Firing Safety Whistleblowers
For Doing Their Job
Endangers All Workers As
Safety Officials Fear
For Their Own Jobs

          When safety whistleblowers are fired from the government for doing their job, truthfully reporting hazards or related activity, the public is harmed, not just the worker. Some function of the government that ought to be done, is left undone. See a recent Texas example in the funeral industry. Worse, many times, coworkers become afraid to act in the subject matter re which they saw their colleague fired.

          As Devine and Aplin, "Whistleblower Protection—The Gap Between the Law and Reality," 31 Howard Law Journal 223 (1988), show, becoming a whistleblower can be the end to a federal employee's career, family, health, and normal life circumstances. And, "the threat of being fired is equal to the threat of most minor and some not so minor criminal sanctions," Herzbrun v Milwaukee County, 338 F Supp 736, 738 (ED Wis, 1972).

          The UAW Solidarity, September 1998 cleaner air article, "Breathing Easy: How UAW Worked With A Company To Clean Up Air in Kenosha Engine Plant," pp 18-19 (September 1999), showing the worker with the respirator brought back memories for me. At TACOM, manager of the Warren Tank Plant, Michigan, the air was also extremely unclean. This violated the common law duty to provide "fresh and pure air," violated OSHA 29 CFR § 1910.1000, and violated other clean air rules. It also violated Michigan law MCL § 750.27, MSA § 28.216, and the Army's own regulations 32 CFR 203 and AR 1-8. Many people complained, including in the agency newspaper.

          Court cases such as Todd v Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp, 924 F Supp 59 (WD La, 9 May 1996), admit that tobacco dangerousness is obvious. Perez v Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp, 967 F Supp 920 (SD Texas, 4 June 1997), said tobacco is inherently dangerous and so known. The case of Banzhaf v Federal Communications Commission, 132 US App DC 14, 29; 405 F2d 1082, 1097 (1968) cert den 396 US 842 (1969) upheld the concept of cigarettes' deleteriousness:

"The danger cigarettes . . . pose to health is, among others, a danger to life itself . . . a danger inherent in the normal use of the product, not one merely associated with its abuse or dependent on intervening fortuitous events. It threatens a substantial body of the population, not merely a peculiarly susceptible fringe group."

Due to cigarettes' illegally high levels of toxic chemicals, private sector workers have obtained court orders banning the behavior causing the hazard, for example, Donna Shimp and Leonard Perkins. An area federal employee, Lauren Hall, got a favorable EEOC decision. (Smoking is in law deemed conduct, "tobacco smoking conduct," NOT environmental, not the tobacco-lobby term, "environmental tobacco smoke." You cannot get a court order banning the environment, e.g., the weather, but you, indeed, many of you, can and do get court orders/injunctions against conduct! as the "fresh and pure air" precedents 1757 and on, establish.)

The Army headquarters recognizes the hazard, and in addition to regulations, issued a Proclamation against it. But the local general was opposed to complying. That would normally be called "insubordination."

As a crime prevention/personnel specialist, in the federal civil service, I blew the whistle. TACOM issued me a respirator, which did not protect the other workers, was just intended to humilate me for raising the issue.

As part of my blowing the whistle, I (a crime prevention officer and personnel specialist, with support by Jeremiah Kator, my immediate supervisor who continued giving me good performance recognition and ratings unceasingly), reported the widespread violations to the regional Appellate Authority (USACARA). After investigation, it ruled in my favor, told the federal agency to come into compliance.

          Instead of obeying, TACOM forthwith fired me. As my supervisor opposed firing me, and gave me awards, management could file no charges against me, just acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner, and said, 'get out!'

          A worker was killed at the Tank Plant. That was shortly after I was fired, as other workers were too intimidated by the firing of myself to dare to speak up effectively. This was during the anti-worker Reagan-Bush era.

Other issues are involved, in addition to safety:
Anti-Racism | Pro-Safety | Anti-Crime
Pro-Pure Air | Anti-Drugs | Pro-Life

           Safety laws are written in both general terms (words against jeopardizing safety) and in numeric terms, quantities of toxic chemcials shall not exceed X amount, in essence, a speed limit, a quantity limit. Employers must obey both the general words and the specific numerics. The employer was found guilty of noncompliance when a Detroit-area worker was killed on the job as a result. That case title is International Union, UAW v General Dynamics Land Systems Division, 259 US App DC 369; 815 F2d 1570 (1987) cert den 484 US 976; 108 S Ct 485; 98 L Ed 2d 484 (1987). But the decision did not help the killed worker. The employer knew it could kill with near-impunity as people such as myself were fired, and the others, intimidated.

          The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 USC § 651 - § 678 forbids hazards. Rules such as 29 CFR § 1910.1000 provide specific examples of hazards such as carbon monoxide (limit of 50 parts per million).

         Civil service workers are too terrified to enforce OSHA clean air rules. Unions bear the brunt of getting clean air for workers. Unions helped create OSHA in 1970, but the enforcers, civil servants like me, after seeing what happens to whistleblowers like me, are too terrified to enforce the law in a meaningful way.

         Obstructing justice intimidates federal safety workers, so they too know they can be fired and denied redress, thus destroying their career and family too.

          The case file is thousands of pages. Here are highlights. Essentially, I blew the whistle on law and regulatory violations. My allegations were upheld by an investigator. The agency retaliated, fired me without filing charges of any misconduct. The efficiency of the federal service, and worker safety, is not promoted by such firings!

"Removal" is defined as "A disciplinary separation action, other than for inefficiency or unacceptable performance . . . where the employee is at fault." FPM Supp 296-33, Subchapter 35, Glossary, page 35-11.

          No employee fired without charges being filed against him, has ever failed to win his job back in such circumstances, as the advance notice law, 5 USC § 7513.(b) is so clear, notice must be in writing 30 days PRIOR to the ouster!

As Devine and Aplin, "Whistleblower Protection—The Gap Between the Law and Reality," 31 Howard Law J 223 (1988), show, becoming a whistleblower can be end to a government employee's career, family, health, and normal life circumstances.

          The agency fired me without 30 days notice, violating 5 USC § 7513.(b). This was unequal treatment, disparate treatment, not done to others. It was done to intimidate coworkers from doing their job on the subject. That violates efficiency of the federal service, vs promoting it. I immediately sought review pursuant to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) system pursuant to 29 CFR § 1613.

          The agency was afraid of EEOC's known integrity. An EEOC official, Administrative Judge Henry Perez, Jr. (Detroit Office), by letter notified the agency that he had observed the firing; and the agency knew that he had observed this without the agency having first issued me the prerequisite 30 days notice, violating 5 USC § 7513.(b) whjich requires 30 days ADVANCE notice with opportunity to reply.

          Wherefore the agency decided to obstruct my obtaining review in the EEOC forum. The agency is in Michigan. The agency therefore unlawfully forced the case to be heard against my will, and in violation of 29 CFR § 1613.403, in the corrupt Chicago Cook County system, specifically, the federal "Merit Systems Protection Board." (The Chicago MSPB office has jurisdiction over Michigan federal employee cases, when the federal employees voluntarily seek such review; and that was the pretext).

          The Agency did not meet the condition precedent for claiming I am removed, a in 5 USC § 7513.(b) 30 days advance written notice of charges. There has been no finding that such a notice exists, even though that is the key controlling fact that "necessarily renders all of the other facts immaterial." Celotex Corp v Catrett, 477 US 317, 323; 106 S Ct 2548; 91 L Ed 2d 265 (1986).

          5 USC § 7513.(b) as elaborated in case law, makes clear that when an employee is purportedly removed without advance notice including specific examples, the employee remains on the rolls entitled to his pay and immediate reinstatement. Other workers receive the benefit of that law, at the Army and elsewhere, as numerous precedents show. That is because notice is a constitutional due process requirement, required by the Constitution as necessary to enable the recipient to reply, Cleveland Board of Education v Loudermill, 470 US 532; 105 S Ct 1487; 84 L Ed 2d 494 (1985).

          When an agency bungles a case, the agency must start over. This principle of law has been upheld all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court, so the Agency knows better. See Shelton v EEOC, 357 F Supp 3, 8 (D Wash, 1973) affirmed 416 US 976 (1974). The principle is so obvious (if you mess up, start over!!) that it is in the government's own regulations, e.g., Federal Personnel Manual 752, Subchapter 2-6, and 5 CFR § 752.404(f).

I will prevail once the review process begins. The investigator will cite the above precedents saying that removals, suspensions, etc., against an employee, must by law, be reversed when the agency has committed law or rule violation. This legal principle is followed for others, e.g., Watson v U.S. Army, 142 Ct Cl 749; 162 F Supp 755 (1958) (Army has a problem obeying rules); Piccone v U.S., 186 Ct Cl 752, 762; 407 F2d 866, 871 (1969); Service v Dulles, 354 US 363; 77 S Ct 1152; 1 L Ed 2d 1403 (1957).

The agency did not abide by bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) requirements and qualifications. Presence of tobacco smoke is not a job requirement for anyone, much elss, a personnel official. TACOM realizes that any/all EEOC AJs will see that claim as a fabrication. All EEOC AJ's know about BFOQ's and that the presence of tobacco smoke in the air is NOT a BFOQ requirement, and that not meeting it, is not disqualifying. (Removal for not meeting a non-existent requirement is the most severe separation from service, and was done--to maximize the humiliation--in retaliation against me as I had (1) won the grievance finding TACOM in violation of anti-smoking rules, and (2) filed class actions to protect others, provide them the same win I'd won.

Bona fide occupation qualifications (BFOQ's) must be based on objective job analysis. Criteria for creating BFOQ's are set in Army Pamphlet 611-2 (June 1962); Federal Personnel Manual (FPM) Chapter 335 (Sep 1968); FPM Supp 335-1 (June 1969); 5 CFR § 339; 29 CFR § 1607, 29 CFR § 1613.705, etc., none of which TACOM obeyed. More legal principles for qualifications are in 15 Am Jur 2d Civil Rights 112, Job Requirements (1976).

BFOQ's must be applied across the board, not just to one person (me, as TACOM had done, i.e., disparate treatment). BFOQ's must be stated in advance, not fabricated retroactively, i.e., must be pre-listed in hiring and medical forms, tests, be actually required for the job, checked for in background investigations, etc. The process is described in unbribed case law, e.g., U.S. v City of Chicago, 549 F2d 415, 429-434 (CA 7, 1977). TACOM EEO officials such as Kenneth Adler knew that TACOM would lose, that is why he maliciously refused to let me have EEO review notwithstanding my requests, date-stamped as received. He knew that there are minimal medical requirements for personnel work, due to the nature of the job, and those few are on the "Health Qualification Placement Form." Mine were use of fingers, rapid mental and muscular coordination, near and far and color vision, hearing, clear speech, and mental and emotional stability. I meet them all. TACOM's own Dr. Francis Holt certified I met them, and never certified otherwise. EEOC review would reveal such facts in minutes.

TACOM officials also refuse me review as they foresee that an EEOC AJ will find that the State of Michigan Unemployment (MESC) Office had agreed with me that I do meet the BFOQ's. So, pursuant to MCL § 421.28(1)(c), MSA § 17.530.28(1)(c), MESC granted me unemployment compensation.

Corroborating MESC, the U.S. Dept of Labor's Office of Workers Compensation programs (OWCP) said I met the qualifications requirements. It repeatedly said I was able to work March 1980 to present, thereby overruling TACOM. Pursuant to 5 USC § 8151(b)(1), that OWCP finding entitles me to priority consideration. The Office of Personnel Management also agreed that there is no job qualification requirement such as TACOMers fabricated. Corroborating further, the Michigan Rehabilitation Service agreed. It even sent supportive letters to EEOC on my behalf, rejecting the allegations of a tobacco smoke BFOQ. Contrary to those claims, tobacco smoke is not "in the requirements for any position," 5 USC 2302(b)(6). No such requirement is published pursuant to law, 5 USC § 552.(a)(1). These rules are obeyed for others, not for me.

Courts invariably reject an alleged requirement "not reasonably related to the duties of the position, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp v Green, 411 US 792; 93 S Ct 1817; 36 L Ed 2d 668 (1973)," cited in Hill v Nettleton, 455 F Supp 514, 519 (1978). In that case, a Ph.D. was not a job requirement, notwithstanding the employer's false claim otherwise. In my case, there is nothing in any job description or BFOQ even mentioning the presence of tobacco smoke in the air, much less as a job requirement, much less, as so essential that failure to meet it, overrides everything, including qualification waivers, performance awards, doctors' letters, supervisory recognition, pay increases, etc.

It is well-established that "Workmen are not employed to smoke," Maloney Tank Mfg Co v Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp, 49 F2d 146 (CA 10, 1931). There is "no necessity to fill the air with tobacco smoke in order to carry on defendant's business," Shimp v N J Bell Telephone Co, 145 NJ Super 516, 523; 368 A2d 408, 411 (1976). (The Shimp case wherein Shimp had been fired like me, is one that gave rise to the Department of Defense's 32 CFR § 203 (1977) no-smoking regulation, and in turn to the Army's AR 1-8 (1977), so as to prevent such firings.

In Michigan especially, smoking is not a BFOQ. Cigarettes are illegal in Michigan, illegal since 1909, pursuant to MCL § 750.27, MSA § 28.216. Far from cigarette smoke being a BFOQ, it is illegal. An EEOC AJ would see that suppressing smoker conduct, even if done "'brusquely,'" is legally valid, Diefenthal v C.A.B., 681 F2d 1039, 1042 (1982); Jacobs v Mich Mental Health Dept, 88 Mich App 503; 276 NW2d 627 (1979); Keyser Canning Co v Klots Throwing Co, 94 W Va 346; 118 SE 521 (1923).

Even if the claim that the presence of cigarette smoke is a BFOQ were true (it is not), "the job requirements and qualifications had never been formally changed," Sabol v Snyder, 524 F2d 1009, 1011 (1975) . TACOM fears letting an honest investigator or EEOC AJ "examine the position descriptions," look for "legitimate job requirements," Coleman v Darden, 595 F2d 533 (1979), Stalkfleet v U.S. Postal Service, 6 MSPB 536, 541 (1981). TACOM knows that it is way too late to forge a retroactive-to-1980 job description with a BFOQ for tobacco smoke. Airborne tobacco smoke only arises from preferences in any case; preferences have no legal standing, Knotts v U.S., 128 Ct Cl 489; 121 F Supp 630 (1954), and Diaz v Pan Am Airways, Inc., 442 F2d 385 (1971) cert den 404 US 950 (1971).

TACOM knows that it lied with its claim that cigarette smoke is a BFOQ. TACOM knows that, contrary to its claim, neither my possession nor non-possession of such a "skill" is relevant to the job. It cannot be used as the basis for the "decision to terminate" me. In law, "'(p)obsession of a skill not needed to meet the requirements of the job cannot be considered in making a determination regarding equality of skill.' 29 C.F.R. § 800.125." Bullock v Pizza Hut, Inc, 429 F Supp 424, 430 (MD La, 1977). The mere fact that TACOM relied on a non-job-requirement as the basis for the "decision to terminate" me for purported inability to meet same, is conclusive as to their losing the case once review is allowed.

With respect to smoking (behavior spewing high levels of toxic chemicals into the air), federal rule 29 CFR § 1910.1000 (alluded to in the 1964 Surgeon General Report, p 60, listing cigarette chemicals vs the legal limits) bans doing it. Obeying 29 CFR § 1910.1000 is a mandatory duty. TACOM knows very well that the safety duty "is unqualified and absolute," not merely "reasonable," or what "the average workplace" may be doing, Natl Realty & C Co Inc v O.S.H.R.C., 160 US App DC 133; 489 F2d 1257, 1265 (1973). "[T]he benefit of worker health [is] above all other considerations." Am Textile Mfrs Inst v Donovan, 452 US 490, 509; 101 S Ct 2478, 2490; 69 L Ed 2d 185, 202 (1981). Safety law § 29 USC § 651 et seq.,bans hazardous conduct, i.e., even if, at any specific employer, compliance "had never before been attained," Am Fed of Labor, Etc. v Marshall, 617 F2d 636, 658 (1979) aff'd 452 US 490 (1981). "Otherwise the Act's commitment to protect workers might be forever frustrated."

TACOM further knows that the claim that cigarette smoke is a BFOQ "suffers from a further inadequacy in that it failed to comply with 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(b)(3), which requires that criteria used to predict job performance 'must represent major or critical work behaviors as revealed by careful job analysis.'" Albemarle Paper Co v Moody, 422 US 405, 432 n 30; 95 S Ct 2362; 45 L Ed 280 (1975); U.S. v Chicago, 549 F2d 415, 431 (CA 7, 1970). At 432, "Job-relatedness can only be determined where the criteria for selection are clearly identified." As the TACOM claim was pure fabrication, there was no "job analysis" at all, much less, a "careful" one. As job analysis is done for others, "Comparison with a single employee" for whom done "is sufficient" for me to prevail, McDonald v Santa Fe Trail Transp Co, 427 US 273 (1976); Clark Oil & Refining Co v Golden, 448 NE2d 958, 964 (Il, 1983).

TACOM knows that its claim that cigarette smoke is a BFOQ is not "objective." Courts invariably find that objectivity is essential. "In U.S. v Bethlehem Steel Corp, 446 F2d 652, 655 (2nd Cir. 1971), the court identified the lack of "fixed or reasonably objective standards and procedures . . ." as a discriminatory practice. Smokers' desire to spew toxic chemicals into the air creates no change in my job description. "Assuming arguendo that the hopes of some [smoker] employees will not be met, their hopes arise from an illegal system." 29 CFR § 1910.1000 and MCL § 750.27, MSA § 28.216 ban their activity; 29 USC § 706.(7)(B) and Standard Form 78 ban even hiring them, example at Austin v State, 101 Tenn 563, 48 SW 305, 306 (1898), affirmed, 179 US 343 (1900), citing Army refusal to hire smokers due to the danger they pose to themselves!!!!!!!! "The proof discloses no objective standards based on education, experience, ability, length of service, reliability, or aptitude to account for the [unequal] treatment ." U.S. v Jacksonville Terminal Co, 451 F2d 418, 449 (CA 5, 1971). "Elusive, purely subjective standards must give way to objectivity." Brown v Gaston Co Dye Mach Co, 457 F2d 1377, 1382 (1972).

So TACOM fears that, if it does not obstruct review of my qualifications, issues of the fabrication of an elusive, bizarre BFOQ for which no objective documentation exists--would arise; and a counselor, investigator, or EEOC AJ would make findings showing it to be a pure fabrication.

          Since 1980, of course, there has been, in addition, significant "intervening change in the legal atmosphere that it renders the bar of collateral estoppel [purported prior review] inapplicable in this case," a concept from Texaco Inc v U.S., 217 Ct Cl 416; 579 F2d 614 (1978), cited in Wilson v Turnage, 791 F2d 157 (CA Fed, 1986), also a federal employee case. One major bit of new evidence is that the department of Justice has reversed position, from its former hostile attitude. See the press release announcing its lawsuit against tobacco companies, at and citing in turn, the URL's, (for the lawsuit) and (for the appendix).

          Due process case law shows that if an employee is removed without the condition precedent advance notice having been issued, the employee remains on the rolls entitled to pay and immediate reinstatement. Others receive the benefit of that condition precedent requirement: Money v Anderson, 93 US App DC 130, 134; 208 F2d 34, 38 (1953); Deak v Pace, 88 US App DC 50, 52; 185 F2d 997, 999 (1950), Mulligan v Andrews, 93 US App DC 375, 377; 211 F2d 28, 30 (1954); Smith v Dept of Interior, 9 MSPR 342 (1981); Sullivan v Dept of Navy, 720 F2d 1266, 1274 (CA Fed, 1983); Mercer v DHHS, 772 F2d 856, 858 (CA Fed, 1985); Pittman v Dept of Army, 832 F2d 598 (CA Fed, 1987), etc. Indeed, notice is more than a condition precedent, it is a constitutional due process requirement, required by the Constitution as necessary to enable a person to reply, Cleveland Bd of Educ v Loudermill, 470 US 532; 105 S Ct 1487; 84 L Ed 2d 494 (1985).

My supervisor Jeremiah Kator opposed removing me, and never issued me a "statement or citation of the written regulations . . . said to have been violated [and] a detailed statement of the facts," Boilermakers v Hardeman, 401 US 233, 245; 91 S Ct 609, 617; 28 L Ed 2d 10, 21 (1971).

The notice requirement is intended to protect the public by protecting federal employees from unjust, discriminatory termination, Congress requires that the agency (normally, the supervisor) must state why he/she wants to terminate the worker. By law, 5 USC 7513.(b), the notice must:

   (a) comply with 5 CFR 752.404(f) by stating all reasons including ex parte contacts. Sullivan v Navy, 720 F2d 1266, 1273-4 (Fed Cir 1983).

   (b) say more than a conclusion, Mulligan v Andrews, 93 US App DC 375, 377; 211 F2d 28, 30 (1954);

   (c) enable more than "general denials," Deak v Pace, 88 US App DC 50, 52; 185 F2d 997, 999 (1950);

   (d) list witnesses and say "the names . . . places . . . dates" of alleged acts, Money v Anderson, 93 US App DC 130, 134; 208 F2d 34, 38 (1953). Examples include being:

       (i) "lengthy and detailed," Baughman v Green, 97 US App DC 150; 229 F2d 331 (1956);

       (ii) with "numerous examples of specific errors," Long v Air Force, 683 F2d 301 (CA 9, 1982); and

       (iii) "item by item," Mandel v Nouse, 509 F2d 1031, 1032 (CA 6) cert den 422 US 1008; 95 S Ct 2630; 45 L Ed 2d 671 (1975).

          In addition, others have had actions taken against them canceled when there was no notice of a qualification requirement or other rule violation by them. When there is in fact no qualification requirement, as here, none for tobacco smoke, that is a jurisdictional matter serving as an absolute bar to the action, Morton v Ruiz, 415 US 199, 231; 94 S Ct 1055, 1072; 39 L Ed 2d 270 (1974); Hotch v U.S., 212 F2d 280, 281 (CA 9, 1954); W. G. Cosby Transfer & Storage Corp v Dept of Army, 480 F2d 498, 503 (CA 4, 1973) (Army has a pattern of law violations); and Onweiler v U.S., 432 F Supp 1226, 1229 (D Idaho, 1977). . Others similarly situated receive the benefit of this jurisdictional principle. Not doing so for me is disparate treatment.

          I sued in federal court to get review, specifically, EEOC review, of my appeal of being fired without notice, and without there even being jurisdiction to do the removal. Nobody, and no federal employee, has ever lost a case in such a circumstance (except me, at MSPB!). And my case would be even easier to win, due to the Perez letter citing observing the firing.

          However, the sad state of judicial institutions made me the one and only exception. To prevent my appeal being heard, the agency committed fraud on the court, said I, age 34, applied to disability retire myself! retroactively, years after the firing, long after the one-year statute of limitations, contrary to all medical writings!! Got the court to agree to this in December 1989! Retroactive to December 1980. BEFORE The agency admits to ahving removed me! (Had there been such a thing, surely a removal notice would ahve cited it!!) And then they ignored it when my doctor wrote the court and said I did no such thing, I have no medical condition preventing me working!!

          Others on "total disability" had to have significant medical data showing 100% inability to do the job! The civil service system provides no "partial disability" (1-99%). The rule was 100% disability necessary to qualify, anything less, application denied.)

Interestingly, I had applied for unemployment compensation in January 1981. Michigan forbids paying unemployment to disability retirees!! But Michigan paid me full unemployment compensation, nine months (then the rule) (January - September 1981). The agency appealed to all appellate levels, continuing for almost a year thereafter, into mid 1982. As the disability application was fabricated (forged) retroactive from December 1989, to December 1980, naturally, there was no Michigan case reference to it!! Such a document would have served as an absolute bar to getting unemployment!! But the fact it, the agency simply forged it, with the full support of the U.S. Attorney all the way to Solicitor General Kenneth Starr.

          However, "once corrupt, always corrupt" (meaning, no retraction even when caught) so I am on total disability at taxpayer expense! That does not promote efficiency of the service, but is contrary to it (the whole idea of course, behind illegally getting rid of a whistleblower. And my appeal of being fired illegally was never heard in the 29 CFR § 1613 system I want!! In addition, I sought review of the TACOM decision to even apply to force me onto disability. TACOM refuses to allow that request for review to be heard either!

           This is not the only case of corruption leaving workers in the lurch. Additional data of this type can be found in the book by Samuel S. Epstein, M.D., The Politics of Cancer (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1978). The difference is, I keep fighting to get review! Most give up.

          Kenneth Starr, James Ryan, Roy C. Hayes, Jr., Maura Corrigan, Stephen Markman, and/or others in the Federalist Society, with its pre-Civil War Confederate-type views, became involved in my case.   See the overview of tobacco lobbyists' connection to Kenneth Starr and the Federalist Society.

          As Starr's conduct obstructing my getting EEOC review, violated federal and state law, I filed a complaint on the subject in January 1991 pursuant to this being discriminatory (others are not denied EEOC review on request). Investigation of that complaint is being obstructed as well. This is further obstruction of justice. Starr wants to force others to testify, but he doesn't do so in my case pending against him for now over eight years. But the fact that I have this case pending allows for my issues being raised.

           Recently, I filed a petition to attempt to get an order to move the case forward in Washington, D.C. The text of that petition and copies of a couple papers from my voluminous case file are reproduced at the URL links indicated below.

Other Materials in Case File

Appellant's 19 Nov 1976 Appointment
as Crime Prevention Officer

The 28 May 1993 Attempt To Get Review to Begin
Citing Violation of Due Process: NO NOTICE OF CHARGES

The 17 Apr 1996 Attempt To Get Review to Begin After
Being Obstructed 1991-1996: Citing Legal Principles With
Respect To Some of The Crimes Being Aided and Abetted

The 19 Apr 1996 List Of Rules of Professional Practice
for Attorneys Being Violated And Attempting To Get
Review To Begin After Being Obstructed 1991-1996

The 6 March 1998 Correspondence
Citing Starr's Apparent Coverup
of Falsehood In Another Case and
My Attempting to Get Review
To Begin After Being Obstructed 1991-1998

The September 1998 Petition
To Get Review To begin

The 20 April 1999 Brief On Merits Pursuant
To Agency Refusal to Allow Review on Merits

Related Websites

Analysis of Chicago Area Judges

The Website Promoting Justice For This Situation

An Neutral Private Citizen's Analysis
of Kenneth W. Starr and the Like

         While decision is pending on whether to even allow review on the merits to begin, the petitioner will continue to post additional materials from the case file, including issues on the merits, as able.

The Parallel DOJ Racketeering Case Against Tobacco Companies
Prior Advice to DOJ
DoJ Lawsuit
DoJ Appendix
DoJ Press Release
Law Writer Analysis
Health Group Analysis

This material can help you understand how Kenneth Starr could go from an anonymous civil servant, Solicitor General, to a million-dollar tobacco lobby lawyer. He had a great entry on his resume, obstruction of both Michigan anti-cigarette law and federal rules against smoking, leading to mass numbers of death. To you and me, that's not a good recommendation, but we are not tobacco lobby hiring staff! And many of his accessories are themselves being rapdily promoted in the system, able to wreak their destruction across wide areas.

         Your assistance is requested. Please write to the President asking him to order a genuine investigation, and when he verifies that no notice of charges was issued me (unlike what is provided to others accused of genuine wrongdoing), to reinstate me.

The President's Address for Employee Issues
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
% White House Office of Agency Liasion
Old Executive Office Building, Room 6
Washington DC 20502

         "Removal" is defined as "A disciplinary separation action, other than for inefficiency or unacceptable performance . . . where the employee is at fault," according to Federal Personnel Manual Supplement 296-33, Subchapter 35, Glossary, page 35-11, pursuant to pre-identified (30 days prior) written notice of charges of violating conduct rules or performance standards, citing the rules, qualifications requirements, and/or performance standards involved as allegedly having been flagrantly and willfully violated, incidents, dates, witness names, etc., and typically citing prior corrective action (warnings, unsatisfactory ratings, reprimands, suspensions, etc.) having failed to secure improvement in performance and/or conduct.

         You can easily verify the lack of notice. Cite the Freedom of Information Act, 5 USC § 552. Request a copy of the notice of charges (misconduct, malperformance, etc., warranting disciplinary removal) citing the rules, qualifications requirements, and/or performance standards involved, incidents, dates, witnesses, etc., all 30 days prior to ordering me off the premises. When you get a denial letter, or no response, you will have verified my claim. Of course, when there is no notice, legally the person is on the rolls. Analogy: when there is no divorce decree, there is no divorce, no matter how many years have transpired!

Analysis of Chicago Area Judges where MSPB Is

A Recent Texas Firing Of A Whistleblower


Email@Crime Prevention Officer