EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Federal Operations P. O. Box 19848 Washington, D.C. 20036 Leroy J. Pletten Appellant, Docket No. 01 A2 2322 v. Thomas E. White, DA Docket No.: BEAEFO0108BO150 Secretary, Department of the Army, Agency. 18 April 2002 _________________________________/ BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF APPEAL Leroy J. Pletten Appellant TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Discovery of New Evidence 1 Statement of Facts 2 ARGUMENT 2 1. TACOM's Ending My Employment February 1980 Violates Law and Case Law 2 2. There Was No Qualification Requirement Involved/Cited/Published 3 3. The Agency Decision Makes No Subordinate Findings of Fact 5 4. The New Incident, Col. Bishop's Material, Is A Separate One 6 5. Note the Jurisdictional Point 6 6. My Affidavit Is Undisputed 7 7. Please Order Whatever Political Relief Would Have Occurred But For the Agency Misleading the Political Officials 7 8. Please Appoint An Attorney For Me 7 9. Conclusion 7 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Federal Operations P. O. Box 19848 Washington, D.C. 20036 Leroy J. Pletten Appellant, Docket No. 01 A2 2322 v. Thomas E. White, DA Docket No.: BEAEFO0108BO150 Secretary, Department of the Army, Agency. 18 April 2002 ____________________________________/ BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF APPEAL Discovery of New Evidence Note that the agency has now admitted, by its Colonel Edward D. Bishop, after 21 years, that it did not inform me of my right to appeal to EEOC. The significance of not being notified of one’s appeal rights, is this, that I do not know what they are, at the time, in the timely manner needed to act on same. All alleged appeals and litigation that I have done (upon which, rest assured, the agency will fixate) were ‘uninformed’ choices, mere guesses, legally nullities. I deny ever waiving my right to notice and merits review like other federal employees typically receive. Wherefore I deny that any adjudicator or court had merits jurisdiction. Note that Col. Bishop admits the lack of notice of EEOC forum rights. Moreover, EEOC has itself already verified in its 23 February 1982 decision (which TACOM did not appeal), that TACOM had cut me off from access to EEO review by February 1980: “In none of the appeals pending before this Commission did the agency ever consider the merits of appellant's allegations. All of the complaints were rejected for the reasons stated in the Appendix. The record indicates that as early as February, 1980, appellant was denied EEO counseling and prevented from filing further complaints.”–Dockets 01.80.0273, et al., 23 Feb 1982. That decision is res judicata in my favor; the agency failure to appeal, estops it from denying that fundamental finding. Re the removal, I could not make, was not allowed to make, a choice of forum, of which the agency now admits it neither notified me, nor allowed me to have access to. Note that the agency’s own EEO Counselor, Kathy Darius, in her “EEO Counselor Report,” admits against agency interest, that I was “Last employed February 1980 . . . “ The agency is estopped from opposing its own EEO Counselor! There was, the agency must admit, no 5 USC § 7513.(b) notice prior thereto, nor thereafter! As per law and case law, there being no prior notice, that fact “divests the [removal] of legality [so Pletten remains] on the rolls . . . entitled to his pay,” so the agency must reinstate me forthwith, Sullivan v Navy, 720 F2d 1266, 1274 (CA Fed, 1983). Please so order. You of course notice that the agency continues to refuse to address the merits. -1- STATEMENT OF FACTS I am an employee of the Army, its Tank-Automotive Command (TACOM). The agency will foreseeably claim that I am not, that it removed me! But the allegations will not be under oath, nor allowed to be cross-examined, for the simple reason that the agency knows the removal claim to be false, unable to withstand review. [Ed Note: See April-May 1982 cross-examination for examples.] And its decision does not, can not, contradict its Ms. Darius’ report, citing February 1980. The agency can show no 5 USC § 7513.(b) notice prior thereto. TACOM, as the agency knows, has sent me no 5 USC § 7513.(b) notice of charges, no reasons, no identification of misconduct, nor job description duties, performance requirements and standards, unmet or below standards. On the contrary, all appraisals from my supervisor, Jeremiah Kator, were consistently for above-standards work, doing better than colleagues. TACOM nonetheless will foreseeably claim, without specificity, to have made some decision to terminate me. At the time (February 1980) when it ended my employment, ordering me off-premises me, it did not provide me a notice of charges, nor of appeal rights. It has never done so thereafter. Instead, it has regularly denied I have any appeal rights. Pursuant to that view, it has opposed my every effort to secure review like other federal employees receive. The latest incident involved the agency admitting, in my political review effort, that failure to have provided me a notice of charges, and a notice of appeal rights. Col. Bishop admitted the failure to have notified me of appeal rights, but did not take action to correct the deficiency. I had contacted political review, as per advisory of attorneys John Kelly and J. P. Karpinski. The review process was not (as EEOC knows since 23 Feb 1982) occurring for me on merits as others receive. No efforts of mine were succeeding in normal (administrative/judicial) forums to get notice of charges, notice of forum rights, merits review as others receive it. Advice was, contact political officials. The assumption was, the Army would not dare mislead political leaders! And they must be told the truth, so they can take appropriate corrective action, write new laws, conduct hearings, etc. A fired employee not getting merits review in 21 years is that kind of thing. The Army could easily admit its error, and ‘give’ the official something, a correction of same, e.g., ‘yes, oops, we never gave Pletten an advance notice, nor appeal rights, so yes, we are correcting it, reinstating him,’ that sort of thing. ARGUMENT 1. TACOM’s Ending My Employment February 1980 Violates Law and Case Law. TACOM never issued me a "statement or citation of the written regulations . . . said to have been violated [and] a detailed statement of the facts," Boilermakers v Hardeman, 401 US 233, 245; 91 S Ct 609, 617; 28 L Ed 2d 10, 21 (1971). To protect the public by protecting federal employees from unjust, discriminatory termination, Congress requires that the supervisor must state why he/she wants to terminate the worker. Congress put this 30 days advance written notice requirement in 5 USC § 7513.(d). Pursuant to it, the notice must: (a) comply with 5 CFR § 752.404(f) by stating all reasons including ex parte contacts. Sullivan v Navy, 720 F2d 1266, 1273-4 (Fed Cir 1983) [Ed. Note: Benacquista-Decker, OPM-Averhart, Averhart-Hoover, Hoover-Stallings, Braun-AMC]; -2- (b) say more than a conclusion, Mulligan v Andrews, 93 US App DC 375, 377; 211 F2d 28, 30 (1954); (c) enable more than "general denials," Deak v Pace, 88 US App DC 50, 52; 185 F2d 997, 999 (1950); (d) list witnesses and say "the names . . . places . . . dates" of alleged acts, Money v Anderson, 93 US App DC 130, 134; 208 F2d 34, 38 (1953). Examples include being: (i) "lengthy and detailed," Baughman v Green, 97 US App DC 150; 229 F2d 331 (1956); (ii) with "numerous examples of specific errors," Long v Air Force, 683 F2d 301 (CA 9, 1982); and (iii) "item by item," Mandel v Nouse, 509 F2d 1031, 1032 (CA 6) cert den 422 US 1008; 95 S Ct 2630; 45 L Ed 2d 671 (1975). Although the agency issues thirty days advance written notices pursuant to 5 USC § 7513.(b) to others, it never issued one to me. This difference shows discrimination, e.g., retaliation. Recall that I had filed class action cases on behalf of fellow employees, due to the regulatory violations in process at TACOM. Filing reports of violation is an employee job duty, pursuant to Army Reg 685-10.3-5a. - b. Recall from the 23 February 1982 EEOC Decision, Dockets 01.80.0273, et al., that TACOM’s superior, the Army Appellate Review Agency, verified my point in January 1980, whereupon TACOM ended my employment February 1980, as Ms. Darius has now admitted against agency against interest. Removals, suspensions, forced leaves, forced absences pre-disability-retirement, all are banned by 5 USC § 7513.(b), and a long line of case law on point, including the recognition that such forbidden action is done ex parte. Such contacts are banned, Sullivan v Dept of Navy, 720 F2d 1266 (1983). Actions without prior notice are banned, Woodall v FERC, 28 MSPR 192 (1985), Pittman v Army, 832 F2d 598 (1987). Agency violations of its own regulations are banned, Watson v Army, 162 F Supp 755 (1958); Piccone v U.S., 407 F2d 866, 871 (1969); Service v Dulles, 354 US 363 [77 S Ct 1152; 1 L Ed 2d 1403] (1957). [Basinger v OPM, 5 MSPB 210 (1981) says action "cannot be effected if there is a lack of compliance with departmental regulations".] 2. There Was No Qualification Requirement Involved/Cited/Published TACOM will likely say that [it] got rid of me over the “smoking” issue. But no qualification requirement for smoking is in my job description, showing by omission, violating standard civil rights BFOQ concepts. An alleged requirement does not exist that is "not reasonably related to the duties of the position. McDonnell Douglas Corp v Green, 411 US 792; 93 S Ct 1817; 36 L Ed 2d 668 (1973)," cited in Hill v Nettleton, 455 F Supp 514, 519 (1978). In that case, a Ph.D. was not a job requirement, notwithstanding the employer's false claim otherwise. In my case, there is nothing in any job description or BFOQ even mentioning the presence of tobacco smoke in the air, much less as a job requirement, much less, as so essential that failure to meet it, overrides everything, including qualification waivers, my many performance awards, supervisory recognitions, pay increases, etc "Workmen are not employed to smoke," Maloney Tank Mfg Co v Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp, 49 F2d 146 (CA 10, 1931). There is "no necessity to fill the air with tobacco smoke in order to carry on defendant's business," Shimp v N J Bell Telephone Co, 145 NJ Super 516, 523; 368 A2d 408, 411 (1976). -3- Even if the agency were to claim that cigarette smoke is a BFOQ, and even if it were true (it is not), "the job requirements and qualifications had never been formally changed," Sabol v Snyder, 524 F2d 1009, 1011 (1975) . TACOM fears letting an honest investigator or EEOC AJ "examine the position descriptions," look for "legitimate job requirements," Coleman v Darden, 595 F2d 533 (1979), Stalkfleet v U.S. Postal Service, 6 MSPB 536, 541 (1981). Tobacco smoke is not "in the requirements for any position," 5 USC § 2302(b)(6). No such requirement is published pursuant to law, a jurisdictional requirement by law, 5 USC § 552.(a)(1). This law is followed for others, not me. Airborne tobacco smoke only arises from preferences in any case; preferences have no legal standing, Knotts v U.S., 128 Ct Cl 489; 121 F Supp 630 (1954), and Diaz v Pan Am Airways, Inc., 442 F2d 385 (1971) cert den 404 US 950 (1971). Any claim, if TACOM were to make it, that tobacco smoke is a BFOQ “suffers from a further inadequacy in that it failed to comply with 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(b)(3), which requires that criteria used to predict job performance ‘must represent major or critical work behaviors as revealed by careful job analysis.’” Albemarle Paper Co v Moody, 422 US 405, 432 n 30; 95 S Ct 2362; 45 L Ed 280 (1975); U.S. v Chicago, 549 F2d 415, 431 (CA 7, 1970). At 432, “Job-relatedness can only be determined where the criteria for selection are clearly identified.” BFOQ’s must be applied across the board, not just to one person (me, as TACOM had done, i.e., disparate treatment). BFOQ’s must be stated in advance, not fabricated retroactively, i.e., must be pre-listed in hiring and medical forms, tests, be actually required for the job, checked for in background investigations, etc. The process is described in case law, e.g., U.S. v City of Chicago, 549 F2d 415, 429-434 (CA 7, 1977). TACOM knows that there are minimal medical requirements for personnel work, due to the nature of the job, and those few are on the “Health Qualification Placement Form.” Mine were use of fingers, rapid mental and muscular coordination, near and far and color vision, hearing, clear speech, and mental and emotional stability. I meet them all. TACOM's own Dr. Francis Holt certified I met them, and never certified otherwise. EEOC review would reveal such facts in minutes. In Michigan especially, smoking is not a BFOQ. Cigarettes are illegal in Michigan, illegal since 1909, pursuant to Michigan’s law MCL 750.27, MSA 28.216 (which bans cigarettes in Michigan). Far from cigarette smoke being a BFOQ, it is illegal. An EEOC AJ would see that suppressing smoker conduct, even if done "'brusquely,'" is legally valid, Diefenthal v C.A.B., 681 F2d 1039, 1042 (1982); Jacobs v Mich Mental Health Dept, 88 Mich App 503; 276 NW2d 627 (1979); Keyser Canning Co v Klots Throwing Co, 94 W Va 346; 118 SE 521 (1923). TACOM Regulation 190-4 bans drugs from being brought on-post (nicotine is a drug). There is no ‘requirement’, no ‘BFOQ,’ for what is banned! 5 USC § 552.(a)(l)(C) - (D) makes the publication of a qualification requirement “jurisdictional,” Hotch v U.S., 212 F2d 280 (1954); Bowen v City of New York, 476 US 467 [106 S Ct 2022; 90 L Ed 2d 462] (1986). EEOC can take official notice that no federal employee has ever, but me, been accused of having a ‘presence of tobacco smoke’ qualification requirement. Well, TACOM did not say it was a requirement, remember, there was no notice. TACOM just said I fail to meet the requirement! Well, what is it? TACOM denies me the right to reply until it provides notice identifying what it is referring to. Others have had actions taken against them canceled when there was no notice of a qualification requirement or other rule violation by them. Morton v Ruiz, 415 US 199, 231; 94 S Ct 1055, 1072; 39 L Ed 2d 270 (1974); Hotch v U.S., 212 F2d 280, 281 (CA 9, 1954); W. G. Cosby Transfer & Storage Corp v Dept of Army, 480 F2d 498, 503 (CA 4, 1973) (Army has a pattern of law violations); and Onweiler v U.S., 432 F Supp 1226, 1229 (D Idaho, 1977). The agency’s not obeying the law for me, is part of the agency retaliation and disparate treatment against me. Others similarly situated are not so treated. I repeatedly return to duty as per Bevan v N Y St T R System, 74 Misc 2d 443;345 NYS 2d 921 (1973) (the case of an employee also falsely accused of not meeting a non-existent qualification -4- requirement!). Please treat this appeal brief as yet another return to duty on my part. Note that I continue as always to work full-time, doing personnel and crime prevention duties, studying pertinent writings on the subject, prepping self for immediate actual return to duty. New evidence, even on TACOM’s smoking claim, has repeatedly come forth, showing TACOM fraud, misrepresentation (e.g., “smoking” ban ability), warranting reopening had at any step, TACOM allowed an EEO case on merits to be “opened,” Hazel-Atlas Glass Co v Hartford-Empire Co, 322 US 238 (1944). These legal principles are obeyed for others. Of course, here, now, Col. Bishop admits my EEO case was not opened, TACOM had not even notified me of my rights! EEOC can take official notice of the fact that its Detroit Office has never been contacted by TACOM to set up an investigation or hearing, with respect to the “decision to terminate” me, notwithstanding what TACOM may claim to be thousands of requests by me – for such merits review to occur! 3. The Agency Decision Makes No Subordinate Findings of Fact. Agency decisions must make findings on all material issues; reasons must be clearly enunciated; each disregard of its own staff writings must be explained. In re United Corporation, 249 F2d 168 (CA 3, 1957). The agency does not do this. You will agree, there is nothing to rebut Ms. Darius’ showing the decision to terminate my employment in February 1980. As you recall, EEOC’s own Detroit Examiner, Henry Perez, Jr., had confirmed likewise, in his 9 April 1980 letter (Enclosure 1), showing his awareness of the agency “decision to terminate“ me. The agency had debunked his statement! The agency must let you know in the decision the basis for its conclusions; there is to be no speculation; even proper reasons are not to be implied; reject the improper processing (here no hearing nor investigation) due to the unfairness. Great Lakes Screw Corp v N. L. R. B., 409 F2d 375 (CA 7, 1969). The absence of required findings requires reversal, even if there may allegedly or actually be evidence in the record to support proper findings. Anglo-Canadian Shipping Co, Ltd v Federal Maritime Commission, 310 F2d 606 (CA 9, 1962). The Army is not allowed to put you, EEOC, the higher level agency, in the position of speculating as to the basis for the Army conclusion; you must know what it means first. Northeast Airlines, Inc v Civil Aeronautics Board, 331 F2d 579 (CA 1, 1964). Here, the agency’s own assigned Counselor, Kathy Darius, has officially put in the Report, the end of employment data, as of February 1980 – something the agency had denied until now! Note that Ms. Darius is from TACOM’s boss, AMC. TACOM had always feared review if any of its superiors were to examine the data; what TACOM feared, has now come to pass. The AMC impartial review shows the end of my employment to have been February 1980, long prior to any notice TACOM ever even alleged, though not under oath, to have been issued. My affidavit (enclosure 3) stands unrebutted, undisputed, indeed, now corroborated by AMC’s Kathy Darius. Note that her Report is not trying to do me any favors, she is not on my side, but essentially taking an ‘adversary’ position throughout. But she got the key point right, the end of my employment data, she got that right, February 1980. -5- 4. The New Incident, Col. Bishop’s Material, Is A Separate One. The agency may argue this is rehash of the same old thing. Not so. Says EEOC, “Under the applicable EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. Section 1613.215, an agency may only reject those allegations in a complaint which set forth identical matters contained in a previous complaint filed by the same complainant which is pending in the agency or has been decided by the agency. While the same type of discrimination was being alleged by appellant in his complaints, the record shows that the complaints resulted from different incidents several months apart.”--Pletten v Army, Case No. 05820275 (4 March 1983). Please take note of Col. Bishop’s admitting TACOM did not notify me of my review forum rights, as per 29 CFR § 1613.403 and thereafter requirement, and as per constitutional due process requirements. Note that when Col. Bishop was approached as to HIS rights, he refused to sign. Note the prevalence of reprisal against whistleblowers in the federal service, cited by Thomas M. Devine and Donald G. Aplin, "Whistleblower Protection—The Gap Between the Law and Reality," 31 Howard Law Journal (#2) 223-239 (1988). Col. Bishop would rightly fear that his admitting the agency failure to notify me of my rights, could be construed as him ‘whistleblowing.’ He rightly feared retaliation. And note Ms. Darius’ admission against interest, of the date of my employment ending, February 1980 (a date TACOM has never admitted). Please assure that these individuals are protected from reprisal, especially crucial if and when investigation and hearing are conducted. Remember, TACOM Col. John Benacquista had committed felony extortion against me, as he admitted against interest: "All he [Pletten] had to do was to say, 'I agree that this is reasonably free of contaminants.'" (4/23/82 Dep. p. 62)."All" Mr. Pletten "had to do was to" change his anticipated testimony, or be put on enforced leave, fired, retired, have his pay embezzled.. "All he had to do was to" lie, deny the extant hazardous conduct; he'd still be at TACOM. Same is extortion, in violation of Michigan law, MCL 750.213, and case law, People v Atcher, 65 Mich. App. 734 (1975). Remember also, that TACOM was unable to persuade the Michigan Employment Security Commission (MESC) of any misconduct, deficiency, etc., on my part, so it awarded me unemployment compensation. This was done pursuant to MCL § 421.28(1)(c), MSA § 17.530.28(1)(c), which precludes such award if the person is guilty of an employment offense warranting removal! In view of the retaliation against whistleblowers, please order protection for Col. Bishop and Ms. Darius, for their words in my favor. (Though they wrote not favorably to me in other respects, the agency is very savage against even the slightest deviation from the party line.) 5. Note the Jurisdictional Point. TACOM will likely say that got rid of me over the “smoking” issue. But no qualification requirement for smoking is in my job description, showing by omission, violating standard civil rights BFOQ concepts. It could not persuade MESC, in its merits review! EEOC is familiar with BFOQ matters, so [no] need to belabor you with that. But please make sure to note that 5 USC § 552.(a)(l)(C) - (D) makes same “jurisdictional,” Hotch v U.S., 212 F2d 280 (CA 9, 1954); Bowen v City of New York, 476 US 467 (1986). This is significant, as the agency keeps claiming courts had jurisdiction! Not by the law and facts shown here, they didn’t. -6- Also, please take official notice that no federal employee has ever, but me, been accused of having a ‘presence of tobacco smoke’ qualification requirement. Well, TACOM did not say it was a requirement, remember, there was no notice. TACOM just said I fail to meet the requirement! Unspecified! Well, what is it? TACOM denies me the right to reply until it provides notice identifying what it is referring to. There is no jurisdiction, by law, 5 USC § 552.(a)(l)(C) - (D), to act outside the rule of law, published law and regulation. The Office of Personnel Managment (Enclosure 2), the Army itself, all deny that smoking is a ’qualifications’ matter, a ‘BFOQ’ matter. They have published nothing making ‘smoking’ a requirement, so Army in turn can not disqualify me for failing to meet a non-requirement. 6. My Affidavit Is Undisputed. As per Ceja v U.S., 710 F2d 812 (CA Fed, 1983), please accept my affidavit (enclosure 3) as undisputed, indeed, corroborated by Col. Bishop (no notice of EEO rights) and Kathy Darius (employment ending February 1980, with no prior notice having been issued). 7. Please Order Whatever Political Relief Would Have Occurred But For the Agency Misleading the Political Officials. The agency should have honestly admitted, yes, oops, we never gave Pletten an advance notice, nor appeal rights, so yes, we are correcting it, reinstating him, that sort of thing. That is the point of having presidential and congressional oversight of federal agencies. That level cannot do their job, when agencies mislead them. Please take into account what would have happened, had the agency honestly admitted its error. Please order that to occur now. Additionally, at that level, those high officials could have, had they had the truth admitted to them, caused systemic change, to enable EEOC to protect federal workers from such savage abuses as have occurred here, as EEOC does protect private sector workers. They could have passed a law, or caused EEOC regulation change, to do or enable that. 8. Please Appoint An Attorney For Me. The situation has gone on for 22 years. The agency idea, which has succeeded, was to punish me for winning the January 1980 Investigator Report. Punishment was to include destroying family, finances, career. Were the savagery of this agency action to be done to a private sector employee, EEOC would file suit on the employee’s behalf. Please do that in this case. Please change your regulations if need be. 9. Conclusion. Please take note of the above-cited facts, and my affidavit (enclosure 3). Note Col. Bishop’s admission of no notice of appeal rights; and Ms. Darius’ admission against agency interest, of end of employment, February 1980. Note the lack of a prior 5 USC § 7513.(b) notice. Please follow the case law, order remand, or better yet, to bring this matter to an end after 22 years, order the agency to follow the pertinent precedent; an absence of notice “divests the [removal] of legality [so Pletten remains] on the rolls . . . entitled to his pay,” so reinstate me forthwith, Sullivan v Navy, 720 F2d 1266, 1274 (CA Fed, 1983). Respectfully,   /s/Leroy J. Pletten Leroy J. Pletten Appellant Enclosures 1. EEOC’s 9 Apr 1980 Letter, Corroborated by Ms. Darius 2. OPM’s 30 Jan 1984 Qualification Denial Letter 3. Appellant’s Affidavit, 18 April 2002

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION First National Building Suite 600 Detroit Michigan 48226 Telephone 226-7636 April 9, 1980 IN REPLY REFER TO: EEO CLASS COMPLAINT OF Pletten, Leroy Charge No: 054-O8O-X0009 Dear Mr. Pletten: Pursuant to your letter of April 2, 1980, you appear to be somewhat confused as to my present involvement with your complaint. Let me attempt to enlighten you on some procedural matters. On the 7th of March 1980, the agency sent this agency a letter requesting the Complaints Examiner issue a recommended decision on whether to accept, reject or cancel your complaint. Thus, at this point of the proceedings I am not concerned so much with the merits of your complaint as I have been requested to render an opinion on whether you have sufficient standing to act as the agent for the proposed class. You must realize that your mere request to act as class agent will not suffice without a further showing that you comply in all respects with 29 CFR § 1613.601 et seq. Futher be advised that I am not now in a position to interfere with or disrupt the agency's decision to terminate you. Should I find at a subsequent hearing, if and when it is held, that members of your proposed class have been discriminated against, then and only then will I be authorized to recommend corrective action. [Ed. Note: I filed on 'individual case' basis for review, not awaiting the 'class action' process. Agency obstruction of justice, refusing to process same, occurred, and still continues.] Therefore, should you remain sincere [Ed. Note: now that you've been terminated and will have your own reinstatement as your priority] in your decision to pursue a class action complaint, you should familiarize yourself with the applicable law and procedures. Sincerely yours,   Henry Perez, Jr. Henry Perez, Jr. Compakints Examiner HPJ/ca cc: Mr. Kenneth R. Adler EEO Officer Department of the Army U.S. Army-TARCOM Warren, Michigan 48090