USACARA REPORT 05-80-001-G
25 January 1980

Note that it confirms Pletten's freedom of
speech/expression whistleblowing on
TACOM violations of the Army pure air rights rule AR 1-8,
specifically, the no-smoking rule's prerequisites/conditions precedent.

TACOM was violating Army's 'no-smoking' Regulation AR 1-8 (1977),
federal hazard-ban laws 29 USC § 651, et seq [1970],
5 USC § 7902.(d) [1905] (“eliminate work hazards and health risks”),
Michigan deleterious cigarette ban law MCL § 750.27 [1909],
TACOM's drug-ban rule TACOM-R 190-4,
the right to pure air [1306], etc.

USACARA represents higher authority. The USACARA Report
in Pletten's case became mandatory pursuant to case law,
see Army Attorney Spann v Gen. McKenna, Gen. John R. Deane, Jr., et al.,
615 F2d 137 (CA 3, 8 Feb 1980).

Non-compliance with the Army Regulation requiring compliance
with USACARA Reports is insubordination, and en masse, is mutiny.

Such mutiny occurred at TACOM. Opponents of complying
with the USACARA Report included Commanding Gen. Decker,
Chief of Staff Col. Benacquista, CPO Hoover, Atty Bacon,
SD Shirock, FE Lang, the Army Inspector General, etc.

It is well-established that Toxic Tobacco Smoke (TTS) is hazardous, inherently so, and that TTS emissions blatantly exceed OSHA legal threshold limits [TLV's]. The Surgeon General published a list of examples! the most notorious being carbon monoxide, 42,000 ppm vs unsafe above 100 ppm (the OSHA limit)! In short, smokers pose both an “extraordinary hazard and extraordinary risk.”
“The tobacco industry is the greatest killing organization in the world. The harm done by all the armies in the world combined, will not begin to equal the damage inflicted upon the human race by the combined activity of the cultivators, manufacturers, and distributors of tobacco.”—Dr. Jesse M. Gehman, Smoke Over America (East Aurora, N.Y: The Roycrofters, 1943), p 216.

"Tobacco alone is predicted to kill a billion people this [21st] century, 10 times the toll it took in the 20th century, if current trends hold," says the Associated Press article, "Tobacco could kill 1B this century," The Detroit News, p 4A (11 July 2006). Details are at "American Cancer Society CEO Urges United States to Do More to Win Global War Against Cancer in Address to National Press Club" (26 June 2006).

"Tobacco producers are "terrorists", Seffrin tells Israel Cancer Association," The Jerusalem Post (31 March 2005): "All those involved in the production and marketing of tobacco products are 'terrorists', declared Dr John Seffrin, president of the American Cancer Society and elected president of Geneva-based International Union Against Cancer (UICC)."

The pertinent deleterious effects and correlatives have been known for centuries, pursuant to the dangerous ingredients and resultant emissions. In Michigan, the House of Representatives reviewed the subject matter in 1889, and passed pertinent law in 1909.
The case of Banzhaf v F. C. C., 132 US App DC 14, 29; 405 F2d 1082, 1097, 78 P.U.R.3d 87; 1 Media L. Rep. 2037 (1968) cert den 396 US 842 (1969), had upheld the concept of cigarettes' universal deleteriousness, meaning hazard to all people: "The danger cigarettes . . . pose to health is, among others, a danger to life itself . . . a danger inherent in the normal use of the product, not one merely associated with its abuse or dependent on intervening fortuitous events." "It threatens a substantial body of the population, not merely a peculiarly susceptible fringe group."
Many cases had long (for centuries!!) been, and were still being, filed to stop nuisances and hazards to all people, including nonsmokers, not just protection for a selected few individuals. Soon, under OSHA, the case of Shimp v N J Bell Tele Co, 145 N J Super 516; 368 A2d 408 (1976), directed employer compliance.
In short, the Dept. of Defense (DOD) saw that smoking was blatantly violating people's long-established pure air rights, rights established by centuries of precedents; and that employees could sue and win to enforce their rights against employers allowing coworkers to put toxic substances into the air. The DOD wanted to be pro-active, protect their employees without awaiting ligitation. DOD issued a regulation, DODI 6015.17, 32 CFR § 203 (August 1977), directing such protection.
Pursuant to that August 1977 rule, during the 1977-1981 term of Secretary of the Army Clifford L. Alexander, Jr. (a former EEOC Chairman concerned with human rights), Army Regulation (AR) 1-8 was issued in November 1977, institutionalizing smoking policy. AR 1-8 was designed to disrupt, end, the TLV falsifying process, and of pretending that TLV's were the sole factor to use in assessing compliance with the full range of applicable law. AR 1-8 would disrupt, end, the ignoring of people's pure air rights. The goal was to solve the situation for the workforce as a whole, not rely on individual case-by-case requests. A system-wide problem required a system-wide solution.
Pursuant thereto, in November 1977, AR 1-8 per 32 CFR § 203 set certain prerequisites, conditions precedent, before smoking behavior could be permitted to begin at any Army installation:
  • [1] protection for both "life" and property"
  • [2] “equitable balance” (term for when these criteria are met).
  • [3] air-flow of at least 10 cfm air-change rate hourly, so as to provide
    "healthful" working conditions aka an environment reasonably free
    of contamination
  • [4] no hazard (whereas tobacco smoke is inherently hazardous)
  • [5] no discomfort to nonsmokers
  • [6] no annoyance to nonsmokers
  • [7] “remove smoke” from the air
  • [8] standard pure air rights and anti-nuisance concepts
  • [9] nonsmokers' rights having priority over smoking
  • [10] a personal standard empowering non-smokers, thus overruling the falsified TLV's policy and practice
  • [11] “affirmative action” (proactive vs reactive, awaiting complaints)
  • [12] educational programs

AR 1-8 labels the behavior and conduct meeting these multiple criteria as "an environment reasonably free of contamination." Whatever other contaminants there may or may not be, air meeting the multiple AR 1-8 criteria is tobacco-smoke-free. AR 1-8 was written to preclude issues of a "ban" on the behavior and conduct at issue, being somehow a 'smokers-rights' violation. AR 1-8 precluded this issue by requiring criteria be met before smoking behavior and conduct could be "permitted" in the first place.

Unfortunately, as at TACOM, there was local hostility to, mutiny against, the rule. Local offices were routinely aiding and abetting the prohibited behavior and conduct, by falsifying the OSHA data, the TLV's. For example, where 42,000 ppm of carbon monoxide was what the Surgeon General reported, blatantly above the 100 limit, locals would write 4!!

Words used describing the refusal to meet the AR 1-8 criteria about smoker behavior and conduct include ridiculing nonsmoker whistleblowing by referring to their doing so as an 'aversion' motivated by 'sensitivity.' (These terms are typically used by persons hostile to the AR 1-8 criteria and wanting the prohibited behavior and conduct to continue.)

The regulation had the effect of ceasing permission for smoking behavior to occur where the criteria were not met. As TACOM's Industrial Hygienist Edwin Braun and Physican Dr. Francis J. Holt testified, TACOM did not meet any of the criteria to continue permitting smoking behvaior and conduct. However, TACOM management was insubordinate, mutinous, refused implementation, did no training of supervisors and employees on-point, denied authority, did no workforce survey, ignored nonsmokers' documented complaints, and opposed any effort to secure compliance.

With respect to training, a training program or policy must be adeequate. For example, simply distributing workplace policies, without training, is inadequate. Ogden v Wax Works, 214 F3d 999, 1010 (CA 8, Iowa). And, "employers must affirmatively establish that they have an active mechanism for renewing employees' awareness of their policies through either specific education programs or periodic re-dissemination or revision of written materials. See Romano v U-Haul Int'l, 233 F.23d 655 (CA 1, Maine) (2000)." TACOM refused to do any training on-point! instead denied having authority!

As per the authority issue, AR 600-20.2-1 grants commanders full authority to do their jobs. Verifying this full authority grant, TACOM's own Legal Office's Chief Counsel Richard T. Tarnas (with TACOM attorneys Frank R. Ortisi and Susan Lewandowski) said on 19 June 1979, "Army Regulation 1-8 does give officials the authority to ban smoking in areas under their jurisdiction." USACARA deemed this analysis so significant, it both (a) cited it, and (b) made the Chief Counsel memorandum its USACARA Exhibit 8g.

The duty of TACOM was to exercise that authority granted by the Army. TACOM refused, did not explain why in 1979, never has, and still has not (2013).

Army USAARL Report No. 86-13, "Smoking and Soldier Performance: A Literature Review" (1986), Chapter 10, § f, page 149 says:
"[I]f the military somehow could restrict enlistments to nonsmokers, there would be far fewer discipline, alcoholism, and drug abuse problems in the Army and other services."

A 17 April 1986 Army Proclamation by the Secretary of the Army, says,

"Medical evidence shows overwhelmingly that the use of tobacco products adversely impacts on the health and readiness of our force. Tobacco usage impairs such critical military skills as night vision, hand-eye coordination, and resistance to cold weather injuries. Moreover, it increase susceptibility to disease. It has become a substantial threat to the well-being of our Army, and we must take immediate steps to eliminate its usage."

Army Pamphlet 600-63-7, Fit to Win, ANTITOBACCO USE (1987), p. 14, says

"1. Nicotine is a physically and psychologically addictive drug. Therefore, any kind of tobacco use may be addictive. There is no safe level of tobacco use.

"2. The U.S. Surgeon General States, 'Cigarette smoking is the chief, single avoidable cause of death in our society and the most important public health issue of our time.'

"3. TOBACCO USE AFFECTS EVERYONE. We all have family, friends, and co-workers who use tobacco. Also, as non-smokers, if we 1ive or work in a smoke-filled environment, we are at higher risk for cancer, cardiovascular and chronic obstructive lung diseases." (emphasis in original)

Army Regulation 600-63.4-la. (1987) summarizes Army experience on point:

"Smoking tobacco harms readiness by impairing physical fitness and by increasing illness, absenteeism, premature death, and health care costs."

29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) forbids hiring drug abusers such as smokers when they "constitute a direct threat to property or the safety of others."

The civil service hiring form, Standard Form 78, Certificate of Medical Examination, precludes hiring persons such as smokers with "medical findings which . . . would make him a hazard to himself or others."

Avoiding negligent hiring is what employers are to do. The federal government is to set the example. But at TACOM, disregard was the norm.

Pursuant to the law of "negligent hiring," the issue is not merely absence of bad data on an applicant, but also affirmative positive statements of non-dangerousness to self/others. See William J. Connelly, "How To Navigate The River Of Legal Liability When Hiring," 63 Personnel Journal 32-46, especially p 38 (March 1986).

Law 29 USC § 706.(7)(B) and Standard Form 78, Certificate of Medical Examination, preclude hiring persons with "medical findings which . . . would make him a hazard to himself or others," e.g., smokers.
Pursuant to Ryder v U. S., 515 US 177; 115 S Ct 2031; 132 L Ed 2d 136 (1995), an appellant can challenge the validity of an adjudicator's appointment. Citing the mental disorder of smokers, is a Ryder right. TACOM smokers were not lawfully hired, and thus not proper deciding officials. Showing invalidity of their appointment involves citing medical data on smoker mental disorder in, e.g., the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 3rd - 4th eds; the International Classification of Disease, 9th ed; Michigan Law Review, Nov 1982; medical files; case law on smoker mental disorder; etc. TACOM officials cited in the record, showed typical smoker mental disorder and behavior dangerous to themselves, others, and property. They had been hired or enlsted in violation of hiring rules. They were unfit, Ryder, supra.
Ryder, supra, follows case law on the duty to do proper hiring. Bowen v Illinois C R Co, 136 F 306 (CA 8, 1905); 70 LRA 915 (1905); Duckworth v Apostalis, 208 F 936 (D C Tenn, 1913); Davidson v Chinese Republic Restaurant Co, 201 Mich 389; 167 NW 967 (1928); Annot., 40 ALR 1215 (1926); 114 ALR 1041 (1938); Bradley v Stevens, 329 Mich 556; 46 NW2d 382 (1951); Annot., 34 ALR2d 372, 390 9 (1954); Hersh v Kentfield Builders, 385 Mich 410; 189 NW2d 286 (1971); Samson v Saginaw, 393 Mich 393; 224 NW2d 843 (1975); Ponticas v KMS Investments, 331 NW2d 907 (Minn, 1983); Welsh Mfg v Pinkerton's, Inc, 474 A2d 436 (1984); 44 ALR4th 603 (1984); Kurtz v City of North Miami, 653 So 2d 1025 (Fla, 1995); Fortunoff F J & S, Inc v N Y St Div of H R, 227 App Div 2d 557; 642 NYS2d 710 (1996); Stevens v Inland Waters, Inc, 220 Mich App 212; 559 NW2d 61 (1996).
TACOMers firing me (Benacquista, Hoover, Holt, Bacon, Averhart) and those upholding it (e.g., at MSPB, DOJ, etc.), are unable “to appreciate the wrongfulness of his [their] conduct,” and “to conform his [their] conduct to the requirements of the law.”—People v Matulonis, 115 Mich App 263; 320 NW2d 238 (1982) (a case involving physical deterioration of the brain due to typical smoker aspects, alcoholism and drug abuse), in context of determining insanity, i.e., whether the person is insane within the meaning of the law (for criminal responsibility purposes). For laws involved, click here. For disqualification details and context, click here and here.
Employers have a duty to ascertain applicants' criminal and dangerous propensities prior to a hiring decision, especially when there is a pattern of such conduct or propensity, as with TACOM's smokers, dangerous people cited in the record.
In addition to the other hazards smokers pose, they also pose a fire hazard. Smoker control for that reason can be traced back at least a century and half, to the precedent of Commonwealth of Massachusetts v Thompson, 53 Mass (12 Metc) 231 (March 1847) (an outdoor smoking case; smoking banned due to foreseeability of fires).
TACOM is an Army base in the City of Warren, Macomb County, Michigan. Macomb County is one of Michigan's smallest counties. TACOM should be easily able to comply.

As per Michigan law MCL 750.27, MSA 28.216, deleterious cigarettes are illegal to be manufactured or sold in Michigan.

The rights to pure air, and to put out fires, date developmentally from at least 1306. These human rights are part of the "common law."

The "common law" is mandated recognition by the Seventh Amendment in the Bill of Rights of the U.S. Constitution (1787).

By laws from 1905-1970, workplaces must be "free" of hazards.

  • 5 USC § 7902.(d) (1905), the federal agency safety law, says to "eliminate work hazards and health risks."

  • 29 USC § 651, et seq (1970), the OSHA safety law, requires workplaces to be "free" of hazards. This bans negligent hiring, employee conduct and behavior, and substances re which regular exposure foreseeably leads to "material impairment of [employee] health."

Those are federal-wide laws.

The aforeseaid mandatory legal safety duty, zero hazards, them being 'eliminated,' not merely reduced (as some might argue), is by definition, "reasonable." It is "reasonable" to obey the law.

The legal duty and safety "adjective ["free" of hazards] is unqualified and absolute," says Nat'l. Rlty. & C. Co., Inc. v. OSHRC, 160 US App DC 133; 489 F2d 1257 (1973).

Not hiring people who foreseeably causes hazards is a recognized way to avoid hazards being caused at a workplace. The Army's USAARL Report 86-13 notes this concept. So does the civil service hiring form, Standard Form 78. The Army knew as long ago as 1898 to not enlist smokers! pursuant to a long line of pertinent medical data.

An "unqualified and absolute" prohibition of hazards is "reasonable," as per the laws from the years 1905, 1970, continuing to present. Army Regulation 385-10.3-5a and 3-5b provided for employees to report, blow the whistle on, any hazards they became aware of. Hazards are to be 'eliminated.'

AR 1-8 (1977) is an additional requirement, based on the presumption that hazards have already been eliminated. AR 1-8 labels an environment meeting these additional, beyond safety, criteria as "reasonably free of contamination." The starting point is, zero hazard is mandated/presumed to be already complied with, from 1905 - 1970. Now follow these additional 1977 criteria.

By definition, an environment that meets these legal requirements, behavioral and conduct aspects, and prerequisites, 'remove smoke,' 'healthful' condition, 'no hazards, 'no discomfort,' 'no annoyance,' 'nonsmokers' personal determinations being abided by,' is "smoke-free."

TACOM management, insubordinately, pretended that TACOM "cannot" do that, cannot comply with the rules. When insubordinate people say "cannot," they mean "will not," i.e., refusal. They are then to receive progressive discipline (reprimand, supsension, etc.) until they cease refusing to comply. (Of course, they shouldn't have been hired in the first place.)

TACOM had an antiquated ventilation system, periodically itself out-of-order, so clearly met neither the safety law "unqualified and absolute" duty, nor any of the additional AR 1-8 prerequisites. Its own Industrial Hygienist Edwin Braun expressly admitted the refusal to "remove smoke" [Deposition, p 26].

Wherefore smoking was to be not even initially "permitted," not even reaching the "ban" point, the prohibition point, as per the safety law "unqualified and absolute" duty, without even reaching the issue of the added AR 1-8 prerequisites.

As TACOM was not complying with the safety laws, the Michigan law, nor the Army or TACOM rules, numbers of employees complained. Newspaper articles cited this issue. Workers' compensation cases were filed for tobacco-caused injuries. Smoking employees retired early due to, or died of, smoking. TACOM's sick leave useage rate regularly exceeded the Army norm (NTE 61.9 hours of sick leave annually per employee); TACOM was regularly in the 80's per year.

TACOM claimed to meet all the rules! while meeting none. Moreover, to obstruct employees' rights to a safe environment, TACOM did nothing to alert workers of the systemic deficiencies, to correct them, or to implement compliance with any of the other prerequisites.

The bottom line was this. In essence, at TACOM, the safety laws, the Michigan law, and the Army and TACOM rules, were nullified by rampant management insubordination.

TACOM Commanding General Oscar C. Decker, Jr., Chief of Staff Colonel John J. Benacaquista, Safety Director Robert Shirock, Facility Engineer John Lang, Personnel Officer Edward Hoover,
  • did not agree with the laws and regulation,

  • flouted the notion of civilian control of the military,

  • ignored the numerous pure air precedents,

  • insisted that smokers' emissions should have priority,

  • and so refused to implement the laws and regulations.
They did not inform the workforce of the regulation prerequisites, did not enforce them, concealed the violations, 'low-balled' the hazardous quantities (ex.: writing 4 hazardous units when honest analysts record 42,000, e.g., on carbon monoxide).
OSHA requires testing be done in the 'breathing zone.' To sabotage the rules, skew the results, Shirock, et al., had their staff, e.g., Ernest Peters, Jr., John Dollberg, test at odd times and locations, e.g., when employees were not present, non-representative of normal conditions, do the 'low-balling,' and testing not in the 'breathing zone.'
TACOM counted on bullying to deter employees from raising the issue; on the Legal Office to defend the falsifications and hostility to the rule of law; and on the foreseeable nature of the career military officers in charge at TACOM. "'You say his [an officer's] military career is a result of his [mental] disturbance?' 'Most military careeers are,'" says Herman Wouk, The Caine Mutiny: A Novel of World War II (Garden City: Doubleday & Co, Inc., 1951), chapter 35, p 416.
Only the Industrial Hygienist, Edwin Braun, and Pletten's supervisor, Jeremiah Kator, favored compliance with the aforesaid laws, rules, and AR 1-8 criteria and prerequisites. Braun reported the non-compliance even on the [1] criterion TACOM claimed; he was ignored, thus rendered ineffective. Kator was overruled.
Pletten blew the whistle in June 1979. The U.S. Army Appellate Review Agency (USACARA) investigated. Its January 1980 Report upheld Pletten, and mandated compliance with all criteria. In essence, bring Pletten's work-area from 0% compliance to 100%. Procedurally, nonsmoker determination controls. Compliance with such Reports became mandatory, Spann v Gen. McKenna, Gen. John R. Deane, Jr., et al., 615 F2d 137 (CA 3, 8 Feb 1980).
You can imagine that this alone enraged TACOM management. [See medical references 1, 2, and 3].
Even worse from their insubordinate viewpoint, Pletten indicated intent via his class action on behalf of co-workers, to alert them to the laws and rules, their "unqualified and absolute" and "personal standard" empowering criteria and prerequisites, and the USACARA Report. He indicated intent to provide the workforce at large, the benefits of all the foregoing, and of the USACARA findings and decision in his behalf for his work area. Tobacco addict Col. Benacquista demanded [extortion] Pletten not do so. Pletten was concerned for the workforce at large, so declined.
TACOM thereupon, February 1980, made (as EEOC's Henry Perez, Jr. observed) the "decision to terminate" Pletten, without the statutory 30 days notice saying what Pletten (having an excellent performance record better than colleagues') had done wrong (nothing but winning, with intent to pass the word!). This type retaliation has a 'chilling effect' on employees reporting violations, thus endangers the public generally.
Let's take one example, the 'right-to-life' issue, abortion. “As early as 1902 Ballantyne had found an increase in the abortion rate in French and Austrian women working in tobacco factories.”—Beulah R. Bewley, “Smoking in Pregnancy,” 288 Brit Med J (#6415) 424-426 (11 Feb 1984).

About "fifty-three per cent. of . . . abortions . . . are due to tobacco. . . . inhalation of tobacco smoke by pregnant mothers when sitting among smokers is sufficient to cause fatal poisoning of the fœtus."—Herbert H. Tidswell, M.D., The Tobacco Habit: Its History and Pathology (London: J. & A. Churchill, 1912), p 238. Thus tobacco has a record of significantly leading to abortion, p 184, terminating about 1/7 of live-births, p 177.

"The smoking mother is . . . 80 percent more likely than the nonsmoker to have a spontaneous abortion."—Samuel S. Epstein, M.D., The Politics of Cancer (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1978), p 162.

Let's take another example, the Pentagon-drugs connection. In the 1898 Spanish-American War era, the Army, pursuant to the legal duty against negligent hiring, would not even enlist smokers. Austin v State, 101 Tenn 563; 48 SW 305 (1898) aff’d 179 US 343 (1900).

Note the change in attitude, in the period leading up to Pletten's reporting rampant violations, starting with reports to AMC’s Inspector General.

“A former military intelligence noncom tells of a 1960 . . . . airstrip . . . transfer point . . . into and out of Vietnam. . . . The first planes out of Vietnam . . . was filled . . . with . . . small plastic bags of a white powder that he has no doubt was heroin.”

“The U.S. Government not only promoted this drug traffic, it intervened to make sure the traffic wouldn’t be discovered. A former officer who did criminal investigations for the Pentagon in the Vietnam theater . . . vividly remembers political interference with criminal justice. ‘Some of the time when you’d be running a criminal investigation, say narcotics, you’d find out that [some official] is involved. . . . . You investigate it up to a point and then you can’t go any further. . . . It would go to our headquarters and then it would go to Washington and nothing would ever happen.’”

“Another former officer from the army’s Criminal Investigation Division recalls a mammoth heroin scheme . . . . he and four others from his unit were investigating corruption in the sale of supplies . . . . The corrupt U.S. and Vietnamese officers they caught tried to bargain away jail terms by describing the heroin traffic involving Vietnamese politicians and senior U.S. officers. The reports checked out, the investigator says. The . . . investigation group filed reports to the Pentagon revealing that G.I. bodies being flown back to the United States were cut open, gutted, and filled with heroin . . . . the heroin-stuffed soldiers bore coded body numbers, allowing conspiring officers . . . to remove the heroin–up to fifty pounds of heroin per dead G.I.”

“The army acted on these reports—not by coming down on the dope traffickers, but by disbanding the investigative team and sending them to combat duty . . . . Other reports corroborate the use of G.I. bodies to ship dope back to the United states. This was the prevailing atmosphere . . . .”—Jonathan Kwitny, The Crimes of Patriots (New York: W. W. Norton, 1987), pp 51-52.

This “prevailing” Pentagon drug culture attitude retaliated against Pletten for his action against the starter drug, tobacco.

  • "The first step toward addiction may be as innocent as a boy's puff on a cigarette in an alleyway,"—U.S. Supreme Court, Robinson v California, 370 US 660, 670; 82 S Ct 1417; 8 L Ed 2d 758 (1962).

  • And, "all" drug addicts are smokers.—Commissioner of Narcotics Harry J. Anslinger and U.S. Attorney William F. Tompkins, The Traffic in Narcotics (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1953), p 196.

  • And, "there would be no marijuana addicts . . . if people did not first learn to smoke cigarettes."—Frank L. Wood, M.D., What You Should Know About Tobacco (Wichita, KS: The Wichita Publishing Co, 1944), p 143. Also, "all of those who became alcohol addicts, in the experience of this writer [Wood], were first tobacco addicts."

  • "Tobacco . . . holds a special status as a ‘‘’gateway' substance in the development of other drug dependencies not only because tobacco use reliably precedes use of illicit drugs, but also because use of tobacco is more likely to escalate to dependent patterns of use of most other dependence producing drugs."—Jack E. Henningfield, Richard Clayton, and William Pollin, "Involvement of Tobacco in Alcoholism and Illicit Drug Use," 85 British J of Addiction 279-292, esp p 283 (1990).

  • Drug abuse has another aspect, the money trail. The money trail involves a cycle starting typically from smokers, the population base of drug abusers. It proceeds through local to higher drug dealers, and on sequentially all the way to initial growers, in foreign nations such as Afghanistan, and can end up with indigenous terrorist groups. See background data by Rachel Ehrenfeld, Ph.D., Director, NYC Center for the Study of Corruption & the Rule of Law,
  • Narco-Terrorism (NY: Basic Books, 1990) and
  • Evil Money (NY: HarperCollins, 1992);
  • "U.S. ignored money trail: Bush is doomed to fail if he doesn't cut off financing of terrorists," Detroit News, pp 17A & 20A (30 Sep 2001);
  • theantidrug.com's data on drugs and terrorism (Jan 2002); and
  • the ICIJ-CPI exposé of cigarette smuggling in terrorism context, "U.S. Tobacco Companies Accused of Terrorist Ties And Iraqi Sanctions-Busting" (22 Feb 2002).
Let's note another example. The Army knows, that to "restrict enlistments to nonsmokers [would lead to] far fewer discipline, alcoholism, and drug abuse problems in the Army and other services."—USAARL Report No. 86-13 (1986), p 149, supra. Example: "Women: rape rampant in military: One-third of female veterans say they've been assaulted," Detroit News (12 May 1995), p 5A, citing Maureen Murdoch, M.D., M.P.H., and Kristin L. Nicholl, M.D., M.P.H., "Women Veterans' Experiences With Domestic Violence and With Sexual Harassment While in the Military," 4 Archives of Family Medicine (#5) 411-418 (May 1995). Example: among "respondents under age 50 . . . 90% reported sexual harassment while in the military." "Histories of domestic violence . . . and of sexual harassment while in the military are common among women veterans." "Some respondents said they had been denied promotions, had transfers blocked or wre given poor assignments after refusing sexual favors to superior officers." "Rates of reports of completed and attempted sexual assaults . . . were 20 times higher than previous reports by other government employees." And, "domestic violence is the single most common cause of injury to women."
Pletten's actions were in the direction of reducing such incidents, by reducing the post-gateway-drug customer base! their lucrative profits! Pro-drug TACOM officials naturally opposed this. They are part of the problem in the ‘war on drugs.’ Hence, they retaliated against Pletten.
TACOM'S anti-work force attitude of contempt for safety led to a worker death resulting in criminal charges! This was at its Tank Plant. A worker was overcome by air-borne fumes. The cases are
  • Int. Un. U.A.W. v General Dynamics Land Sys Div, 259 US App DC 369; 815 F2d 1570 cert den 484 US 976; 108 S Ct 485; 98 L Ed 2d 484 (1987), and

  • People v General Dynamics Land Systems, 175 Mich App 701; 438 NW2d 359 (1989) lv app den 435 Mich 860 (1990).
  • "Universal malice" encompasses toxics causing "premature death" "without knowing or carying who may be the victim," Black's Law Dictionary 1110 (4th ed. 1968), citing Mitchell v State, 60 Ala 26, 30 (1877).

  • "Precisely what happened is what might have been expected as the result . . . and is the natural and probable consequence . . . Malice is presumed under such conditions," Nestlerode v US, 74 US App DC 276, 279; 122 F2d 56, 59 (1941).

  • TACOM's universal malice "is not directed to any particular individual, but is general and indiscriminate . . . putting the lives of many in jeopardy . . . without [necessarily] the intent to kill any particular person, but . . . likely to [kill] some one or more persons . . . 'regardless of human life, although without any preconceived purpose to deprive any particular person of life," State v Massey, 20 Ala App 56; 100 So 625, 627 (1924).

  • Army Regulation 385-10.3-5a. and b., has words "emphasizing personnel responsibility for making . . . reports" "of unsafe or unhealthful conditions."
    • “The failure to comply with promulgated regulations, which must go through a considerable vetting process before they take effect, may be viewed as intentional discrimination.” Association for Disabled Americans, Inc v Concorde Gaming Corp, 158 F Supp 2d 1353, 1362 n. 5 (SD Florida, 2001).
    When federal employees are fired for their freedom of expression, their JOB DUTY freedom of expression, their peers foreseeably thereafter fear to blow the whistle on non-enforcement of pertinent laws.
    Thus truthfulness is not an Army priority, see, e.g., exposé by Philip Barron, “The Next Pat Tillman-Style Cover-Up?” (22 February 2007).
    Next, here is data from the 25 Jan 1980 USACARA Report, compared with a similar arbitration case. That was based on the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) regulation, a regulation paralell to the Army Regulation.

    As per HEW RegulationAs Per Army Regulation
    FMCS Arbitration Case 61K - 26042
    22 January 1982
    Arbitrator Berkeley
    USACARA Case 05-80-001-G
    25 January 1980
    Examiner Kennedy
    [Dept of HEW, Soc Sec Admin v
    AFGE Local 1923,
    82-1 Lab Arb Awards (CCH) § 8206;
    click here for .pdf Full Text.]
    "Smoking shall be prohibited on the work area of the entire fifth floor of the . . . Building, and shall be posted accordingly." (P. 24) "The Commander has the authority . . . to ban all smoking." (P. 14)
    "It is clear that the Grievant has not, in fact, been sufficiently accommodated." (P. 18) "The rights of smokers exist only insofar as discomfort or unreasonable annoyance is not caused . . . he is caused discomfort by smoke." (P. 12)
    "A single employee could eliminate smoking within an entire open work area." (P. 17) "Smoking does constitute a safety hazard to him . . . The regulation provides that smoking will be permitted in common work areas only if ventilation is adequate to remove smoke. . . ." (P. 7)
    "Indeed no employee need be relocated on account of his or her smoking/non-smoking . . . , which could well represent a cost savings over the current patch-work system." (P. 22) "An equitable balance . . . cannot be accomplished by relocating one nonsmoker. . . . The other nonsmokers also have rights . . . No evidence was offered to indicate that the Command had considered the rights of all nonsmokers." (P. 11) [Considering others' rights applied the concept of Donahue v Stockton Gas & Elec, 6 Cal App 276; 92 P 196 (26 Aug 1907). This is a case of air pollution causing varying effects on individual victims, and though one person complained, it was banned as a public nuisance due to impacting a number of people.]
    "Ours is a society in which few rights indeed are absolute, and smokers are often subject to restrictions in airplanes, hospitals and schoolrooms, to name but a few instances." (Pp. 22-23) "Smoking will be permitted . . . only if . . . healthful. . . the rights of smokers exist only insofar as discomfort or unreasonable annoyance is not caused . . . ." (Pp. 7, 12)
    "Medical documentation of an employee's adverse reaction to smoke is clearly not required." (P. 20) Grievant "has established that smoking does constitute a safety hazard to him." (P. 7)
    "A single . . . could eliminate smoking within an entire . . . area, regardless of the size . . . or the nunber of people working in it." (P. 17) "Smoking is banned in the area where the computers are located." (P. 10)
    "It is clear that the Grievant has not in fact, been sufficiently accommodated." (P. 17) "An equitable balance . . . cannot be accomplished by relocating one nonsnoker." (P. 11)
    "Medical documentation . . . is clearly not required." (P. 20) "Smoking is banned in the area where the computers are located." (P. 10)

    As per Army RegulationAs Per HEW Regulation
    Examiner Kennedy
    Arbitrator Berkeley
    "Whether or not an individual is discomforted by smoke is a personal determination to be made by that individual." (P. 12) "It is clear that the guidelines envision a personal standard." (P. 20)
    "The Commander is not as devoid of authority as COL Thomas' letter indicates." (P. 13) "The Commander has the authority . . . to ban all smoking . . . ." (P. 14) "Consider two prior arbitration decisions on the smoking issue . . . the first case . . . Interestingly enough, it was the position of the Agency that it had to prohibit smoking pursuant to the regulations . . . apparently considered alternatives to the prohibition but found none." (P. l6)
    "It is clear that the rights of smokers exist only insofar as discomfort or unreasonable annoyance is not caused to nonsmokers." (P. 12) "A single employee could eliminate smoking within an entire open work area, regardless of the size of the area or the number of people working in it." (P. 17)
    "The position of the Command appears to be based on the premise that the recommendation of ten cubic feet of fresh air per minute per person is met." (P. 13) "The Agency's contention that the air quality tests demonstrated that the standard was met . . . is not valid . . . if met it will not rebut an employee's statement that smoke in the air in his or her workplace is damaging his or her health." (P. 1)
    "Whether or not an individual is discomforted by smoke is a personal determination to be made by that individual." (P. 12) "Medical documentation of an employee's adverse reaction to smoke is clearly not required. That the Grievant gathered these documents should not be held against him. (P. 20)
    "The regulations, as written, do not require an absolute ban on smoking . . . The Commander has the authority, however, to ban all smoking." (P. 14) "It must be noted that the guidelines do not envision an environmen totally free of smoke and its contamination . . . yet . . . does provide for the prohibition of smoking." (P. 5)
    "Smoking is banned in the area where the computers are located." (P. 10) "The Agency has no difficulty or reluctance in prohibiting smoking where it interferes with sensitive data processing equipment and here the interference caused by smoking is with human life, something far more precious." (Pp. 14-15)
    "Smoking does constitute a safety hazard to" Grievant. (P. 7) "It is clear that the Grievant has not, in fact, been sufficiently accommodated." (P. 16)

    PMCS Arbitration Case 81K - 26042 provides insight on the pertinent principles governing smoking. The employer has a regulation to "prohibit smoking if an employee objects in writing to tobacco smoke in the immediate work area on the basis that it is having an adverse effect on his or her health," p. 3 of the Report. AR 1-8 is even more pro-nonsmoker than that; under AR 1-8, "it is clear that the rights of smokers exist only insofar as discomfort or unreasonable annoyance is not caused to nonsmokers," p. 12 of the 25 Jan 80 USACARA Report. Those "subjective" criteria provide additional grounds for nonsmoker freedom of choice to ban forced smoking, not merely "adverse effect on . . . health."

    AR 1-8 provides for protection prior to the initiation of "adverse effect," i.e., against even pro-hazardous and pre-sickness situations. AR 1-8 also does not specify or require non-smoker objection "in writing." Verbal objection is adequate; see the USACARA reference as adequate evidence on the matter—what I simply "declared" and "advised," p. 12.

    The Arbitration noted that the employer's rule cited only "a minimum rate of 5 cubic feet per minute (cfm) of fresh air per person" as what was "recommended" to achieve the regulatory goals. The AR 1-8 guidance is for 10. Both employers specify that such cfm guidance is only "As a general rule." See the Arbitrator's Report, p. 6, and the USACARA Report, p. 8.

    The Arbitrator noted at p. 20 that "it is clear that the guidelines envision a personal standard and the 5 cfm standard is at best only a guide and does not control in determining whether or not smoking should be prohibited." USACARA had analyzed the rule at issue in the same vein, "whether or not an individual ie discomforted by smoke is a personal determination to be made by that individual." Both rules make "clear that the guidelines envision a personal standard."

    Ed. Note: The "personal determination" concept is one people regularly use, to exercise their rights to, e.g., vote, travel, assemble, worship, obtain a jury trial, etc. This personal right also applies in medical context, see this court analysis: “The duty to disclose . . . arises from phenomena apart from medical custom and practice. The latter, we think, should no more establish the scope or duty than its existence. Any definition of scope in terms purely of a professional standard is at odds with the patient's prerogative to decide . . . himself. . . . The scope of the physician communication to the patient, then, must be measured by the patient's needs, and that need is the information material to the decision. Thus the test for determining whether a particular point must be divulged is its materiality to the patient's decision; all risks potentially affecting the decision must be unmasked.” Source: Canterbury v. Spence, 150 U.S.App.D.C. 263; 464 F.2d 772 (1972).

    In the arbitration case, the full authority to ban all smoking was obvious and not even a matter of debate. Indeed, at 16, the case referred to a prior situation when "Interestingly enough, it was the position of the Agency that it had to prohibit smoking . . . ." The USACARA Report, p. 14, noted that "The Commander has the authority . . . to ban all smoking." The installation is required "to take whatever action is necessary" to achieve the regulatory goals. At p. 6, the [25 Jan 1980] Report by USACARA cited AR 600-20.2-1 showing the full authority involved,

    "It is Army policy that each individual in the chain of command is delegated sufficient authority to accomplish assigned tasks and responsibilities."

    That "sufficient authority" includes authority to achieve compliance with rules, for example, that "discomfort or unreasonable annoyance is not caused to nonsmokers" in accordance with "a personal determination to be made by that individual" nonsmoker, p. 12.

    This includes “the other nonsmokers” who “also have rights even though they have not actively pursued such rights,” 11. A "personal determination" is a typical means of exercising one's rights, for example, the "personal determination" to vote, indeed, to exercise any of the rights referenced in the U.S. Constitution, the Bill of Rights, State Constitutions, and so on.

    The USACARA Report at 14 referred to the "affirmative action" duty to achieve the goals, and said "If such affirmative action has been taken at TARCOM, it is not evident . . . ." It still is "not evident." The Arbitrator confirmed that "It is clear that the Grievant has not, in fact, been sufficiently accommodated . . . ." Such inaction violates "the guidelines" which "envision a personal standard."

    FMCS Arbitration Case 61K - 26042 [82-1 Lab Arb Awards (CCH) § 8206] provides insight on the pertinent principles governing smoking. The employer therein, like the installation, alleged that supposed "air quality tests demonstrated that the standard was met." The Arbitrator, like USACARA, noted that the employer claim "is not valid," p. 19. Other factors must be taken into account. "Thus, it is clear that the guidelines envision a personal standard and the . . . cfm standard is at best only a guide and does not control in determining whether or not smoking should be prohibited," p. 20.

    USACARA said likewise at p. 12, "whether or not an individual is discomforted by smoke is a personal determination to be made by that individual." "Thus, it is clear that the rights of smokers exist only insofar as discomfort or unreasonable annoyance is not caused to nonsmokers."

    Even if a particular cfm standard is met, USACARA noted at 13, "The fact that it was stated 'as a general rule" indicates that there might be a variance." The Arbitrator at 19 quoted relative to a cfm standard that "if met it will not rebut an employee's statement that smoke in the air in his or her workplace is damaging his or her health. As a result, meeting this standard will not preempt a ban on smoking in the workplace." AR 1-8 allows for and specifies no smoking for more reasons than merely adverse effects on health; it includes other reasons as well that nonsmokers might cite, such as mere "subjective" discomfort or unreasonable annoyance.

    The Arbitrator said, at p. 20, "In a similar vein, medical documentation of an employee's adverse reaction to smoke is clearly not required." USACARA at p. 12 referred to the same concept by emphasizing "personal determination to be made by that individual." A doctor is not "that individual." A medical statement is limited to being only "further" evidence, but clearly subordinate to the "personal determination," which is all that is necessary for causing compliance to begin. The Arbitrator noted "That the Grievant gathered these documents should not be considered against him and while there may have been some confusion . . ." it is evident that the Arbitrator made clear that "these documents should not be considered against him." In my case, the medical documents are clearly and wrongly being "considered against" me, despite my long standing rebuttal of doing that.

    The Arbitrator rejected the employer claims about the alleged attempts at accommodation that had supposedly been made. At 18, the decision stated, "It is clear that the Grievant has not, in fact, been sufficiently accommodated, no matter the extent or good faith of previous Agency efforts in this regard." Attempts do not count! Rules contemplate doing, not attempting. The USACARA Report at 12 made the same point that, regardless of what supposedly was done, it was still true that "Mr. Pletten . . . is caused discomfort by smoke.' "Mr. Pletten has established that . . . smoking does constitute a safety hazard to him," at 7, regardless of what was supposedly done by the installation. The Arbitrator at 20 noted that the protective terms "must be given their broadest meaning and application. To not do so would vitiate the very purpose of the entire non-smoking program." In my case, the installation cites the violations (the endangerment, discomfort, etc.) as the basis for ousting me. The Arbitrator's words at 21 are insightful, "In sum, to accept the Agency's interpretation would open a door to complete abrogation of this policy which would be illogical in the extreme."

    When smokers endanger themselves or others, as the various court cases by and about smokers show, and when the installation condones like behavior, that is granting a "preference or advantage not authorized by law, rule, or regulation" in violation of 5 USC 2302. Endangering self or others (as smokers tend to do) is forbidden under rules such as FPM Suppl. 752-1, 5 USC 7902, AR 1-8, etc. The installation disregard of the 25 Jan 60 Report saying to comply with AR 1-8 has been ignored. My rights under various civil service laws and rules and under Army policy are thus violated; clearly, "irreparable injury should be presumed from the very fact that the statute has been violated." U.S. v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 415 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1969).

    The agency has failed to properly balance the harm to me vs. no demonstrated harm to the agency of having to comply with its own rules. Balancing is critical, and has long been recognized in court, as in, for example, Conway v. O'Brien, 111 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1940). AR 1-8 mandates an "equitable balance" so that nobody will be made sick by smoke, and so that nobody will be endangered, discomforted, or unreasonably annoyed. AR 1-8 not only forbids making nonsmokers sick, it forbids even pre-sick leave results. Preventable harm is to be prevented and courts have long made this clear, as long ago as the case of Heaven v Pender, 11 Q.B.D. 503 (1883).

    The duty is to protect the right to remain at work in safe conditions, as OSHA and 5 USC 7902 provide; cf. 64 Cal. Law Rev 702 (1976). The even more basic right to work (at all) has been recognized in cases such as Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 US 356 (1886), and Truax v. Raich, 239 US 33 (1915).

    Job discrimination violates the "right to work" and is "one of the most deplorable forms of discrimination known to our society, for it deals not with just an individual's sharing in the 'outer benefits' of being an American citizen, but rather the ability to provide decently for one's family in a job or profession for which he qualifies or chooses.' Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 5 Cir., 1970, 421 F.2d 888, 891," says Rowe v General Motors Corp, 457 F2d 348, 354 (CA 5, 1972).

    The FPM recognizes the same concept. See FPM Suppl. 752-1. S5-4c(l)(e),

    "in view of the objective of keeping the employee in an active duty status in his regular position whenever practicable, it is good practice for an agency to use the alternative which most nearly approximates active status or otherwise causes the employee the least possible loss."

    The installation ignores that rule, and refuses to even cooperate in efforts to eliminate the hazard, and resolve the overall situation. The duty is especially clear considering the "irreparable injury" that the installation is causing.

    The installation behavior is clearly arbitrary and capricious in that reasons for its actions of not complying with the rules and the 25 Jan 80 Report are not stated. The fact an employee such as me may react to arbitrary and capricious behavior is foreseeable. It is unacceptable for the installation to focus only on the reaction, and seek to divert attention away from its own role as the cause. The agency reaction is, in causing "irreparable injury" to which a reaction is foreseeable, whimsical, arbitrary, capricious, and evidencing that "no standards govern" which does indeed "cross the line" into misconduct. The alleged "difficulty in formulating remedy" is the result of "too much deliberation" and not enough speed and good faith.

    Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 US 1 (1948), makes clear that "private conduct" such as of smokers harming nonsmokers such as me is not entitled to government protection; yet that is what the installation is doing by subterfuge. It refuses to enforce rules, then criticizes me for doing as trained when a violation becomes apparent. It says go"elsewhere" for assistance, though saying to go "elsewhere" is not a lawful response, Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 US 337 (1938). Also see Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707. cert. denied, 352 US 903 (1956), for other court rejection of going elsewhere, and rejection of protection of "private conduct" from which a minority needed protection.

    Exhibits

    ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT

    I. ALTHOUGH NOT UNLAWFUL PER SE OR IN MOST CIRCUMSTANCES, THE SMOKING OF A CIGAR, WHEN DONE IN VERY CLOSE PROXIMITY TO A PERSON KNOWN BY THE SMOKER TO BE SICKENED THEREBY, AND AFTER A REASONABLE REQUEST TO DESIST, CONSTITUTES ASSAULT AND BATTERY UNDER THE CIVIL LAW OF TORTS, AND ASSAULT UNDER THE CRIMINAL LAW.

    A. Numerous well-documented and authoritative studies, including some by government agencies, have demonstrated that ambient tobacco smoke can create a serious health hazard, and produces impairment of bodily functions, physical irritation, and clearly discernible signs in the majority of healthy nonsmokers.

    a. Affidavit of Luther L. Terry, M.D., former Surgeon General of the United States [unsigned copy attached]

    b. Burns, David M., M.D., Medical Staff Director, The National Clearinghouse on Smoking and Health, "Consequences of Smoking—The Involuntary Smoker"; Aronow, Wilbur S., M.D., "Effects of Passive Smoking on the Cardiovascular and Respiratory Systems"; Epstein, Norman, B.S. , M.D., "The Effects of Tobacco Smoke Pollution on the Eyes of the Non-Smoker" [excerpts of papers attached]

    c. "The Health Consequences of Smoking - 1975," report to Congress prepared by the National Clearinghouse on Smoking and Health, H.E.W.

    B. Several studies have demonstrated that smoke produced by cigars contains far higher concentrations of toxic substances and is far more irritating and hazardous to nonsmokers than ordinary cigarette smoke.

    a. See, generally, attached petition to the C.A.B. and authorities cited therein

    C. Authorities hold that the torts of assault and battery, and the crime of assault, can be committed by intentionally causing harmful fluids including gases to strike another with knowledge of the harm to health caused thereby.

    a. "All that is necessary is that the actor intend to cause the other, directly or indirectly, to come in contact with a foreign substance..." RE 2d TORTS, Comment to #18 Battery

    b. "Bodily harm is any physical impairment of the condition of another's body . . . if the structure or function of any part of the other's body is altered to any extent even though the alteration causes no other harm." RE 2d TORTS, #15 Text and Comment

    c. One acts with the requisite intent if "the actor desires to cause the consequences of his act, or . . . believes that the consequences are substantially certain to result from it." RE 2d TORTS, #8A.

    d. See, generally, Prosser, Law of Torts, p 66 n 37 (1971) (trespass by invisible gases and microscopic particles)

    e. Bishop v. U. S., 349 F2d 220; 121 US App DC 243 (1956) [sulphuric acid]; Tatum v. U.S., 110 F2d 555; 71 App DC 393 (1940) [lye]

    D. A substantial majority of all adults find being near a smoker annoying, and an overwhelming majority—including a majority of smokers—support additional restrictions on smoking in public places.

    -1-



    USACARA in essence overruled the Army Inspector General's do-nothing approach.
    See DAIG's 19 Nov 1979 letter having TACOM investigate itself!
    When overruled, TACOM reacted by crimes including by

  • extortion to force change in anticipated testimony
    in violation of Michigan law MCL § 750.213;
  • ousting me without first filing charges; and
  • cutting off my access to further USACARA review!
    in the EEOC 29 CFR § 1613 system,
    as it allows 'hearings' (cross-examination)
    which TACOM attorneys feared.

    See also prior IGAR's:

    1. Non-compliance with DOD Instruction 6015.18, 10/12/78

    2. Non-compliance When Ventilation is Off, 5/22/79

    3. Non-compliance with FPM Supp. 752-1, 6/4/79

    4. Error in Daily Bulletin on Stationary, 7/31/79

    5. Non-compliance with Courtesy Rule, 9/26/79

    With the IG System Non-functional,
    Try the Safety Reporting System, of AR 385-10.

    Disclosure of Safety Violations on DARCOM Form 2242-R
    each with a cover memo addressed through the chain of command, in the immediately-next-below indicated context.

    TACOM's own Dr. Francis J. Holt admits against interest its bad ventilation system and the resultant Toxic Tobacco Smoke (TTS) universal malice hazard to all employees:

    "mechanical failures happen all the time." (Dep. 25).

    "And there's a hazard for all these other people. Isn't that also true?

    "Yes. Yes.

    "Have you been asked—

    People smoking in their vicinity is hazardous to them." (Dep. 42).

    The universal malice TTS conduct injured my co-worker Evelyn Bertram. She filed a workers' compensation claim, Matter of Bertram, Case A9-190131 (1977). To avoid reprisal, she did not ask halt of the hazard.

    AR 385-10 Report of Tobacco Smoke Hazard, 6/14/79

    AR 385-10 Report to TACOM Safety Office of Violations re Cafeteria No Smoking Areas, 9/12/79

    AR 385-10 Report to TACOM Safety Office, Request for Ban on Smoking When Ventilation is Off, 9/24/79

    AR 385-10 Report to TACOM Safety Office, Request that Tobacco Products be denied Entry onto the Installation per TARCOM-R 190-4 (bans bringing habit forming substances on-post), 11/12/79

    AR 385-10 Report to TACOM Safety Office, Request for Discontinuance of Unhealthful Use of Tobacco Products in Guard Buildings, 12/17/79

    AR 385-10 Report to TACOM Safety Office, Request that an Order be issued Banning Smoking Whenever the Ventilation is Off, 12/18/79

    Request for Enforcement of Smoking-Related Regulations and Criminal laws on Assault, Battery, and Poisoing, Etc. 12/25/79

    AR 385-10 Report to TACOM Safety Office, Request for Enforcement of Cafeteria "No Smoking" Signs, 12/31/79

    AR 385-10 Report to TACOM Safety Office, Third Request for an Order Banning Smoking Whenever the Ventilation is Off, 1/10/80

    AR 385-10 Report to TACOM Safety Office, Request that Dangerous Smokers be treated 1ike Dangerous Alcoholics, 1/11/80

    Request for Compliance With Posted "No Smoking" Sign in Communications Center, 1/14/80

    Fourth Request for an Order Banning Smoking Whenever the Ventilation is Off, 2/5/80

    Urgent, Critical, Life and Death, Priority, Emergency Request that Tobacco Products be Denied Entry onto the Installation per TACOM-R 190-4, 2/8/80

    Request for Elimination of Smoking Violations in Training Rooms, 3/12/80

    Request for Ban on Smoking Per FPM Supplement 532-1, S8-7a, 3/17/80

    Fifth Request for an Order Banning Smoking Whenever the Ventilation is Off, 3/20/80

    Emergency Preventive Measures to Forestall Smoking in My Office, 3/21/80

    Request for Ban on Smoking in PT&FD Xerox Room, 3/21/80

    Emergency Request to End and Investigate PT&FD Failure to Eliminate "Safety Hazard" and Comply with Dr. Holt's Advice for A "Smoke-Free" Environment, 3 /24 /80

    Request for Ban of "Safety Hazard" Now Claimed by Other Offices to be "An Immediate Threat" to Me, 5/21/80 78/6