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"A definition is the beginning of knowledge"—Demosthenes
"If you would converse with me, define your terms"—Socrates

Standard Black's Law Dictionary and
Court Definitions Pertinent To The Subject
Of These Medicolegal Webpages

List of Terms Defined Herein
Abulia Accessory
Accident Addiction
Balancing the Equities Cause
Common Law Consent
Duty of Aiding Victim Element of Illegality
Federal Common Law Foreseeable
Fraud Holocaust
Increased Risk of Death Informed Consent
Intent Malice
Motive Murder
Natural and Probable Consequences Negligence
The Nonendangerment Duty Nonsmokers' Rights
Premeditation Right to Fresh and Pure Air
Smokers' Rights Taking
Toxic Transferred Intent
Ultrahazardous Activity Universal Malice
Violence Weapon

See also Targeting Children.

1. Cigarette smoking involves toxic chemicals constituting Toxic Tobacco Smoke (TTS). It is the single most preventable cause of death and disability, causing as three-term Michigan Governor John Engler said, over 15,000 deaths in Michigan each year. Michigan Law MCL § 750.27, MSA § 28.216, says
"Any person within the state who manufactures, sells or gives to any one, any cigarette containing any ingredient deleterious to health or foreign to tobacco, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."

2. This law fits well within long established legal concepts and societal values. The pertinent terms of applicable law are found in standard law dictionaries, e.g., Black's Law Dictionary, dating from 1891 through 1999. This will aid us in pertinent terms in tobacco control. These terms are not Michigan-exclusive, but are standard legal concepts generally applicable in all jurisdictions.

3. We can use these law dictionary terms to help us understand TTS-related concepts including "consent" and "informed consent," and the distinction between "accidental" death where the death was not foreseeable, was not a "natural and probable consequence," vs intentional death where death is a "natural and probable consequence." By using law definition terms, we refute the mythology and disinformation about these terms that is so prevalent, disinformation that has led to the holocaust-level TTS-caused death rate that the Governor and medical authorities cite.

4. "Consent" is based on the person having attained the legal age of contracts, typically age 18. Consent has a condition precedent, a prerequisite. It
"supposes a physical power to act, a moral power of acting, and a serious, determined, and free use of these powers . . . unclouded by fraud, duress, or sometimes even mistake." See Black's Law Dictionary, 6th ed (St. Paul: West Pub Co, 1990), p 305.
In dealing with crime, "consent of victim" "is generally no defense to a crime." See, e.g., State v Fransua, 85 NM 173; 510 P2d 106; 58 ALR3d 656 (NM App, 1973). "Informed consent" means
"A person's agreement to allow something to happen (such as surgery) that is based on a full disclosure of facts needed to make the decision intelligently; i.e., knowledge of risks involved, alternatives, etc. Informed consent is the name for a general principle of law that a physician has a duty to disclose . . . whatever grave risks of injury might be incurred." Reference Black's Law Dictionary, 6th ed, p 779.

5. In law, people cannot generally "consent" to others causing them harm! Most "consent" has no legal standing (especially re youths and in fraud cases) so constitutes no defense for the accused. An exhaustive amount of case law exists on this very point. See "Assault and Battery: Consent as Defense to Criminal Charge," 58 ALR3d 662 (1974), and "Assault and Battery: Secondary Smoke As Battery," 46 ALR5th 813 (1997).

Think of it: why is Dr. Jack Kevorkian in jail? Answer: BECAUSE people 'consented'! Death by 'consent' gets you in prison just as surely as if they had not consented!

6. In fact, smokers do not "consent." "Most smokers do not view themselves at increased risk of heart disease or cancer," see John P. Ayanian, M.D., M.P.P., and Paul J. Cleary, Ph.D., "Perceived Risks of Heart Disease and Cancer Among Cigarette Smokers," 281 J Am Med Ass'n (#11) 1019-1021 (17 March 1999). Also, "research findings . . . systematically refute the notion that young people accurately perceive the risks of smoking or the power of nicotine addiction when they [are defrauded to] begin experimenting with tobacco. . . . evidence [does] challenge the arguments of the tobacco industry that smokers are fully informed of tobacco's risks, choose to smoke in a rational decision-making process, and are thus personally responsible for any ill effects of smoking that they may incur."--Diana P. Hackbarth, RN, PhD, "Smoking, Risk, Perception and Policy," Medscape General Medicine 4(#1), 2002.

7. In fact, "smokers never, even today, have sufficient information to make a decision about smoking," a quote from the 11 Jan 1999 testimony of Elizabeth M. Whelan, Sc.D., M.P.H. Whelan is President of the American Council on Science and Health, and reports that, "Cigarette Makers Get Away With Murder," The Detroit News, p 4B [14 March 1993].) Dr. Whelan has also written a number of books, including
  • Cigarettes: What the Warning Label Doesn't Tell You: The First Comprehensive Guide to the Health Consequences of Smoking (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 1997) and

  • A Smoking Gun—How the Tobacco Industry Gets Away With Murder (Philadelphia: George F. Stickley, People's Health Library, 1984).
  • 8. Liability flows from improper labeling, a legal doctrine known as long ago as the case of Thomas v Winchester, 6 NY 397, 410; 57 Am Dec 455 (1852) ( cited with approval by the U.S. Supreme Court in Waters-Pierce Oil Co v Deselms, 212 US 159 (1909)). That is a mislabeled drug case. Using "universal malice" type reasoning, it holds that there is no obligation of others (known and unknown) to test the label accuracy as it is to be presumed wholly accurate; the law imposes a duty on everyone (e.g., manufacturers) to avoid acts (e.g., mislabeling) in their nature dangerous to the lives of others.

    9. Even among some medical office staff, "knowledge of the harmful and addictive effects of cigarettes is poor. If our own staff have insufficient knowledge of the harmful and addictive effects of cigarettes and continue to smoke, what hope is there of educating patients to cease or refrain from smoking?" See E F Bowen and C F J Rayner, "Medical students' knowledge of smoking," 54 Thorax (#7) 655 (1 July 1999). Most smokers do not even recognize such basic TTS hazards or links to smoking, much less, others cited at TCPG webpages, e.g., abortion, alcoholism, AIDS, Alzheimers Disease, crime, drug abuse, their non-use of seat belts, SIDS, suicide, etc. This inability to comprehend the TTS hazard also connotes acalculia, inability to do simple mathematical calculations of risk. Education is not what it was a century ago.

    10. It is deemed fraud, action to defraud, page 423, if one provides an inconsistent message, for example, misrepresents fact, denies foreseeable harm, as so doing is deemed the opposite of "full disclosure." Doctors, unlike tobacco sellers, do not vaguely tell patients, 'go look it up at the medical library. I'll tell you nothing specific.' Indeed, tobacco sellers do not even say that much to presmokers. Rather, there are repeated rebuttals of medical journal data, contradicting the actual nature of the hazard. Such misrepresentations are so far outside "informed consent" as to constitute "fraud," p 660. For there to be genuine "informed consent," doctors do individualized counseling, providing full vs partial information, one on one. Nobody claims that tobacco sellers do this, they often do not even know their buyers, especially not, e.g., the children when sold cigarettes without so much as a glance at their identification.

    The result is as follows. "Nearly all [smokers] know that they did not begin their use [of cigarettes] after mature thought and consideration of their harmfulness and disadvantages. Virtually all [instead] began . . . as a result of youthful experimentation . . . ." Frank L. Wood, M.D., What You Should Know About Tobacco (Wichita, KS: The Wichita Publishing Co, 1944), p 30. Denial of hazard follows.

    The pushers engage in fraud, even denying that nicotine is addictive! See foreseeable result data.

    A Pertinent Court Precedent
    In Robinson v American Broadcasting Companies (ABC), 328 F Supp 421, 422, 424-426 (D ED Ky, 1 June 1970) aff'd 441 F2d 1396, 1399 (CA 6, 30 April 1971), a U.S. District Court had a censorship case attempting to ban adequately informing the public. The case involved

    "growers of burley tobacco [who] complain [of ABC words] which announce, directly, or by innuendo, that the smoking of cigarettes will kill those persons who smoke them . . . . cigarette advertising . . . has been directed to young persons . . . [with] conclusions opposed to those of the Surgeon General's. . . ."

    The growers wanted to censor (ban) such informing of the public! The court rejected the effort to directly ban informing the public, saying, "The doctrine of clean hands requires this Court . . . to avert further injury to the public, by the continued retardation and erosion of public awareness of the hazards of smoking . . . the mere fact that information is available, or even that it is actually heard or read, does not mean that it is effectively understood. A man who hears a hundred 'yeses' for each 'no,' when the actual odds lie heavily the other way, cannot be realistically deemed adequately informed."

    "Any time the uncleanness of . . . hands . . . comes to the attention of the Court . . . the Court is required to act sua sponte . . . on account of the public interest . . . for the advancement of right and natural justice."

    11. The sweeping nature of the requirement of providing full data for there to be deemed "informed consent" is covered in a law review article by John A. Kindley, J.D., "The Fit Between the Elements for an Informed Consent Cause of Action and the Scientific Evidence Linking Induced Abortion with Increased Breast Cancer Risk," Wisconsin Law Review (# 6) 1596-1644 (1998). The bottom line is that the individual must be warned about all foreseeable, credible adverse side-effects, even those that have not (necessarily) been accepted as proven by the medical community.

    12. Of course, nonsmokers, e.g., babies and fetuses being poisoned and killed by TTS do not "consent" and certainly not "informed consent." Adult nonsmokers being killed by TTS-caused lung cancer and heart disease also do not "consent," in fact, many actively though unsuccessfully seek to prevent themselves being killed by such means.

    13. "Without exception, federal and state courts have held that a crime in which fraud is an ingredient involves moral turpitude. In the construction of the specific section of the Statute before us, a court of appeals has stated that fraud has ordinarily been the test to determine whether crimes not of the gravest character involve moral turpitude. United States ex rel Berlandi v Reimer, 113 F2d 429 (1940)." And, "it can be concluded that fraud has consistently been regarded as such a contaminating component in any crime that American courts have, without exception, included such crimes within the scope of moral turpitude." Quoted from Jordan v De George, 341 US 223, 228-9; 71 S Ct 703; 95 L Ed 886 (7 May 1951).

    14. The terms "accident," "accidental," "accidental death," and "accidental killing" all include the concept that the consequence was not a "natural and probable" one, but rather due to a
    "sudden, unexpected, external force," with "a reasonable belief that no harm is possible," and occurring "upon the instant, rather than something which continues, progresses or develops." Pages 15-16.

    In contrast, the term for something foreseeable   is   "natural and probable consequence," meaning, events that "happen so frequently . . . that . . . they may be expected [intended, foreseen] to happen again." Page 1026. "A [non-abulic] person [company] is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his [its] voluntary acts [and failures to act]." P 1185.


    "Precisely what happened is what might have been expected as the result . . . and is the natural and probable consequence . . . Malice is presumed under such conditions." Nestlerode v United States, 74 US App DC 276, 279; 122 F2d 56, 59 (1941).
    This is especially true of tobacco manufacturers, with origin in slavery, when there is voluntary formula changing (e.g., altering nicotine levels) or adding of additives (e.g., coumarin), especially over a period of time, here, for over a century. (Likewise, the consequences are natural and probable, thus intended, in cases of employers, travel companies, public accommodations, etc., accessory to smoking.)

    15. This concept of protracted action showing "intent" constitutes "premeditation." "Premeditation" means "thought of beforehand for any length of time, however short." See Black's Law Dictionary, 6th ed (1990), p 1180. Case law establishes that a timeframe as short as several seconds establishes premeditation, "instantaneous as successive thoughts of the mind." See, e.g., People v Wells, 10 Cal.2d 610, 621, 625; 76 P. 2d 493 (1938).

    16. The term "malice" applies to such acts, especially the "universal malice" type. "A death is caused of malice aforethought if, under the circumstances, known to the actor, the probability of its ensuing from the act done is great and manifest according to common experience." Com. v. Pierce, 138 Mass. 165, 178, 52 Am. Rep. 264 [, 268, (1884)]; 1 East, P. C. 262. See also Mogul S. S. Co. v. McGregor, L. R. 23 Q. B. Div. 598, 613," Aiken v Wisconsin, 195 US 194, 203; 25 S Ct 3, 5; 49 L Ed 154, 158 (1904).
  • "Universal malice" relates to action "to take life . . . without knowing or caring who may be the victim." Black's Law Dictionary, supra, pp 956-957.

    We "recognize the fact that smoking is a universal affair . . . harmful . . . to normal people . . . . [changing them into injured / dead category]."—Schwartz, Herbert F., M.D., "Smoking and Tuberculosis," 45 New York State Journal of Medicine (#14) 1539-1542 (15 July 1945).
    "Virtually everyone in the United States is at some risk of harm from exposure to secondhand smoke. The reason is that nearly everyone is exposed to tobacco smoke, and there is no evidence of a threshold level of exposure below which the exposure is safe."—Ronald M. Davis, M.D., "Exposure to Environmental Tobacco Smoke," 280 J Am Med Assn (#22) 1947-1949 (9 Dec 1998).
    TTS court cases such as Todd v Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp, 924 F Supp 59 (WD La, 9 May 1996), say that tobacco dangerousness is obvious. Perez v Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp, 967 F Supp 920 (SD Texas, 4 June 1997), said tobacco is inherently dangerous and so known.
    The case of Banzhaf v Federal Communications Commission, 132 US App DC 14, 29; 405 F2d 1082, 1097 (1968) cert den 396 US 842 (1969) upheld the concept of cigarettes' universal deleteriousness:
    "The danger cigarettes . . . pose to health is, among others, a danger to life itself . . . a danger inherent in the normal use of the product, not one merely associated with its abuse or dependent on intervening fortuitous events. It threatens a substantial body of the population, not merely a peculiarly susceptible fringe group."

  • The "universal malice" concept is well-established in law, dating from at least as long ago as Mitchell v State, 60 Ala 26, 29 (1877) and State v Massey, 20 Ala App 56, 58; 100 So 625, 627 (1924).

  • "Universal malice" encompasses toxics causing "premature death" "without knowing or caring who may be the victim," Black's Law Dictionary 1110 (4th ed. 1968), citing Mitchell v. State, 60 Ala. 26, 30 (1877). "Precisely what happened is what might have been expected as the result . . . and is the natural and probable consequence . . . Malice is presumed under such conditions," Nestlerode v U.S., 74 US App DC 276, 279; 122 F2d 56, 59 (1941).

  • Tobacco universal malice "is not directed to any particular individual, but is general and indiscriminate . . . putting the lives of many in jeopardy . . . without the intent to kill any particular person, but . . . likely to [kill] some one or more persons . . . 'regardless of human life, although without any preconceived purpose to deprive any particular person of life," State v Massey, 20 Ala App 56; 100 So 625, 627 (1924).
  • 17. This concept (of "universal malice") links to the "Doctrine of Transferred Intent," p 1498. Once a perpetrator does an initial wrongful act, even if somehow that victim is not harmed, but "another" is harmed, intent in law "is said to be transferred from one to the other and the [perpetrator] is liable to the other even though he did not intend it in the first instance." Examples of the pushers' intent to kill adult smokers by the tobacco death rate (as verified as long ago as 1938) and by smokers' disproportionately high suicide rate, leads to deaths of many others include but are not limited to

    killing of fetuses (called abortion and miscarriage)
    killing of a wide range of people by drunk driving
    killings by TTS causing nonsmokers' heart disease
    killing by TTS causing nonsmokers' lung cancer
    killing of fetuses and babies by TTS (called SIDS)
    the slavery era death rate due to tobacco farmers
    smokers' disproportionate crime rate, e.g., murders

    For additional context, see our tobacco-pushing-in-murder-precedent-context site.

    18. Intent. "A person is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his voluntary acts." Black's Law Dict, supra, p 1185. One "is not required in crimes to prove that a defendant intended the precise consequences of his act and [instead] his criminal intent can be inferred from his act," p 1067. Intent is thus objectively determined, not subjective. It is NOT determined by what the person professes or claims to want! Intent is determined by objective fact, objective foreseeable results, actual recurring events. So don't be scammed by phony denials! Look at the objective facts. And, "there can be no doubt that if the direct tendency of any man's willful act is to produce injury, and that injury is in fact produced, the intention is in law deducible from the act itself." People v Carmichael, 5 Mich 10, 17; 71 Am Dec 769 (1858); York's Case, 9 Metc. 93, 103; 50 Mass 93 (1845). And: "if one willfully does an act, the natural tendency of which is to destroy another's life, the irresistible conclusion . . . is that the destruction of such other person's life was intended." People v Coolidge, 26 Ill 2d 533, 537 (1963). See also People v Fitzgerald, 524 NE2d 1190, 1193 (1988).

    "That is a judicial rule: when a person does something with a foreseeable result, it is assumed that he did it in order to obtain this result."--Uri Avnery.

    See also Rowe v General Motors Corp, 457 F2d 348, 359-360 (CA 5, 1972), "this Court has held that 'intentional' means only that the activity or practice was not accidental."

    And here is another caveat: Some laymen may tend to confuse "motive" and "intent." For example, laymen may think that the suspect's motive (for example, the tobacco sellers' motive) is to make money. Yes, that's indeed so. But that fact is not ALL the truth. That motive is itself what helps confirm the "intent." See Black's Law Dictionary, p 810, which explains as follows:

    "Intent and motive should not be confused. Motive is what prompts a person to act, or fail to act. Intent refers only to the state of mind with which the act is done or omitted."

    19. As tobacco raising, manufacture, distribution, sales, and use are all drawn-out processes, spewing clouds of toxic chemicals, the process is intentional, referring to the category of unlawful "nuisances which are intentional, using that word as meaning not that a wrong or the existence of a nuisance was intended but that the creator of them intended to bring about the conditions which are in fact found to be a nuisance." Melendres v Soales, 105 Mich App 73, 79; 306 NW2d 399, 402 (7 April 1981), citing Denny v Garavaglia, 333 Mich 317, 331; 52 NW2d 521 (1952) quoting Beckwith v Town of Stratford, 129 Conn 506, 511; 29 A2d 775 (1942).

    20. Tobacco smoke involves massive quantities of toxic chemicals making bodily contact [aka "touching"] and producing effects at the "holocaust" level. The word "cause" means "to bring about, to bring into existence." United States v Leggett, 269 F2d 35 (1939). The pushers bring tobacco-caused deaths "into existence." "A plaintiff in an action to recover damages for [resultant harm] founded on bodily contact [touching] must prove only that there was bodily contact; that such contact was offensive; and that the defendant intended to make the contact. The plaintiff is not required to prove that defendant intended physically to injure him." Masters v Becker, 22 App Div 2d 118; 254 NYS2d 633 (1964) (decision rejecting the false and mythical notion that the injured plaintiff must also prove "that the [harm-causing] defendant intended the act that resulted in injury . . . intended to commit an injury, and . . . intended the very injury sustained. . . ."). See also Rum River Lumber Co v State of Minnesota, 282 NW2d 882 (Minn, 1979). The St. Peter state mental hospital had negligently allowed a pyromaniac to escape. Of course, what he might specifically burn could not be predicted, only that he would foreseeably burn something. The specific he burned was a local lumber yard!! It sued for negligence, saying that some harm (burning) was foreseeable, though not the specific items. The defense argued that the exact specific had to be known in advance. This absurd argument was rejected, and both the jury and State Supreme Court agreed.

    21. Think for example of this analogy, a person who kills for money, e.g., during a robbery, or as an organized crime hitman being paid a fee to kill someone perhaps otherwise unknown to the individual. Do we ever for a moment think that the money motive REFUTES the unlawful intent? Of course not. The money motive PROVES the unlawful intent. The money motive is involved in causing the intentional behavior. Think of motive as subjective. Intent is objective; the consequences objectively occur as "natural and probable consequences." This objective methodology is how intent is proven in court. "Intent" refers to the objective natural and probable consequences. "A person [company] is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his [its] voluntary acts." Black's Law Dict, supra, p 1185.

    22. According to the above-cited expert, Elizabeth M. Whelan, "Cigarette Makers Get Away With Murder," The Detroit News, p 4B (14 March 1993). Is she correct? Notice the definition of the term. "Murder" is defined as
    "the unlawful killing of a human being . . . with malice aforethought . . . All murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, or by lying in wait, or by any other kind of wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing . . . [is] murder of the first degree." Black's Law Dict, supra, p 1019.

    Note also the definition of "weapon," "An instrument of offensive or defensive combat, or anything used, or designed to be used, in destroying, defeating or injuring a person."--Black's Law Dict, supra, p 1429. Toxic chemicals, poisons, such as those in Toxic Tobacco Smoke have a long record of being used as weapons.

    The cases of Application of Yamashita, 327 US 1; 66 S Ct 340-379; 90 L Ed 499 (4 Feb 1946), and Application of Honmo, 327 US 759; 66 S Ct 515-517; 90 L Ed 992 (11 Feb 1946), establish that 'negligence' in a government official, in failing to stop third parties from crimes, e.g., from killings, can itself be deemed a crime, in these cases, warranting hanging. (Details at our anti-genocide site and our anti-murder site.)

    A simliar culpability concept applies in the private sector, United States v Park, 421 US 658, 672; 95 S Ct 1903; 44 L Ed 2d 489 (1975) (holding private sector official criminally liable for subordinates' acts).


    When an official refuses to enforce the law, he can be removed from office, Foster v State of Kansas ex rel. Johnston, 112 US 205; 5 S Ct 97; 28 L Ed 696, 697 (10 Nov 1884) (case on removing a prosecutor from office).
    When a police officer disregards the law blatantly, a criminal conviction can indeed follow, e.g., United States v Luteran, 93 F2d 395 (CA 8, 1937) (conviction of police officer as accessory to crime, due to his not enforcing the law), and in a cigarette case, United States v Sheriff Goins, 593 F2d 88 (CA 8, 1979) (a bribed sheriff case).

    23. The Nonendangerment Duty has long been recognized. It is an ancient common law maxim applicable in both civil and criminal law: "Sic utere tuo ut alienum non lædas" ("Use your own property in such a manner as not to injure that of another"), Black's Law Dict, supra, p 1380, citing e.g., a common law text, Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol 1, p 306. In a criminal case, a conviction was sustained with the court using these words to describe the concept:
    "The defendant was charged with the duty to see to it that . . . life was not endangered; and it is apparent he could have performed that duty . . . " [And] "To constitute murder, there must be means to relieve and wilfulness in withholding relief." Stehr v State, 92 Neb 755; 138 NW 676, 678 (1913) (a case involving a child); Commonwea1th v Hughes, 468 Pa 562, 364 A2d 306 (1976) (a case involving employees, firemen).

    24. An "accessory" is indistinguishable in law from a principal, e.g., one whose words aid and abet, support or help to cause, or justify, any crime or effect, e.g., extortion, fraud, kidnapping, rape, theft, murder, slavery, robbery, cigarette caused deaths, etc. The effect is as though the accessory committed the act(s) at issue. See definition laws such as Michigan's MCL § 767.39, MSA § 28.979. “The term 'aiding or abetting' includes all forms of assistance. The term comprehends ‘all words or deeds which may support, encourage, or incite the commission of the crime.’ People v. Palmer . . . 220 N.W.2d 393 (1974),”   People v. Usher, 121 Mich App 345, 350; 328 N.W.2d 628, 631 (1982). Wherefore, for example, cigarette advertising is illegal (site contains precedents and principles on prosecuting for words).

    Example Current Statutory Definitions of Murder
    18 USC § 1111 - Federal
    MCL § 750.316, MSA § 28.548 - Mich 1st Degree
    MCL § 750.317, MSA § 28.549 - Mich 2nd Degree
    MCL § 750.321, MSA § 28.553 - Mich Manslaughter

    25. Cigarettes' TTS involve poisons, e.g., acetaldehyde, arsenic, benzo(a)pyrene, cadmium, coumarin, crotonaldehyde, chromium, ethylcarbamate, formaldehyde, hydrazine, lead, nickel and radioactive polonium. The toxic chemicals produce emissions above legal limits, acetaldehyde (3,200 ppm vs 200 ppm); acrolein (150 vs 0.5 ppm), ammonia (300 vs 150 ppm, carbon monoxide (42,000 vs 100 ppm), formaldehyde (30 vs 5 ppm), hydrogen cyanide (1,600 vs 10 ppm), hydrogen sulfide (40 vs 20 ppm), methyl chloride (1,200 vs 100 ppm), and nitrogen dioxide (250 vs 5 ppm). (Data from Surgeon General Reports, 1964, p 60, and 1989, pp 86-87, see TCPG's analysis in this context). Also available is a listing of all Surgeon General Reports, 1964-2002.

    26. "Poison is a dangerous subject. Gunpowder is the same. A torpedo is a dangerous instrument as is a spring gun, a loaded rifle or the like. They are instruments and articles in their nature calculated to do injury to mankind, and generally intended to accomplish that purpose. They are essentially, and in their elements, instruments of danger." Loop v Litchfield, 42 NY (3 Hand) 351, 359 (1870). Notice the key point, poison is "calculated" and "intended" to injure "mankind," i.e., the "universal malice" concept. Tobacco is notoriously a poison, documented over a period of centuries, and in turn, emitting poisons.

    27. Here is a definition of the word "toxic": from "Latin, toxicum, Greek, toxikon," meaning "Poisonous; having the character or producing the effects of a poison; referable to a poison; produced by or resulting from a poison.'" Black's Law Dictionary, 6th ed, p 1492. By 1836, it was already well-established "that thousands and tens of thousands die of diseases of the lungs generally brought on by tobacco smoking. . . . How is it possible to be otherwise? Tobacco is a poison. A man will die of an infusion of tobacco as of a shot through the head."—Samuel Green, New England Almanack and Farmer's Friend (1836).

    28. Engineering and medical analyses of the chemicals involved led to a regulation, 29 CFR § 1910.1000, setting "speed limits" (so to speak, the official term is "Threshold Limit Value" or TLV) above which exceeding them is foreseeably dangerous. The synergistic effect of the chemical combination in TTS is reported to lead to 37,000,000 U.S. deaths. See Dept of Health, Educ, and Welfare, National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) Research on Smoking Behavior, Research Monograph 17, DHEW Pub No. ADM 78-581, Foreword, p v (Dec 1978).

    29. This TTS-caused death number is at the holocaust level. The Royal College of Physicians, Smoking and Health Now (London: Pitman Medical and Scientific Publishing Co, Ltd, 1971), p 9, called the cigarette death rate a "holocaust" due to the then "annual death toll of some 27,500." This high a TTS death toll is not "accidental" but "premeditated." "Premeditation" means "thought of beforehand for any length of time, however short." See Black's Law Dictionary, supra, p 1180. Case law establishes that a timeframe as short as several seconds establishes premeditation. See, e.g., People v Wells, 10 Cal.2d 610, 625 (1938).

    30. This TTS-caused casualty rate is above what is ever foreseeable from any other "ultrahazardous activity" as that term is discussed by the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Laird v Nelms, 406 US 797; 92 S Ct 1899; 32 L Ed 2d 499 (1972). There, sonic booms and dynamite blasting are discussed in context of "ultrahazardous activity." Each produces a spreading effect. Cigarettes do that, produce a spreading effect, via fires and via their toxic chemicals, superheated, moving at high speed. In contrast to sonic booms and dynamite blasting, which kill essentially nobody, cigarettes' TTS kill 37,000,000 in the U.S. alone, and constitute a "holocaust." The subject at issue concerning which we are noting legal definitions, is the most "ultrahazardous activity" on earth.

    31. This is clearly so in context of other "ultrahazardous activity" cases, which often involve enclosed substances which thereafter escape and cause harm typically to one or few people or items (in contrast to TTS which is not enclosed and its danger is due to its excessiveness as spewed about, and the fatal impact involves millions). Below are pertinent cases:

  • Hay v Cohoes County, 2 NY (2 Comst) 159, 161; 51 Am Dec 279 (1849) (as the law "prohibits all direct injury," if one cannot do activity without casting debris upon neighbor, due to "the higher right of others to the lawful possession of their property," the perpetrator "must abandon that mode of using his property, or be held responsible for all damages resulting therefrom"—exactly the situation of TTS being cast about, spewed, emitted, in a "universal malice" fashion)

  • Rylands v Fletcher, LR 3 HL 330 (1868) (water reservoir damage case)

  • Shipley v Fifty Associates, 101 Mass 251; 3 Am Rep 346 (1869) aff'd 106 Mass 194; 8 Am Rep 318 (1870) (roof design let ice fall onto highway)

  • Ball v Nye, 99 Mass 582; 97 Am Dec 56 (Sep 1868)

  • Heeg v Licht, 80 NY 579 (1880) (explosion by powder magazine, cause unknown, nonetheless owner is liable)

  • Hannam v Pence, 40 Minn 127; 41 NW 657 (1889) (roof design let ice fall onto highway)

  • Gorham v Gross, 125 Mass 232; 28 Am Rep 224 (1878) (party wall design let it fall onto neighbor's land)

  • Gas Light & Coke Co v Vestry of St. Mary Abbott's, 15 QBD 1 (1885) (steam roller crushed conduits under street)

  • Pensacola Gas Co v Pebley, 25 Fla 381; 5 So 593, 595 (1889) (filthy water spill onto other's land; perpetrator "had no right to allow the filthy water to escape from their premises, and to enter the land of their neighbors. It was the duty of the company to confine the refuse from their works so that it could not enter upon and injure their neighbors . . . the escape of the refuse filthy water being in itself an evidence of negligence")

  • Berger v Minneapolis Gaslight Co, 60 Minn 296; 62 NW 336 (1895) (seepage of crude oil from storage tank)

  • Sullivan v Dunham, 35 App Div 342 (Dec 1898) aff'd 161 NY 290, 293; 55 NE 923; 76 Am St Rep 274, 276; 47 LRA 715, 718 (9 Jan 1900) (one death 400 feet away from blasting, deemed trespassing; "the law prohibits all direct injury without regard to its extent or the motives of the aggressor")

  • Chichester Corp v Foster, 1 KB 167 (1906) (engine crushed conduits under street)

  • Shiffman v Order of St. John, 1 All Eng Rep 557 (1936) (flagpole design allowed harm where people including children congregate)

  • Sinclair Refining Co v Bennett, 123 F2d 884 (CA 6, 1941) (gasoline seepage for months into wells)

  • Luthringer v Moore, 31 Cal 2d 489; 190 P2d 1 (1948) (hydrocyanic gas seepage into adjoining area)

  • Loe v Lenhardt, 227 Or 242; 362 P2d 312 (1961) (crop-dusting, involving spewing a toxic chemical about, impacting others, liablity exists regardless of the prevalence)

  • Yommer v McKenzie, 255 Md 220; 257 A2d 138 (Md App, 1969) (gasoline storage tank adjacent to human consumption water source)

  • McLane v Northwest Natural Gas Co, 255 Or 324; 467 P2d 635 (1970) (storage of "large amounts of natural gas in a populated area")

  • Sigler v Kuhlman, 81 Wn 2d 448; 502 P2d 1181 (1972) cert den 411 US 983; 98 S Ct 2275; 36 L Ed 2d 959 (1973) (5,000 gallon gasoline spill onto highway leading to one death)

  • Cities Service Co v State, 312 So 2d 799, 803 (Fla, 1975) ("The justification for strict liability . . . is that useful but dangerous activities must pay their own way")
  • 32. TTS is not "useful" but rather, is the No. 1 cause of premature death in "holocaust" numbers). Tobacco products are not designed to retain the toxic chemicals within themselves. So they aggressively, regularly, foreseeably cause injury and death as "natural and probable consequences" of their design and use constituting ultrahazardous activity of a "universal malice" type. Wherefore, "the rights of adjoining [people] require . . . a doctrine which places the burden upon the parties whose activity made it possible for the damages to occur."

    33. TTS causes Increased Risk of Death. See Metro North Commuter Railroad Co v Buckley, 521 US 438; 117 S Ct 2113; 137 L Ed 2d 661 (23 June 1997). This case was on a lawsuit by a 15 year smoker. It alleged that re asbestos, "the exposure created an added risk of death due to cancer, or to other asbestos related diseases of either 1% to 5% (in the view of one of plaintiff's experts), or 1% to 3% (in the view of another)." Note that cigarettes are such that 37,000,000, 1/6 of the total U.S. population, is killed thereby!-a genuinely significant increase!!). Your being exposed to TTS increases your risk of death, even if the exposure is only briefly as in the case of children, increasing, for example, the risk of SIDS, i.e., immediate death. (Rum River Lumber Co v State, 282 NW2d 882 (Minn, 1979) says, it is not necessary "that the specific conduct . . . must be foreseeable. It is sufficient . . . that the . . . risk of harm . . . be foreseeable." Perpetrator “ignorance of [e.g.] the victim's poor condition is immaterial,” Kasieta v State, 62 Wis 2d 564, 570-571; 215 NW2d 412, 415-416 (1974).)

    34. Tobacco products have no label identifying effects. This brings TTS issues squarely within classic poisoning case law, e.g., "rape drug" case law such as People v Carmichael, 5 Mich 10; 71 Am Dec 769 (1858), which provides life in prison for providing a person a mind-altering substance that influences judgment. Even if there were consent, which there is not, the law bans deaths via such means as herein described.

    35. This is especially so as cigarettes' toxic chemicals, TTS, like the "rape drug" in Carmichael, cause brain injury such as hemmorhaging leading to abulia, a "state of dethronement of reason from its governing power," Carmichael, 5 Mich 21, e.g., an "abnormal lack of ability to act or to make decisions," Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary (Springfield: G. & C. Merriam Co, Publishers, 1972), p 4. This "dethronement of reason" is commonly evident in, for example, prostitutes. Additionally, there is a link to crime via smoker mothers.

    36. Tobacco's TTS effect may be deemed comparable to that of the "rape drug," causing a specific impairment/effect. (The lay term for tobacco's brain-injuring effect is "addiction," but this term seriously understates the actual extent and nature of the brain injury. One way to comprehend the real extent of it, is by thinking of "cerebral palsy," a condition the symptoms of which in some victims go to the extreme of inability to control motor impulses. Tobacco-induced abulia likewise impairs ethical controls to the extent of motor impulses being affected, e.g., willingness to ingest poison, and the commission of drunk driving and other crimes. Sane people don't typically voluntarily ingest fatal levels of poison, indeed, it is a typical reaction is to seek criminal prosecution for mere attempts to poison! But many smokers are so victimized by tobacco, the original "rape drug," so abulic from tobacco, that they don't perceive the hazard: "Most smokers do not view themselves at increased risk of heart disease or cancer," Ayanian, et al., supra. This inability to comprehend also connotes acalculia, inability to do simple mathematical calculations.

    37. Smokers' Rights. MCL § 750.27, MSA § 28.216, and the above definitions, protect smokers from being discriminated against by tobacco companies and their accessories (e.g., distributors/sellers). Smokers are the only group of people regularly provided a deleterious and adulterated product that kills when used as manufacturers intend it to be used. The law thus functions as both a smokers' and nonsmokers' rights law. The latter's objections to smoking arise from its deleterious TTS emissions, which if smokers' rights to a safe product were being respected, would not occur.

    38. The ancient common law Right to Fresh and Pure Air has been developed since at least the year 1306 and has a long record of judicial recognition. See Rex v White and Ward, 1 Burr 333 (KB, 1757) and Rex v Neil, 2 Carr & Payne 485 (Eng, 1826) ("It is not necessary that a public nuisance should be injurious to health; if there be smells offensive to the senses, that is enough, as the neighborhood has a right to fresh and pure air") cited with approval in Ross v Butler, 19 NJ Eq 294, 299; 97 Am Dec 654 (NJ, 1868) (a case involving a nuisance from burning pine wood affecting the adjoining land owner by smoky cinders and odors as not even a short nuisance is allowed when foreseeably recurring, i.e., applying the concept of banning "ultrahazardous activity" spreading beyond the perpetrator's person or property). This pre-Constitution right is protected by the Constitution's Ninth Amendment ("The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.").

    39. The "right to fresh and pure air" has been regularly upheld; a case list and analysis is found in Annotation: Nuisance Resulting from Smoke Alone as Subject for Injunctive Relief, 6 ALR 1574 (1920). This concept was in turn applied (in an injunction banning TTS thus rendering plaintiff "able to breathe the air in its clear and natural state") in the TTS context in Shimp v New Jersey Bell Tele Co, 145 N J Super 516, 531; 368 A2d 408, 416 (1976).

    40. "Common Law." The "common law" comes from the time before Congress and state legislatures even existed. Obviously our ancestors had laws, even before such officials even existed. The term "common law" refers to this aspect of what they had, and is defined as follows:

    "As distinguished from statutory law created by the enactment of legislatures, the common law comprises the body of those principles and rules of action, relating to the government and security [rights] of persons and property, which derive their authority solely from usages and customs of immemorial antiquity, or from the judgments and decrees of the courts recognizing, affirming, and enforcing such usages and customs; and in this sense, particularly the ancient unwritten law of England.

    "In general, it is a body of law that develops and derives through judicial decisions, as distinguished from legislative enactments. The 'common law' is all the statutory and case law background of England and the American colonies before the American revolution." People v Rehman, 253 Cal App 2d 119; 61 Cal Rptr 65, 85 [2 Aug 1967].

    "It consists of those principles, usage and rules of action applicable to government and security [rights] of persons and property which do not rest for their authority upon any express and positive declaration of the will of the legislature. Bishop v U.S., D C Tex, 334 F Supp 415, 418 [31 May 1971]." Black's Law Dictionary, 6th ed., supra, p 276, and other references, e.g., Martin v Superior Court, 176 Cal 289, 292-293; 168 P 135, 136-137 (11 Oct 1917) and LRA 1918B, 313.


    See also the book Origins of the Common Law, by Prof. Arthur R. Hogue (Indiana Univ Press, 1966), which cites the deep medieval roots of our legal system. During the early formative period of the common law, between 1154 and 1307, from the reign of Henry II to that of Edward I, common law experienced a spectacular growth as a legal system enforced in the English Royal Courts. In the last chapter, “From Medieval Law to Modern Law," Hogue concludes, “The rule of law, the development of law by means of judicial precedents, the use of the jury to determine the material facts of a case, and the definition of numerous causes of action—these form the principal and valuable legacy of the medieval law to the modern law."

    Note that one issue in the American Revolution was that colonists complained that they were not being given the benefit of the common law, not given the full rights of Englishmen!
    They were familiar with the common law, and with the eminent English writers on the subject, e.g., Lord Chief Justice Edward Coke, Prof. Sir William Blackstone, etc..
    American Revolution era people wanted the "common law" here, wanted it so much so as to revolt against Britain for not [according to them] providing it in full.
    For background on Lord Coke (1551-1633) and 'common law' development, in the face of despotic opposition, see Catherine D. Bowen, "Lord of the Law," 8 Am Heritage (#4) 4-9, 91-95 (May 1957); and The Lion and the Throne (New York: Little, Brown & Co, 1957).
    For additional references, see, e.g.,
  • Blackstone's Commentaries, vol. I (about the first 100 pages
    systematizing common law)
  • Jean Edward Smith, John Marshall: Definer Of A Nation
    (apparent discussion of the state of American law as Marshall
    entered into it)
  • Kurland and Lerner, Founders' Constitution (document
    collection with thematic introductory essays, online at
    http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/.

  • "When an Act of Parliament [Congress; State] is against common right and reason . . . the common law will control it and adjudge such act to be void."—Dr. Bonham's Case, 4 Coke's Rep, part 8, p 118; 77 Eng Rep 638, 652 (C.P. 1610).
    And in fact, "Chief Justice Marshall (12 Wheat. 653, 654 [1827)]) lays great stress on the framers of the constitution having been acquainted with the principles of the common law, and acting in reference to them. Most of them were able lawyers; and certainly able lawyers drew up, and revised the instrument. Are we, then, to believe, that if they had any design to take away the common law right, or to authorize congress to take it away or to impair it; they would, knowing the rules of construction cited, and like common law maxims, have used the language they have? There is the strongest reason to believe, from the language, it was adopted for the purpose of preserving it [the right], and to reserve from congress any power over it. This probability arises, almost irresistibly, from the language used; and under the circumstances that it was used. . . . This case, and all the law on this subject, discussed and decided by it, must have been known to the lawyers of the [constitutional] convention." Wheaton v Peters, 33 US 591, 602; 8 Peters, 8 L Ed 1055, 1059 (1834).

    41. "Federal Common Law is "A body of decisional law developed by the federal courts. The application of this body of common law is limited by the Erie doctrine and by the Rules of Decision Act [28 USC § 1652 (1789)], which provides that except for cases governed by the Constitution, the treaties of the United States, or acts of Congress, federal courts are to apply state law. . . . Erie R Co v Tompkins, 304 US 64, 58 S Ct 817; 82 L Ed 2d 1188 [1938]." Black's Law Dictionary, 6th ed., supra, p 610.

    42. The Duty of Aid is applicable when people are being injured by TTS.     "A tortfeasor has a duty to assist his victim. The initial injury creates a duty of aid and the breach of the duty is an independent tort. See Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 322, Comment c (1965)." Taylor v Meirick, 712 F2d 1112, 1117 (CA 7, 1983).

    43. "Taking" relates to the Constitution's Fifth Amendment ("No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law") specifiying that private property (example, your air supply, needed for life everywhere, including on others' property) cannot be taken or impaired without due process, meaning a prior court order. Naturally smoking does not comply! (Related terms subsumed in the "taking" concept include "inverse condemnation" and "servitude on land.") (Beware of pro-death (e.g., pro-SIDS, pro-alcoholism, pro-crime) people who pretend the word "taking" does not protect life (the highest priority, first listed) everywhere, including on the property of others. Use of the mind-altering drug tobacco has effects at locations other than where used!, e.g., the crime effect.).

    44. "Balancing the equities" is a term you may hear. Laymen claim that smokers and nonsmokers' rights must be "balanced." Such assertions are almost invariably out of legal context, apart from the legal principles, thus accessory to the "universal malice." There are many pertinent court precedents. The concept is stated thus: sic utere tuo ut alienum non lædas" (everyone must use his own property so as not to injure that of his neighbor). The duty to do no harm, i.e., your right to safety, is "absolute." Wheatley v Chrisman, 24 Pa St 298, 301-2 (21 May 1855). And see our 'pure air' site for details and precedents .

    45. Your rights in these matters are present rights, for the here and now. If you are being affected by violation of these rights being described, do not accept typical anti-law answers such as, 'if you don't like it here, go away.' Courts have repeatedly shown that rights are for where you are, to be enforced and obeyed there. See cases such as State of Missouri ex rel Gaines v Canada, 305 US 337; 59 S Ct 232; 83 L Ed 208 (1938); and Watson v City of Memphis, 373 US 526, 533; 83 S Ct 1314; 10 L Ed 2d 529 (1963).

    46. Violence. The legal definition of violence includes words. "Violence . . . is not limited to physical contact or injury, but may include picketing conducted with misleading signs, false statements, publicity, and veiled threats by words and acts." Black's Law Dictionary, 6th ed, 1990, p 1570. Do not "subscribe to the oft-repeated contention and argument that the use of the word 'violence' . . . is limited always to physical contact or injury. A blackjack applied to [one person's] skull may in the long run be less serious than . . . misleading signs, false statements and publicity . . . and insidious propaganda. The scalp wound may be healed through the surgeon's art." Esco Operating Corp v Kaplan, 144 Misc 646, 650; 258 NYS 303, 309 (1932). Pro-tobacco words = "violence," leading to mass deaths unhealable by any surgeon. This concept is so large as to require separate explanation and elaboration in case law context, at two sites, from two different approaches, (a) on the tobacco taboo, and (b) on the inherent illegality of cigarette advertising.

    47. Element of Illegality. "One cardinal principle must be borne in mind, that any element of illegality essential to a scheme or combination makes the whole illegal." Newton Co v Erickson, 70 Misc 291, 298; 126 NYS 949, 954 (6 Jan 1911).

    '"The very plot is an act in itself.' Mulcahy v Queen, L R 3 HL 306, 317. But an act which, in itself, is merely a voluntary muscular contraction, derives all its character from the consequences which will follow it under the circumstances in which it was done.

    "When the acts consist of making a combination calculated to cause temporal damage, the power to punish such acts, when done maliciously, cannot be denied because they are to be followed and worked out by conduct which might have been lawful if not preceded by the acts.

    "No conduct has such an absolute privilege as to justify all possible schemes of which it may be a part.

    "The most innocent and constitutionally protected of acts or omissions may be made a step in a criminal plot, and if it is a step in a plot, neither its innocence nor the Constitution is sufficient to prevent the punishment of the plot by law." Aiken v Wisconsin, 195 US 194, 205-206; 25 S Ct 3, 6; 49 L Ed 154, 159 (1904).

    Re the acts involved in producing TTS, and aiding and abetting its continuance, there is not just one "element of illegality," but many, indeed a lengthy list, and of course the aforesaid "universal malice."

    48. The Michigan cigarette ban law MCL § 750.27, MSA § 28.216, and the above definitions, refute those who allege that the best way to prevent kids smoking is, while themselves smoking, telling kids --"do as I say, not as I do." The reality is, as Michigan knew in 1909, that kids (while susceptible to being deceived otherwise) are smart enough to be able to tell a hypocrite when they see one! So Michigan followed standard law terms and protects all of us from deleterious and adulterated cigarettes. This approach helps adults set the right example for kids. Adherence to these legal principles and definitions is the only right way to prevent smoking! Avoid hypocrisy.

    49. Children have long been targeted (see physiology reason, adults' typically not starting, then examples 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11). See pushers' own analysis #1, #2, and Child Development Exam 2. Note also the ongoing effort to protect children from this, at the joechemo.org educational site. There have been many illegal tobacco sales to minors. Both the sellers and professional analysts recognize that adult smokers would typically not be smoking if they had not been illegally solicited or obtained while they were children.

    Tobacco company intent/action when unrestrained by law is shown by this pre-restraint example of smoking—30% of 6 year old boys; 50% of "boys between 9 and 10"; 88% of boys over 11. Source: Dixon, On Tobacco, 17 Canadian Med Ass'n J 1531 (Dec 1927). And see "Sex, Lies & Cigarettes': Vanguard Sneak Peek" (2010) (on modern pusher targeting of children).
    "If you are really and truly not going to sell to children, you are going to be out of business in 30 years."--Bennett LeBow, Tobacco CEO, quoted by Georgina Lovell, You Are the Target: Big Tobacco: Lies, Scams—Now the Truth (Vancouver, B.C: Chryan Communications, 2002).
    Here's an example, see K.B. Lall, F.S.K. Barar, and S.K. Pande, "Probable Tobacco Addiction in a Three-Year-Old Child," 19 (#1) Clinical Pediatrics, pp 56 - 58 (1 January 1980).
    For a 2004 example of targeting youth, see "Smoking 'em out," by Charles Duhigg, Los Angeles Times (23 Nov 2004) (and using Utah's public land to promote cigarette selling to youths).
    See also the Movies, Smoking and Teens article in the December 2005 issue of Pediatrics, "The first complete review of research on the link between teenagers viewing on-screen smoking and then taking up smoking themselves finds that one leads to the other. The review concludes that eliminating scenes of smoking in new youth-rated films should substantially reduce smoking initiation in the adolescent years, when the vast majority of smokers start. “'The weight of dozens of studies, after controlling for all other known influences, shows the more smoking kids see on screen, the more likely they are to smoke,'” said lead author Annemarie Charlesworth, a research specialist at the University of California, San Francisco Institute for Health Policy Studies. “This strong empirical evidence affects hundreds of thousands of families.”
    "A demographic study found that purchases by young smokers are behind the success of certain cigarette brands, the Wall Street Journal reported Oct. 3," says the article "Young Smokers Critical to Brand Success" (4 October 2000).
    ". . . the clearest statement he heard from RJR headquarters executives came in a question and answer period at a regional sales meeting. Someone asked exactly who the young people were that were being targeted, junior high-school kids, or even younger? The reply came back, 'They got lips? We want 'em,'" says Philip J. Hilts, Smoke Screen: The Truth Behind The Tobacco Industry Cover-Up (NY: Addison-Wesley Pub Co, 1996), on the book jacket. For background on the Hilts book, see Ken Gewertz, "Smoke Screen: Philip Hilts reveals abuses by tobacco companies," in Harvard University Gazette (3 Oct 1996).
    "Tobacco companies invite young opinion leaders to special events at nightclubs and use direct mail to market to smokers in a low-profile but effective strategy to recruit 18- to 25-year-old smokers," says the article "Tobacco Cos. Recruit Young Leaders to Sell Cigarettes" (23 February 2007).
    Note that "exposure to smoking in movies predicted risk of becoming an established smoker, an outcome linked with adult dependent smoking and its associated morbidity and mortality," says James D. Sargent, MD, et al., "Exposure to Smoking Depictions in Movies: Its Association With Established Adolescent Smoking," in Arch Pediatr Adolesc Med., Vol 161 (#9) pp 849-856 (September 2007).
    "The likelihood that an adolescent will become addicted to cigarettes increases with every smoking scene he or she sees in movies, new research indicates," says "Smoking in Films Linked to Adolescents' Habits" (The Washington Post, Science Notebook, Monday, 24 September 2007).
    See also Joseph Queenan, "Hollywood Stogies," Wall Street Journal, p A9 (21 June 2008).
    Chyke Doubeni, M.D., M.P.H., George Reed, PhD, and Joseph R. DiFranza, MD, of the University of Massachusetts, "Kids Don't Recognize Signs of Nicotine Addiction" (6 May 2010), citing Pediatrics (doi:10.1542/peds.2009-0238, 3 May 2010): "Young, non-daily smokers experience symptoms of nicotine addiction but often fail to make the connection between cigarettes and the signs of growing dependence." Pushers count on this youthful ignorance, to enable them (pushers) to kill said youths.
    See the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) rule entitled "Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents." 61 Fed Reg 44,396 (28 Aug 1996) (resulting rule codified at 21 CFR § 801, et al.).
    The FDA found that "cigarette and smokeless tobacco use begins almost exclusively in childhood and adolescence." 61 Fed Reg 45239.
    Minors are particularly vulnerable to Madison Avenue's exhortations, plastered on racing cars and outfield fences, to be cool and smoke, be manly and chew, and the FDA found "compelling evidence that promotional campaigns can be extremely effective in attracting young people to tobacco products." Id. at 45247.
    The pushers engage in fraud, even denying that nicotine is addictive!
    See examples of tobacco effects on children, "Environmental Tobacco Smoke," by Jonathan M. Samet and Sophia S. Wang, in Environmental Toxicants, 2d ed (John Wiley & Sons, Inc, 1999).
    Nazis were prosecuted for "corrupting young minds" pursuant to the holocaust they caused. Contrast the substantially higher tobacco death rate.
    For background on Toxic Tobacco Smoke (TTS), click here.

    Here is a fundamental essential element of illegality rendering the total package of cigarette manufacturing and sales illegal. (Excerpt of Confirmatory 1882 Narrative and 1915 Narrative). 'Once hooked, always hooked.' Sadly, that's the norm; and the reason pushers target children. Once hooked, the full range of foreseeable natural and probable consequences, i.e., tobacco effects, inherently follows.

    50. Children have in essence been treated as slaves before the Civil War, treated as though "they had no rights which the white man [often tobacco farmers] was bound to respect," Dred Scott v Sandford, 60 US 393, 407; 15 L Ed 591, 701 (1857). The Michigan cigarette ban tells cigarette manufacturers and sellers,
    'once you began the illegal process, enslaving children, selling to children, you can't reap the fruit of your lawbreaking. Otherwise you will continue enslaving/selling to children, as your lawbreaking pays off once they become 18.'
    Enforcement of the law banning this result would, as some allege, perhaps have the effect that cigarettes would go underground. But enforcement would get cigarettes out of legitimate stores, malls, grocery stores, convenience stores, etc.

    51. Re any underground cigarettes, the federal cigarette smuggling ban, 18 USC § 2341, § 2342, § 2343, § 2344, § 2345, and § 2346), takes over, rendering the matter a federal crime, allowing for doubled-up enforcement. Smuggling in the context of the above standard legal terms, makes it clear that sellers are not doing mere "accidental" harm (a civil matter for which no future immunity is ever granted anyone else), but harm meeting the criteria of standard definitions of unlawfulness and crime, e.g., murder.

    52. From a solution point of view, driving cigarettes underground, i.e., creating a black market, is an excellent approach, contrary to lay views. The federal law provides for five years in prison, a more meaningful penalty than states typically provide. Regardless, states rarely enforce cigarette control laws, even when they ban sales to children, as the penalties are too minor, and pro-cigarette corruption is widespread. So pushing cigarettes into black market status is about the most efficient method under the circumstances of getting genuine cigarette control, and stopping the cigarette holocaust cited by the Royal Society of Physicians of London. Putting cigarettes into black market status would foreseeably take them out of legitimate stores, thus end that aspect of the societal stamp of approval. All in all, making cigarettes a black market item is a reasonable approach to cigarette control, bringing an end to the cigarette holocaust closer.

    53. Nonsmokers who in the past have been intimidated or misdirected by others' use of terms such as "smokers consent" that are not in accord with the legal meaning of the terms, can serve the cause by insisting on using the correct (legal) meanings of the words. Proper use of words, debunking pro-tobaccoists' disinformation pretending "choice" exists, will assist in ending the TTS holocaust.

    Recommended Websites for Medical Background Data
    Abortion AIDS Alcoholism Alzheiemr's Birth Defects
    Coumarin  Crime 
    Divorce
    Drugs Heart Disease
    Lung Cancer Mental Disorder Seat Belts SIDS Suicide

    Fundamental Principles
    "The proof of the pattern or practice [of willingness to commit acts such as the above] supports an inference that any particular decision, during the period in which the policy was in force, was made in pursuit of that policy." Teamsters v U.S., 431 US 324, 362; 97 S Ct 1843, 1868; 52 L Ed 2d 396, 431 (1977).

    Violations of criminal law can indeed result in damage to private citizens. Ware-Kramer Tobacco Co v American Tobacco Co, 180 F 160 (ED NC, 1910).

    Litigants can show as part of the evidence in his/her own case, the guilt of others linked to the current defendant, in showing a pattern. Locker v American Tobacco Co, 194 F 232 (1912).

    Recommended Websites for Legal Background Data
    Crime Prevention Extraditing Pushers Genocide
    Government Crime Medical Statistics Michigan Law
    Prosecuting Non-Enforcers Tobacco Murder Toxic Chemicals

    For your own legal research, a useful resource for dealing with the many abbreviations you'll meet, is Mary Miles Prince, Bieber's Dictionary of Legal Abbreviations, 4th ed (New York: William S. Hein & Co, 1993) (often available in the library's reference section).

    "Partem aliquam recte intelligere nemo potest, antequam totum, iterum atque iterum, periegerit."
    "No one can rightly understand any part until he has read the whole again and again."—Black's Law Dict., 5th ed,
    p 1007 (1979). Meaning: study!

    Michigan Gov. Engler's Support

    Exec Order 1992-3
    Law Support Letter # 1
    Anti-Cigarette Smuggling Finding
    Law Support Letter # 2
    Governor's Overview

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