the bar of collateral estoppel [purported prior review] inapplicable in this case," a concept from Texaco Inc v U.S., 217 Ct Cl 416; 579 F2d 614 (1978), cited in Wilson v Turnage, 791 F2d 157 (CA Fed, 1986), also a federal employee case. The situation began in 1979. I blew the whistle on Agency violations of laws and regulations on tobacco smoking conduct (TSC) sometimes referred to as ETS (environmental tobacco smoke). Pursuant to my personnel background, I use the professional term TSC, as it refers to the conduct/behavior aspect. Controlling conduct, smoker behavior, is how conduct is solved, normally by prison or disciplinary action when smokers violate cigarette smuggling laws and/or employer no-smoking rules. (Nobody puts "environment" in prison; it is bad conduct, e.g., cigarette smuggling, that leads to prison). TSC violates law and regulations. Examples include: TSC violated Michigan law MCL § 750.27, MSA § 28.216, which bans cigarettes; 29 CFR § 1910.1000, which bans cigarette emissions such as carbon monoxide, hydrogen cyanide, etc.; 32 CFR § 203 and Army Reg. 1-8, which banned poor ventilation, and hazardous and discomforting TSC by others; and federal hiring guidelines which ban hiring persons such as smokers whose conduct is foreseeably dangerous to themselves, others, and property. Re my June 1979, the Grievance Office (USACARA) ruled for me in Jan 1980, as EEOC's 23 Feb 82 Decision 01.80.0273, et al., p 2 says. Instead of obeying USACARA's Report, TACOM retaliated, removed me, but cited no 5 USC § 7513.(b) notice. To prevent me getting review, it (a) banned my access to 29 CFR § 1613's review forum, and (b) denied it removed me! See EEOC Dec 03.81.0087 (April 1983). It took 10 years to get an Agency admission (against interest) of the Feb 1980 decision to remove me. (A "decision to remove" is not a notice as defined by 5 USC § 7513.(b), so is legally void, as a "decision" is not the condition precedent advance notice). The admission came in the form of an Agency EEO Officer Kenneth Adler memo citing Feb 1980 as the real date of my being off TACOM rolls. His memo is a Wilson-Turnage type of "intervening change in the legal atmosphere," and shows Agency fraud, concealment, and misrepresentation meeting the reopening criteria of Hazel-Atlas Glass Co, 322 US 238; 64 S Ct 997; 88 L Ed 1250, supra. (So since then, I have been trying to get EEO review to begin on that Adler admission against interest--review of the same type others get, counseling, investigation, and hearing, then decision.) Plus, then TACOM EEO Officer Gonzellas Williams by letter 26 Feb 1996, admits that the Agency cut off all counseling for me in the 1979-1989 period. According to the Agency, I got review of the January 1982 removal. If so, how? TACOM's own chief EEO official denies it! In writing!! That conclusively proves agency fraud, and is one reason Starr is so opposed to letting review begin here on merits. Buttrey's claims are based on refusal of review. Refusal is conclusive that the agency is wrong. Worse, the decision ignores the fact that I have been treated differently by the Agency, refusing to let me at least have review by the Inspector General (IG). The IG does review for others. It is discriminatory to deny me. I have personally seen IG review for others, that is why I asked. As the IG will foreseeably note the lack of the due process requirement (advance notice), the relief it can grant is well within its scope, and indeed well within the time limit that it acts for others. (The EEOC time limit of 30 or so days, is mandated by Congress, singling out federal employees for an arbitrarily low time limit, far less than for other workers, even dead ones). With respect to the TSC issue, which was the original issue, there has been a whole series of sea-change Wilson-Turnage type of "intervening changes in the legal atmosphere." Examples include: A. MASS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL LITIGATION. A mass of Attorney General litigation now exists against tobacco pushers, seeking damages for the scores of billions of dollars damage they have done. This confirms my 1980 point that cigarettes cause billions of dollars in damage, a point I published in Smoke Signals, Vol 26, page 4 (October 1980). (Smoke Signals was a journal subscribed to by the Anti-Alcoholism section of the Personnel Office where I worked.) Michigan's then Attorney General Frank J. Kelley (no relation to Stanley!) filed such a recovery lawsuit, incorporated by reference. It cites mass fraud by tobacco pushers, including violation of MCL § 14.28; MSA 3.131, MCL § 445.771 et seq.; MSA § 28.70(1) et seq. ("Antitrust Reform Act"), and MCL § 445.901 et seq.; MSA § 19.418(1) et seq. ("Consumer Protection Act"). This new evidence, support by our Attorney General, shows that the Agency relied on numerous law violations as basis for removing me. Agencies cannot lawfully do that, Watson v Army, 142 Ct Cl 749; 162 F Supp 755; Piccone v U.S., 186 Ct Cl 752, 762; 407 F2d 866, 871; Service v Dulles, 354 US 363; 77 S Ct 1152; 1 L Ed 2d 1403, supra, p 42. B. A PRESIDENTIAL EXECUTIVE ORDER ( 13508) AGAINST SMOKING. President William Clinton issued Executive Order 13508, Vol 62, Federal Register, pages 43451-2 (13 Aug 1997), on banning smoking in federal buildings. The Order supplements, i.e., does not replace, other pertinent laws, e.g., 5 USC § 7902.(d) (hazards banned) and state law, e.g., MCL § 750.27, MSA § 28.216 (cigarettes banned) and regulations, e.g., 29 CFR § 1910.1000 (cigarette emissions banned), Army Reg. 1-8 and 32 CFR § 203 (smoking ban in Agency when conditions precedent are unmet) already extant on the subject. Significantly, the Order (13508) takes for granted that agencies can already have taken action against smoking. Thus it refutes the bribe-induced Agency and federal judge claim that the issue is one of "accommodation" for rare employees such as me. Recall that the bribed judges made this claim over my and my doctor's objection. (Bribery is undisputed.) The President's Exec Order supports my 19 year position that the issue is not accommodation but instead an across-the-board safety and health matter. It shows that the Agency committed fraud on, lied to, the courts, in denying "authority to ban" TSC and in fabricating that controlling TSC is somehow an "accommodation" of Pletten and "cannot" be done. Note 7 and 9 wherein the President correctly recognizes that agencies can (may already have) eliminated TSC. The principles in the Order are of course especially apropos in states such as Michigan, whose state law MCL § 750.27, MSA § 28.216, bans cigarettes in the first place. Cigarettes are not even supposed to be in Michigan (no manufacture, sale, giveaway), much less, be being used by federal employees who should be setting an example of law abiding conduct. Agency personnel were involved in cigarette smuggling as shown in the record, in constant on-going defiance of the law. Naturally, to continue their own personal drug habit, they had no qualms about mass-bribing of judges such as fellow druggie Anna Diggs-Taylor and others listed in the record. C. THE ARMY'S MAJOR SEX HARASSMENT SCANDAL SHOWING NO EEO HELP. The Army hires smokers whom it knows have a propensity to rape.8 The worthlessness of Army's so-called
EEO system to stop this, has even received media attention. The Army's Aberdeen, Maryland sex harassment
The Confederate/tobacco farmer/smoker mindset was that female slaves were property. They cost about $1,000. Breeding them and selling the children, brought in about $200 per child. In five years, the slave woman was paid for. As $.50 a day was a typical pay rate, i.e., $125 or so a year, the slave breeding program brought double income from each female slave, p 34, supra. Slave breeding involved not just "sex harassment" (inappropriate touching and feeling) as defined in the modern era, but also forced prostitution, rape, and woman-whipping. "Woman-whipping" (something abolitionists particularly objected to) involved stripping women and whipping them with whips moving about 900 miles per hour at the tip, so as to smash and splatter the flesh. It included whipping lactating women until both blood and milk were running from their breasts; and whipping pregnant women, including during labor. (Just as racist restaurant owners pre-1960's Civil Rights era would turn away attempted black customers, i.e., accept financial loss, likewise the pre-Civil War thrill of such acts torturing women periodically overrode the financial aspect.) As anti-woman brutality is in their mindset, it is mostly smokers who commit the modern, toned-down version of sexual harassment and rape. But the mindset can be gleaned from the fact that they fought America for four years, with 600,000 casualties, 12X-Vietnam, trying to forcibly continue their "right" to have female sex slaves, as abolitionists had said, and was widely reported. So the Army has a vast background of data by which to know not to enlist smokers (as it had refused to enlist them in the Spanish-American war of 1898) but maliciously chooses to disregard said vast data. At the time of periodic scandals, the Army pretends to care, then as soon as media attention goes away, it reverts to doing nothing, except firing whistle blowers such as me who oppose such atrocities. scandal is also a Wilson-Turnage type of "intervening change in the legal atmosphere." This scandal has received national publicity. Please take official notice of it. The Army has a pattern of discrimination, up to and including criminal violations such as rape. The Army discrimination policy and practice is as follows: On paper, the Arm laughingly says it is against discrimination!! Yeah, right!! The actual reality is that A. it hires people (smokers) known (by its own Report 86-13 (cited at p 27, supra) to have a foreseeable propensity to harass at a statistical rate nine-fold that of non-smokers, B. it assigns to its EEO staff, people such as S. Kelley, K. Adler, K. Buttrey, etc., who have an intense hatred of the EEO system, even though knowing that their hatred of the EEO system, as typified by refusal to allow review, will foreseeably result in mass sex harassment, rape, and other outrages. To them, their hatred of the EEO system is paramount, and C. uses the services of tobacco lobbyists, unreconstructed southerners such as Kenneth Starr, to defend their perverted system. As part of its purported solution, the Army again claims to be adjusting its EEO and hiring practices to not hire people (smokers) with a propensity to harass. We've heard that one before! That is an action known to be needed long ago. In the 1890's, the Army refused to enlist smokers, see State v Austin, 101 Tenn 563, 566-7; 48 SW 305, 306 (1898). Removing me was to prevent my taking such basic personnel measures. The Army brass knowingly caused the Army's mass rape and sex harassment problem. Please note the laments of women who--correctly--feel that the system will not protect them. My case is a prime example of how review is refused for 19 years, almost the entire length of an officer's career. (A solution after 123 years is too late--what the Army did for one person! The Army scandal involved many people up to and including the Army Sergeant Major, and shows that women who were harassed or raped saw that the Agency EEO system is non-functional. My case is a prime example, 19 years of refusal to let me have EEO review (counseling, investigation, hearing, etc.) like others get. Due to widespread Army-management hatred of the EEO system, the Army's EEO system staff (1) commit crimes themselves, (2) encourage, aid and abet the gross intimidation of discrimination victims, e.g., women in the Army's Aberdeen sex harassment case, and me in my case, and (3) terrorize the workforce so all employees know, as did the women rape victims, that even if they seek help from the EEO system, absolutely nothing will happen, except more retaliation against them. The Agency got, is getting, away with refusing me review for 19 years. Foreseeably, there will be more rapes. Michigan's MCL § 767.39, MSA § 28.979 abolished distinction between accessories and principals. So opponents of letting me have review are accessories/principals to the foreseeable resultant rapes due to their participating in Army refusal to let me have review, i.e., are in essence principals to rape, as they "aid and abet," encourage would-be discriminators to feel that they can defy the law, defy review processes, bribe judges, and get away with it forever. Starr, not just a salacious report writer, but a rapist, that'll be news. Make such a finding. My case, published nationwide, is a prime example in terrorizing Army employees, including women and rape victims, into knowing there is absolutely no possibility of getting EEO review in discrimination cases, even when management goes to the extreme of repeated criminal acts such as assault, extortion, and rape. (Occasionally the sleaze. Criminals, and racists who run the Army EEO system sometimes, for appearance' sake, take some de minimis action against some "little people" who discriminate). Worse, in the Aberdeen sex harassment case, the Army view is that nobody in command-level management was responsible to make the system work, e.g., to protect women from sex crime or rape. Army officials get away with committing, aiding, abetting, crime such as rape, because they know they can get away with refusing to allow review (e.g., refuse to let me have review of the Agency discrimination) and even with bribing federal judges to refuse to enforce the EEOC orders directing that I be allowed review such as other receive. D. NEW (1996) EVIDENCE OF AGENCY FRAUD/CONCEALMENT/MISREPRESENTATION Another Wilson-Turnage "intervening change in the legal atmosphere," and/or evidence of Agency fraud, concealment, and misrepresentation is the fact that then TACOM EEO Officer Gonzellas Williams confirmed that the decision to remove me was not in January 1982, as the Agency has been alleging, but was actually back in 1979. The 1979 date shows reprisal even earlier than before--prior to any medical letters the Agency later purported justified removing me. 1979 was when I was "blowing the whistle" on Agency violations, and had filed the grievance, that would later be won in January 1980. This new evidence of fraud by the Agency, not in existence prior to 26 February 1996, was clearly no part of any court proceeding, which had long previously been concluded. This also makes this a Hazel-Atlas, 322 US 238, fraud "reopening" situation if you like that wording. E. NEW (1996) EVIDENCE (CONFESSION) OF AGENCY BRIBERY OF FEDERAL JUDGE Another Wilson-Turnage "intervening change in the legal atmosphere," and/or evidence of Agency fraud, concealment, and misrepresentation is the fact that an Agency official, Robert Singleton., confirmed that the Agency bribed adjudicators to ignore the lack of a 5 USC § 7513.(b) notice, to go outside the record, and even went so far as having "the judge . . . make up the story about how I serviced the whole place." Remember the outrageous, bizarre story federal judge Anna Diggs-Taylor fabricated, hallucinated, or was bribed to say--that I serviced the whole place!!! (She must think I'm Superman!!) Worse, that crazy story was invented apart from any 5 USC § 7513.(b) advance notice, thus denied me the due process right to respond. (The first I heard of the story, was--the judge alleging it!! Not in any 30 day notice!) Agency official Robert Singleton agreed with me when I humbly said that I did not service the entire place: "[T]our the entire place, . . . walk through every building, past every desk, then you will realize that the judge was bribed to make up the story about how I serviced the whole place. That is impossible. In a 30-year career, I would not get to all the places. They made this up as a deliberate conscious lie and then they bribed, they bribed the United States attorney to present this lie to the judge, knowing that it is physically impossible for one person to service the whole area." Any Agency official (e.g., Robert Singleton) agreeing with me, that was the Agency's worst fear--that some official who would listen to me for even an hour, might blurt out the truth, some confession of Agency fraud, concealment of fact, misrepresentation of truth. Mr. Singleton became the Agency's (Emily Bacon's, Stanley Kelley's) worst night mare--he admitted that I was right! He confessed against interest the Agency concealment, misrepresentation, fraud:
This confession against interest (going so far as to thank me for pointing out the judge-bribing, a fact Starr knew of) makes the situation clearly one to be dealt with pursuant to Hazel-Atlas Glass Co, 322 US 238; 64 S Ct 997, supra, criteria. F. THE MICHIGAN GOVERNOR FOUND A CIGARETTE SMUGGLING EMERGENCY. The Governor of Michigan (John Engler) due to organized crime and the cigarette smuggling epidemic (caused, aided, and/or abetted by the criminals [organized crime racketeers including Agency and federal and state judges] named in the record), declared a state of emergency to try to halt rampant cigarette smuggling. This action by Gov. Engler is a logical follow-up to his 1992 order banning smoking and cigarette sales in state government buildings. The Legislature has had to pass a special law to deal with the epidemic of cigarette smuggling in Michigan. The Governor quotes State Treasurer Douglas B. Roberts: "Smuggling is threatening the safety of law enforcement officials and other Michigan citizens because of the organized crime element involved in bringing unstamped, untaxed cigarettes into Michigan." I agree. Recall that consiglière Emily S. Bacon, in early 1980 put in writing that smokers' conduct is an "immediate threat" to me. But as a drug smuggler/aider/abetter, she ranted in February 1980 that the solution to the smoker-caused danger is to fire me, not the smokers whose conduct was causing the "'immediate threat." She and her thug clients were enraged that I was blowing the whistle, due to my education, over 18 years ahead of others. They were enraged that my whistle blowing could land them in prison. Pursuant to MCL § 750.27, MSA § 28.216 (1909), cigarettes with deleterious ingredients are banned--all of them. Cigarettes are not to be here--no manufacture, no sale, no giveaway. Bringing them into Michigan is "smuggling." "'Smuggling has well-understood meaning . . . signifying bringing . . . goods . . . importation . . .whereof is prohibited. Williamson v U.S., 310 F2d 192, 195 [CA 9, 1962]; 18 USC §§ 545-6.'" Black's Law Dictionary, 6th ed (St. Paul: West Pub Co, 1990), p 1389. She and her smuggler clients were enraged that with my Crime Prevention Officer background, I'd want them in prison for their aiding/abetting the cigarette smuggling that was the source of the cigarettes being smoked on base. And with their Confederate mentality, they wanted as many Army employees dead ("murdered," ala Dr. Elizabeth Whelan's term, supra,) as possible, in revenge for the Civil War's outcome. Once review begins, the number of casualties they inflicted on the workforce will be obtained, and submitted in evidence. G. THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION HAS TAKEN ANTI-CIGARETTE ACTION. Another Wilson-Turnage type of "intervening change in the legal atmosphere," and a showing of Agency fraud, concealment, and misrepresentation meeting the reopening criteria of Hazel-Atlas Glass Co 322 US 238, is this. The Food And Drug Administration (FDA) has taken action to halt sales of cigarettes to children. It was illegal sales to children that started the current wave of smokers on post. (Adults generally don't start; only children basically can be defrauded by sellers into buying and paying for the poison to poison themselves with). Please take notice of FDA's action, 21 CFR § 897; 60 Federal Register 41313-41787 (11 Aug 1995) and 61 Federal Register 44396-45318 (28 Aug 1996), hereby incorporated by reference. Michigan did likewise, only more fully in 1909. The "Cigarette Ban of 1909," MCL § 750.27, MSA § 28.216 (1909), moots the issue of banning smoking on the Army base; without cigarettes, one cannot even reach the issue of smoking them! (The Agency refuses me EEO review, investigation, hearing, etc., as they know that once review begins, I'll say my position that has been refused review for 19+ years). 24. EEOC SHOULD TAKE AN ANTI-KKK, ANTI-CRIME STAND AND RULE IN MY FAVOR.
The underlying problem is that organized crime and the Ku Klux Klan (which unreconstructed Southerner
mentality dominates the Agency) and criminals (e.g., Agency and Department of Justice staff, e.g., Kenneth W. Starr,
and federal and state judges named in the record) oppose any precedent of compliance with the "Cigarette Ban of
1909," MCL § 750.27, MSA § 28.216 (1909, revised 1939). Due to my Crime Prevention Officer background, they
knew I'd raise the issue. That is why, in their klonvokation, they decided to change the focus of the situation, off
my whistle blowing, onto my desperate effort to get review of the malicious decision to fire me without notice.
Their decision was made in retaliation against my having won the January 1980 USACARA Report which
EEOC alluded to on top of page 2 of its 23 February 1982 (Docket 01.80.0273, et al.) decision. Army also bribed
judges to change the focus off the laws and rules I cite, to focus instead on the nonsense issue of "accommodation,"
an issue I did not raise, and oppose. Enforcing laws and regulations is not "accommodation," never was, and never
will be. Even making the claim against me is discrimination. Lying is standard agency retaliation. Devine and Aplin,
"Whistleblower Protection--The Gap Between The Law and Reality," 31 Howard Law J 223, 226-227 (1988). Other
people who blow the whistle against violations of rules and laws are not accused with "accommodation" issues.
Army concern is (as it has been unable to bribe its own investigators, nor local EEOC hearing officers and
administrative judges,) to prevent them from being let begin review of the situation. Corrupt agency staff know that
an investigator or EEOC administrative judge will see that they cut me off from review, not allowed to have the
review process (counseling) begin, thus preventing the subsequent investigation and hearing steps.
And re the next paragraph, fraud on the court, EEOC Decision 01923611, 4 Dec 92, page 2, says that the
agency (to reject my case) must show that my issues are the same as those before the court (obviously issues of
subsequently discovered misrepresentation, fraud, concealment, were not brought before the court!! nor job
applications thereafter!!). This clearly applies to another Army act of discrimination, corrupting, blackmailing or
bribing my then attorney, to join with the Army in committing fraud on the court, Judge Cooke, to pretend that my
case was settled. Such fraud on courts is outrageous, and unlawful--the very type of thing the Hazel-Atlas Glass
Co, 322 US 238, case makes clear warrants allowing review ("reopening" as the agency calls it!).
Though this may be long, the only way to record what I intend to state, is to put as much of it as I can in
briefs, first one brief, then another, on and on, without making any one brief too long. EEOC is more focused on
the process than on the actual merits; whereas, once I get an investigator from USACARA, the investigator, will, like
the one who issued her Report in January 1980, listen to the merits issues I state, record it, and thus get the focus off
the process of my trying vainly for 18 years to get an investigator and hearing official to listen to me.
Remember, another fundamental point is that the Agency story for removing me related to my alleged
inability to do my job, write 1 page job descriptions. Clearly, that was misrepresentation, deliberate, malicious
fraud, and concealment of fact, as my ability to write more than that for 18 years shows!! Please uphold the notion
that my very ability to write more than 1 page memos, is conclusive that the Agency committed mass fraud and
bribery--and that this conclusion is appropriate even if there were no other evidence whatsoever. My being able to
write beyond 1 1/2 pages is conclusive that the Agency lied and bribed to get rulings to the contrary, and that Starr
knew he was lying when he denounced my writings (in excess of 1 1/2 pages I assure you) to the Supreme Court!
He's a liar, and he knows it, that is why this has case been obstructed so long. Please make the very fact that this
paper is more than 1 1/2 pages conclusive that Emily Bacon bribed Kenneth Starr. By itself. Without more. I can
write more than 1 1/2 pages = Bacon bribed Starr to say otherwise. Make such a finding. Issue a press release. Keep
this criminal Starr off the Supreme Court.
When the governmental changes position as drastically as here, able nationwide to do what the President
ordered, what "couldn't" be done at small little TACOM, the rule of law is clear: The Agency must reverse the
alleged removal, and begin the removal process anew, pursuant to FPM 752.2-6, 5 CFR § 752.404(f), Shelton v
EEOC, 357 F Supp 3 (D Wash, 1973) affirmed 416 US 976 (1974).
In view of the record, please treat this as a sex discrimination/harassment case. The agency is abusing
women throughout the agency, and female employees in the EEO Office, re the former, by outright rape, re the latter [by refusing] me [review, thus setting a bad precedent]. The law allows persons such as me to oppose discrimination against others. Trafficante v Metropolitan Life Ins Co, 409 US 205; 93 S Ct 364; 34 L Ed 2d 415 (1972); EEOC v Bailey Co, Inc, 563 F2d 439, 454 (CA 6, 1977).
25. STARR'S CONDUCT HAS CROSSED THE LINE INTO CRIME.
Another reporter, Frank Rich, in a 4-10-96 column, p 13, Detroit Free Press, provided evidence
corroborating the facts herein alleged, e.g., that Starr used public office for private gain; sought roles conflicting with
government assignments; procured, aids and abets obstructing EEOC orders in my favor (Feb 1982, Mar 1983, etc.);
and obstructs justice and federal and Michigan law, for his personal gain. (Incorporated by reference, with testimony
anticipated).
The unlawful intent is to obstruct Michigan law against poisoning people. See People v Carmichael, 5 Mich
10; 71 Am Dec 769 (1858) and MCL § 750.27, MSA § 28.216 (bans deleterious/adulterated cigarettes from being
manufactured, given away, and sold). Starr's obstructing state law violates established legal concepts and societal
values, pertinent terms of which are in standard law dictionaries, e.g., Black's Law Dictionary, 6th ed. (St. Paul: West
Publishing Co, 1990).
For example, "consent" requires the person being of legal age to contract, typically 18. It "supposes a
physical power to act, a moral power of acting, and a serious, determined, and free use of these powers . . .
unclouded by fraud, duress, or sometimes even mistake." See Black's Law Dict, supra, p 305. And "consent of
victim" "is generally no defense to a crime." "Informed consent" means
It is deemed fraud, action to defraud, p 423, if one provides an inconsistent message, e.g., misrepresents fact,
denies foreseeable harm, as so doing is deemed the opposite of "full disclosure." Doctors, unlike tobacco pushers
whom Starr is aiding and abetting, do not vaguely say, 'go look it up at the medical library. I'll tell you nothing
specific.' Indeed, tobacco sellers do not even say that much. Rather, there are repeated disputes of medical journal
data, contradicting the hazard. Starr blatantly lies, denies nicotine's addictiveness. Such misrepresentations are so
far outside "informed consent" as to constitute "fraud," p 660. In short, smokers do not "consent."
The terms "accident," "accidental," "accidental death," and "accidental killing" mean that the consequence
was not a "natural and probable" one, but rather due to a "sudden, unexpected, external force," with "a reasonable
belief that no harm is possible," and occurring "upon the instant, rather than something which continues, progresses
or develops." Pp 15-16. The term "natural and probable consequence" relates to events that "happen so frequently
. . . that . . . they may be expected [intended] to happen again." P 1026. "A person is presumed to intend the natural
and probable consequences of his voluntary acts." P 1185. This is especially true when there is voluntary formula
changing (e.g., altering nicotine levels) and additives (e.g., coumarin). The term "malice" covers such acts, and
"universal malice." "Universal malice" relates to action "to take life . . . without knowing or caring who may be the
victim." Pp 956-957.
Pursuant to the "Doctrine of Transferred Intent," p 1498, once a perpetrator does an initial wrongful act, even
if somehow that victim is not harmed, but "another" is harmed, intent "is said to be transferred from one to the other
and the [perpetrator] is liable to the other even though he did not intend it in the first instance." This concept covers,
e.g., second-hand smoke.
Murder is "the unlawful killing of a human being . . . with malice aforethought . . . All murder which shall
be perpetrated by means of poison, or by lying in wait, or by any other kind of wilful, deliberate and premeditated
killing . . . [is] murder of the first degree." P 1019. Cigarettes have poisons, e.g., acetaldehyde, arsenic,
benzo(a)pyrene, cadmium, coumarin, crotonaldehyde, chromium, ethylcarbamate, formaldehyde, hydrazine, lead,
nickel and radioactive polonium. They cause emissions above legal limits, e.g., acetaldehyde (3,200 ppm vs 200
ppm); acrolein (150 vs 0.5 ppm), ammonia (300 vs 150 ppm, carbon monoxide(42,000 vs 100 ppm), formaldehyde
(30 vs 5 ppm), hydrogen cyanide (1,600 vs 10 ppm), hydrogen sulfide (40 vs 20 ppm), methyl chloride (1,200 vs
100 ppm), and nitrogen dioxide (250 vs 5 ppm). (See Surgeon General Reports, 1964, 1989).
Analyses of such chemicals led to 29 CFR § 1910.1000 "speed limits" above which excess is foreseeably
dangerous; the natural and probable synergistic consequence is tens of thousands of Michigan deaths, and 37,000,000
U.S. deaths. See Dept of HEW, Research on Smoking Behavior, Research Monograph 17, Pub ADM 78-581,
Foreword, p v (Dec 1978). Such deaths are not "accidental" but "premeditated." "Premeditation" means "thought
of beforehand for any length of time, however short." P 1180.
Michigan follows standard law principles to protect people from poison, e.g., deleterious and adulterated
cigarettes. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld states' police power against cigarettes in Austin v State, 179 US 343
(1900). Tobacco products have no label citing effects. Such secrecy brings them within classic anti-poisoning case
law, e.g., People v Carmichael, supra, which provides life in prison for providing a person a person, e.g., a
mind-altering substance that impairs judgment. Even if there were consent (which there is not), criminal law bans
deaths via such means. Starr is aiding and abetting the mass casualties in Michigan and nationwide, by obstructing
a precedent of enforcement of the law re which I blew the whistle.
Adult smokers would typically not be smoking if they had not been illegally solicited as children. Michigan
law tells Starr's clients, 'once you began the illegal process, addicting children, you can't reap the fruit of your crime.
Otherwise you will continue selling to children, as your lawbreaking pays off once they become 18.' Michigan bans
Starr's clients keeping the illegally obtained customers, just as it bans robbers keeping the illegally obtained loot.
Enforcement of the law would get cigarettes out of legitimate stores, malls, grocery stores, convenience
stores, etc. Re any underground cigarettes, the federal anti-smuggling law 18 USC §§ 2341-2346 makes the matter a
federal felony. Smuggling corroborates intentional killings, not accidents. MCL § 767.39, MSA § 28.979, renders
persons such as Starr principals (not accessories) in the crimes being committed.
Time limits have been grossly exceeded, constituting "flight" having "probative value to guilt," Wangerin v State, 73 Wis 2d 427; 243 NW2d 448, 453 (1976); U.S. v Crisp, 435 F2d 354 (CA 7, 1970). Please stop the obstruction of review, which will confirm that it is undisputed that Starr and accessories are guilty of crimes above stated and as detailed in the record, extant and to be developed. They are in default (as they would accuse me of if I were late), past 29 CFR § 1613 time limits.
26. STARR'S CONDUCT VIOLATES THE CODE OF ETHICS
Frank Rich's 4-10-96 column, p 13, Detroit Free Press, shows Kenneth W. Starr's propensity to lie in court for tobacco, as he did in my case: "Starr was arguing [4-2-96] for his client Brown & Williamson that nicotine isn't addictive and that cigarette manufacturers have no responsibility to the 400,000-plus Americans their products kill each year." B&W has a record of putting coumarin, for rat poison, in tobacco; Starr's accomplice Thomas Bezanson seeks to obstruct revealing that fact so the "natural and probable consequence," vast numbers of deaths, can continue.
Starr's arguing for that client against nicotine as addictive contradicts medical fact, the tobacco lobby position in the Sunday-closing law era that it is a drug, and his client Army's position that "Nicotine is a physiologically and psychologically addictive drug" and "There is no safe level of tobacco use." -- Army Pamphlet 600-63-7, Fit to Win, ANTITOBACCO USE, p 14 (1987).
Starr defended client TACOM's position that it was because its officials were tobacco addicts dangerous to self and others (including me) that they were personally unable to ban smoking. He aided and abetted Col. J. Benacquista's extortion (see deposition confession), and defended client TACOM's position contrary to regulations and what doctors, its own legal office, USACARA, and EEOC said, that sane people, non-addicts, the agency and TACOM all have authority/ ability to cease permitting (ban) smoking. In fact TACOM did so in 1993, shortly after Starr had lied to the Supreme Court, saying it couldn't be done!!
The motive for Starr's misconduct obstructing me getting EEO review in defiance of EEOC's repeated orders has now surfaced; using public office for private gain contrary to EO 12674, he is a tobacco lobbyist. That is why he obstructs justice and enforcement of the rules/laws I have cited. This explains his aiding and abetting subordinates including Detroit U.S. Attorney personnel in bribing judges including Jones, Ryan and Celebrezze to fabricate that I filed a "disability retirement application" between October "1984 [and] "September 1985" and in obstructing the police investigation of the bribery/said false allegation.
Starr's behavior pattern violates Rules of Professional Conduct, e.g., 1.2 (not to aid and abet client crimes, re TACOM, extortion, document falsification, bribery of judges, etc., and re B&W, foreseeable killings); 1.5 (excessive fees, here, at the bribe level in exchange for his aid in obstructing Michigan law and thereby aid in the killing of vast numbers of our people); 1.8 and 1.9 (conflict of interest between clients and former clients, e.g., between Army, nicotine is addictive, and B&W, it is not); 1.11 (conflict between successive government and private employment); 3.4 (ban on unlawful obstruction of evidence, here, e.g., the entire EEOC review process I had requested); 3.7 (making himself foreseeably a witness) 3.8 (violation of prosecutor duty to not make false claims); 4.1 (ban on untruthful statements); 5.1 (failure as a supervisory attorney to control subordinates, preventing denial of personal responsibility); 8.3 (failure to report the attorney misconduct evident herein); and 8.4 (e.g., violating the rules and obstructing justice).
27. THERE WERE MANY OTHER INCIDENTS CITED IN THE
There have been many other incidents for which I have sought review from the agency. The agency simply refuses to allow counseling, investigation, hearing such as others get. Examples include the theft of my personal effects, the corrupt magistrate Thomas Carlson refusing me the transcript of the hearing before him (a transcript I paid for, yet have never received, 1989 to present), etc., etc.
Please note any issues that I may have overlooked briefing, based on the agency's severe harassment of me, depriving me of an income, denying me ability to live a normal life, even get normal typing done, via refusing me review for 18+ years, hence, I may have overlooked some pertinent issue(s).
When you read the record, you will see that there has been no court adjudication on the merits of any of these matters. These issues are easy to resolve (for others similarly situated they would be: return one's personal effects, deliver the transcript, etc.) As this is all refused me, re each issue, please order relief, starting with the easy ones: order the return of my personal effects, delivery of the 1989 transcript, etc.
WHEREFORE, this appeal should be granted. Order relief pursuant to the rule of law and intervening change in circumstances, as done for others.
Respectfully,
|
| Appellant's 19 Nov 1976 Appointment |
| The 7 Jan 1992 Attempt To Get Review to Begin | The 3 Nov 1992 Attempt To Get Review to Begin |
Citing Violation of Due Process: NO NOTICE OF CHARGES |
Being Obstructed 1991-1996: Citing Legal Principles With Respect To Some of The Crimes Being Aided and Abetted |
for Attorneys Being Violated And Attempting To Get Review To Begin After Being Obstructed 1991-1996 |
Citing Starr's Apparent Coverup of Falsehood In Another Case and My Attempting to Get Review To Begin After Being Obstructed 1991-1998 |
Untimely Agency Response Attempting to Continue to Obstruct Review |
To Agency Refusal to Allow Review on Merits |
While decision is pending on whether to even allow review on the merits to begin, the petitioner will continue to post additional materials from the case file, including issues on the merits, as able.
Your assistance is requested. Please write to the President asking him to order a genuine investigation, and when he verifies that no notice of charges was issued me (unlike what is provided to others accused of genuine wrongdoing), to reinstate me.
"Removal" is defined as "A disciplinary separation action, other than for inefficiency or unacceptable performance . . . where the employee is at fault," according to Federal Personnel Manual Supplement 296-33, Subchapter 35, Glossary, page 35-11, pursuant to pre-identified (30 days prior) written notice of charges of violating conduct rules or performance standards, citing the rules, qualifications requirements, and/or performance standards involved as allegedly having been flagrantly and willfully violated, incidents, dates, witness names, etc., and typically citing prior corrective action (warnings, unsatisfactory ratings, reprimands, suspensions, etc.) having failed to secure improvement in performance and/or conduct..
You can easily verify the lack of notice. Cite the Freedom of Information Act, 5 USC § 552. Request a copy of the notice of charges (misconduct, malperformance, etc., warranting disciplinary removal) citing the rules, qualifications requirements, and/or performance standards involved, incidents, dates, witnesses, etc., all 30 days prior to ordering me off the premises. When you get a denial letter, or no response, you will have verified my claim. Of course, when there is no notice, legally the person is on the rolls. Analogy: when there is no divorce decree, there is no divorce, no matter how many years have transpired!
